201 Conn. 577 | Conn. | 1986
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court confirming an arbitration award and concomitantly denying an application to vacate the award. The plaintiff, the town of Stratford, attacks on constitutional and public policy grounds the validity of a provision in its collective bargaining agreement with the named defendant, Local 134, International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers, under which the municipality must provide all members of the bargaining unit with hypertension or heart disease benefits mandated for municipal fire or police personnel under General Statutes § 7-433c. The plaintiff asserts additionally that the trial court erred in denying its application to vacate the arbitration award because the failure of the arbitration panel to address the constitutional and policy issues rendered the award not “mutual, final and definite,” as required by General Statutes § 52-418. We conclude that neither the challenged bargaining agreement provision nor the contested award violates public policy or any provision of our state constitution.
The parties stipulated to the facts. The defendant Warren Johns began working for the plaintiff in the public works department in 1971. At that time Johns passed a physical examination, indicating that he was then free from heart disease. In the years 1975 through
The Superior Court, Gerety, J., granted the defendants’ application to confirm the arbitration award and denied the plaintiff’s opposing application to vacate, which had been filed pursuant to General Statutes §§ 52-417 and 52-418 respectively.
We first reject the plaintiffs contention that because the arbitrators refused to consider the constitutional issue their award was not mutual, final and definite, and, therefore, ought to have been vacated pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418 (d). We conclude, nevertheless, that the factors enumerated in § 52-418, each of which, if found, would require that an arbitration award be vacated, are not exhaustive and consequently do not in all instances limit the scope of judicial review of such awards.
A
It is axiomatic in this jurisdiction that, when an award is challenged pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418 (d) on the ground that the arbitrators exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award was not made, the reviewing court is properly limited to a comparison of the award with the submission. E.g., Bruno v. Department of Consumer Protection, 190 Conn. 14, 18, 458 A.2d 685 (1983); Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 23, 453 A.2d 1158 (1983); Trumbull v. Trumbull Police Local 1745, 1 Conn. App. 207, 212, 470 A.2d 1219 (1984). The award will not be vacated under § 52-418 (d) if it conforms to the submission, and the award need contain no more than the actual decision of the arbitrators. Ramos Iron Works, Inc. v. Franklin Construction Co., 174 Conn. 583, 589, 392 A.2d 461 (1978).
B
The plaintiff contends that it was reversible error for the trial court to deny the plaintiff an opportunity to litigate the constitutional and public policy aspects of the contract provision underlying the arbitrators’ award. Our response is that the trial court, however succinctly, did address and dispose of those issues.
Arbitration in the present case was a creature of the parties’ agreement and not mandated by legislative enactment. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons for considering the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional and policy claims. Our concern is not with whether the arbitrators have properly construed the collective bargaining agreement, but only with whether the agreement, and, a fortiori, the arbitration award itself, is capable of being enforced. See Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, 179 Conn. 184, 196 n.6, 425 A.2d 1247 (1979). “ ‘Just as private parties cannot expect a court to enforce a contract between them to engage in conduct which is illegal or otherwise contrary to public policy, they cannot expect an intervening arbitral award approving (or ordering) that conduct to receive judicial endorsement.’ Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unionization and Collective Bargaining (1976) p. 593.” Board of Trustees v. Federation of Technical College Teachers, supra, 195. Furthermore, when an arbitration panel declines to hear constitutional claims on the basis of this court’s
In the present case the plaintiff did raise its constitutional and policy claims in its brief before the state board of mediation and arbitration. The defendants responded in their brief that our holding in Caldor, Inc., precluded arbitral consideration of those claims. The parties may have felt that it would have been futile formally to submit such issues to the arbitration panel, because this court in Caldor, Inc., had upheld the panel’s refusal to consider a constitutional question clearly included within the unrestricted submission. In any event, the arbitrators in the present case agreed that policy matters as well as constitutional issues were not within their jurisdiction. Because the parties’ submission did not include such matters, we need not determine whether the panel correctly construed our decision in Caldor, Inc., which removed issues concerning the constitutional validity of a statute from the arbitration sphere, to apply also to issues involving public policy as expressed in common law or statute. We conclude, however, that the parties in this case have not waived their right to challenge article XII, § 3, of the collective bargaining agreement on constitutional and policy grounds, and that judicial review in such a circumstance extends beyond the parameters of General Statutes § 52-418.
We proceed to review the merits of the plaintiff’s constitutional and policy claims. The plaintiff contends that article XII, § 3, of the collective bargaining agreement (1) creates a class preference in violation of article first, § 1, of our state constitution, which provides in part that “no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community,” and (2) grants a special bonus to public works employees such as the defendant Johns in contravention of public policy. We reject both of these contentions.
A
Article first, § 1, of the constitution of Connecticut “prohibits the adoption of legislation that has no public purpose but operates to confer private gain on an individual or group. Tough v. Ives, 162 Conn. 274, 292-93, 294 A.2d 67 (1972); Lyman v. Adorno, 133 Conn. 511, 515-16, 52 A.2d 702 (1947). Where, however, the statute does serve a public purpose, the legislature may constitutionally differentiate between classes of persons, so long as the legislative classification bears a rational relationship to the public purpose sought to be served. Caldor’s, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc., 177 Conn. 304, 315, 417 A.2d 343 (1979); Tough v. Ives, supra; State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Commission, 139 Conn. 102, 106, 90 A.2d 862 (1952).” Beccia v. Waterbury, 192 Conn. 127, 134, 470 A.2d 1202 (1984).
In Grover v. Manchester, 168 Conn. 84, 357 A.2d 922, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805, 96 S. Ct. 14, 46 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975), this court upheld the constitutional validity of General Statutes § 7-433c, the statute incorporated into the contract provision at issue in the present case. We said that § 7-433c does not create a class preference in violation of § 1 of article first of our state con
In Grover v. Manchester, supra, 88, we termed the benefits conferred by § 7-433c “special compensation.” As such, they are indubitably an appropriate subject of collective bargaining between a municipal employer and a designated employee organization. Under § 7-469 of the General Statutes, such parties have a duty to
In Inland Steel Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960, 69 S. Ct. 887, 93 L. Ed. 1112 (1949), the court construed the terms “wages” and “other conditions of employment,” as found in then § 9 (a) of the National Labor Relations Act. The court agreed with the National Labor Relations Board that “the benefits accruing to an employee by reason of a retirement or pension plan are encompassed in both categories,” that the term “wages” “must be construed to include emoluments of value, like pension and insurance benefits, which may accrue to employees out of their employment relationship,” and that “[realistically viewed, this type of wage enhancement or increase, no less than any other, becomes an integral part of the entire wage structure . . . .” Id., 250-51.
We conclude that the “special compensation” represented by the hypertension and heart disease benefits presently at issue is certainly within the realm of acceptable, if not mandatory, bargaining subjects. Fur
B
Finally, the plaintiff contends that the contract provision it challenges grants a special bonus to public works employees in contravention of public policy. The plaintiff’s policy claim can be disposed of largely on the basis of what has already been said. Although the plaintiff contends that the arbitrators “exceeded their powers” in violation of § 52-418 (d) by rendering a decision that contravenes public policy, we reject this as the basis of our review, noting, once again, that the arbitration award conformed to the parties’ submission. We proceed to review the policy claim on grounds independent of § 52-418.
As is the case with respect to contracts generally, the judiciary’s power to enforce the terms of a collective bargaining agreement is at all times exercised subject to the restrictions and limitations of public policy as manifested in constitutions, statutes and applicable legal precedents. See generally Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35, 68 S. Ct. 847, 92 L. Ed. 1187 (1948); Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 64-68, 65 S. Ct. 442, 89 L. Ed. 744 (1945); Avco Corporation v.
We have made it clear today that article XII, § 3, of the collective bargaining agreement does not violate the equal protection policy against the governmental creation of class preferences underlying article first, § 1, of our state constitution. We now add that § 7-433c, which recites that one of the purposes for its enactment was to “act as an inducement in attracting and securing persons” for employment in police and fire departments nowhere indicates that the benefits it mandates shall not be available by consent of the parties to other municipal employees. We conclude that the purpose of § 7-433c is not to remove these benefits from the realm of arms length collective bargaining, but merely to ensure that they are provided for members of police and fire departments, even where their municipal employers object. Therefore, § 7-433c does not manifest a policy limitation that would render the challenged contract provision unenforceable. Nor do we find any such limitation in our case law.
Finally, we agree with the defendants that the most compelling policy considerations relevant to the present case weigh in favor of untrammeled bargaining over contract terms. “In the federal sector it has been said that the purpose of the NLRA is to seek the peaceful adjustment of labor-management disputes as a substitute for industrial strife and the promotion of industrial stabilization through the collective bargaining
There is no error.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
Article XII, § 3, provides: “PENSIONS .... Effective April 1,1974, the Municipality shall provide all members of the bargaining unit with the hypertension or heart disease benefits mandated for municipal fire and police personnel under 1971 P.A. 524 under the same terms and conditions as set forth in said Public Act; provided, however, that any new employee hired on or after November 1, 1978, shall not be eligible for hypertension or heart disease benefits.”
Because Johns was over forty-five years old when he began working for the plaintiff, he was ineligible to participate in the town’s ordinary retirement plan. See Stratford Town Code, “Retirement Plan for Employees of the Town of Stratford,” § 2, as amended by Appendix D.
General Statutes § 7-433c provides: “benefits FOR POLICEMEN OR FIREMEN DISABLED OR DEAD AS A RESULT OF HYPERTENSION OR HEART DISEASE. In recognition of the peculiar problems of uniformed members of paid fire departments and regular members of paid police departments, and in recognition of the unusual risks attendant upon these occupations, including an unusual high degree of susceptibility to heart disease and hypertension, and in recognition that the enactment of a statute which protects such fire department and police department members against economic loss resulting from disability or death caused by hypertension or heart disease would act as an inducement in attracting and securing persons for such employment, and in recognition that the public interest and welfare will be promoted by providing such protection for such fire department and police department members, municipal employers shall provide compensation as follows: Notwithstanding any provision of chapter 568 or any other general statute, charter, special act or ordinance to the contrary, in the event a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department or a regular mem- ’ ber of a paid municipal police department who successfully passed a physical examination on entry into such service, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of hypertension or heart disease, suffers either off duty or on duty any condition or impairment of health caused by hypertension or heart disease resulting in his death or his temporary or permanent, total
Although Johns did not show that he had contracted heart disease as a result of his employment, § 7-433c does not impose such a condition precedent on claimants.
Article XVI of the collective bargaining agreement provides in pertinent part: “Section 1. For the purpose of this Agreement, a ‘Grievance’ is defined as any dispute between the Municipality and the Association, or between the Municipality and any employee group of employees concerning the interpretation, application [or] violation of the provisions of
The panel made the following award: “The Town of Stratford did violate Section 3 of Article XII by refusing to pay the grievant, Warren Johns, compensation in the same amount and in the same manner as that provided under Chapter 568 in accordance with the provisions of Section 7-433c of the Connecticut General Statutes. The Town shall forthwith make said payments to the grievant. There is no award of interest or attorneys’ fees rendered at this time; however, the Board of Mediation and Arbitration shall retain jurisdiction of this case and in the event the case is returned for other reasons, the matter of interest and attorneys’ fees may be considered at that time.”
General Statutes § 52-417 provides: “application for order confirming award. At any time within one year after an award has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration notified thereof, any party to the arbitration may make application to the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, to any judge thereof, for an order confirming the award. The court or judge shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419.”
General Statutes (Rev. to 1982) § 52-418 provides: “vacating award. (a) Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a contro
“(b) If an award is vacated and the time within which the award is required to be rendered has not expired, the court or judge may direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.”
The submitted issue read: “Did the Town of Stratford violate Article XII, Section 3, by refusing to pay the grievant, Warren Johns, compensation in the same amount and in the same manner as that provided under Chapter 568 in accordance with the provisions of Section 7-433e of the Connecticut General Statutes? If so, what shall be the remedy?”
Article first, § 1, of our state constitution provides: “All men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.”
The plaintiff also asserts that the contested provision violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution. This court has repeatedly stated that, in addition to article first, § 20; see Laurel, Inc. v. Commissioner of Transportation, 173 Conn. 220, 223 n.l, 377 A.2d 296 (1977); article first, § 1, of our constitution has a meaning equivalent to that of the clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution that prohibits the states from denying to any person the equal protection of the laws. E.g., Leech v. Veterans’ Bonus Divi
In its memorandum of decision the trial court stated that although considerations of “peculiar occupational hazard and the promotion of public safety,” which are set forth in General Statutes § 7-433c and which enabled that statute to withstand constitutional attack; Grover v. Manchester, 168 Conn. 84, 88, 357 A.2d 922, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 805, 96 S. Ct. 14, 46 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1975); seem lacking in the present case, the benefits claimed “are not statutory but contractual, agreed upon by the parties in arms length bargaining.” Therefore, said the court, “there is no creation of any class by the government and no grant of exclusive public emoluments or privileges.”
In Caldor, Inc. v. Thornton, 191 Conn. 336, 344, 464 A.2d 785 (1983), aff’d, Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 105 S. Ct. 2914, 86 L. Ed. 2d 557 (1985), this court held that the state board of mediation and arbitration, as an administrative agency, has not been granted the authority to consider constitutional issues. That we “reserve[d] for another day the extent to which an arbitrator may have authority to determine constitutional questions . . . which do not attack a statute as being unconstitutional on its face”; id., 345 n.6; does not compel us to find a waiver-in the present case.
In Grover v. Manchester, 168 Conn. 84, 88, 357 A.2d 922 (1975), we also rejected the contention that the financial obligation that § 7-433c imposes on towns deprives towns of property without due process of law. We said that § 7-433c is free from the infirmity of a predecessor statute, General Statutes § 7-433a, which we declared unconstitutional in Ducharme v. Putnam, 161 Conn. 135, 285 A.2d 318 (1971), because it raised a conclusive presumption that hypertension or heart disease suffered by a fire department or police department employee whose physical examination on entry into the service had failed to reveal any evidence of such an impairment was a personal injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. We note that a 1974 amendment to the Stratford Town Code, “Retirement Plan for Employees of the Town of Stratford,” § 3 (2), which provides in part that “[i]n the case of firemen and policemen and all members of the Pension Plan, disablement due to hypertension or heart disease shall be conclusively presumed to be disability incurred in the line of duty,” is not at issue today. There is no claim of a necessary link between this amendment and article XII, § 3, of the collective bargaining agreement.