96 Vt. 413 | Vt. | 1923
This is a petition for mandamus to compel the petitionee to forthwith repair and surface that portion of the highway between its tracks and for a distance of two feet on each side thereof, on certain streets in the village of West Rut-land, all in said town, with a concrete pavement seven inches in thickness; the concrete to be a mixture in strength of one part cement, two parts sand and four parts crushed stone; or by a paved road of equal strength, hardness, imperviability to moisture, and surface,- and for other relief. The respondent alleges in effect:
(1) That the petitioner has a full and adequate remedy at law under the terms of the charter, which provides that upon failure to repair its tracks and the highway or street within or adjacent to the same, as required, the selectmen of the town or trustees of the village on notice may make such repairs as are required, and the town or village, as the case may be, may collect the expense thereof from the company.
(3) That under its charter it is not its duty to reconstruct and rebuild its roadbed and put down new and improved pavement; but that it is its duty, only, to keep in repair the portion of the highway between its tracks and for a distance of two feet each side thereof in as good condition for travel in all respects, as was the adjacent highway at the time the charter was granted; that it is possible and practical, and the petitionee is ready and willing to keep that portion of the roadbed in as good condition for travel as required by the charter without the úse of the same kind of material used by the petitioner in the reconstructing of the adjacent highway as prayed for.
(4) That because of its financial condition the petitionee is unable to make the changes and improvements required by the petitioner without interfering with others equally necessary, and has no means which it can use for that purpose without impairing its service and depriving others of equal rights, so that the order prayed for would be inequitable and unjust and unenforceable; that its charter imposes other equal duties or obligations to the public which would be interrupted.
The Rutland Street Railway was chartered by No. 181 of the Acts of 1882. Section 7 provides, among other things, that, “Said company shall keep the portion of the highway between its tracks, and for a distance of two feet each side thereof, in as good condition for travel in all respects as is the adjacent highway, except that it shall not be obliged to make repairs upon highway bridges; and shall so grade the surface of the street and crosswalks within and adjacent to its tracks, that persons and vehicles can conveniently cross or turn off from the same.” Said section further provides that, ‘ ‘ If said company at any time shall fail to repair its track and the highway or street within or adjacent to the same as above required * * * said selectmen or trustees may make such repairs as are required and the town or village, as the ease may be, may collect the expense thereof from said company.” Section 8 of the charter provides among other
By G. L. 5265, 5266 (No. 86 Acts of 1894, now G. L. Chap. 221) provision is made in respect to persons or corporations proposing to construct a railway and sections or portions thereof in any highway or street in this State obtaining consent of selectmen and trustees. And G. L. 5278 provides that “The provisions of this chapter are hereby made a part of all special acts of incorporation of all street railways heretofore granted; and the provisions of all such acts of incorporation, and of all charters of cities and villages are, so far as the same may be inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, hereby repealed.” And G. L. 5267 provides that, “If such person or corporation fails to agree with the selectmen, aldermen, or trustees upon the location, manner of construction or use of such railway either party may apply to the Public Service Commission.”
This chapter therefore became a part of respondent’s charter, and as such must be construed to include all such subsequent rights, duties and obligations as therein provided for, and to exclude the rights and privilege's granted by its charter inconsistent with said chapter. Burlington v. Traction Co., 70 Vt. 492, 41 Atl. 514.
By No. 218 of the Acts of 1896 the charter of the Rutland Street Railway was again amended granting to it the right to ex
The first question then for our consideration is whether mandamus is a proper remedy, in view of the provisions of the charter that the selectmen or trustees of the village may make such repairs as are required and collect the expense of the petitionee company.
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and is only issued against private corporations to compel the performance of a public duty. It issues only in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, subject always to well-settled principles which have been established by the courts. Where questions of grave importance concerning rights of persons who have had no opportunity to be heard are involved the courts may, although an appropriate remedy, in the exercise of that discretion, refuse the writ. Since the object of madamus is not to supersede legal remedies, but rather to supply the want of these, two prerequisites must exist to warrant its issue: First, it must appear that the relator has a clear legal right to the performance of a particular act or duty at the hands of the respondent; and, second, that the law affords no other adequate or specific remedy to secure the enforcement thereof. Bates v. Keith, 66 Vt. 163, 28 Atl. 865; Sabine v. Rounds, 50 Vt. 74; Cook v. Town of Peacham, 50 Vt. 231; High on Extraordinary Remedies, p. 15; People ex rel. Bacon v. Northern Central Rd. Co., 164 N. Y. 289, 58 N. E. 138.
We must next inquire whether the law has otherwise provided an adequate remedy in the first instance; for, if so, whether the defendant has performed its full duty, or is ready to perform it, must be first determined by that method. In determining this question it will be necessary to inquire into the provisions of the charter and facts disclosed, as well as other legislative enactment, as to the extent of the powers conferred upon the Public Service Commission; for the Commission is an administrative body of limited jurisdiction, and unless, by that body or some other, adequate remedy for the breach of the legal duty complained of is provided, resort to mandamus may be had.
By section 13 of No. 126, Acts of 1906, now G. L. 5045, the Public Service Commission has general supervision of all railroads whether operated by steam or electricity or other power, and of 'all corporations or persons owning or operating the same so far as is necessary for it to perform the duties and exercise the powers conferred upon it. Among other things, it provides that said Commission shall see that all railroads • comply with the provisions of their charters and the laws of this State. By section 23, now G. L. 5050, said Commission is given jurisdiction on due notice to determine, render judgment, make orders and decrees in all matters provided for in the charter of any railroad corporation, or in the statutes of this State relating to rail
Towns have extensive powers and are charged with the duty of maintaining and beeping in repair the highways for public use; but they are not the owners of highways within their limits. City of Montpelier v. McMahon, 85 Vt. 275, 81 Atl. 977. The administrative power of supervision of that portion of the highway which respondent is using and bound to keep in proper condition, as well as the operation of its cars, and maintenance of its tracks, like the regulation of other public utilities, is a part of the police power of the State, and this it has undertaken to delegate to the Public Service Commission. Rutland Ry. Lt. & P. Co., v. Burditt Bros., 94 Vt. 421, 111 Atl. 582; Barre v. Barre & Mont. P. & T. Co., 88 Vt. 304, 92 Atl 237; Town of Bristol v. Palmer, 83 Vt. 54, 74 Atl. 332, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 881; Sabre v. Rut. Ry. Co., supra.
Within the proper limits of the authority conferred upon the Public Service Commission by the Legislature, its jurisdiction is complete and can be reviewed only in the manner provided by statute. Neither will mandamus issue to redress grievances within those limits until the Commission clothed by statute with authority has had an opportunity to exert its administrative function. Otherwise the diverse findings of the Commission might nullify the action of the Court and compel it to overrule itself. Baltimore & Ohio Rd. Co. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 481, 30 Sup. Ct. 164, 54 L. ed. 292; Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, 27 Sup. Ct. 350, 51 L. ed. 553, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075; see Sanborn v. Weir, 95 Vt. 1, 112 Atl.
If the Public Service Commission shall determine that the company has failed or neglected to observe its charter obligations, and conditions exist requiring certain kinds of repairs by the use of certain materials, and the facts warrant, it can make all necessary orders and decrees, and the courts are vested with full power to enforce such orders and decrees.
Want of jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission is not (nor could it well be) claimed in petitioner’s brief, but it is said that the remedy is inadequate, for it is not clothed with judicial power to enforce-its orders. But the mode of procedure may be prescribed through an administrative body.
That the remedy as to matters within its jurisdiction is adequate has already been determined by this Court in George v. Consolidated Lt. Co., 87 Vt. 411, 89 Atl. 635, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 850, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 416, wherein it was held that the question of enforcement of its orders, decisions and judgment by process does not arise, for it is left to the courts to protect and enforce the rights of both. And in that case, the writ of prohibition, said to be a counterpart of mandamus, was dismissed on the ground that it was the right of the Public Service Commission to proceed in the matter. And it is there also held: ‘ ‘ The functions of the Public Service Commission, and its impartial character, considered in connection with the supervisory power of the courts, render it not only eminently fit but unobjectionable on constitutional grounds that it should be entrusted with the determination of the questions which it is authorized to determine by the legislation now under consideration.” Stimets v. Town of Highgate, 81 Vt. 231, 69 Atl. 878. And this is so whether the charter provides a remedy or not, for such remedy would be concurrent merely. Central Vt. Ry. Co. v. State and Town of Hartford, 82 Vt. 145, 72 Atl. 324.
The Public Service Commission having jurisdiction of all matters provided for in the charter of any railroad corporation
It should also be observed that the proviso in Section 23 of No. 126 of Acts of 1906, now G-. L. 5050, that “nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting special provisions of the law relating to anything herein contained,” has not been overlooked. Under this proviso it was held in Barre v. Barre & Mont. P. & T. Co., supra, that the franchise of the company having been granted prior thereto, together with its accepted terms and conditions, became a special provision of law, and as such was not affected by the provisions of that section. Unlike the case at bar the location was obtained by an agreement with the city of Barre, fixing the toll rate for fares and transfers, and this agreement was held lawful. This was the special provision of law referred to, from which the company could not release itself. An injunction was asked against fixing an unlawful rate in violation of a contract, which was threatened, and which the Commission had no power to prevent or permit. The special provisions of law referred to in the proviso, relate solely to the jurisdiction of the Board, which is the sole subject of the section, and there appears to be no special provision of law in any way in conflict with the jurisdiction of the Board over the matters herein involved. Central Vt. Ry. Co. v. State and Town of Hartford, 82 Vt. 145, 72 Atl. 324. In view of the foregoing holdings further consideration of the questions raised is unnecessary.
Petition disnvissed with costs.
Upon handing down the foregoing opinion the petitioner had leave to file a motion for reargnment, pending which the entry of judgment is withheld.
The brief filed in support of the motion is mainly, as it expressly states, an argument of the motion, and to that'extent is not such a brief as serves any good purpose. We took occasion in Ryan v. Orient Ins. Co., 96 Vt. 291, 119 Atl. 423, and McAllister v. Benjamin, 96 Vt. 475, 121 Atl. 263, decided at the May Term, to point out the proper function of the brief in support of such a motion. As said in the Ryan Case, leave to file such a brief does not open the door to argument of the grounds of the motion, for such a practice would turn a motion for opportunity to reargue into re-argument itself.
Such grounds of the motion as are available (as to which see Ryan v. Orient Ins. Co., supra, and the cases there collected) challenge the correctness of the opinion in respect to two matters^for separate consideration. In various ways the claim is made that G-. L. 5267, referred to in the opinion, has no application. In this respect the motion is framed upon the mistaken theory that the decision is affected by this section of the statutes. It is at once apparent that the jurisdiction there conferred upon the Public Service Commission has no reference to the matters here involved, and all that is said respecting that and other sections of the same chapter could be omitted from the opinion without affecting the result. The only purpose of the reference to those sections was to call attention to the fact that certain provisions of the defendants’ charter had been amended by what is now Chapter 221 of thg-General Laws and to show the course of legislation and policy of the Legislature with respect to similar, though disconnected, matters relating to street railways. The jurisdiction involved here is plainly conferred by other sections of the statutes, which are made the basis of the decision. Properly understood the opinion does not refer to G. L. 5267 as conferring upon the Commission authority to deal with the questions presented in-the instant case. No more need be said in disposing of the pertinent grounds of the motion, some seventeen in number.
One ground of the motion seeks a specific holding whether the Commission would have authority to modify or re
No occasion for a reargument of the case is shown.
Motion overruled.