46 Conn. 189 | Conn. | 1878
An elderly woman, feeble in body, of an excitable temperament, and habitually relying upon the judgment of others in matters of business, is informed by her nephew, who had been reared in the family of which she was a' member, and to whom she was greatly attached, that he was a defaulter to the town; this announcement is presently followed by a declaration from Mr. Chapman, the selectman, that the nephew had exposed himself to a criminal prosecution and punishment in the state prison, and that, unless she immediately secured the town against loss, criminal proceedings would on that day be instituted against him. He left her greatly agitated in her mind, and within about half an hour returned with an attorney and offered the mortgage in question for her signature. She signed it without time for deliberation, and without the advice of counsel or friends.
The finding makes it certain that Mr. Chapman believed, and. intentionally produced in the mind of Miss Gager the belief, that her nephew had exposed himself to a criminal prosecution; that such prosecution would be immediately commenced unless she executed the mortgage; that the execution of the mortgage would stifle it; and that he knew that
In Williams v. Bayley, 1 L. R., Eng. & Irish Appeals, House of Lords, 200, one Bayley obtained money from the plaintiffs by forging his father’s name. Upon discovery they insisted (though without any direct threat of a prosecution,) on a settlement, to which the father was to be a party; he consented, and executed an agreement to make an equitable mortgage of his property. Held, that the agreement was invalid. The Lord Chancellor said:—“ But here w*as a pressure of this nature. We have the means of prosecuting, and so transporting, your son. Do you choose to come to his help and take on yourself th.e amount of his debts, the amount of these forgeries? If you do, we will not prosecute; if you do not, wo will. That is the plain interpretation of what passed. Is that, or is it not, legal ? In my opinion,, my lords, I am bound to go the length of saying that I do not think it is legal.” Lord Chelmsford said:—“The defence of the bankers being rested entirely on these two grounds, as I have already said, in my opinion this negotiation proceeded upon an understanding between the parties that the agreement of James Bayley to give security for the notes would relieve William Bayley from the consequences of his criminal act; and the fears of the father were stimulated and operated on to an extent to deprive him of free agency, and to extort an agreement from him for the benefit of the bankers. It apppears to me therefore that the case comes within the principles on which a court of equity proceeds in setting aside an agreement where there is inequality between the parties, and one of them takes unfair advantage of the situation of the oilier, and uses undue influence to force an agreement from him.” Lord Westbury said:—“What remained then as a motive for the father ? The only motive to induce him to adopt the' debt, 'was the hope that by so doing he would relieve his son from the inevitable consequences of his crime. The question therefore, my lords, is, whether a father appealed to under such circumstances to take upon himself an amount
The petitioner says that Mr. Chapman erred in his belief that the default of the nephew was punishable as an offence. This being so, the deed has no better foundation than a mistaken belief as to facts, produced by the erroneous statement made and persisted in by the agent of the town, and therefore it should be set aside.
In Davies v. London & Provincial Marine Ins. Co., L. Reps. Chancery Div., Vol. 8, 469, the officers of a company, believing that the retention of money by one of their agents amounted to a felony, directed his arrest. Certain friends of his came to the officers of the company and proposed to deposit a sum of money by way of security for any deficiency. On the same day the company was advised that the acts of the agent did not amount to felony, and the directions for the arrest were withdrawn. Later in the day the friends of the agent had a second interview with the officers of the company, and agreed to deposit a sum of money as security for his defaults, no mention being made of the withdrawal of the directions for the arrest. The sum of money was afterwards deposited with trustees on an agreement for the security of the company. Held that the change of circumstances ought to have been stated to the intending sureties, and that the agreement must be rescinded and the money returned to the
We advise the Superior Court to dismiss the petition.
In this opinion the other judges concurred. •