This is а bill in equity filed June 25, 1956, by the town against the administratrix of the estate of one Chadwick and against all persons interested in his estаte to enforce a hen (for old age assistance furnished to Chadwick) against real estate in Tisbury owned by him at his deаth on May 20, 1953, and also on January 23, 1952, when a certificate of lien under G. L. c. 118A, § 4 (as amended through St. 1951, c. 801, § 4),
1
was recorded in the rеgistry of deeds. Upon Chadwick’s application, the town granted to him old age assistance in the amount of $1,638.50. After Chadwiсk’s death, real estate taxes accrued in the sum of $587.42, and the real estate depreciated in value. The facts, except the value of the real estate, have been agreed. The judge found this value to be not less than $2,500 at the date of his finding (June 20, 1957) and somewhat more at the date of Chadwick’s death. A final decree was entered (1) deсlaring that the defendants were indebted to the town for $1,638.50 for old age assistance and for $620.68 for taxes and interest; (2) ordering the real estate sold at public auction; and (3) directing distribution of the proceeds in the following manner. From the рroceeds, the sum of $1,500 (the amount mentioned in § 4; see footnote 1,
supra)
was to be set aside.
1. Section 4, as amended in 1951,
2
has not been construed by this court in the respects here relevant. Cf.
Weaver
v.
New Bedford,
2. The town is not barred by loches in enforcing its lien.
Sears
v.
Treasurer & Receiver Gen.
4. The defendants contend that § 4 as amended in 1951 is unconstitutional, even though it operated only prospectively.
3
They have advanced no reason which leads us to doubt thаt the Commonwealth may provide that old age assistance shall be furnished to persons applying for it under reasonable, nondiscriminatory terms and conditions calling for reimbursement from available resources of the recipiеnt or his estate. Chadwick accepted assistance after the effective date of the 1951 amendment. Therе is nothing inequitable or unreasonable in holding him, and those claiming under him, to be bound by the provisions of the amendment relating to reimbursement. See
Boston
v.
McCafferty,
Decree affirmed.
Notes
Section 4 (which by St. 1951, c. 801, § 7, became effective in its amended form as of January 1, 1952) as so amended reads in part as follows: “The ownership ... of an interest in rеal estate by an applicant . . . shall not disqualify him from receiving [old age] assistance . . . provided, however, that the town shall take a lien on such property as a condition of granting old age assistance .... The town shall plaсe on record in the proper registry of deeds ... an instrument . . . creating a lien upon such real estate for the amount of assistance paid by it, including amounts paid subsequently to the recording of the lien, which lien shall be prior to any liеn thereafter recorded .... Such lien shall be enforceable by a bill in equity .... It shall be the duty of the board of public welfare of the town to take action upon the death of the recipient ... to enforce any such lien .... No lien shall he enforced under this seсtion when the combined value of the recipient’s interest in real estate at the time of his decease, based on fair market value, together with the amount of cash surrender value in life insurance exempted under section five, amounts in the aggregate to fifteen hundred dollars or less. When said aggregate value of real estate and cash surrender value in life insurance еxceeds fifteen hundred dollars, the amount in excess of fifteen hundred dollars shall be recoverable under the lien, but in nо event shall said recovery exceed the total amount of assistance paid . . .” (emphasis supplied).
Section 4 has been further amended in respects not here relevant. St. 1956, c. 637; St. 1957, c. 304.
Dartmouth
v.
Paull,
See St. 1951, c. 801, § 4A.
