Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Board of Taxation

CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN For affirmance —Justices and STEIN-4 and HANDLER and WILENTZ

For reversal —Chief Justice GARIBALDI —3 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, SECAUCUS, v. HUDSON

TOWN OF BAYONNE, TAXATION AND CITY OF COUNTY BOARD OF HUDSON, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS, AND COUNTY OF GUTTENBERG, NEWARK, OF OF EAST TOWN BOROUGH HOBOKEN, HARRISON, CITY OF JERSEY OF CITY OF TOWN BERGEN, CITY, KEARNY, OF NORTH TOWN OF TOWNSHIP CITY, AND OF WEEHAWKEN CITY OF UNION TOWNSHIP YORK, NEW DEFENDANTS. TOWN OF WEST February August Argued 1993 Decided Holland, General, argued Attorney Deputy Margaret A. (Robert County J. Board Taxation appellant Hudson cause for Joseph L. Jersey, attorney; Attorney of New Tufo, Del General Jacobson, General, Mary Attorney and C. Assistant Yannotti counsel). General, Attorney Deputy appellant City of argued the cause of Eric Martin Bernstein Bernstein, (Weiner Lesniak, attorneys; Beth Mr. Bayonne & counsel). Panepinto, of Jaffe, Nicholas A. (Holland argued respondent the cause for

Frances Holland C. Holland, attorneys). & opinion of the Court was delivered

The HANDLER, J. question to resolve the whether a

This case asks the Court exempts City enacted under the education laws statute paying opera- to the Bayonne from its share of taxes committed County violates the State tion of the Hudson Vocational School exemption, County implementing the tax Hudson Constitution. system Bayonne paid a tax under which established two-tier municipalities in county tax rate lower than that of all other County. challenged that two-tier Hudson The Town of Secaucus prohibition special legislation, system violating both the clause, IV, 9(6), uniformity paragraph article section VIII, Jersey paragraph article section New Constitu- grounds. The trial court found for Secaucus on both those tion. uniformity Appellate The Division affirmed that decision on clause grounds, question but failed to reach the of whether N.J.S.A. special legislation. Secaucus v. Hudson 18A:54-37 constituted (1992). County, N.J.Super. 605 A.2d 1151 petitioned of Taxation this The Hudson Board Court certification, granted and we decision (1993), exemption A.2d 618 to decide whether statute is constitutionally invalid.

I Bayonne, County, City operated located in Hudson has Originally, Bayonne program vocational-educational since 1931. through high implemented program separate vocational 1960s, however, Bayonne comprehensive school. In the created a fully integrated program high school that the vocational into its general high Bayonne’s vocational-education school curriculum. widely program, praised, which has been allows vocational stu- many participate fully in activities and attend to school dents high general school students. classes with education County of Education of the Hudson Voca- the Board school”) (hereafter “county vocational “HCVS” or tional School building for authorizing acquisition of a a passed a resolution county following year, a million vocational school. The $2 new HCVS, operation and in 1974 budget proposed was for the of facility. Realizing began operating from its own that the HCVS by in existence more than Bayonne program, vocational that time discontinued, wanting spare to forty years, not be would its coun- Bayonne expense supporting own and the the double County programs, legislators from Hudson ty’s vocational State contributing Bayonne to the legislation exempting from proposed county school. vocational maintenance original proposed legislation, as Senate Bill The terms of the Session, Legislative quite Those terms in the 1972 were broad. provided that maintaining a a of vocation- system each included within school district municipality for or State Allotment vocational al education Federal purposes approved regulations of the State Board of Education under the

funds Commissioner taxes assessment, from or collection of based of Education shall be exempt levy use of a vocational of amounts any appropriated apportionment school district. exempted original legislation effect of the would have program municipality virtually every with a vocational-education county’s contributing support to the of its vocational school. that, Committee amendments to Recognizing Senate Education scope exemption significantly Bill narrowed the Senate 7U general obligation Bayonne to exempt only from the order narrowing programs. That support vocational-educational legislation ways. in two limiting the effect of the was achieved First, only affected the amendments restricted “county having population of not of the first class a to those 700,000 Federal Census.” according the 1970 more than L.1973, § class c. 1. In N.J.S.A. 40A:6-1 defined first 600,000.” county having population of than county as “a more (1970 criterion, 897,148), Essex Bergen By that (1970 (1970 932,526), County population County popu- and Hudson 607,839) Hudson, qualified Only lation as first class counties. however, population requirement met the amended statute’s for exemption. the tax

Second, required municipali- the amendments that in order for a ty qualify exemption, program to for the its vocational would have existence, program by in approved to have been as a the State funding, of Education for or federal Board state for at least Because, twenty years. among County municipalities, the Hudson only Bayonne program had a vocational education in existence and approved by twenty years, the State for at least the amended bill, applied only Bayonne. statute to The statement to the from Committee, the Senate Education left no doubt about the intent of amended, bill, legislation: exempt “This City would of Bayonne any from of support- assessment taxes due to the cost of ing county County.” vocational school in Hudson County’s

When the 1980 census revealed a reduction in Hudson 556,972, status, population thereby jeopardizing its first-class Legislature, by § population L.1981 c. established density as a new criterion and amended N.J.S.A. 40A:6-1 to redefine counties of the having population first class as “counties a 550,000 3,000 population density of more than a of more than persons per square reclassification, mile.” Under that Hudson 12,801.1 County, density mile, per square residents time, county retained its status as a of the first class. At the same L.1981, 462, 20, Legislature, by § amended N.J.S.A. 18A:54- c. 37 to substitute “latest federal decennial census” for “1970 federal Consequently, Bayonne census.” Jersey remained the sole New municipality exempt county-vocational-school from payments. tax statute, 18A:54-37, N.J.S.A. exemption now reads: Notwithstanding 54 of Title 18A of the New any provisions chapter Jersey having Statutes, of the first class any county of not than more according 700,000 to the latest decennial each census, included within municipality a school district which has maintained for a minimum of 20 a vocational years program educational for the of federal or approved State allotment of purposes regulation

vocational funds the Commissioner under the State Board of Education shall be assessment, collection of taxes based on exempt levy vocational for the use of county of amounts appropriated any apportionment school district. 18A:54-37, Hudson implement mandate of N.J.S.A. To assessing county tax system tax for County a two-tier devised system, administered defen- municipalities. The on its burden (HCBT), provided a Taxation Board of dant Hudson (which county operating the higher included the costs of rate school) municipal- County’s twelve for eleven of Hudson vocational (which Secaueus, ities, plaintiff, a lower rate exclud- including school) Bay- operating the vocational ed the costs necessary appropriations for because The dual rate was onne. levied, assessed, must and collected education vocational' pursuant general county appropriations manner as the same authorization, Lacking any statutory 18A:54-29.2. N.J.S.A. county component separate the vocational-school HCBT could not county. budgetary requirements of the purpose from the common County Hudson system, the other eleven Under the two-tier Bayonne, than paying proportionally more tax municipalities, by Bayonne’s exemption through for the revenue lost compensated Appellate Division maintaining of HCVS. As from the cost County bluntly, precisely, Hudson and more noted: “Put more municipalities, the lower one county tax rates for its struck two Bayonne.” N.J.Super. at 605 A2d solely for however, only in taxation, operated not system of The two-tier in regular county also the determina- of taxes but the assessment County pay to in added municipality had tion what each Hudson of litigation in below As the trial court and omitted assessments. explained: of must also to the share county pay On each February year, municipalities (added of to et assessments 54:4-63.1, N.J.S.A. seq.,

the revenues derived pursuant (omitted estate), 54:4-63.31, et 54:4-63.12, seq., et and N.J.S.A real N.J.S.A. seq., estate). constructed new of real These prevent properties assessments provisions in included which were not date, 1 assessment properties after October escaping until taxation regular 1 for the tax year, list October assessment following or omitted the added 54:4-63.19, -63.38, N.J.S.A. year. Under calculate the due rate to sums assessment list is multiplied county property to for added and omitted taxes. the county (Law [Secaucus v. Hudson Bd. Taxation, No. 094204-86W Div. County June 1990).] By applying system its two-tier of taxation to the added-and- list, Bayonne omitted assessments HCBT afforded the benefit of a rate, imposing lower while County municipal- on the other Hudson higher Exacerbating ities a rate. perception unfairness system the two-tier tax was fact generated that the revenues by the added and omitted applied only assessments were to general county operating expenses separately and were not allo- cated to HCVS. 17,1986, Seeaucus,

Accordingly, on October as one of the eleven County municipalities subjected rate, Hudson higher to the tax brought complaint prerogative against lieu of writs Hudson initially challenged only and HCBT. Seeaucus the meth- odology by which HCBT calculated the two rates. Seeaucus sought to have the component vocational school excluded from the By added and omitted Appel- assessments. leave of the Division, late subsequently Seeaucus complaint amended its include the claim that N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 was unconstitutional as violating special-legislation uniformity provisions Bayonne State Constitution. necessary was included as a party. Finding the effect of clearly N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 to be discrimi natory, the trial court adopt single ordered HCBT to county tax rate, Bayonne underpayment taxes, to debit for its credit the eleven other payments. for excess On claims, the constitutional the trial court determined N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 uniformity violated both the Jersey clause of the New Constitution, VIII, 1, 1, article section paragraph special- and the legislation prohibition IV, of article paragraph section 6. The trial court found a violation uniformity clause because N.J.S.A, granted exemption 18A:54-37 a tax Bayonne to based on location, the mere incidence of rather than on the use of its property. Applying three-step special-legislation the analysis of Byrne, 292, 300-01, (1977), Vreeland v. 370 A .2d 825 the trial court also found special legislation. the statute to be comply to HCBT August this Court Ordered On among single tax rate all judgment requiring a the trial court judg- the County municipalities, stayed part but Hudson credit and debit the Hudson requiring ment HCBT to payments the tax prior years’ under two-tier municipalities for County tax rate now effect was system. single The Hudson year, the Court’s order. computed pursuant 1990 tax to the court that N.J.S.A. agreed Division with the trial Appellate The Division, uniformity Appellate violated the clause. 18A:54-37 view, In however, rationale. its the applied entirely an different (Bayonne) “by excusing taxpayer uniformity lack of was caused of the cost of an item having proportionate to its share pay (Hudson County).” N.J.Su taxing budget of the district the uniformity the clause re A.2d 1151. Because per. at general rate of the quires property all “be taxed the real situated, for use property is taxing in which the district district,” a uniform taxing Appellate Division found that such among municipalities of a is mandat county tax rate as VIII, 1. paragraph section Id. ed article Having 18A:54-37 unconstitutional under found N.J.S.A. clause, reach the uniformity Appellate Division did not legislation question. special

II A N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 unconstitutional We now consider whether uniformi- legislation or it violates the special because because it is answering Jersey ty clause under the New Constitution. preliminary matter two consider as question, constitutional we constitutionality standing of address the HCBT issues: reviewing claims exemption and the standard for statute constitutionality legislation. challenging the standing urge lacks claims that HCBT Secaucus standing a constitutionality That to have of N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37. 492

party must have “a sufficient stake and real adverseness with respect subject to the litigation” matter of the is well settled. N.J. Chamber Commerce v. N.J. Election Law of Enforcement Commission, 57, (1980). 67, 82 411 N.J. A.2d Additionally, 168 upon “[a] substantial likelihood of some harm plaintiff visited in the event of an unfavorable decision is purposes needed for the standing.” By criteria, of clearly Ibid. those standing. HCBT has Indeed, present position HCBT’s is Bergen not unlike that of the County Township Board of Taxation in Bergen Mahwah v. of Taxation, County 268, 818, Bd. 98 N.J. cert. denied of Borough Mahwah, sub nom. Township v. 471 U.S. of Demarest of (1985). 105 case, S.Ct. 86 L.Ed.2d 696 In that Bergen County Court heard the of cross-appeal Board Taxation’s constitutionality county of tax rebate statutes. Like the Mahwah, situation the decision here will affect how the tax board municipalities’ calculates the apportioned share of coun ty taxes. regarded boards of taxation are agen as state jurisdiction, authority, cies with the and responsibility over 54:3-11; Smith, taxes. N.J.S.A. 183, 188, see DeFeo v. 17 N.J. (1955). 110A.2d agency, As a state will HCBT be affected the determination of the constitutionality of the statute it is charged enforcing. Significantly, HCBT has been involved in every step litigation, of having this been named Secaucus as a original defendant both the complaints. and amended Accord ingly, we hold that standing HCBT has to be heard. respect

With to the standard for reviewing the constitution ality statutes, of State every the Court will possible pre afford sumption in favor an Legislature. act of the Holster v. Board 60, 66, Trustees County College, Passaic 59 N.J. 279 A.2d 798 (1971). Where interpretations alternative of a equally statute are plausible, sustaining the view statute’s constitutionality Co., favored. David v. (1965); Vesta N.J. A.2d 345 Arbor, re Loch (1957); 25 N.J. 135 A.2d 663 Edgewater see Inv. Assocs. Borough Edgewater, v. 510 A.2d 1178 (1986). Only “clearly repugnant a statute to the constitution” will City Superior Ass’n v. void. Newark be declared Officers of (1985). Newark, 212, 486 A.2d 305 98 N.J. taxation, Further, great in the of the Court has accorded field McKenny Byrne, v. 82 N.J. legislative judgments. deference (1980). 304, 314, recognized The Court has 412 A.2d 1041 practical impossibility, Borough a equality taxation is absolute Taxation, 454, 464, N.J. v. Board 5 Totowa Passaic of of (1950), precision is that absolute mathematical not 75 A.2d 874 and Park, 452, Asbury 471 A.2d 1196 required. Murnick v. N.J. (1984). challenges Additionally, on the in constitutional based IV, “the is on the special-legislation prohibition of article burden constitutionality of demon party challenging the the statute to Mahwah, clearly provision.” it violates a constitutional strate supra, 486 A. 2d 818. 98 N.J. statute, however, can an unconstitutional

No authorize Decker, Township West v. Van practice. Milford of (1990). and the constitution Wherever statute 576 A.2d 881 conflict, give way. Id. at the statute must come into if it 18A:54-37 to see Accordingly, we must examine N.J.S.A. pro- irremediably provisions violates the constitutional clearly ¶ IV, 7, 9, mandating § unifor- special legislation, hibiting art. district, VIII, taxing art. mity property within taxation of real of ¶1. 1,§

B. Jersey provides that: New Constitution The or local laws: not any 9. The shall pass private, special ¶ 9(6).] Const, (6) § Relating [N.J. art. IV, to taxation or therefrom. exemption v. in Town Morristown Woman’s As Justice Garibaldi observed of Club, in the principles of taxation as embodied guiding “the constitution, imposed property be requir[e] that of all real taxation only by accomplished only exemption be by uniform rules and (1991). 605, 612, general laws.” 124 592 A N.J. .2d Town only uniformity challenge provi Morristown involved under the “general sion of article VIII. We need not resolve whether the requirement prohibition special law” of article VIII and the legislation functionally purposes of article are identical for the IV case, challenged legislation. special tax laws Whatever the principle the second that Justice Garibaldi enunciated is relevant ie., special-legislation analysis, exemptions to an article IV accomplished only by general taxation shall be laws. concept special legislation “has been well established Morristown, century.” supra, this state for almost a Town (Clifford, J., dissenting). N.J. at 592 A.2d 216 From a standpoint, regarded special legislation constitutional a law is as “ ‘when, limitation, arbitrarily separates force of an inherent it which, persons, places things upon some or from others but for limitation, operate. such special it would The test of a law is the ” appropriateness provisions objects of its to the that it excludes.’ Ibid, Hancock, 133, 135, (quoting v. Budd 66 N.J.L. 48 A. 1023 (Sup.Ct.1901)); Hosp. see Kimball Township Hosp., v. Brick (1981). 429, 446, 432 N.J. A.2d 36 Byrne, In three-part Vreeland v. the Court established a special test to determine a legislation. whether statute constituted As Justice Mountain described it: object [T]he method of is this: we first discern and of the analysis purpose enactment. We then undertake to it to the factual situation apply presented. resulting we decide as so Finally whether, classification can be said to applied, object

rest rational or reasonable basis relevant to the and of upon any purpose act. added).] (emphasis [72 at 300-01, N.J. 370 A.2d 825 Accordingly, we purpose must first discern the of N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37; apply purpose specific then to the facts of the support municipal county case before us—the of and vocational schools; finally, 18A:54-37, decide whether N.J.S.A as it actually operates, represents legislative a reasonable classification. seeking purpose

In a rational for a statute under constitu challenge, tional purpose “the court is not limited to the stated of any seek rationale basis.” legislation, but should conceivable Mahwah, light 486 A.2d 818. Taken supra, N.J. statute, constitutionality possible of the two favorable to most legiti face reveal interpretations of N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 their First, may con legislative purpose. N.J.S.A 18A:54-37 mate designed a tax statute to lessen generally most relief ceived municipalities that maintain their own vocational on those burden view, object of programs. On that N.J.S.A. 18A:54- education problem by municipali of double contribution 37 is to address programs both a local their vocational ties that have own program. program county vocational Under vocational analogized pro N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 could be interpretation, services, 18A:54-11, N.J.S.A grams like health 40:33-9,' services, problem that address the of library N.J.S.A. funding optional systems. providing dual contributions may promote the of 18A:54-37 be to purpose A second N.J.S.A local, programs educational development high-quality vocational objec- achieving densely-populated communities. within reducing tive, added the statute would have the benefit county vocational schools. strain on specific case and the scrutiny careful facts this After challenge, 18A:54-37 realizes either under how N.J.S.A statute purposes is difficult to see. those case, problem if of double contribu- alleviating the

In the first programs their own vocational tion that maintain for 18A:54-37, population-density purpose of is the real N.J.S.A At requirements of the statute make little sense. longevity and state, one other twenty municipalities within the and at least least their County (Kearny), maintain own municipality within Hudson noted, to the extent programs. As Seeaucus vocational-education any less from double contribution not the burden programs for local vocational municipalities that have maintained twenty years, longevity requirement of than N.J.S.A. feiver goal particularly of tax relief. ill-suited to 18A:54-37 seems 496 case, is to goal if of N.J.S.A 18A:54-37

In the second vocational-education development high-quality encourage the thereby municipalities, reduc- densely-populated programs within schools, municipali- county to exclude on vocational ing the strain counties, Bergen, and most-populous i.e. Essex in the ties either and Middle- densely-populated counties like Union but or less Nonetheless, statute excludes sex, not seem reasonable. does (over populations Bergen of their excessive and basis Essex 700,000), densely-populated and Middlesex Union and excludes designated counties. they not first-class are counties because population does not automati based on “[a] That classification special legislation” is well cally a law unconstitutional render Ass’n, supra, N.J. at Superior Newark settled. Officers recognized the rational “nexus A This Court has .2d 305. 225-26, 486 A. 2d accountability population.” Id. at and between upheld has explaining cases in which the Court (citing and legis rationally legitimate to a related population classifications Mahwah, 288-90, 486 supra, 98 N.J. at purpose); see also lative upheld has (citing explaining cases in which Court A. 818 2d challenges). against special-legislation requirement population Mahwah, special legislation supra, the Court considered In statute”) (hereafter rebate challenge “the to N.J.SA 54:4-5 (hereafter supplemental “the then 54-4-5.2 what was N.J.SA statute, statute”). 271, 486 A.2d 818. The rebate 98 N.J. at originally enacted if the of a share of taxes a rebate of a municipality’s

provided portion with a in excess of located in a first-class county were municipality or more of land used and had within its borders acres 800,000 andoccupied institution. a state [Ibid.] was to reduce the purpose and effect of the rebate statute Grove, municipal- host imposed upon which acted as burden Cedar any hospital receiving ity county psychiatric “without to the Essex corresponding Id. at 486 A.2d 818. tax benefit.” imposed a supplemental statute that passed had By the “grandfather clause” on the rebate statute’s benefits. statute, supplemental only those that terms of the prior September could qualified statute had rebate scope of the rebate statute. Id. at 486 A2d come within the guarantee supplemental statute was to that 818. The effect of the qualify only municipality to ever Grove would remain “the Cedar for the rebate.” Ibid. was unconsti to find that the rebate statute

The Court declined merely special legislation on the rebate statute’s tutional based Observing Id. population requirements. (like “an common sense that institution dictated likely larger psychiatric hospital) in a will in people more a similar institution a smaller be utilized than ibid., to the host county,” concluded that costs Court greater larger in a municipality institution would be of such an county. Accordingly, in a Court found the than smaller to have a reasonable basis. population classification County case, cognizant of the fact that Hudson In this we are population, its density in and urbanization of unique terms (12,108.1) many square mile per having twice as residents almost (6,701.- densely-populated county, Essex as next most 7). fact, conjecture Legisla- possible that the From it is development of local encouraging in special had a interest ture densely populat- programs in the State’s most vocational education remote, Nevertheless, if possibility seems not ed areas. possible advanced as a illusory. has never been That concern Further, perspective from the legislative purpose or concern. many as students as available to making educational services feasible, excellent vocational schools encouragement of as much sense for less districts would make individual school How- densely-populated. densely-populated areas as those more noted, ever, already particular limitations embodied density. beyond population size and go 18A:54-37 well N.J.S.A opera- program be requirement that the local vocational require- years “longevity” twenty so-called tion for least —the just municipalities, in areas exclude other ment —works to To Bayonne, from the benefit of the statute. densely populated as as hav- in 18A:54r-37 contained N.J.S.A. accept the classifications Legislature had basis, imagine that the one must ing a rational development of local ground encouraging for the some reasonable most-densely-populated county in only in programs vocational 700,000, population and that a total below the state with concluding only grounds those reasonable for had years twenty were of sufficient programs in existence for at least through worthy encouragement tax relief. quality of financial to be credulity beyond reason- to us to stretch Those conclusions seem limits. able pursues very rational because it finds the statute

The dissent in the embodied analysis of the classifications different mode First, population and lon disaggregates the statute. the dissent twenty-year approval respect gevity requirements. With “second-guess” the simply refuses to requirement, the dissent at longevity requirement rational. Post legislature and finds the population The dissent then finds the 628 A.2d at 304. rational, “[t]he at least harmless because list requirements, if not municipality programs reveals that no approved vocational program.” Bergen in or Essex -maintains such either Counties at 304. Post at mind, however, important keep in that when the dissent

It is programs, approved it means vocational-education refers to “such” twenty years. least Under programs in existence for statute, required to have longevity a school district is term of years a educational for a minimum of 20 vocational “maintained allotment approved purposes for the or State program federal by funds the Commissioner of Education.” N.J.S.A. of vocational added). Appellate recognized (emphasis As 18A54-37 Division, approved every district has an “almost local school N.J.Super. A.2d 1151. In program.” education turn, every municipality in the state maintains a vocational- almost program approved purposes of federal aid under education (700,000) ceiling to be N.J.A.C. 6:43-2. Were statute, Bergen municipalities in and Essex from the those excised qualify still not under the statute’s classifications counties would programs have been exis- because their vocational-education twenty years. tence for less than Bergen says municipalities that no

When the dissent thus approved programs, what it means Essex counties maintain “such” programs approved all vocational-education within those is that requirement. longevity excluded the statute’s counties are longevity precisely point. The interaction of the That is irrationally population requirements restricts the statute’s classifi- that, analysis, any reasonable cations to exclude purview. ought to come within the statute’s history further analysis An of the of N.J.S.A 18A:54-37 interpreting legiti as a plausibility the of the statute undermines densely- in attempt encourage programs vocational mate to local populated areas. more

Ordinarily, the fact that N.J.SA 18A:54-37 was enacted in twenty years ago by Legislature the 1981 than and amended constitutionality. strong presumption in of create a favor its would case, Mahwah, 291, supra, A.2d 818. In the instant 98 N.J. at however, history legislative of the of a careful examination in of its amendment 18A:54-37 and the circumstances N.J.S.A. 1981, only perception the statute constitutes reinforce the special legislation. earlier, original the supra at 628 A.2d at

As noted the 18A:54-37would have achieved terms of what became N.J.SA entirely purpose of tax relief for all those rational broad pro municipalities operated their own vocational-education however, amended, a to be directed toward grams. The bill was legislation Bayonne. special nature of the was of one: The class itself, de Education Committee which recognized the Senate City Bayonne “exempt a legislation bill scribed of supporting the any due to the cost of from assessment of taxes County.” supra county vocational school Hudson added). (emphasis A.2d at 291

When, population of Hudson fell below class, 600,000, county the first jeopardizing its status as a of thus the first class responded by redefining Legislature requirements. population-density population and new total with keeping had the effect population-density requirement larger population than County, by 1980 had a which Middlesex first County, becoming a class. Hudson that of county, it redefined a first-class the same time At population ceiling of 18A:54-37 so that its N.J.S.A. amended The effect 700,000 recent decennial census. would track most only guarantee that to continue to of those amendments was exemption. of the statute’s Bayonne would derive the benefit True, special legisla not unconstitutional as a statute is particular municipali merely its is limited to a because effect tion Nevertheless, Mahwah, A.2d ty. supra, 98 N.J. limits its effects must be which a statute the classification grounded in Ibid. a statute has effect rational basis. When a particular community serving addressing needs alia, to, looks inter particular legislative purpose, Court have, could, time and from time to “other whether scope.” Ibid. come within its comparison regard, we to Mahwah. Unlike

In that draw case, presented reasonable the Court is not now by making “quibble compari invite the requirements that Court subjects slightly dividing the line chosen or below sons to above Moreover, 291-92, note 486 A.2d 818. we Legislature.” Id. the Mahwah, to invalidate the although in the Court declined the purely population on the classifications rebate statute based supplemental imposed, the Court did strike down the statute municipali imposed “grandfather clause” on those statute that purview. Id. could fall within the rebate statute’s ties that strong analogy can drawn believe a between 486 A.2d We in supplemental statute invalidated grandfather clause in the the Mahwah, longevity requirement in embodied N.J.S.A. case, rationally justify if In this even one could 18A:54-37. population-density requirements of population and N.J.S.A. total 18A:54-37, excluding aof rational basis for we cannot conceive may satisfy population requirements other of N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 on the basis of the fact that their vocational programs approved by twenty have not been the State for at least years. history only of N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 makes clear not that the basis,

classifications embodied within it lacked a reasonable but municipality partly that no other subsequent due to the statute’s — scope amendment —has come within its its derived benefit. Kearny, implemented program which its vocational-education in scope year would come with the statute’s 2000. Were operation to occur the statute would have been in almost municipality three Bayonne decades before other than came scope. within its analysis, foregoing

Based on the we conclude that N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37, actually operates, represent itas does not a reasonable legislative Accordingly, classification. we find that N.J.S.A prohibition special legislation 18A:54-37 violates the of article IV, 7, paragraph Jersey section 9 of the New Constitution. suggests

The dissent that the Court sever the statute, ceiling saving constitutionality. from the thus its Post at “judicial surgery” 304. That sort of is warranted only “if provisions may a few of Act’s be severed without [an] Cahill, altering Legislature’s purpose.” intended Robinson v. 449, 559, (Pashman, dissenting). n. A. 2d 129 J. Accordingly, population requirement severance of the of N.J.S.A justified only legislative 18A:54-37 would be if “the intent [of nearly by exscinding provision will be more realized this statute] Vreeland, by declaring than the entire statute unconstitutional.” supra, 72 N.J. at 370 A.2d 825. clear, however,

It is that no such warrant exists in this case. At history, least twice the statute’s was confronted opportunity altering scope of the statute’s classifi- application. opportunity cations so as to broaden its The first original proposal. came at the time of the statute’s The second opportunity publication came with the of the 1980 federal census. expressly opportunities, those declined

Each time the to a affirmatively keep scope the statute narrowed to acting Bayonne. class of one— legisla special as finding that the is unconstitutional statute N.J.S.A 18A:54-37

tion, note, however, readily distin that we municipalities opt to guished allow out from statutes that municipality to maintain a local chooses services for which programs, as optional kinds of such program. those Unlike services, not N.J.S.A library 18A:54-37 does or health programs local operate to afford tax relief Rather, have by county-wide programs. as we duplicated are above, unreasonably scope its N.J.S.A 18A:54-37 limits detailed population, population-density, longevity and re total both N.J.S.A 18A:54-37 finding to be quirements. Accordingly, legislation special does not prohibition violation of article IV validity of other impugn at all the constitutional statutes county expenditures for provide exemptions from contributions test, in already provided by municipal governments. The services case, particular every embodied in a is whether the classifications to the upon a or rational basis relevant statute “rest reasonable Vreeland, supra, 72 N.J. object” purpose and of the statute. A .2d 825. C. Having found N.J.S.A 18A:54-37 to be unconstitutional special legislation, not reach the issue of whether we need uniformity article Never- violates clause of VIII. statute also theless, important Appellate Division decision raises because clause, uniformity of the questions interpretation on the we believe following comments are order. article, VIII, Jersey New the taxation Constitu- Article part: tion in relevant reads l(l)(a). general § shall assessed for taxation under laws Property real the State

uniform rules. All assessed and taxed locally property taxing according same districts shall be assessed to the allotment and payment shall be such value, herein, standard of as otherwise except permitted property general taxing taxed at the tax rate of the district in which the is situated, property taxing for of the use such district. granted general from taxation laws. Until other- Exemption may only by granted all wise law from taxation and now in by provided exemptions validly existence shall be continued. from taxation or be altered Exemptions may exempting those real and used for repealed, except personal property exclusively religious, educational, law, charitable or as defined and cemetery purposes, organized owned or association and conducted for by any corporation exclusively operating one or and not for more such purposes profit. above, VIII, 1, paragraph quoted para The first article section 1(a), commonly “uniformity graph is most called the clause.” See Kimmelman, e.g., Jersey League Municipalities New State v. 422, Robinson, (1987); supra, at A.2d 430 69 N.J. paragraph 355 A.2d 129. The second termed Court has Morristown, “exemption supra, clause.” See N.J. 592 A .2d 216. Jersey League Municipalities,

In New State Justice O’Hern provided thorough what is to date the Court’s most discussion There, history uniformity of the clause. noted Justice O’Hern (1) uniformity components” proper “two distinct to the clause: all ty according general must be taxed the State laws and (2) rules, property uniform all real must be assessed at the general taxing same standard of value and at the rate of the Regardless district for its use. 105 N.J. at 522 A.2d 430. them, Jersey political of the subdivision within New that levies all Exceptions taxes are taxes. Id. at 522 A .2d430. to the State provisions uniformity exemption of the clause are delineated clause. Court, however, listing has declined to take the of the (i.e.,

exemption literally property confined used exclu clause educational, charitable, sively religious, cemetery purposes, by non-profit organizations), instead to “whether has looked so, exemption permissible is on a classification and if based Morristown, public purpose.” whether the classification serves a supra, Accordingly, any 124 N.J. at 592A.2d 216. determina tion of a statute violates of the whether article VIII State Consti- being property real taxed

tution first look to whether must so, and, district; if taxing whether rates within a nonuniform constitutionally property exempted taxation falls within exemption recognized-exceptions clause. Appellate Division found N.J.S.A.

Both the trial court and clause, uniformity although for have 18A:54-37 to violated reasons, N.J.Super. at 605 A.2d 1151. supra, 255 different hand, exempting statute as the trial court saw the On the one portion of the Bayonne property owners from that Hudson Finding no rational basis for property support tax used to HCVS. statute, requirements the the trial longevity the and exemption that based on the “mere court concluded the was Municipalities, Relying League on incidence of location.” 430, 429, that supra, at 522 A.2d it held the statute 105 N.J. The that an uniformity clause. trial court believed violated the justified only the the basis of exemption from taxation could property. use of the hand, Division, Appellate on the did not see the

The other exempting Bayonne’s property real from taxation. statute as Appellate that Division reasoned N.J. at exception dealing property an of real from “we are not with taxation; uniformity by dealing a caused we are lack of having pay proportion its excusing taxpayer (Bayonne) a to budget taxing ate the cost of item in the district share of an (Hudson grounds, Appellate County).” those the Divi Ibid. On uniformity that violated the sion concluded N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 clause. holding Appellate to that Division was

Intrinsic “taxing county purposes a for the conclusion that is district” conclusion, Appellate For Division relied on article VIII. that Cahill, holding v. A.2d this Court’s in Robinson (1973). Robinson, equal-protec an In the Court considered elementary secondary challenge financing public to the tion issue, resolving In Court also considered wheth schools. uniformity public to requires er tax levied finance clause throughout uniformly property fall on all taxable schools to holding property designed state. tax to finance a State state, property service must fall on all taxable within the responsibility Court held: for the function “[I]f State assigned government, uniformly to local the local tax must fall upon property all municipality.” taxable within the or the Appellate Id. at A 303 .2d273. The Division understood that applies statement from Robinson to demand that clause “[t]he government, including all levels of N.J.Super. state counties.” 255 605 A.2d 1151. history A careful review of the of article VIII and the decisions uniformity grave of our courts on the clause leaves us with reservations about that conclusion. “taxing political

The definition of district” as a division “less county” than a was well established both the judiciary delegates began at the time the 1947 Constitutional L.1918, Legislature, by “taxing their work. The c. defined (as district” term was then used in the tax assessment- statute) “every political collection division less than a inhabitants, governing body power whose or officers have the added). levy “taxing (emphasis taxes.” That definition of dis- trict” is 1:1-2. now codified N.J.S.A. Legislative “taxing

The 1918 definition of district” as less than a merely was itself a codification of a definition that had been time, promoted by early Supreme At courts as as 1907. the Orange, 75 Court Essex Park Commission v. West 376, 379, grounds, (Sup.Ct.1907), N.J.L. 67 A. 1065 rev’d on other (E. 575, 578, A.1909), analyzed 77 N.J.L. 73 A. 511 & the words of * * * supplemental exempted property a tax “the of 1903 law that counties, Jersey respective the of New and of the school State districts, taxing public purposes.” The districts and when used for court held that taxing [s]inee in divisions this state districts are coterminous the political

generally known ... “all of as the words lands the property municipal corporations taxing of the district,” act, as used any ownership property by import is less extensive than a some whose county. municipal corporation territory 506 379, A. 1065.] at 67

[75 N.J.L. principle Appeals Errors later reaffirmed of and Court 578, A. 73 taxing district.” 77 N.J.L. county is not a that “[a] Convention, “taxing the term During 1947 Constitutional record. rarely defined district” was mentioned never Only once were the words E.g., 5 Record 854-55. Convention a together, and here mentioned “taxing districts” “counties” the two. That occurred when was drawn between distinction Jersey for representative of the New Committee Constitutional only equalization, “utter not complained lack of Revision about counties, but between individual taxing districts and between history taxing id. at 740. The properties in the same district.” 5 tax thus indicates that Constitutional of the 1947 clause phrase “taxing delegates commonly Convention understood municipality. district” to be the term supports contention that

More recent caselaw district,” clause, uniformity within the refers “taxing used Municipalities, supra, example, League municipalities. of uniformity clause that the was written Justice O’Hern concluded providing property of that real dedi apparent purpose “with the an municipal purposes never be taxed at cated to tax should (emphasis unequal A.2d 430. burden.” 522 added). of Educ., 242 Borough Bright Department also v. See Sea (App.Div.) (holding A.2d 331 constitution N.J.Super. 576 applicable tax rate to allocation requirement al of uniform not district), regional school cert. among costs constituent members (1990); Township Princeton 127 A.2d 596 denied N.J. Educ., 389, 397, A.2d Jersey Dep’t N.J.Super. v. New (same). (App.Div.1978) Robinson, the case on which the also note that even We should was a Appellate for its conclusion that Division relied district, uniformity taxing describing the purpose when quoted Appellate pages by the Division clause a few after the dicta to that all purpose of the clause “was assure stated that municipality shall bear the same share property unthin a taxable municipality.” 62 N.J. (emphasis at 505 tax burden of that of the added).

Ill special N.J.S.A 18A:54-37 unconstitutional as holding In 9(6), IV, paragraph we of article section legislation violation relief from the two- question appropriate presented are with the implement the county used to system of taxation that was tiered exemption statute. tax challenged only applica- original complaint, Secaucus its taxation, imple- by HCBT system of which

tion of the two-tiered 18A:54-37, omitted assess- mented N.J.SA to the added and explained: Division Appellate As the ments. rate there was no need apply upper-tiered Secaucus contended only taxing was made after levy and omitted assessments because

when added regular budget tax had been funded by vocational school district fully for that year. levy N.J.Super. 1151.] [255 16,1987, that taxes collected trial court directed April On the vocational- be used to reduce and omitted assessments added credit provide purpose of that order was budget. The school by imposed paid upper-tier tax municipalities that to the given to amend its Subsequently, was leave Secaucus HCBT. N.J.S.A 18A:54-37 was unconstitutional allege complaint to reversed and necessary parties. The matter was join other and to court. to the trial remanded decision, 29, 1990, granted relief to the trial court

In its June County municipalities “similarly Hudson situated Secaucus budget payments [HCVS] to the two-tiered application of excess original filing commencing year subsequent to with the full relief from granted trial court complaint in 1986.” The the two-tiered by the elimination of N.J.SA 18A:54-37 incorpo- court remedy the trial Thus the ordered rate municipal- similarly granted situated the relief Secaucus rated 508 (the extending filing 1986 of the April period

ities for the (the May which first date on Secaueus original complaint) to 1988 complaint). issues its amended raised constitutional invalid, any Bayonne urges should the statute be declared that similarly-situated granted financial to be to Secaueus relief year tax thereaf- municipalities only relate to the 1989 should court, remedy by the trial which the partial ter. ordered The affirmed, by Bayonne imper- is to be Appellate Division deemed relief. missible retroactive rejected argument. rightly

The Division Appellate the N.J.Super. partial judgment A.2d 1151. court, noted, “simply the Appellate preserves trial as the Division given non-Bayonne in the period for relief judgment. complaint.” to first That relief not retroactive Id. at 605 A.2d 1151.

Accordingly, judgment Appellate affirm the Division we Bayonne remaining Hud- HCBT debit and credit should County municipalities appropriate added and omitted son May 27,1988, period to and for the assessments for the from 1986 Bayonne, modify year. tax on To ease burden we appro- to Appellate decision to direct HCBT calculate the Division implement pro-rated them on a basis priate and credits and debits period of further affirm the elimina- over a reasonable time. We County rate that tion of the Hudson tax was ordered two-tiered STEIN, J., dissenting. enacting apparently was N.J.S.A. 18A:54~37 City

attempting spare Bayonne responsibility financial Bayonne for a its not vocational school students would attend. pro- high-quality own has maintained its vocational-educational students, Bayonne gram For the Hudson since 1931. program, duplication vocational established in was effort; Bayonne taxpayers, duplication expense. it was a concluding that 18A:54-37 offends the constitutional By N.J.S.A. taxation, majority legislation relating to prohibition special authority unnecessarily Legislature’s with the to bal- interferes majority competing municipal interests. Because the over- ance Court’p principles governing this consid- looks the well-established legislation, I dissent from so much of the Court’s special eration of special legis- unconstitutional judgment as holds the statute uphold validity of the statute. I would lation.

I. provides: N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 Notwithstanding of the New of the of 54 of Title 18A Jersey any provisions chapter having than a of not more of the first class Statutes, any county according included census, decennial each to the latest federal 700,000 municipality a minimum of 20 district which has maintained for years

within a school program or for of federal State vocational education the purposes approved regula- of Education under the of vocational funds the Commissioner allotment or assessment, from -levy Board of Education shall be exempt tion of the State for the use of amounts collection of taxes based any apportionment appropriated vocational school district. of a county man- the constitutional allege that that statute violates Plaintiffs special or pass any private, Legislature shall not “[t]he date that * * * exemption Relating taxation or therefrom.” local laws: Const, ¶ 9(6). IV, 7, generally applica- principles § N.J. art. constitutionality of statutes challenges to the addressed ble that a statute violates consideration of a claim guide likewise our prohibition. special legislation and will not be presumed to be constitutional That statute is “[a] Constitution,” clearly to the repugnant void unless it is declared Newark, 212, N.J. City v. 98 Superior Ass’n Newark of Officers (1985), When a statute is well-established. 486 A. 2d 305 an inter interpretation, courts favor than one susceptible of more Arbour, 25 constitutionality. In re Loch sustaining pretation its (1957). Furthermore, 264-65, party 135 A.2d 663 N.J. special-legislation validity a statute under challenging the of demonstrating clearly has the burden of prohibition of article IV 510 Ass’n, Superior Newark

the constitutional violation. Officers A.2d 305. supra, N.J. at 486 (1977), A.2d 825 Byrne, v. N.J. In Vreeland to determine whether a statute is three-part test we established purpose special consider the legislation. We first unconstitutional Next, question. apply we the law to the factual law in of the appli exclusions the statute’s to determine whether context Finally, we whether a ration can be identified. determine cations object statute on which exists is related to of the al basis may ascertaining In the exclusion classification rest. Ibid. exists, “limited to such a basis we are not whether rational any legislation, but purpose of the should seek conceivable stated Bergen County Mahwah Bd. Township basis.” v. rational of Taxation, 268, 286, A .2d sub cert. denied nom. Mahwah, 1136, 105 Township Borough v. 471 U.S. Demarest (1985). 2677, 86 L.Ed.2d 696 S.Ct. Vreeland, guided supra, that test our consideration validity increased of Associate of a statute that the salaries any Supreme of the but denied that increase to Justices Court might appointed to the who Court member salary during increase the term after enactment of the or he or she elected to serve in the Senate General which had been Assembly. purpose the sole of Court first determined that 298-99, judicial to at the statute was increase salaries. 72 N.J. inquired A .2d 825. The then whether “there are 370 Court act, who, similarly those the persons situated to embraced within act, by operation.” Id. the terms of the are excluded from its at 299, Any Legislature might 825. of who 370 A.2d member vacancy to a the Court was the terms of succeed on excluded considering rational the statute. Ibid. whether some basis exclusion, Court that would “[i]t existed for concluded be suggest among to the Associate fatuous that distinctions exist justify salary to a Court such as differential.” Id. Justices 300, Having .2d found for at 370 A 825. no rational basis exclusion, legislative concluding [would] and that “the intent nearly by exscinding provision this than more realized declar- 825, unconstitutional,” 301, A.2d at id. ing the entire statute from the statute. arbitrary classification the Court excised Ibid. 212, Ass’n, 486 A.2d supra, 98 N.J. Superior In Newark Officers permitted

305, a statute that test to applied the Vreeland we form having “Mayor-Council Plan C” a mayors of first-class cities civil-service police chiefs to unclassified appoint to government legislation object of the that the first determined positions. We and police chief cooperation between provide greater was to A. 2d Id. at the first class. of cities of the administration only applicable was that the statute then observed 818. We requirement of population Jersey City and that the and Newark Acknowledging Ibid. all other cities. acted to exclude the statute drawing on accountability population, and nexus between validity classifica recognition of the judicial earlier by the statute were tions, exclusions created that the we concluded rationally Id. at based. “in decid Ass’n that Superior in explained Newark

We Officers legislation, the determin general special act is ing whether an is included.” Id. and not what is excluded ing factor is what statutory emphasized our focus We also 486 A. 2d 818. Township Hospital, Inc. v. Brick in Paul Kimball exclusions (1981), Inc., in we which 432 A.2d 36 Hospital, special law is the of a particular “the determinant observed objects it excludes.” Id. which appropriateness of equal-protection applicable to principles generally A.2d 36. The propriety similarly applicable to a consideration analysis are Thus, we noted 432 A. 2d 36. statutory Id. at exclusion. Hospital Kimball Paul determining of a classifica- perimeters has wide discretion exactitude, than mathematical less be made tion, substantially distinctions may judgment legislative to exist. for the presumed an factual basis adequate strong in favor of constitutionality, mindful of the presumption We must also be judicial to be void, a statute power reluctance declare and the traditional repugnant to the Constitution. is unless the statute clearly exercised delicately (citations omitted).] A.2d 36 [Id. 446-47, challenge proceed must adjudication special-legislation a Our principles. Generally, uphold we the consti with those accordance party challenging the statute can tutionality of a statute unless the support the exclusion that no rational basis exists to demonstrate Ass’n, supra, ary Superior classification. Newark Officers A.2d 305. II. First, object is threefold. the statute of N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 program that has municipalities that maintain a vocational spares twenty approved funding for at least been for federal State densely-populated years large, counties and are located county contributing funding voca- financial burden of to the turn, exemption serves as an incentive to program. tional preserve quality of their vocational municipalities to those availability operation. Finally, programs continue their and to program municipal high-quality vocational ren- residents of likely program. to attend a vocational ders them less at the local vocational school reduces to some Their attendance program to a vocational-school extent the demand for admission county. operated a first-class which, any, municipalities if are excluded We next consider rationally is based. scope and whether that exclusion statute’s exemption, requires eligible in order to be for the The statute ap- program maintain a vocational municipality must may funding. Funding be withheld proved for State or federal meet the standards programs that do not from local vocational Board of Education and the United States established the State generally N.J.A.C. 6:43-2.1 to Department of Education. See existed for the Unquestionably, a rational basis 3.19. only comprehensive, those

to have selected exempt- in the class regulated programs to be included vocational funding pro- participating in the vocational ed from grams. programs of importance of vocational emphasizing the

Further requires program that also quality, the statute established twenty years. That limitation at least in existence for have been all scope from the of N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 necessarily excludes operating for fewer programs that have been vocational-school designated Surely, could have twenty years. than assuring for twenty years the standard than period shorter sufficiently program well-established that a vocational-school not municipality, we need exemption for its but merit the tax only programs legislative second-guess the rational decision required mea- years twenty or more demonstrate operating durability. quality and sure of any municipality not excludes from the class

The statute also Essex, Bergen, and Hudson are county. in a first-class located Thus, municipali Jersey. only in New only first-class counties eligible for the 18A:54-37 in counties are N.J.S.A. ties those population status is determined exemption. First-class earlier, on “A classification based county. As noted density of the unconstitutional automatically render a law population not does Ass’n, supra, 98 Superior legislation.” Newark special Officers counties have 305. Because first-class N.J. population, largest vocational-student largest population and may overcrowding county-vocational programs potential for counties, prompt arguably than in other greater in first-class municipal encouraging Legislature to focus its attention ing the Although a programs first-class counties. vocational-school may exist vocational schools municipally-operated need counties, irration not condemn as we should other than first-class exemption the tax to restrict Legislature’s determination al the Mahwah, supra, See municipalities in first-class counties. only to “in (emphasizing that 486 A.2d 818 cases, progres may undertake the legislative bodies classification aspects dealing first with those problems sive resolution pressing”). are most of mu- eligibility far described narrow thus

The classifications have in a first-class nicipalities to those located program twenty approved an vocational for at least maintained years. approved programs reveals that no The list of vocational municipality Bergen either in or Essex Counties maintains such twenty Bayonne program maintained its for over program. has years. in first-

N.J.S.A. 18A:54-37 is further limited 700,000. population not than That class counties with a more any municipality limitation not exclude from the benefits of does municipality in a first-class the statute because no 700,000 approved population exceeding has maintained an voca program twenty years for or more. The tional 700,000. Hudson is less than Because we look to what is included, excluded and not what is we need not determine the rationality population cap it because has no effect. As Mahwah, supra, might agree in we not noted “While been, population line should have been drawn where it has we subject legislative submit that that determination is a function many beyond purview considerations of this Court.” 98 N.J. 291, 818; Fury, at rel. v. 486 A.2d see also State ex Owens (S.Ct.1892) 1, (upholding statutory 25 A. 934 classification N.J.L. 50,000 populations that excluded all cities with below or above 100,000). population ceiling municipality

Even if the were to exclude a situated, similarly that is otherwise Court could invalidate statute, ceiling it and sever from the balance of the rather than special legislation. conclude that the statute is unconstitutional as 700,000 population ceiling qualifying no Because the excludes municipalities coverage, Legislature clearly from the statute’s exempting prefer complete its excision to invalidation of the would Mahwah, supra, statute. See 98 N.J. at 486 A.2d 818 (preserving constitutionality by severing grandfather statute’s Vreeland, special legislation); clause that would render statute supra, (finding legislative 370 A.2d 825 intent more N.J. nearly by excising statutory realized irrational classification than unconstitutional). by declaring statute oper 18A:54-37 rationally-based classifications N.J.SA The except Bayonne. That a statute municipalities to exclude all ate only municipality does not render that operates favor of one Mahwah, A.2d 818. supra, 98 N.J. at statute invalid. community, specific of a When a statute addresses the needs could, “other Court should consider whether have, scope.” Ibid. Other time to time come within its exemption provided by municipalities may eligible for the become 18A:54-37; example, Kearny eligible for the will N.J.S.A. year statutory exemption in the 2000.

III. 18A:54-37, actually majority as it concludes that “N.J.S.A legislative classification.” operates represent does not a reasonable conclusion, reaching Supra at 628 A.2d Superior majority the direction of Newark overlooks Officers Ass’n, that courts should not supra 98 N.J. at Legislature in determin judgment their for that of the substitute “If we can legislative classification is rational. ing whether classification, any justify the statute will conceive of reason to 227, majority offers several upheld.” Id. at 486 A.2d 305. The example, justifications statutory For for the classifications. conjecture Legisla majority possible to that the states that “it is development of local special encouraging in ture had a interest densely-populat in most programs education the State’s vocational Nevertheless, 497, Supra A .2d at 296. ed areas.” at Ibid. Our majority possibility that is remote. concludes however, “any if conceivable ration prior holdings emphasize, 818, basis,” Mahwah, exists to supra, 486 A.2d al classification, uphold must justify statutory the Court Vreeland, 818; supra, 72 N.J. at A.2d statute. Id. at Superior explained we in Newark 370 A.2d 825. As Officers Ass’n, supra: generality of reason- of a statute becomes question

Ultimately, speciality distinguish general an a reasonable from unreason- ableness. There is no rule varying being with the facts each one classification, able question practical of reasonableness debata- fairly case. As stated where the previously, question showing that the classifica- The burden of will the classification. ble, courts uphold attacking If we can conceive of the statute. tion is not reasonable is upon party justify will be the statute classification, upheld. reason to any 305] [98 N.J. of the classifications that the reasonableness Because I believe debatable,” least, I are, very “fairly at the 18A:54-37 N.J.S.A. validity of the statute. uphold the would WILENTZ Justice For modification affirmance —Chief CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK and Justices GARIBALDI —5. STEIN and O’HERN —2.

For reversal —Justices

628 A.2d 305 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, D’AGOSTINO, v. JOHN- J. RICHARD JOHNSON, INC., AND RON- ROBERT N. WILSON SON & GELBMAN, ALD G. DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. February August Argued 1993 Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Town of Secaucus v. Hudson County Board of Taxation

Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Date Published: Aug 4, 1993

Citation: 628 A.2d 288

Court Abbreviation: N.J.