220 Conn. 556 | Conn. | 1991
The dispositive issue of this appeal is whether proposed amendments to the Hamden zoning regulations considered by the named defendant, the Hamden planning and zoning commission (commission), “concern[ed] [a] project” within the meaning of General Statutes § 8-3h
The relevant facts are as follows. In July, 1988, Pellegrino, Homart and Fusco/Gottlieb filed an application with the commission to amend the Hamden zoning regulations for all fifteen Business B-2 and CDD-1 districts located in Hamden.
It is undisputed, however, that the commission was aware that the applicants sought the amendments to enable them to develop a commercial shopping mall, known as Hamden Court, on a thirty-three acre site located at the corner of Dixwell Avenue and Skiff Street (site). The town planner, who acted as the clerk of the commission, knew that these amendments were necessary before the applicants could obtain a special permit for the mall they intended to propose later. At the meeting of the planning section referred to above, Pellegrino had stated that the owners wanted to demolish the existing buildings on the site and construct Ham-den Court. In a letter dated September 29,1988, to the residents of Hamden, Homart had stated, inter alia, that it was “proposing to build Hamden Court Shopping Center at the intersection of Dixwell Avenue and Skiff Street,” and that “[i]n order to develop Hamden Court as proposed by Homart Development Co. and Fusco/Gottlieb Associates, zoning ordinance changes are essential.” Furthermore, in 1987, Homart had filed an application for certain other amendments to the zoning regulations in order to permit it to build a larger mall on the site. The commission had denied that application.
Following the receipt of the recommendation of the planning section, the commission held public hearings
The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court.
The defendants claim that: (1) the proposed amendments did not concern a project within the meaning of § 8-3h and, therefore, the commission was not required to give notice to the plaintiff; (2) § 8-3h does not apply in this case because the traffic created by the Hamden Court mall will not use the plaintiff’s streets to enter and exit the site; (3) the court relied on evidence outside the record; (4) the court erroneously placed the burden of proof on the defendants; (5) the plaintiff had actual notice of the hearing and, therefore, waived its right to statutory notice; (6) § 8-3h notice is not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction;
The defendants’ first claim is that the trial court improperly interpreted § 8-3h when it concluded that the statute applied to the proposed amendments that were before the commission. The defendants argue that § 8-3h should be interpreted as requiring notice to be given to an adjoining municipality only when an application, petition, request or plan proposes on its face a specific project, rather than when it proposes general amendments to zoning regulations that are not confined to one specific site or project. The plaintiff argues, however, that § 8-3h does apply to general zoning amendments and that, in this case, the proposed amendments concerned a project within the meaning of § 8-3h. We agree with the defendants.
Construction of a statute is a question of law for the court. Lees v. Middlesex Ins. Co., 219 Conn. 644, 650, 594 A.2d 952 (1991). “ ‘We approach this question according to well established principles of statutory construction designed to further our fundamental objective of ascertaining and giving effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. State v. Kozlowski, 199 Conn. 667, 673, 509 A.2d 20 (1986); Hayes v. Smith, 194 Conn. 52, 57, 480 A.2d 425 (1984). In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to
We first examine the language of § 8-3h. The statute requires, in pertinent part, that a zoning commission “notify the clerk of any adjoining municipality of the pendency of any application, petition, request or plan concerning any project on any site in which . . . (2) a significant portion of the traffic to the completed project on the site will use streets within the adjoining municipality to enter or exit the site . . . (Emphasis added.) Section 8-3h specifically refers to applications concerning a “project.” Since our zoning statutes do not define the word “project,” we must give the word its plain and ordinary meaning. Bolt Technology Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 213 Conn. 220, 228, 567 A.2d 371 (1989); Carlson v. Kozlowski, 172 Conn. 263, 266, 374 A.2d 207 (1977). When a statute does not define a term, “it is appropriate to look to the common understanding expressed in the law and in dictionaries.” Bolt Technology Corporation v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, supra.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “project” as a “specific plan or design.” Other sections of the General Statutes similarly define “project” in relation to a particular building, structure or facility.
This conclusion is bolstered by an examination of the legislative history of § 8-3h. Section 8-3h was enacted
Furthermore, every example given by the members of the General Assembly who discussed the application of § 8-3h pertained to a specific construction project and not to general amendments to zoning regulations. For example, Representative Miles S. Rapoport noted that “[t]he bill simply requires that in a development project that is close enough to a neighboring town . . . the neighboring town, will be notified . . . ."(Emphasis added.) 30 H.R. Proc., Pt. 16, 1987 Sess., p. 6031, remarks of Representative Miles S. Rapoport. Senator Kevin B. Sullivan remarked that § 8-3h would apply when there are “impacts . . . from a commercial business type of development or from a very large subdivision . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Planning and Development, Pt. 3, 1987 Sess., p. 689, remarks of Senator Kevin B. Sul
The plaintiff contends, however, that § 8-3h should be given a broader interpretation. It argues that general amendments to zoning regulations may, in some cases, concern a project and that in this case they do because the proposed amendments were designed for the construction of the Hamden Court mall to be located on a specific site. In support of its position, the plaintiff notes that the legislature included the use of a “petition,” as well as an “application,” “request” or “plan” as a medium for triggering the notice requirement of § 8-3h. See footnote 1, supra. The plaintiff argues that the legislature uses the word “petition” when referring to proposals to amend zoning regulations, but uses the word “application” when referring to proposals for special permits, special exceptions and variances. Therefore, the plaintiff claims, by specifically including the word “petition” in § 8-3h, the legislature intended that proposed general amendments to zoning regulations would be covered by § 8-3h where those
Statutory words should be interpreted in the context in which they appear. Nichols v. Warren, 209 Conn. 191, 197, 550 A.2d 309 (1988). The use of the word “petition,” when viewed in the context of the entire section, does not support the conclusion that § 8-3h was meant to apply to an application, petition, request or plan for general amendments to zoning regulations that is not, on its face, confined to a specific project. Section 8-3h requires notice when an “application, petition, request or plan concernjs] any project on any site . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The word “project” is used in the same subsection with the word “petition.” A project is ordinarily proposed by a site-specific or structure-specific request, such as a request for a special permit, variance or special exception, and not by general zoning amendments.
Furthermore, § 8-3h requires a commission, within seven days of receipt of an application, petition, request or plan concerning a project, to make certain detailed factual determinations regarding the specific location
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s appeal.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes § 8-3h provides: “notice to adjoining municipalities. The zoning commission of any municipality shall notify the clerk of any adjoining municipality of the pendency of any application, petition, request or plan concerning any project on any site in which: (1) Any portion of the property affected by a decision of such zoning commission is within five hundred feet of the boundary of the adjoining municipality; (2) a significant portion of the traffic to the completed project on the site will use streets within the adjoining municipality to enter or exit the site; (3) a significant portion of the sewer or water drainage from the project on the site will flow through and significantly impact the drainage or sewerage system within the adjoining municipality; or (4) water runoff from the improved site will impact streets or other municipal or private property within the adjoining municipality. Such notice shall be made by certified mail, return receipt requested, and shall be mailed within seven days of the date of receipt of the application, petition, request or plan. No hearing may be conducted on any application, petition, request or plan unless the adjoining municipality has received the notice required under this section. Such adjoining municipality may, through a representative, appear and be heard at any hearing on any such application, petition, request or plan.” (Emphasis added.)
The trial court also concluded that the defendants had not complied with General Statutes § 8-26f. The language of § 8-26f is identical to § 8-3h except that § 8-26f applies to a town’s planning commission. See General Statutes § 8-26f. Therefore, our holding in this case also applies to § 8-26f.
The defendants in this appeal are the commission, Bernard A. Pellegrino, Homart Development Company (Homart), and Fusco/Gottlieb Associates (Fusco/Gottlieb). Homart and Fusco/Gottlieb filed an application with the commission for the amendments to the zoning regulations. Also named as defendants in the trial court were the Hamden town clerk, and the chairman and clerk of the commission, who are not involved in this appeal. We refer herein to the defendants Pellegrino, Homart and Fusco/Gottlieb as the applicants.
The Appellate Court granted certification to appeal from the judgment of the trial court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023.
A Business B-2 district is a business district, and a CDD-1 district is a controlled development district. Hamden Zoning Regs. § 301.
All five amendments were adopted by the commission. A sixth amendment to the regulations was rejected by the commission and is not involved in this appeal.
This case was tried and argued on appeal simultaneously with Protect Hamden/North Haven from Excessive Traffic & Pollution, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 527, 600 A.2d 757 (1991).
We have recently held that the notice required by General Statutes § 8-3h is not a prerequisite for a zoning commission’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Lauer v. Zoning Commission, 220 Conn. 455, 460, 600 A.2d 310 (1991).
Since we conclude that the proposed amendments did not concern a project within the meaning of General Statutes § 8-3h, we need not consider the defendants’ other claims.
See, e.g., General Statutes § 8-39 (i)(“ ‘Housing project’ means any work or undertaking ... (2) to provide decent, safe and sanitary urban or rural dwellings . . . .”) (emphasis added); General Statutes § 8-119e (b) (“ ‘Congregate housing project’ means the planning of the buildings and improvements ... the construction ... of the improvements or all other work
The plaintiff claims that a discerning observer would have understood that the application concerned a project because the applicants responded “Yes” to the question, on the application form, “Any previous petition for the same location?” This response, however, did not necessarily refer to the prior special permit application to build the Hamden Court mall, but referred to the applicant’s prior proposal in 1987 to amend the Business B-2 and CDD-1 zones in Hamden. Therefore, this response was correct because the “same location” was the Business B-2 and CDD-1 zones and not the site of the contemplated Hamden Court mall. Furthermore, under the heading, “Property Owners of Subject Change,” on the application, was the legend, “N/A.” Also, the stated purpose of the application was: “To permit existing zoning regulations to be more compatible with the development of a Shopping Center.” Thus, we reject the plaintiff’s argument that the application on its face referred to a specific project.
Conn. Joint Standing Committee Hearings, Planning and Development, Pt. 3, 1987 Sess., p. 721, remarks of the mayor of West Hartford, Christopher F. Droney. Although we ordinarily review a statute’s legislative history in light of discussions conducted on the floor of the Senate or House of Representatives, we have also considered discussions before joint standing committees when discerning legislative intent. See Elections Review Committee of the Eighth Utilities District v. Freedom of Information Commission, 219 Conn. 685, 695 n.10, 595 A.2d 313 (1991); State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 273-74 n.8, 528 A.2d 760 (1987).
We need not decide at this time whether a request for a zone change regarding a specific site or sites would be covered by General Statutes § 8-3h.
The plaintiff claims that at the special permit stage the commission would have no discretion to deny the special permit application if it conforms to the Hamden regulations. This claim has no merit under the circumstances of this case. Sections 512.3 and 572.2 of the Hamden zoning regulations require, in Business B-2 and CDD-1 districts respectively, special permits for shopping centers and stores containing more than 20,000 square feet of floor area. Moreover, § 826 of the regulations provides that, in passing on a special permit application, the commission “shall give con
General Statutes § 8-3 (c) states in pertinent part: “All petitions requesting a change in the regulations . . . shall be submitted in writing and in a form prescribed by the commission and shall be considered at a public hearing within the period of time permitted under section 8-7d.” (Emphasis added.)
General Statutes § 8-3 (d) states in pertinent part: “Zoning regulations ... or changes therein shall become effective at such time as is fixed by the zoning commission, provided . . . notice of the decision of such commission shall have been published in a newspaper .... In any case in which such notice is not published . . . any applicant or petitioner may provide for the publication of such notice within ten days thereafter.” (Emphasis added.)
Indeed, the form supplied to the applicant by the Hamden zoning commission for the proposed amendment in this case uses both the term “application” and the term “petition.”