283 N.Y. 334 | NY | 1940
This action was brought by the town of Putnam Valley to recover from the defendant, a justice of the peace of that town, the sum of twelve hundred thirty dollars and thirty-five cents ($1,230.35) which the plaintiff asserts was unlawfully paid to defendant by the town during the year 1937 on account of claims made by him for compensation for services in criminal proceedings conducted by him during that period. It was alleged that the payments were made under a mistake of law in that the town board did not know at the time of audit and payment, of the limitation on the amount of compensation payable to a justice of the peace under section 27, subdivision 2, of the Town Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 62). In the answer, defendant denies that the payment was excessive or otherwise unlawfully made or that it was made under a mistake of law and sets up affirmative defenses to the effect that the claims for compensation were valid in all respects and in accord with applicable law and that the claims were validly and legally audited and paid by the town board. Each party moved for summary judgment. There being no dispute as to the facts, the Justice at Special Term granted plaintiff's motion and denied defendant's motion and judgment was entered accordingly. Upon appeal to the Appellate Division, second department, the judgment was unanimously affirmed but leave was granted to appeal to this court.
It appears that defendant was a duly elected and acting justice of the peace of the town of Putnam Valley, a town *338 of the second class which was not operating under the budget system authorized by sections 110-121, inclusive, of the Town Law, that no board had fixed the amount of his fees in criminal proceedings and that the amount of such fees was nowhere fixed except in section 740-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure; that, as such justice of the peace during the year 1937, defendant presided at duly constituted Courts of Special Sessions within the town of Putnam Valley in nine hundred and twenty-nine (929) criminal cases under and pursuant to the criminal jurisdiction conferred upon a justice of the peace by the Constitution and laws of the State of New York in which he collected fines of $8,401 which fines were turned over to and accepted by the plaintiff; that he duly presented claims to the town for fees for services rendered in such criminal cases, by the authority of article VI, section 19, of the Constitution of the State as then written and sections 102, subdivision 9, and 103 of the Town Law according to the schedule of fees allowable under section 740-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in the aggregate sum of $4,055.35 which claims the plaintiff duly audited and paid; and that, during the same period, defendant, as a duly constituted member of the town board and of other boards, attended board meetings and committee meetings in furtherance of his duties of town officer and member of the town board of plaintiff for which he presented claims for services, pursuant to section 27, subdivision 2, of the Town Law, aggregating the sum of $185 which claims were, without dispute here, duly audited by the town board at $175 and lawfully paid. It has been stipulated by defendant that he does not urge the defense of voluntary payment.
The town does not claim nor attempt in any manner to assert here that the defendant is not entitled to compensation for services performed by defendant as a member of the town board or that he is not entitled to fees in criminal cases in which he presided at the rates fixed in section 740-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but insists that the gross amount of compensation and fees which he may *339 receive for the eleven months specified could not exceed the sum of three thousand dollars under every and all relevant statutory provisions. Reliance for sustaining that position is placed exclusively upon section 27, subdivision 2, of the Town Law, which, it is urged, provides the absolute ceiling beyond which his total compensation cannot go. That section, so far as material, reads: "Town officers in towns of the second class, except towns which shall have adopted the budget system as provided by sections one hundred ten to one hundred twenty-one, inclusive, of this chapter, shall be entitled to compensation at the following rates for each day actually and necessarily devoted by them to the service of the town in the duties of their respective offices, except for services for which a compensationis otherwise authorized by law: The supervisor, town clerk and justices of the peace, such an amount as the town board may determine, but in no event to exceed six dollars per day. * * * Nor shall the total compensation of said supervisor for services rendered the town, including the allowance to him under authority of section one hundred ten of the highway law, or of any other town officer in such a town, exceed the sum of three thousand dollars per annum." (Italics ours.) (L. 1932, ch. 634, § 27, subd. 2.)
It is asserted that the foregoing provision of the Town Law limiting the total compensation of a justice of the peace in a town of the second class supersedes every other earlier provision of law to the extent inconsistent with that limitation and, to the extent of such inconsistency, every other act relating to such compensation was by implication repealed. With that contention we are unable to agree.
The origin and history of the office of justice of the peace and of his jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases has heretofore been the subject of judicial comment (People v.Kraft,
In addition to the judicial functions which he is authorized and required to perform as a constitutional and judicial officer within the judicial system of the State, he has other functions which he is required to perform for and on behalf of the town and as a town officer (see § 31, subd. 2, and other sections of the Town Law too numerous to detail here) of an administrative and legislative character in which his status is separate and distinct from that of a judicial officer, and for which a compensation is fixed exclusively with sole reference to the performance thereof by section 27, subdivision 2, of the Town Law. The Legislature so conclusively indicated by providing that the compensation referred to in section 27, subdivision 2, was such as is not otherwise authorized by law and by making provision for certain of his fees to be made town charges in section 102, subdivision 9, of the Town Law. Section 147 of the Code of Criminal Procedure includes in the term "magistrate" justices of the peace and there is no definition found in the Town Law to the contrary. Subdivision 9 of section
The last sentence in the section relating to the three thousand dollars total compensation per annum for a justice of the peace first appeared in chapter 634 of the Laws of 1932 and went into effect on January 1, 1934 (Town Law, §
The judgments should be reversed and the motion of defendant for judgment dismissing the complaint should be granted, with costs in all courts.
LEHMAN, Ch. J., LOUGHRAN, FINCH, SEARS, LEWIS and CONWAY, JJ., concur.
Judgments reversed, etc.