26 Conn. 578 | Conn. | 1857
It appears that in 1807 there was abridge, 150 feet long, spanning the Willimantie river, between the towns of Tolland and Willington. It had ever been the practice, as it was the duty, of these towns, to build and maintain this bridge at their joint and equal expense, as the statute directs where a river or stream is the dividing line between two towns. The bridge standing in 1807 was carried off by high water in 1818, and the towns, concluding that it would be best to reduce this space of 150 feet by filling a part of it with abutments of earth, gravel and stone, in order that the bridge or structure might be more permanent, very much reduced the open space, and built a bridge of wood, which latter was replaced by the towns in 1835, when the space was still more reduced by further extending the abutments into the river, until the distance between the abutments was reduced to about sixty-five feet.
The neglect which has given rise to the damages and suit in question was an omission to place a proper railing on the north or upper side of the solid part of the work on the Tolland' side of the river, but within the original space of 150 feet. The language of the motion is, “ all of the aforesaid bridges and abutments were made and have been maintained by said towns, at their joint and equal expense.”
An injury having been sustained and damages being claimed by William S. Moore and William W. Moore, and a suit brought by William S. Moore against the towns jointly, and the persons injured being willing to compromise for $275, the towns agreed with each other that if Tolland would, in the first instance, pay the said Moores the $275, Willington would repay Tolland the one-half, provided Willington was by law equally liable with Tolland for said damages. The plaintiffs have paid the sum named to the Moores and the latter have released their claims.
There being no dispute as to the facts of the settlement
Much stress has been laid on the insufficiency in law of the facts specifically found by the judge, to sustain his conclusion that it was the duty of the towns to maintain the abutment and railing at their joint expense. We have already said that the judge’s motion does not present such a question; but further, no such error is assigned. The assignment of the first error is in these words:—“ That judgment should have been rendered for the defendants instead of the plaintiffs.” What is the error ? Is it in the declaration, the pleadings, the reception of evidence, or in something else ? We can not tell. Were the declaration insufficient, perhaps a general assignment would answer; for the meaning of such an assignment is this: that if the facts, each and all of them, are taken as stated by the plaintiff' in his declaration, still he is not entitled to judgment. But this
Allowing, however, that we can notice that, from the facts recited in the motion, (assuming them to be all the facts,) the judge has drawn an inference that Willington is jointly bound with Tolland to maintain this railing, we are not satisfied that he has therein committed an error, for it may be that this abutment is part of the bridge. We can not say, as matter of law, how this is. We can not decide, as matter of law, what is bridge or what is abutment,—where one begins and the other ends, or what is mere highway. It is more a question of fact than of law, and may be sometimes a very nice and difficult one. If a bridge is considered to be a pathway for traveling over a stream of water, or if the work of a bridge includes whatever is necessary to make it accessible, as we think is intended by the statute respecting bridges, when it requires towns to maintain necessary bridges, the abutments may be parts of a bridge. At any rate, these towns have so treated this structure, whether of earth, wood, or stone, which occupies this space of 150 feet. At first it was all wood; it may become so again, for the stream is unchanged, except that the abutments confine it to a narrower and deeper channel. The towns could well agree to fill out the work in a permanent form from the shores, if they thought it wise and best. Parker v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 3 Cush., 107. 1 Whart. Lexicon, 114. Ang. on High., 27.
We may learn something from analogous cases. If a town, or two towns whose division line is a river, neglect to build a necessary bridge, the public authorities may build it and charge the expense to the town or towns as the case may be. May not these public agents build abutments, such as are indispensable to make the bridge accessible and useful? Rev. Stat., tit. 24, § 3. So where turnpike companies are obliged to build bridges in old highways, the com
We do not attach much importance to a mere scientific definition of the word bridge, especially in this case, the parties having adopted their own construction of their duty, and acted upon it for a half century. But Brande’s Encyclopedia defines it, “ a structure for the purpose of connecting the opposite banks of a river, by means of certain materials, forming a road way from one side to the other.”
In Bardwell v. Jamaica, 15 Verm., 438, the court decided that “abutment,” by description in pleading, comes within the word “ bridge.” The same was held in Board of Freeholders v. Strader, 3 Har., 108. In The King v. The West Riding in York, 7 East., 596, it was held, that the county being obliged to support bridges as distinct from the highways, was obliged to support the abutments extending 300 feet back from the bridge structure, at each end,—this being required by the statute of Henry VIII., which was held to be in affirmance of the common law. Lord Ellenborough said that he considered it to have been laid down long ago by Lord Coke, that the 300 feet of highway at the ends of the bridge are to be taken as parts of the bridge itself, being in the nature of the thing intimately connected with it, and the exact limits difficult in some cases to be ascertained, from the continuation of arches beyond the sides of the river; that the statute of Henry VIII. was intended to define the limit which was perhaps uncertain at common law, but that the statute proceeds upon the presumption that there existed a common law liability, &c. The same was held in the House of Lords. Inhabitants of West Riding in Yorkshire v. Buckley, 5 Taunt., 284, See also 4 Petersdorf’s Ab., 708. An arbitrary rule of 300 feet might not, and we think would not, be proper in this country, but it shows that the question, what constitutes exactly a bridge within the meaning of our statute, is not of course a question of law.
It is again contended that when the bridge was in part made solid, and the solid part extended from time to time, so much of it ceased to be bridge and became abutment or
It was said that the selectmen could not bind their respective towns by their action, for it was out of their jurisdiction. The towns could bind themselves through their selectmen, andthis is all that was necessary. A clear vote of the towns would not be more efficacious to that end.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Judgment affirmed.