48 Conn. App. 849 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1998
Lead Opinion
Opinion
The defendant, the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998 (union), appeals from the judgment of the trial court vacating an arbitration award. The principal issue in this appeal
The following facts are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. The plaintiff, town of Stratford, and the union at all relevant times were parties to a collective bargaining agreement (agreement) that contained an arbitration clause. Under the arbitration clause, the parties agreed to submit unresolved grievances to the state board of mediation and arbitration (board). The parties further agreed that an arbitration decision by the board would be final.
On December 12, 1991, the date on which the grievances involved in this appeal were filed, article I of the agreement provided that “the positions of assistant fire prevention chief, assistant fire chief, deputy fire chief and chief are not members of the union bargaining unit.” Section one of article XXII of the agreement, however, provided that " all promotions in the Fire Department shall be made from eligibility lists for each promotional classification, which lists shall be established through competitive merit examinations . . . .” (Emphasis in original.) The agreement also provided that when a vacancy occurred, it was to be filled by one of the three highest ranking candidates and that subsequent appointments were to be generated in the order of standing on the list. Moreover, the agreement provided that when an eligibility list expired, a new list had to be established within ninety days.
In 1991, the eligibility lists for the positions of assistant fire chief and lieutenant in the fire prevention
On December 12, 1991, the union also filed grievance no. 91-03, which was submitted to the board to determine if it was arbitrable. As did grievance no. 91-04, which was filed on the same day, no. 91-03 alleged that the town had violated article XXII, § 1, of the agreement. This grievance concerned the following events, which had occurred earlier in 1991. In April, 1991, the town administered a promotional examination for the position of assistant fire chief in the fire suppression division. On May 30, 1991, the results of the examination were posted and a list was established with eight individuals, ranked one through eight, with the candidate receiving the highest score ranked as number one. On or about June 3, 1991, the town interviewed the first three candidates on the eligibility list for a vacancy for the position of assistant fire chief in the fire suppression division. This vacancy was filled by the candidate who was ranked first. On or about December 11, 1991, the town interviewed the candidates ranked two through four for the assistant fire chief position, and the town selected the third ranked candidate over the second ranked candidate. On or about January 4, 1993, the town interviewed the remaining candidates for the assistant fire chief position for two additional vacancies in the fire suppression division. The town again selected lower ranked candidates over individuals with higher ranks. The union’s ground for grievance no. 91-03 was that the town had failed to promote employees on the
On December 28, 1993, a panel of arbitrators of the board issued an award in grievance no. 91-04, holding that article XXII of the agreement did not apply. The board found that the grievance was not arbitrable because the promotions clause of the agreement did not apply to promotions to jobs outside of the bargaining unit, including promotions to the position of assistant fire prevention chief. A unanimous panel rejected the union’s contention that the parties had agreed orally in the 1987 negotiations to continue to apply article XXII to the assistant fire chief position.
On March 17, 1994, a different panel of arbitrators issued an award holding that grievance no. 91-03 was arbitrable, which was inconsistent with the earlier decision. This second panel also decided that the issue to be decided was whether article XXII applies to employee promotions to the assistant fire chief position. The subject matter of this grievance thereafter proceeded on the merits before a third panel of arbitrators.
On May 25, 1995, the third panel of arbitrators addressed the merits of no. 91-03 and issued an award holding that article XXII, § 1, did apply to promotions to the position of assistant fire chief and that the town had violated this provision. The two panels of arbitrators deciding aspects of grievance no. 91-03, therefore, reached conclusions on the issue of arbitrability that were at odds with the prior arbitration award, namely, that article XXII applies to promotions to the assistant fire chief position.
On February 22, 1996, the town filed an application to vacate the May 25, 1995 arbitration award in grievance no. 91-03 pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418
The union claims that the trial court improperly vacated the award in case no. 91-03 on two grounds.
“At the outset, we note that as a reviewing court we afford great deference to arbitrators’ decisions . . . .” Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1336, 28 Conn. App. 337, 341, 610 A.2d 1324 (1992), citing Board of Education v. AFSCME, 195 Conn. 266, 270, 487 A.2d 553 (1985), and Board of Education v. Hartford Federation of School Secretaries, 26 Conn. App. 351, 352, 600 A.2d 1053 (1992). The
In the present case, the parties concede that both of the awards, the “first grievance decided” and the “second grievance decided,” arose out of unrestricted submissions. Even though both grievances were
“In spite of the general rule that challenges to an arbitrator’s authority are limited to a comparison of the award to the submission, an additional challenge exists . . . when the award rendered is claimed to be in contravention of public policy. . . . This challenge is premised on the fact that the parties cannot expect an arbitration award approving conduct which is illegal or contrary to public policy to receive judicial endorsement any more than parties can expect a court to enforce such a contract between them. . . . When a challenge to the arbitrator’s authority is made on public policy grounds, however, the court is not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator’s decision, but with the lawfulness of enforcing the award. . . . Accordingly, the public policy exception to arbitral authority should be narrowly construed and [a] court’s refusal to enforce an arbitrator’s interpretation of [a collective bargaining agreement] is limited to situations where the contract as intepreted would violate some explicit public policy that is well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. . . . The party challenging the award bears the burden of proving that illegality or conflict with public policy is clearly demonstrated.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Watertown Police Union Local 541 v. Watertown, 210
“We have historically construed narrowly the two common law grounds for vacating an arbitration award. We denominate the constitutionality and public policy exceptions as common law grounds although we have, on occasion, implied that the basis for these grounds is to be found within the statutory scheme of § 52-418 (a) (4). ... It is more appropriate to recognize that the power to determine the constitutionality of a statute and the power to strike an arbitration ruling as violative of public policy exist apart from any particular grant of authority from the legislative branch. Because of the multiple sources authorizing judicial review of arbitration awards, we therefore deem inaccurate the implication in these earlier cases that § 52-418 (a) (4) is the sole source of the court’s power of review.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.) Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 6.
The town acknowledges that in deciding whether arbitrators have exceeded their powers under § 52-418 (a) (4), courts have generally compared the award with the submission to determine if the award exceeds the scope of the submission. New Haven v. AFSCME, Council 15, Local 530, 208 Conn. 411, 415-16, 544 A.2d 186 (1988); Board of Education v. AFSCME, supra, 195 Conn. 271. The town argues, however, that this general analysis is not appropriate to determine whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel should be applied to preclude the arbitrator from deciding the same issue of contractual interpretation again.
In addition, the town argues that although the submission in this case was unrestricted, courts have the authority to vacate an award pursuant to § 52-418 (a) (4) when it violates clear public policy. The town maintains that the second arbitration board failed to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel and, therefore, did not adhere to the public policy consideration that requires giving collateral estoppel effect to prior arbitration awards in subsequent arbitrations. The town argues that “ [conflicting contractual interpretation awards are repugnant to the fundamental policy underlying the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel that a multiplicity of the same disputes should be avoided.” The town asserts, therefore, that the trial court was justified in vacating the arbitration award at issue.
We acknowledge that the doctrine of collateral estop-pel is based and enforced on the ground of public policy. Brady v. Anderson, 110 Conn. 432, 435, 148 A. 365
Although it can be said that collateral estoppel is a public policy notion in a general sense by virtue of its being well established in the law, we conclude that the failure of an arbitration board to apply this doctrine does not violate a well defined and dominant public policy in the sense that gives rise to the narrow excep
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court improperly interpreted the public policy exception as a basis for vacating the arbitration award as to grievance no. 91-03.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the application to vacate the arbitration award.
Although the trial court employed the term “res judicata” in its memorandum of decision, it is undisputed that issue preclusion rather than claim preclusion is involved and, therefore, collateral estoppel is the appropriate doctrine.
General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides in relevant part: “Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court . . . shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects ... (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”
The union also claims that the trial court improperly vacated the award because arbitration awards do not have the same stare decisis effect as court judgments, and the fact that inconsistencies exist between prior arbitration awards in itself is not a basis to vacate an award. Furthermore, the union claims that the trial court improperly relied on Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903, 34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973), which is inapposite to this case. Finally, the union claims that the trial court cannot vacate an arbitration award that draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. We need not address these claims in view of our determination on the inapplicability of collateral estoppel.
An unrestricted submission has been characterized as follows: “The authority of an arbitrator to adjudicate the controversy is limited only if the agreement contains express language restricting the breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review. In the absence of any such qualifications, an agreement is unrestricted. Carroll v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 Conn. 16, 20, 453 A.2d 1158 (1983); Bic
The town also claims that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to arbitration awards. See Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903,34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973). The town argues that the trial court was correct in vacating the second arbitration panel’s award because under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the issue had already been decided in a previous proceeding. Furthermore, the town claims that the trial court properly considered Corey to be analogous and on point. We find the decision in Corey to be distinguishable. In Corey, the court determined the question of whether the decision of an arbitration panel precluded a hearing tribunal or another agency from deciding the same issue. Upon reviewing the same grievance the arbitration panel had already decided, the hearing tribunal reached a different result. In reaching its decision, the court in Corey held that a prior arbitration award was binding and conclusive on the hearing tribunal under the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata. In the present case, however, the conflicting decisions involve two arbitration panels acting on an unrestricted submission.
The dissent fails to address the unrestricted nature of the submissions and the consequent limitations on our review.
In support of its argument, the town cites International Assn. of Firefighters v. Las Vegas, 107 Nev. 906, 823 P.2d 877 (1991). Furthermore, the
Although the dissent purports to extend our Supreme Court’s decision in Corey to cover the situation presented in the case at hand, we have previously noted in footnote five that Corey is factually distinguishable from the present case.
Citing a Nevada case, International Assn. of Firefighters v. Las Vegas, 107 Nev. 906, 823 P.2d 877 (1991), the dissent relies on the proposition that an arbitrator’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement becomes part of the contract and binds both parties. That proposition has not been adopted in Connecticut.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which reinstates the arbitration award vacated by the trial court. The issues in both arbitrations no. 91-03 and no. 91-04 were identical. The parties, the town and the union were also identical.
The issue to be decided in both arbitrations was whether article XXII of the agreement applies to promotions outside of the bargaining unit, i.e., the assistant fire chief. The decision in grievance no. 91-04, that article XXII was not arbitrable because the promotions clause of the agreement did not apply to promotions to jobs outside of the bargaining unit, including promotion to the position of assistant fire prevention chief, was binding on the decision in no. 91-03, the subject of this appeal.
I agree with the trial court’s determination that the first arbitration award should be accorded res judicatacollateral estoppel effect and in its citing of Corey v. Avco-Lycoming Division, 163 Conn. 309, 319, 307 A.2d 155 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S. Ct. 903, 34 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1973). In Corey, the court held that res judicata-collateral estoppel applied to the award of an arbitration panel in bar of subsequent litigation on the same claim.
In Delahunty v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 236 Conn. 582, 674 A.2d 1290 (1996), our Supreme Court stated: “[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim. A judgment is final not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose. . . . The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different
In this case, both arbitrations included the same parties, the plaintiff town and the defendant union. The issue was also the same in both arbitrations, that is, whether the promotion clause for the collective bargaining agreement applied to promotions to the nonbar-gaining unit position of assistant fire chief or assistant fire prevention chief. Although the first arbitration was for the position of assistant fire prevention chief and the second was for the position of assistant fire chief, both positions were out of the bargaining unit and the issue or claim is the same.
Once the arbitrator found that the promotions clause of the collective bargaining agreement did not apply to promotions to a nonbargaining unit position, it became part of the contract and bound both parties. International Assn. of Firefighters v. Las Vegas, 107 Nev. 906,
“Policy considerations underlie our conclusion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should apply to arbitration. The harmony sought by arbitration as a substitute for work stoppage and elimination of strife between labor and management could be jeopardized if repetitive submission to arbitration of the same issue was permitted. Todd Shipyards Corp., [supra] 242 F. Supp. at 611. Here, the prior decision involves the interpretation of the identical contract provision between the same employer and union. In such cases, every principle of common sense, policy, and labor relations demands that [the decision] stand until the parties annul it by a newly worded contract provision. F. Elkouri and E. A. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, 426 (4th ed. 1985) (quoting Pan Am. Ref. Corp., 2 ALAA ¶ 67, 937, p. 69, 464 [1948]). Moreover, unless there is finality to an arbitration award, there is no inducement for parties to accept a provision for arbitration in the labor agreement.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) International Assn. of Firefighters v. Las Vegas, supra, 107 Nev. 911-12.
The Nevada court found that the prior award construing the collective bargaining agreement became part of
I agree with the reasoning of the Nevada Supreme Court and I would uphold the trial court’s decision.
