211 Wis. 220 | Wis. | 1933
The determination of the controversy in this case depends upon the interpretation of sec. 49.02, Stats., as follows:
“Legal settlements. (4) Every person of full age who shall have resided in any town, village, or city in this state one whole year shall thereby gain a settlement therein; but no residence of a person in any town, village, or city while supported therein as a pauper, shall operate to give such person a settlement therein.”
In this as in every other case involving the construction of a statute, one of the principal considerations is the object and purpose of the enactment. The statute in question is designed to fasten liability for support of a citizen who falls below the level of subsistence, upon the political subdivision 'in which he has his settlement at the time when he becomes dependent. If a person has had his productive years in one political subdivision or is on the way to a recovery to become self-supporting, it is no more than just and proper that the community in which he has lived should bear the burden resulting from his misfortune or incapacity. The statute in question was designed to prevent one municipality from shifting this burden upon another, and the test set up for the acquirement of a settlement by a person who is receiving aid is for the purpose of determining which municipality shall be liable.
Sub. (4) cannot be applied as a mere rule of thumb, disregarding all considerations except the one of aid furnished. It was such considerations that moved the court in Town of Saukville v. Town of Grafton, 68 Wis. 192, 31 N. W. 719, to hold that Ebert, although he had received no aid from the public treasury for four years, nevertheless remained a pauper, having in the interval been supported by one Dengel. Applying the fundamental principle involved in that case to the facts in the case at bar, we find that the Vanderhei family constitutes a marginal case. The trial court found that at all times they were poor and indigent within the meaning of
In cases of this kind we are not helped very much by definitions found in the dictionaries either of law or literature. In this as in all other cases of statutory construction, the legislative intent when once discovered is the controlling feature in determining how the statute should be applied in a particular case. We are well aware that under the reasoning adopted herein there will be cases difficult of decision, but that affords no excuse for adopting a mere rule of thumb which defeats the purpose of the statute and imposes liability upon a municipality in violation of ordinary equitable considerations and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature. No useful purpose will be served by analyzing the various cases cited to our attention. We have examined them, and while there may be expressions in the opinions somewhat inconsistent with the statements made herein, when the cases
By the Coitrt. — Judgment reversed, and cause remanded with directions to enter judgment for the plaintiff.