225 P. 342 | Utah | 1924
The defendants were convicted before the justice of the peace of Tooele precinct, Tooele county, on a charge of violating an ordinance of the town of Ophir relating to befouling the waters of the stream from which the inhabitants of the town secure their water for domestic and culinary purposes. From the judgment entered upon that conviction they appealed to the district court of Tooele county, were there tried before the court sitting without a jury, and were ordered discharged and their bondsmen released on the ground that the ordinance under which they were prosecuted was invalid. From the judgment the town appeals to this court.
The defendants» move to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the town has no right to take an appeal to this court from the judgment of the district court. If this is a criminal action the town has no right to appeal. It was held by this court, in the ease of Salina City v. Freece, 61 Utah, 574, 216 Pac. 1078, that a city has no right to appeal to this court from an adverse judgment of the district court in a criminal action prosecuted under a city ordinance, before a city justice of the peace, and appealed by the defendant to the district court. The reason is that such an appeal is not authorized by the state Constitution nor by the statutes. There is no
The principal argument made in opposition to the motion now under consideration is directed in support of the proposition that this is a civil, and not a criminal action, .and hence is not to be governed by the rules as to appeal in criminal cases. It is settled law in this state that proceedings under city ordinances are criminal actions, not civil, and are governed by the statutes relating to criminal prosecutions. Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 39 Utah, 260, 116 Pac. 442, 35 L. R.
To make the distinction t which it is suggested the court ought to make, and hold that this is not a criminal case because the act denounced by the ordinance is not made a crime under state law, would result in endless confusion in the administration of the law, not only for all the courts, but also for the prosecuting officers. If that distinction be made, then some prosecutions under municipal ordinances will have to be carried on under the Codg of Criminal Procedure, while others will fall under the Code of Civil Procedure. The two systems differ so substantially, except in regard to the rules of evidence, that before any case could be initiated or go forward the nature of the action would have to be determined. In view of the multitude of penal laws and ordinances now upon the books, which are being steadily augmented by recurring sessions of the Legislature and by the various boards of city commissioners, city councils, and town boards, the court may well pause before it lends a sympathetic ear to a proposition which, if adopted, would affect the situation mainly by adding to its complexity. The
It is due counsel to say that the numerous authorities and cases which he cites in his brief upon this subject have been considered. But the writer is of the opinion that they can have no application in this state because a contrary doctrine has been adopted by the court in the Robinson Case, supra, and that case makes it unnecessary to review those decisions. So, not only for the reasons given in Salt Lake City v. Robinson, supra, but also, it may be pertinent to add, for the additional slight reasons that the Legislature, in section 786x14, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, speaks of proceedings under town ordinances as criminal actions, and this court in two cases (State ex rel. Town of Garland v. Maughan, Judge, 35 Utah 426, 100 Pac. 934, and Richardson v. Capwell, 63 Utah —, 176 Pac. 205) recognized and treated them, although but incidentally, as such, the writer is of opinion, that this is a criminal case.
It follows that the motion ought to be sustained, and the appeal dismissed. Such is the order.