TOWNSEND v. BEERS
2:24-cv-01107
W.D. Pa.Apr 21, 2025Check TreatmentDocket
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ANTHONY TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-1107
V. Hon. William S. Stickman IV
STEPHEN BEERS, et al,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Anthony Townsend (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging his rights were violated on July 27, 2024, during a traffic stop of the
vehicle he was driving. (ECF No. 4). Defendant City of Pittsburgh (“City”) filed a motion to
dismiss on October 31, 2024 (ECF No. 13), and the Court ordered Plaintiff to respond by
November 26, 2024. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff failed to respond. On December 3, 2024, the
Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause by January 5, 2025. (ECF No. 22). He failed to do so.
Meanwhile, Defendants Stephen Beers, Andrew Nagy, and Aaron Gray (collectively, “Defendant
Officers”) filed a motion to dismiss on December 17, 2024. (ECF No. 23). The Court ordered
Plaintiff to file his response by February 7, 2025. (ECF No. 25). Plaintiff once again failed to
respond. On February 26, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause by March 24, 2025.
(ECF No. 26). He failed to do so. Consequently, this case will be dismissed with prejudice due
to Plaintiffs failure to prosecute, and the pending motions will be terminated as moot.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal court has the discretion to dismiss a proceeding sua sponte based on a party’s
failure to prosecute the action. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962); Qadr v.
Overmyer, 642 F. App’x 100, 102 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(b) states in pertinent part:
If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a
defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the
dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any
dismissal not under this rule—except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue,
or failure to join a party under Rule 19—operates as an adjudication on the merits.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that “a
district court dismissing a case sua sponte ‘should use caution in doing so because it may not
have acquired knowledge of the facts it needs to make an informed decision.’” Qadr, 641 F.
App’x at 103 (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 2008)). Before engaging in a
sua sponte dismissal, “the court ‘should provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to explain his
reasons for failing to prosecute the case or comply with its orders.’” Jd. (quoting Briscoe, 538
F.3d at 258). Additionally, the Third Circuit has established a six-factor balancing test to guide a
court’s analysis as to whether to dismiss a claim as a sanction:
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to
discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the
attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than
dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphases omitted). In
weighing the Poulis factors, the court must analyze the factors in light of the “strong policy
favoring decisions on the merits.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir.
2019). Although a court must balance the six factors, it need not find that all factors are met
before dismissing an action with prejudice. See Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d
912, 919 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding that “it is not necessary that all of the factors point toward a
default before that sanction will be upheld”); see also Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d
Cir. 1992) (“[N]ot all of the Poulis factors need to be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint”).
I. ANALYSIS
As to the first Poulis factor, the court must consider the extent to which the dilatory party
is personally responsible for the sanctionable conduct. See Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.’
Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873 (3d Cir. 1994) (‘“[I]n determining whether dismissal is
appropriate, we look to whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction
which led to the dismissal.”’). Since the filing of this matter, Plaintiff has ignored multiple orders
of court, and continues to ignore orders to respond to the pending motions to dismiss. Because
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is solely responsible for his own conduct. See, e.g., Colon v.
Karnes, 2012 WL 383666, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2012) (“Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and
thus is responsible for his own actions.”). This factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
The second Poulis factor assesses whether the adverse party has suffered prejudice
because of the dilatory party’s behavior. Relevant concerns include “the irretrievable loss of
evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses’ memories[,| the excessive and possibly
irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party,” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874, and “the
burden imposed by impeding a party’s ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial
strategy,” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003). Although this factor
does not weigh heavily here, the Court notes that Plaintiff's continued inaction frustrates and
delays resolution of this action by preventing a timely resolution of the pending motions to
dismiss.
The third Poulis factor weighs strongly in favor of dismissal. Despite being warned that
failure to comply with orders of court and respond to Defendants’ motions may result in
dismissal for failure to prosecute, Plaintiff has failed to do so. This conduct is sufficient to
establish a history of dilatoriness. See Mack v. United States, 2019 WL 1302626, at *2 (M.D.
Pa. Mar. 21, 2019) (“Mack has established a history of dilatoriness through his failure to notify
the Court of his whereabouts and failure to comply with Court Orders and rules.”).
With respect to the fourth Poulis factor, “[w]illfulness involves intentional or self-serving
behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. While it is difficult to evaluate willfulness on the record
available, there is nothing on the docket to suggest that Plaintiff is not receiving the Court’s
orders. Under such circumstances, the Court must conclude that Plaintiffs failure to respond to
court orders regarding Defendants’ pending motions is intentional, tilting this factor in favor of
dismissal.
The fifth factor address the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. Poulis, 747
F.2d at 869. It is well-established that alternative, monetary sanctions are ineffective when the
Plaintiff is indigent. See Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002). Moreover,
alternative sanctions are unlikely to be effective against Plaintiff, who refuses to adhere to court
orders. Mack, 2019 WL 1302626, at *2 (noting that the Court was “incapable of imposing a
lesser sanction” on a plaintiff who refused to participate in his own lawsuit). As such, this factor
weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
Finally, the Court must consider the potential merit of Plaintiff's claims. A claim will be
deemed meritorious “when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support
recovery by plaintiff.” Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70. The Court finds that Plaintiff's claims
against Defendants are not meritorious.
As to Defendant Officers, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim under § 1983.
To state a cognizable claim under § 1983, a plaintiff is required to adequately allege: (1) the
plaintiff was deprived of a “right or privilege secured by the Constitution or the laws of the
United States” and (2) the plaintiff was deprived of his rights by a person acting under the color
of state law. Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989). Plaintiff
failed to plead facts demonstrating that any of the Defendant Officers lacked probable cause to
arrest, detain, or criminally charge him and/or that any of the officers used excessive force.
Notably, he has failed to set forth sufficient allegations as to the personal involvement of each
officer.
To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must allege facts
establishing that he was arrested without probable cause. See Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71
F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995). “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and
circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to warrant a
reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to be
arrested.” Jd. at 483 (citation omitted). “False arrest and false imprisonment claims will
‘necessarily fail if probable cause existed for any one of the crimes charged against the
arrestee.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Dempsey v. Bucknell
Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 477 (3d Cir. 2016)). Here, Plaintiff was observed committing a traffic
violation, and he failed to bring his vehicle to a stop until he pulled into his own driveway. He
then refused to provide identification and registration, and refused (and resisted) to get out of the
vehicle. (ECF No. 4, p. 2). Under such circumstances, the officers had probable cause to arrest
Plaintiff. Plaintiff admits that he violated two traffic laws — he failed to stop at a red light and he
refused to adhere to the police directive to stop his vehicle. (d.). The existence of probable
cause negates any claim for false arrest or false imprisonment against Defendant Officers.
Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to set forth a viable excessive force claim. “[C]laims that
law enforcement officers have used excessive force ... in the course of an arrest, investigatory
stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its
‘reasonableness’ standard[.]” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); see also Santini v.
Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 417 (3d Cir. 2015) (“In an excessive force case, we determine whether a
constitutional violation has occurred using the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness
test.”). “Courts determine whether the force used is ‘objectively reasonable’ based on the totality
of the circumstances, ... and certain factors, including: ‘the facts and circumstances of each
particular case, ... the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate
threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.’” Klein v. Madison, 374 F. Supp. 3d 389, 407 (BD. Pa.
2019) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 386). All that has been specifically alleged is that
Defendant Beers grabbed Plaintiff's shirt when he attempted to remove the non-compliant
Plaintiff from the vehicle. The officers never deployed a Taser to remove Plaintiff from the
vehicle. Although Plaintiff claims that Beers and Gray both “assaulted” him when placing
Plaintiff in the police vehicle, he has provided no specific factual allegations. The conclusory
allegation of “assault” is insufficient to allege a plausible claim.! Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
' Plaintiff also fails to set forth any factual allegations to support a claim of assault under
Pennsylvania law. Furthermore, the tort of assault requires that the defendant act with the intent
to place the plaintiff in apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive bodily contact and that
the plaintiff actually experience such apprehension. D’Errico v. DeFazio, 763 A.2d 424, 431 n.2
(Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). Police officers are privileged to commit these torts using a
reasonable amount of force when effectuating an arrest. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47
F.3d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TorTS § 118, 132 (1965). It is
662, 678 (2009). Thus, nothing in the facts pled show that Defendant Officers’ alleged use of
force was objectively unreasonable during the attempt to arrest Plaintiff.
Next, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to pursue § 1983 relief under the Fifth
Amendment, he has failed to state claim. Plaintiff cannot recover under the Fifth Amendment
against municipal actors like Defendant Officers. See Huffaker v. Bucks County District
Attorney’s Office, 758 F. Supp. 287, 290 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Nguyen v. U.S. Catholic Conference,
719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1983).
As to the City, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable Monel/ claim against it under §
1983. Where there is no underlying constitutional violation, a Monell claim will not lie against a
municipality.?, Bhatnagar v. Meyer, No. 22-2848, 2023 WL 5378834, at *3 (3d Cir. Aug. 22,
2023) (affirming dismissal of a Monell claim after determining that the plaintiff “had no
remaining cognizable constitutional claim”). Because, as set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for a constitutional violation, any Monell claim against the City of Pittsburgh fails.
It also fails because (1) there is no individual with final policymaking authority named in this
well-established that employees of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania are entitled to sovereign
immunity from common law tort claims so long as they are acting within the scope of their
duties. See PA Const. ART. 1, § 11; 1 Pa. C.S.A. § 2310.
* A municipality or other local government may be liable under § 1983 if it subjects a person to a
deprivation of rights or causes a person to be subjected to such a deprivation. See Monell v.
Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978). Under § 1983, a local
government is responsible only for “their own illegal acts.” Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S.
469, 479 (1986) (citation omitted). Thus, a municipality may be held liable under § 1983 only
when its policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Within
this framework, the Third Circuit has clarified that there are three ways a municipality can be
liable for the torts of its employees. McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367 Gd Cir. 2005).
“First, the municipality will be liable if its employee acted pursuant to a formal government
policy or a standard operating procedure long accepted within the government entity; second,
liability will attach when the individual has policy making authority rendering his or her
behavior an act of official government policy; third, the municipality will be liable if an official
with authority has ratified the unconstitutional actions of a subordinate, rendering such behavior
official for liability purposes.” Jd. (internal citations omitted).
case who could be said to have acted on behalf of the City of Pittsburgh and (2) Plaintiff does not
allege that a policy or custom of the City of Pittsburgh caused a violation of his constitutional
rights. Thus, the claim against the City of Pittsburgh is subject to dismissal with prejudice as
amendment would be futile.
On balance, the Court concludes that five of the six Poulis factors support dismissal.
II. CONCLUSION
While the Court is mindful of the Third Circuit’s strong policy in favor of deciding cases
on the merits, such a resolution is impossible when a Plaintiff declines to meaningfully
participate in his own lawsuit. The Court concludes that the extreme sanction of dismissal is
supported by the Poulis factors and the record. This case will be dismissed with prejudice due to
Plaintiff's failure to prosecute, and the pending motions will be dismissed as moot. Orders of
Court will follow.
BY THE GOURT:
2. UL Woe
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: alo 2+