72 Ind. App. 550 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1920
—Appellant, under the name of the town board of the incorporated town of North Judson, filed a petition and plat for the annexation of the unplatted and contiguous territory to the town of North Judson, with the board of commissioners of Starke county-, on March 29, 1916, and át the May term of the-commissioners’ court, after' due notice had been given, the board ordered the unplatted contiguous land annexed as prayed for, and from the judgment appellees appealed to the Starke Circuit Court, from which court the case was taken on change
There was no objection made to the name used by the petitioner, either before the board of commissioners or the circuit court, where it should have been made, if at all. Sinton v. Steamboat R. R. Roberts (1874), 46 Ind. 476. In view of this failure to raise the question we hold that there is no merit in the objection first made in this court. The petition will be considered from the beginning as that of the town of North Judson and the words “town board of” as mere surplusage. Yocum v. Waynesville (1866), 39
It is to be observed that the town of North Judson contains within its present boundaries 850 lots, thirty-five outlots, fifteen acre lots, and about 200 additional acres which are now used as farm lands and for the rights of way of the respective railroads. It does not appear by the finding whether the outlots and tracts of land are occupied by dwelling houses or not, but it does appear by the findings that there are fifty-one business houses, and 358 residences, making a few more than 400 lots that are occupied by some kind of buildings. Even though these buildings occupy the lots, outlots, etc., mentioned above, we still have a surplus of 500 vacant lots which are not used for building purposes. In addition to this there are 200 acres of land now used for farm lands which may also be platted into lots and used for building purposes. In the case of Harris v. Martindale (1908), 42 Ind. App. 633, 86 N. E. 494, the court said: “But such lands should be contiguous to some portion of the town, * * * and should be salable in smaller lots or parcels as town property, or valuable by reason of their adaptability to town uses, or requisite or desirable to furnish premises for business or dwell
In the case of Morford v. Unger (1859), 8 Iowa 82,
In the case of State, ex. rel. v. Minnetonka Village (1894), 57 Minn. 526, 533, 59 N. W. 972, 974, 25 L. R. A. 755, 759, the court said: £ ‘ The law evidently contemplates, as a fundamental condition to a village organization, a compact center or nucleus of population or platted lands; and, in view of the expressed purposes of the act, it is also clear that by the term £lands adjacent thereto’ is meant only those lands lying so near and in such close proximity to the platted portion as to be suburban in their character, and to have some unity of interest with the platted portion in the maintenance of a village government.”
In the case of State, ex rel. v. McReynolds (1875), 61 Mo. 203, the court holds that, where the order of incorporation includes a large tract of farming land, it is without jurisdiction and void, that the officers of the town or'village have no authority to act even within the proper limits thereof. That case involved the construction of statutes not essentially different in principle from the statutes of this state, and the territory involved included 1,200 acres, of which 900 acres was farming land, and about 300 acres was included in the town and additions thereto, and relief was granted against the incorporation of the farming lands.
In the case of City of Covington v. Southgate (1854), 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 491, Southgate- sought to recover against the city certain taxes which he had been compelled to pay on 160 acres of land which he owned, and which without his consent had been included within the city limits by act of the legislature. The land was used exclusively for agricultural purposes and the boundary of the city adjoined it. The court by Chief Justice Marshall, said: “There was no legitimate necessity of the city, which required that this'portion'of Southgate’s land should, at the date of the act which the city procured without and against his consent, or should, even at this time, be included within its boundary. There is little reason to apprehend that when the city actually grows up to the land now in question, the proprietor, whoever he may be, ■ will withhold it from the necessities of a growing population.” The court further said: “The only apparent purpose to be affected by including his land within the city against his consent is that of subject- ■ ing it to taxation for the benefit of the city, and with
While it is our opinion that the facts in such cases could be more safely determined by the board of commissioners, yet it is clear that under the law of this state there is a right of appeal from such board to the circuit court, and that in that court the cause must be tried de novo. The circuit court having found the facts as above set out, upon the facts so found we must hold that there was no right of annexation of the territory Involved.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.