58 So. 613 | Ala. | 1912
Lead Opinion
As will be seen from the statement of this case by the reporter, the question for consideration is the right of the municipal corporation of New Decatur to repeal a former ordinance granting to the appellee corporation the right “to construct, operate, and maintain lines of telephone and telegraph, including necessary poles, wires and fixtures, upon and along the highways of the said town,” etc. No time was fixed for the duration of said franchise, and the ordinance provides that “said company shall be subject to all ordinances now in force, or that may hereafter be passed, relative to the use of said highways of said town.” Subsequent to the repealing- ordinance, another was passed May 3, 1904, directing said company to remove its poles and wires from said streets within 30 days, and providing that thereafter the same would be considered as a nuisance, and the prayer of the bill is for a writ of injunction to prevent the enforcement of said ordinance. The original ordinance was an exercise of the governmental powers of the municipal authorities granting a franchise. In our Constitution of 1875 there was added to the section (mrw section 22, Const. 1901) that no ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligations of contracts shall be passed, this additional clause “or making any irrevocable grants of special privileges or immunities shall be passed by the General Assembly.”
We hold, then, that said company cannot rest its rights, upon said section 5817. It results that the court erred in overruling the demurrer to the bill as amended and motion to dissolve the injunction.
The decree of the court is reversed, and a decree will be here rendered sustaining the demurrer to the bill as amended, and granting the motion to dissolve the injunction.
Reversed and rendered.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting.) — The effect of the ordinances of the city complained of in this bill, and which this decision decrees to be valid, is to take from this complainant, the appellee here, several miles of telegraph and telephone lines, upon which for several years it has been collecting tolls as a public service corporation, and to destroy several thousand dollars’ worth of its property. It is not pretended that this is done by reason for any forfeiture, or of any wrong done to or suffered by the appellant; but, if it were, surely it would require at least some kind of judicial proceedings and finding to support the confiscation of this property. It is not claimed by the city that these offending ordinances were passed as police regulations; in fact, the bill avers they were not, and the hearing was on demurrer, which, of course, admitted these averments. But there is no pretense that the ordinances are mere regulations, and they must be sustained, if at all, in the exercise of that reserved power to amend, alter,
I believe that the decision of my Brothers in this cáse is that “first invasion” of that sacred and fundamental principle to which Judge Cooley referred. I think the invasion is not intentional in this case, and that my Brothers do not believe it exists; but I feel sure that it does, and I am writing this dissent in the hope that they will examine authorities cited, and reconsider. I hope that what I have said in this dissent, or in any other that I may hereafter say, will not be considered as some dissents have been considered — a harsh or severe criticism of my Brothers, of their opinion, or decisions. I know, of course, what everybody else knows that they have not and would not any more than I willfully or negligently decide any case wrongly, or ignore or violate any provision of the Constitution, statutes, or the rights of litigants. It is simply an honest difference of opinion as to the law and the rights of the parties involved in this case, and what is said here, however emphatically or spiritedly, is intended only to enforce, to give zest or point to the argument in support of my own contention, and not in disregard or ridicule of the opinion of my Brothers. In my judgment the error into which my Brothers have fallen is due largely, if not. solely, to a wrong construction of sec
As to the reserved powers of repeal, alteration, and revocation, the court has unwittingly extended these too far, and to subjects and purposes not within the contemplation of the Constitution makers. But for section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States, as to impairing the obligation of contracts (and probably some other provisions), the power of the state to amend or revoke' charters Avould be ample without being expressly reserved. The reservation leaves the state just as any other government would be, which is not restrained by express constitutional limitations. It can do whatever any constitutional sovereign can when not restrained; bnt not that which would be inconsistent with or repugnant to all constitutional or civil government principles. It will certainly not be claimed at this late day that any civil government of an English-speaking people has the right to arbitrarily take from corporations or individuals any property which they have rightfully acquired, except for governmental purposes, and then only in the mode and manner provided by law. Such an arbitrary taking of property as is alleged in this bill has never been authorized or allowed by any civil government since Magna Charta; and before that, when the power was exercised, it was recognized and conld be denominated as nothing but pure tyranny.
Judge Cooley, from whom I quote almost literally, says it' is wholly immaterial in what way the property was lawfully acquired, whether by labor, gift, or by profitable use of a franchise; that, if it has become private property, it is then protected by the “law of the land.” The charters of municipal corporations are in
I cannot willingly assent to the doctrine which justifies a municipality in doing what this bill alleges the respondent has done, and will do unless restrained. Such a law in my opinion must of necessity ascribe to a municipality some kind of sovereign right to treat arbi
The reason why such acts as this bill alleges the respondents is doing and will continue to do unless restrained are both void and wrong was probably never better expressed than by Chief Justice Marshall and Johnson, J., in the famous case of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 3 L. Ed. 162. In that case the Legislature of Georgia had done and attempted to do what the town of New Decatur has done and is attempting to do in this case; that is, .after having made numerous grants by one act, they tried to destroy the grants by repealing the act which made them. In speaking of the matter, Marshall, C. J., said: “The principle asserted is that one Legislature is competent to repeal any act which a former Legislature was competent to pass, and that one Legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding Legislature. The correctness of this principle, so far as respects general legislation, can never be controverted. But, if an act be done under a law, a succeeding Legislature cannot undo it. The past cannot be recalled by the most absolute power. Conveyances have been made, those conveyances have vested legal estates, and, if those estates may be seized by the sovereign authority, still that they originally vested is a fact, and cannot cease to be a fact. When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when absolute rights have
The majority opinion bases the decision chiefly upon its construction of section 22 of the Bill of Bights. It reads as follows: “That (1) no ex post facto, (2) or any other law impairing the obligation of contracts, (3) or (law) making any irrevocable grants of special privileges or immunities shall be passed by the Legislature; (4) and every grant, or franchise, privilege, or immunity, shall forever remain subject to revocation, alteration or amendment.” (Paranthetical numbers
The opinion is as wrong in its genealogy of this section of the Bill of Rights, as it is in its construction of it. The last clause of this section, which I have numbered 4, the one the opinion relies upon as conferring both the right and the power upon a municipal corporation to destroy the property of telegraph and telephone companies, was not in the Constitution of 1875, but appeared for the first time, in the Constitution of 1901.
My Brothers Avholly overlook the first and second clauses, which constitute the head and body of the section, and Avhich have always been in all our Constitutions, and in all other Bills of Bights. The third and fourth are only tails, or appendages; one being added by the Constitutional Convention of 1875, and the other by that of 1901. Like a kite, it may now need a tail to properly fly; but the whole strength and virtue of the section does not reside in the tail, so as to make it a “kangaroo clause,” or a case of “the tail’s Avagging the dog,” or so as to liken it to the fabled jointed snake which had a construction and a “little movement all its OAvn,” by Avhich with its tail it could lop off its head and its body at will. Certainly the third and fourth clauses of this section of the Constitution ought not to be so construed as to violate the first and second, or any other
I know that my Brothers do not think their construction complained of has the effect of violating these other provisions of the Constitution to which I refer; but I am writing this dissertation to try to show that it does have this effect. I heartily agree with the majority when they say in the opinion: “Subsequent to the adoption of said Constitution (that of 1875) every ordinance of a municipal corporation in the exercise of its legislative powers must be construed as if that section (22) of the Constitution was written into it.” And, may I not add, every other section of the Constitution and every other general law of the state that is applicable. The Constitution expressly provides that municipalities shall not be authorized to pass laws inconsistent with the general laws of the state. While the court recognizes and announces this proposition, it straightway imoceeds to construe the ordinances as if the last clause of section 22 of the Constitution was all the law applicable to the ordinance. As I have heretofore said, and will now point out fully, the last clause of section 22 was not in the Constitution of 1875, but appeared for the first time in the Constitution of 1901; yet the majority make it applicable to a law passed in 1898. By this construction what becomes of the first clause of section 22, that no ex post facto law shall be passed? Why not read the first and second clauses into the second and third ordinances, as well as to read the fourth clause into the first ordinance? The second and third ordinances construed by the court, if valid, destroy thousands of dollars worth of property and hundreds, if not thousands, of contracts. What becomes of the second clause of section 22, which says that the obligation of contracts shall not be impaired? What becomes of the
What becomes of section 5817 of the Code, AAdiich is the general law of uniform operation which the Constitution directed the Legislature to pass in order to give effect to the constitutional provisions? This section reads as folloivs: “The right of Avay is granted to any person or corporation having the right to construct telegraph and telephone lines Avitliin this state to construct them along the margin of public higliAvays.” The majority opinion attempts to ansAver this question by saying that “public highways” as used in that statute does not include “streets.” If not, AAdiy not? Because the opinion says that, that section of the Code is found in the chapter relating to “public roads,”' and therefore the Avorcl “highAvays,” as used in the section must be limited so as to exclude “streets.” I do not think this is a reasonable construction of the word “highways” as used in this section of the Code, for the following reasons: This statute Avas originally passed by the Legislature in
If it does not include “streets,” .then it does not include “railroads.” How can the statute be general and uniform if it applies to one kind of-highways, and not to another? If the Legislature had intended that the stat-' ute should apply only to “public roads,” would they not have said “public roads,” instead of “highways,” which includes both these and many other ways?- Is it not a matter of common knowledge that this statute was applied to streets and to railroads for 35 years or more before it Avas ever applied or used as to public roads9 It is only Avithin the last 15 or 20 years that telegraph and telephone lines have been used along the public roads, yet the term has been used and applied to both streets and railroads since the laAV Avas first enacted. The stat
It was decided by the federal court in the case of Southern Bell, etc., Co. v. Mobile (C. C.) 162 Fed. 523, construing this identical phrase and statute, that the term “highways” embraces city streets within the meaning of the statute, and that it includes urban as well as rural highways; and in that case it was further held that this statute gave telegraph and telephone companies the right to occupy the streets and alleys in cities and incorporated towns without authority from such cities and towns. While this decision is not binding on this court, it ought to be strongly persuasive when it is in accord with all the adjudged cases construing statutes of other states, identical in purpose and almost identical in verbiage. The word “highway” is a generic term. It is the genus of all kinds of public ways, including roads, streets, alleys, turnpikes, railroads, tramways, bridges, ferries, canals, and navigable rivers. Chancellor Kent defined “highway” in his Commentaries as “every thoroughfare which is used by the public, whether it be a carriageway, a horseway, a footway, or a navigable river.” The term has been held to include “so much of a public square as is around a courthouse and devoted to the public.” It has been held to include the sidewalks of a city. The word “street” imports a highway. — Eap. Law Diet. p. 1226. It is said by the Supreme Court of Florida that the meaning of the term “street” is not sufficiently broad to include all highways, though all streets are embraced in the generic term “highway.”- — Duval v. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196, 18 South. 339, 29 L. R. A. 416. Bouvier’s Dictionary de
I can .see’ no reason why the word “highways” as used in this statute should he limited to rural highways. It is matter of common knowledge that telegraph and telephone companies have always had their offices in the business center of municipalities, and that they rarely, if ever, deliver messages from their wires at private residences on rural highways, though their poles and wires extend over or along the same. It is true that telephone lines have been recently extended along the rural highways, and into the private homes of people living in the country; but it is equally true that they go to the homes of people in the cities, and that the homes of people in city and country are now connected by such wires to the mutual comfort and advantage of the inhabitants of both.
I cannot think that it was the intention of the Legislature in enacting section 5817 of the Code to provide that telegraph and telephone lines should be constructed along rural highways, but not upon and along the streets of towns and cities. There is certainly no reason why these companies should have a right to erect their lines upon the country roads, while the people in the towns or cities should be denied the conveniences and aclvant
But it was never supposed and has never been contend.ed that such reserved powers, no matter where inserted in the Constitution, in the charter, nor in what language expressed, authorized the state, the Legislature, or a municipality to ignore or avoid other constitutional questions, such as due process of law, the obligation of contracts, ex post facto laws, etc. It has been uniformly decided that such reserved powers go hand in hand with other rights and privileges secured and granted by the Constitution. In other words, it was never supposed that these reserved powers authorized the sovereign state to deny and disregard in any way the inalienable rights secured to the citizen by the Bills of Rights. It has been uniformly decided, so far as I am advised, by all courts, that alterations or repeals will never be allowed, no matter what the reserved power may be, that will disturb vested rights or operate in confiscation of property, or that will impair the obligation of contracts, or that would defeat or substantially impair a prior or original contract or grant of corporeal property, or that would deprive a corporation of its property, or
My Brothers have evidently failed to observe the distinction which the law makes between franchises and charters. A charter is a mere receptacle of the corporation’s franchise, and is not the franchise itself. The charter is the evidence that a franchise has been granted, and is usually the only evidence of the grant. The constitutional inhibition against impairing the obligation of contracts is not operative upon the charter, but upon the franchises which the charter contains; and it protects certain franchises because they are valuable corporeal property or contract rights. It has been said by some courts that a municipal corporation cannot grant a franchise, but can only confer a privilege. It would seem to be more correct to say that a franchise
The grant of a public franchise to a public service corporation is a contract between the state and the private corporation, in consideration of which the latter undertakes to perform certain public duties from which it cannot release itself without the consent of the state. This grant may be made by the state through its agent, a municipal corporation. The right of municipalities to govern or control the location and operation of such public service corporations depends upon the constitutional and statutory provisions governing the respective localities in which the business is carried on. A cor
In support of the above proposition, Mr. Jones cites many authorities, and all that I have examined support the text. Mr. Thompson states the rule as follows: “Municipal ordinances under certain conditions stand upon the same footing as charters as to their contractual relation. When they grant franchises on stated conditions, which are accepted, such grant then constitutes a contract between the municipality and the corporation, and the corporation is entitled to protection against subsequent legislation which would impair its obligation. Contracts which are made by municipal ordinances, under authority conferred by the Legislature, are protected against laws impairing their obligation.” —Thompson on Corp. § 328. To this text the author cites a great number of adjudged cases, among them those of the Supreme Court of the United States and of this court. A municipal ordinance granting a particular telegraph or telephone company authority to construct and maintain lines on its streets without limitation as to time, and for a consideration stipulated, when accepted and acted on by such company by compliance with all the conditions imposed, and having constructed valuable plants in pursuance of such authority granted, thereby acquires the features of a contract which the ■city cannot thereafter abolish or alter in any essential manner without the consent of the said company. — N.
It was also held in the case of Jersey City, 49 N. J. Law, 303, 18 Atl. 123, 60 Am. Rep. 619, that a municipality could not revoke a former ordinance or resolution, which authorized the use of streets by telephone companies, when they had conformed to the conditions of the first ordinance, and had expended money in placing poles upon designated streets; that, while it was competent for the municipality to couple with the permission to so use the streets, such reasonable conditions as the occupancy of public streets would suggest, and that while the erection and maintenance of the appliances of the business would be subject to the reasonable control of the municipal by-laws, the council could not at its mere will annul the former act which legalize the occupation of the streets and declare the property of the company so used to be a nuisance; thus destroying the property and business of the company. It has been held' that ordinances conferring easements in streets, though in excess of the power of the municipality or of the Legislature, were not necessarily void in toto, but might be valid in part, as, where the ordinance conferred an exclusive right when the municipality had no power to grant such exclusive right, the ordinance was held valid in so far as it conveyed a right which was subjected to the right of the city to grant like privileges in the same streets to others. — Morristown v. East Tenn. Co., 115 Fed. 304, 53 C. C. A. 132; Birmingham Co. v. Birmingham Co., 79 Ala. 465, 58 Am. Rep. 615; Weller v. Gadsden, 141 Ala. 658, 37 South. 682, 3 Ann. Cas. 981. This idéntical ordinance under consideration was held by this court not to be exclusive or void, and that it allowed other like corporations to use the same streets for like
It was said by this court in the case of Port of Mobile v. L. & N. R. Co., 84 Ala. 119, 4 South. 106, Am. St. Rep. 342, that the Legislature under the general police power inherent in the state had a constitutional power to grant the right to construct a public utility through the streets of a city, and that, after such permission had been granted and the public utility constructed, it did not lie in the mouth of any one to complain that, the changed use of the street would per se be a nuisance;, and that the grant of such a privilege is obviously a franchise of the most valuable kind, and that it is certainly a “right, privilege, or franchise” within the meaning of the company’s charter, and, when it is accepted and exercised by the corporation to which it is granted,, it becomes a contract between the state and such corporation, and as such has always been protected from destruction by legislative action by virtue of both the federal and state Constitutions, each of which prohibits the passage of any law by which the obligation of existing contracts is impaired or arrested; that such a privilege is none the less a franchise when accepted and exercised because it was not granted directly by legislative enactment, but by municipal authority under the sanction of the charter of the corporation, which itself is a legislative enactment. What was said in that case with regard to the right of a railroad company is equally applicable and true in this case as to the right of a telephone and telegraph company. The telephone company in this case having acquired valuable property and contract rights by virtue of the legislative and municipal grants conferred upon it, and having accepted such grants and having erected its poles and wires, and engaged in the business which it was authorized by the
What was said by the Supreme Court of New York in the famous case of People v. O’Brien, 111 N. Y. 1, 40, 41, 18 N. E. 692, 698, 699 (2 L. R. A. 255, 7 Am. St. Rep. 684), is strikingly appropriate here: “When we consider the generality with which investments have been made in securities based upon corporate franchises throughout the whole country, the numerous laws adopted in the several states providing for their security aud enjoyment, and the extent of litigation conducted in the various courts, state and federal, in which they have been upheld and enforced, there is no question but-that, in the view of Legislatures, courts, and the public at large, certain corporate franchises have been uniformly regarded as indestructible by legislative authority, and as constituting property in the highest sense of the term. It is, however, earnestly contended for the state that such a franchise is a mere license or privilege enjoyable during- the life of the grantee only, and revocable at the will of the state. We believe this proposition to be not only repugnant to justice and reason, but contrary to the uniform course of authority in this country. ■ The laws of this state have made such interests taxable, inheritable, alienable, subject to levy and sale under execution, to condemnation under the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and invested them with the attributes of property generally.” The franchise sought to be protected' by this bill was acquired by this complainant after it legally became a corporation, and the title and right thereto was- in all things legally acquired by it, and was in all things con
The majority also fall into error in holding that the first ordinance was an exercise of legislative or governmental powers of a municipality, other than the proprietary, private, contractual, or business powers. This question has, if not uniformly, by a great weight of authority, been decided to the contrary. This court is among the number, and therefore by implication overrules its former decisions along this line. While so far as I know this court has not held that an ordinance authorizing the use of its streets by telegraph and telephone companies was the exercise of its private or proprietary rights and powers, yet they have held that an ordinance granting the right to use the streets for waterworks and for railways was tire exercise of private, proprietary, or business power, and not governmental. Surely there is no difference in principle in authorizing and in contracting with public service corporations to use the streets in consideration of furnishing the citizens with the means of acquiring and transmitting intelligence than in transportation of freight or passengers, or furnishing water or gas, etc., to the citizens. In the case of Mobile v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 84 Ala. 119, 4 South. 106. 5 Am. St. Rep. 342, it was held
It is true, as Brother Simpson says in the majority opinion, the other members did not concur in nor dissent from all that was said by the writer of the opinion; but the same doctrine had been decided by this court in the case of Greenville Waterworks Co., 125 Ala. 625, 27 South. 764, and was subsequently announced by Denson, J., in the case of Bessemer v. Bessemer Water Works, 152 Ala. 406, 44 South. 663, in a case construing a similar ordinance, which was concurred, in by all the justices who participated in the decision. In that case the court spoke as follows: “Our own court has held that a city in making a contract for water to be supplied to itself and its inhabitants is not in the exercise of its governmental, but of its proprietary or business, powers, and is governed by the rules applicable to business corporations; the purpose in making
As to there being no consideration to support the grant of the charter or franchise by the state or the municipality, the contract in such cases is one of the examples which the law books afford that needs no independent consideration, not even Blackstone’s common-law pepper-corn. The making or confirming of the gift, or right by the sovereign, and the acceptance of the same by the public service corporation, whereby it agrees to serve the public and to discharge a part of the duties of the sovereign, is the consideration the law contemplates. The corporation may, and sometimes does, pay large sums, in addition, for these rights, and the sovereign may, of course, demand as a prerequisite, if it will; but it is not at all necessary. And after the grant is made the courts cannot inquire into the consideration therefor. This is not the function or office of courts in such cases. This court has spoken on this subject in unmistakable language: “Every corporation is invested with privileges which distinguish it from natural persons, and do not pertain to the people generally. The perpetuity, right of succession, and of suing and being sued in a corporate name, and of exemptions from liability on the part of the corporators to its debts beyond their stock, are privileges characterizing almost all corporations. A still higher privilege is that conferred upon all companies organized for public service to build roads, etc., of subjecting private property to their use upon making compensation. The conferring of none of these or the like privileges has ever been supposed to involve an infringement of the constitutional provisions as to exclusive privileges. If it did, every act of incorporation ever granted in the state would be void. The theory of every corporation is that tbe
The third ordinance of which this bill chiefly complains is wholly judicial action, and not legislative. It reads more like a final judgment or decree of a court of chancery, declaring the telegraph and telephone company and business a nuisance, and directing its abatement and destruction, than it does like a legislative act or a municipal ordinance. It undertakes to determine what the law and the facts were, as well as what the rights of the parties were, with reference to transactions already had and past between them. It does not attempt to prescribe what the law shall be in the future. It is, in short, a judicial foreclosure of the respondent’s rights to its property, contracts, and business in the town of New Decatur. This is clearly an act of usurpation of judicial power, such as the Constitution prohibits even the Legislature from exercising. The majority opinion does not inform us when, where, or how the tOAvn of New Decatur acquired the right or poAver to decree the property of the telegraph and telephone company a nuisance, and destroy it without any judicial proceeding. This court has uniformly (heretofore) held that a municipal corporation cannot at pleasure, by its mere ipse dixit, declare to be a nuisance any thing or business Avhtch is not in fact or in laAV such. — Town of Cuba v. Mississippi Oil Company, 150 Ala. 259, 43
Probably the earliest declaration of the Legislature of this state with regard to the right of telegraph companies to use the highways of the state was that of December 17, 1855 (Acts 1855-56, p. 6), which, among other things, provided that a right of way urns granted to any person having the right to construct telegraph lines within this state upon the margin of any public highway. This part of the act first appeared in code form as section 1364 of the Revised Code of 1867, and has reappeared in all subsequent Codes, and now appears as section 5817 of the Code of 1907, without any charge, except to add “telephones,” where it is practically the same as when it appeared in the Revised Code, with the addition that the right is extended to corporations as well as persons and to telephone as well as telegraph lines. A great number of other acts have been passed by the Legislature relative to the rights of telegraph and telephone companies to.do business in this state, both as to domestic and foreign corporations. The right
Mr. Joyce, in his recent work on Electrical Law, I think has stated the law accurately and succinctly upon this subject. He says: ■ “The Post Roads Act confers a right and not a mere privilege to construct, maintain, and operate telegraph lines in the manner provided, and upon, over, and along the places specified. A plenary power is granted for the benefit of the public and of. the government of the United States, having in view the' growing necessities of commerce and the needs of the postal service; but, while the statute confers this right, it may not be exercised absolutely and under all circumstances. It cannot, as will hereafter appear, be taken away by hostile state legislation, nor can such legislation operate to prevent placing telegraph lines upon, over, along, or under the places designated in said Post Roads Act. Nor after such lines are located there may the use of them be stopped by state or municipal legislation,” etc. Section 62. * * * The telegraph is indispensable as a means of interstate communication. This power to regulate interstate com- . merce and to establish post offices and post roads is exclusive of hostile legislation, and this is true as to the power to regulate telegraph companies in respect to
This being the undoubted law, it followed that the acts complained of in this bill were clearly void, because in violation of the federal laws. The object and end of legislative power, under our republican and constitutional form of goArernment, necessarily places certain limits and restrictions upon the exercise of that power. It is not omnipotent power, by any means, which is thus conferred upon the laAvmaking body. This results from the very nature of the government itself. There are certain things AA’hich neither the federal nor the state Legislature can do, Avithout exceeding its authority. There are underlying our form of government certain necessary, vital, and basic principles intended to prevent the abuse of poAvers thus conferred upon the legislative departments. They cannot authorize a manifest injustice by a legislative enactment which takes aAvay or disregards the security of personal liberty, of life, and of property, for the conservation of which the very government itself was established. If a municipality by a mere ordinance can do what the town of New-Decatur professes it can do, and proposes to do, in this case, unless restrained, it Avould be difficult to conceive
Dissenting Opinion
I join Justice Mayfield in the dissent from the majority holding, but wish to rest my conclusion on the one fact — that the complainant was authorized by the statute, section 2490 of the Code of 1890 [5817, Code of 1907] to erect its line along the margin of the streets of New Decatur, whether with or without the consent of the municipality. This authority being given by the Legislature, the municipality had no right to declare the poles and wires of complainant a nuisance per se or to order them removed, and in my opinion the bill contains equity. The statute says: “The right of way is granted to any person or corporation having the right to construct telegraph or telephone lines within this state to construct them along the margin of public highways.” “The term ‘highway/ as used in the statutes, is generally held to include streets, unless the statute itself indicates a different intention.” — 28 Cyc. 834, and many cases cited in note 9. I do not think that the statute in question indicates that the word “highways” should include only rural roads; fox*, while it appeal’s in a chapter pertaining to public roads, the word “roads” is used in every section except this one, where the word “highways” is substituted, thxxs evincing a legislative intent not to confine the right to roads elsewhere dealt with in the chapter, but to extend it to all highways and to use a word that
It may be true that the right could not now be given by the Legislature without the consent of the municipality (section 220 of the Constitution of 1901), but this constitutional restriction did not exist when this complainant’s vendor first constructed its line upon the streets of New Decatur. On the other hand it may be conceded that the right was derived from the city, was contractual, and authorized by the charter of the municipality, as is indicated by the majority opinion, yet I cannot agree that the ordinance reserved the right to revoke the contract or that section 23 of the Constitution does so. To my mind, section 3 of the ordinance merely reserved the right to regulate and control the use of the streets, and did not reserve the right to revoke the grant or contract. Therefore, if the grant was authorized, as my Brothers hold, then it became a contract, and as such it has always been protected from impairment by the federal and state Constitutions, each of which prohibits the passage of any law by which the obligation of any existing- contract is impaired or lessened. — Mobile v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 84 Ala. 115, 4 South. 106, 5 Am. St. Rep. 342. This case dealt with a grant similar to the present one, and is an authority in point, that it is a binding contract to be protected
As stated in the outset, I think the grant Avas under section 5817 of the Code, and not under an ordinance of the city, and the other questions could well be pretermitted, but as the majority hold that the statute does not apply and the grant is derived from the ordinance, and which Avas authorized, which I merely assume but do not decide, then I think that the respondent did not reserve the right to revoke, nor does section 23 of the Constitution do so for it.
Rehearing
ON REHEARING.
The ordinance involved in this case is clearly an exercise of the governmental functions of the city. It has none of the elements of a contract, but is purely a grant of the right to place poles in the streets by the governing body of the city. The company did not bind itself to do anything, but Avas free to enter upon the work or not, as it might choose, could not have been forced by the city to act at all, and, even after it had erected its poles, it might have removed them and ceased to do business, at any time, without a violation of any contractual obligations. As shoAvn in the original opinion in this case, every ordinance granting special privileges must be construed as if section 23
The Alabama cases referred to were dealing simply with the exclusive feature of the section of the Constitution, and consequently there was no necessity for discussing the right of revocation. In fact, they derived the exclusive feature from the revocability of the grant.
To construe this section of the Constitution as referring merely to monopolies, or to exclusive grants, is simply to write out of the Constitution its important word, and to write into it other words. The section in question does not mention monopolies, nor is the word “exclusive” in it. It provides merely that “no ex post facto law, or any law impairing the obligation of contracts or making any irrevocable grants of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed by the General Assembly.” And, when the Constitution of 1901 was adopted (section 22), it emphasized the expression, providing, not that no irrevocable grant of exclusive privileges shall be made, but that “no irrevocable grant or exclusive grant” of special privileges shall be made, and provides that “every grant,” etc., shall forever remain subject to revocation. So its prohibition is against making any irrevocable grant. In other words, the decisions are based On the reasoning that inasmuch as the Constitution has forbidden the making of any irrevocable grant, and can revoke any such grant in toto, it necessarily follows that it can revoke it in part, by granting the same franchise to another. The argument to the contrary is to say that, because the Supreme Court has declared that something not specially mentioned in the Constitution (to wit, exclusive grants) is included in its prohibition, therefore the subject which is dis
The following Alabama cases referred to contracts by which certain companies entered into agreements to construct and operate certain works for the benefit of the city, and the city, in turn, granted certain franchises. In Weller et al. v. City of Gadsden, et al., 141 Ala. 642, 37 South. 682, 3 Ann. Cas. 981, the ordinance in question involved a contract, by which the water company agreed to furnish the city with water for fire' plugs and hydrants, and to furnish water free of charge for certain public buildings and fountains, and for sprinkling the streets, in consideration of which the franchise was granted. In City of Gadsden et al. v. Mitchell et al, 145 Ala. 137, 156, 40 South. 557, 558 (6 L. R. A. [N. S.] 781, 117 Am. St. Rep. 20), the same contract or ordinance was before this court, and the evidence showed that the ordinance had not been repealed, but, on the contrary, that another ordinance had been passed showing that certain modifications had been agreed upon, “and the original contract was in all things ratified and confirmed, and declared to be in full force.” The party demanded of the city to do certain
What has been said of this constitutional provision is absolutely decisive of this case, but, in addition, the numerous cases cited by counsel in opposition to this rehearing are at least persuasive, if not conclusive to the proposition, that any grant of such privileges, without any limit of time, must necessarily be a mere license, which is revocable.
I think the application for a rehearing should be overruled, and in this opinion Dowdeld, C. J., and McClellan, J., concur, but as a majority of the court, for various reasons expressed in their several opinions, hold that the rehearing should be granted, the judgment of reversal is set aside, and a judgment of affirmance entered.
Affirmed.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring.) — In view of some differences among the members of the court in respect to the law of the case I prefer to state the reasons for my opinion that the decree should be affirmed.
In 1898 the town of New Decatur adopted an ordinance granting to the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York, its successors and assigns, the right to construct, operate, and maintain lines of telephone and telegraph, including the necessary poles, wires, and fixtures, upon, along, and under the highways of the town. Conditions of the grant were that all poles should be neat, straight, and symmetrical, and so located as not to interfere with the public use of
As for the meaning of that provision of the Constitution of 1875, of force at the time this franchise was granted, inhibiting laws making irrevocable grants of special privileges or immunities, that has been settled by the decisions of this court. In the case of Birmingham Railway Companies, 79 Ala. 465, 58 Am. Rep. 615, it was-said that the evil intended to be specially prevented was the legislative granting of exclusive privileges in the nature of monopolies. The language of the opinion is: “What, it may be asked, is the nature of these special or exclusive privileges which are thus prohibited to be granted by the Legislature? It seems plain from the very terms used that the evil intended to be specially prohibited was the granting of special privileges in the nature of a monopoly by the legislative creation of corporate franchises.” And on page 475 of 79 Ala. (58 Am. Rep. 615) : “The policy of the law, as now declared by our Constitution, is as clear in the condemnation of the grant of irrevocable exclusive privileges conferred by franchise as that of the common law was in the reprobation of pure monopolies.” The constitutional provision and the decision to which I have referred were correctly interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States in Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 186 U. S. 213, 22 Sup. Ct. 824, 46 L. Ed. 1132, where it was said, after referring to our case: “By a separate section of the Constitution, it is declared that the Legislature shall pass no act ‘making an irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities.’ While that body may grant special privileges and immunities to build waterworks, construct railways, or other works of public utility, and by a failure to duplicate a grant make it in effect for the time being exclu
The language of the ordinance in this case was “that the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, its successors and assigns, be and the same is hereby granted the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate
Municipal corporations, exercising a part of the sovereign power of the state by delegation, must be able to show legislative authority for the acts which they undertake to perform. A reasonable doubt will be re
The power to control the streets, the power exercised in the grant of this franchise, is legislative, but it may be and commonly is delegated to municipal corporations, and was so delegated in this case. But the authorities everywhere recognize the presence of the contractual element in franchises of this character when, accepted and acted on, no specific right of-revocation being reserved. On the other hand, the police power, the power to take ample care for the morals, health, safety, and convenience of the people cannot be bartered away. “The right to use a highway or street is taken, affected with the implied condition that the highway or street shall not be used in such manner as to destroy its proper and legitimate use by the public at all times.”— Grand Trunk Railway v. South Bend, 174 Ind. 203, 89 N. E. 885, 91 N. E. 809, where many cases are cited. The relation between inviolability of contracts and the police power in such cases was thus stated by Chief Justice Fuller: “The governmental power of self-protection cannot be contracted away, nor can the exercise of rights granted, nor the use of property, be withdrawn from the implied liability to governmental regulation in particulars essential to the preservation of the community from injury.” — N. Y. & N. E. R. R. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 567, 14 Sup. Ct, 437, 38 L. Ed. 269. In the cases I have seen in which the contract rights of the grantees of franchises have been made to yield to the exercise of the police power some residuum of the original privilege has been preserved, as for example, in Railroad Company v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 521, 24 L. Ed. 734, where a steam railroad was required after 40 years to abandon the use of steam along a street; as in C., B. & Q. R. R. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S. 57, 18
The course of the municipality cannot be justified on the facts stated in the bill. The ordinances complained of cannot be taken as an effectual judgment of forfeiture of appellee’s franchise for abuse or misuse, though it was doubtless so intended. That would require judicial proceedings. Nor were they a legitimate exercise of the police power. “The public necessity of the exercise of the police power in any case is a matter addressed to the discretion of the Legislature, but whether a given regulation is a reasonable restriction upon personal rights is a judicial question.” — Tiedman on Police Power, § 214. And the presumption is in favor of the reasonableness of -the ordinance condemning appellee’s poles and wires as a nuisance. — Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361, 45 Am. Rep. 85; Grand Trunk Railway v. South Bend, 174 Ind. 203, 89 N. E. 885, 91 N.