Town of Moorcroft v. Lang

negligence impact comparative co-employees Haapapuro, on of Rand Leonard rule, Gradert, Foster, danger concluding Danny and and the sum- obvious mary judgment dan- appellees those situations wherein obvious for those is af- ger negate duty operates Alternatively, rule on be- the record does dis- firmed. i.e., property operates genuine half of the close issues of material fact as to owner— ,PP recovery negligence appellees nar- L as an absolute bar & and —were dangers presented by Dunn, and, therefore, rowly limited to natu- Weldon we reverse conditions, particularly rally existing summary judgment accu- entered favor appellees. of ice and snow. We held those mulations that, plaintiff in that where O’Donnell part, part, Affirmed in reversed in and dangerous obviously an case encountered proceedings. remanded for further municipal created defen- condition dant, negligence plaintiff was negligence compared defen- in that case: “Gone are

dant. We stated negligence by days when a scintilla plaintiff recovery.” at will Id. .bar

1284. Jones, 897-98, quoted 718 P.2d at we ap- from and noted the limited MOORCROFT, O’Donnell Wyoming, TOWN OF duty” plication danger of the “no obvious Appellant (Defendant), rule: Company, Lincoln Land a former Nebras- obvious-danger rule, Under owner (dissolved corporation August 5, ka duty has no to his invitees 1974), any and and all successors danger “to correct an obvious and known interest, heirs, executors, administra- resulting from natural causes.” O’Don- (De- tors, thereof, assigns trustees and Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d nell v. fendants), (1985); Note, see also Danger Qualified Rule—A v.

Obvious Adoption Secondary Assumption of Gladys LANG, Hays, D. Robert H. Analysis, Risk Land & Water L.Rev. (Plaintiffs). Evelyn Hinz, Appellees J. obvious-danger But the rule COMPANY, apply dangerous LAND LINCOLN a former does not when a condi- (dissolved corporation Nebraska tion is created Au- the owner or his ser- gust 1974), any and all succes- City Casper, vants. O’Donnell su- interest, heirs, executors, sors pra, at 1283. ad- ministrators, assigns trustees added.) Thus, (Emphasis we held Jones thereof, Appellants (Defendants), that, danger even if the created defendant perfectly owner was Moorcroft, Wyoming, Town of plaintiff, jury’s obvious to the (Defendant), comparative function negligence under the compare plaintiffs negli- statute to gence Jones, with that of the defendant. Gladys LANG, Hays, D. Robert H. 718 P.2d at 898. The same is true in the (Plaintiffs). Evelyn Hinz, Appellees H. instant case. To the extent the district 87-182, Nos. 87-183. upon assumption court relied of the risk Supreme Court of Wyoming. danger granting and the obvious rule in summary judgment to PP & L and Weldon Sept. Dunn, it inwas error. summarize,

To appellant we hold that genuine

failed to demonstrate a factual is- respect culpable negligence

sue with

repeat them in here. The decision detail rights held that the mineral alleys of Moorcroft streets and Town original remained in the dedicator. Upon rehearing, parties addressed following issue: the mineral estate Was dedicated transferred to the ad- lot or did it remain with joining owners developer? We conclude that the mineral estate re- developer. mained with the dispute requires The of resolution us presumed to decide whether the intent rule applied involving statu- should be to a case tory dedication.1 presumed The intent rule is a well- principle established law. It conveyance by developer holds that a of a includes fee title to not subdivision lot described, the lot but also to the middle of the street which that lot abuts. The the mineral estate includes be specifically neath the lot unless it is re grantor. 11 C.J.S. served Bound Annotation, (1938); aries see also § Boundary Highway, to Center —Title 49 A.L.R.2d 982 Sundance, Cundy, Harlan A. Cecil A. and Schmidt, Dakota, Spearfish, ap- explained for The reason for the rule is South Charleston, pellant Lincoln Land Co. MacCorkle v. 841, 843, W.Va. S.E. 58 A.L.R. 231 Dumbrill, Hughes Hughes L. Mark & (1928): Sundance, appellant for Town of Moor- ordinarily “The seller of land can have no croft. object retaining strip along a narrow Price, Morgan, Arp, R. II of Price & Dan * * grant, strip line of his *. The is of Gillette, appellees. separated * * * adjoin- no from the value when ing property. The retention of the CARDINE, C.J., and Before strip may seriously improve- retard the URBIGKIT, GOLDEN, JJ., THOMAS, ment adjoin- and further alienation of the KALOKATHIS, Judge. District and * * ing property, KALOKATHIS, Judge. District Another reason advanced is the notion that upon piecemeal looks law with disfavor case came before the Court ownership strips of small of land. rehearing September on petition for filed opinion presumed The intent rule finds 1988. The the court wide ac- ceptance in those Lang, issued in Town instances which the of Moorcroft pub- The facts set out dedication creates an easement in the P.2d 96 were However, unnecessary it is lic. in those instances in opinion, in that thus "Same; provides: premises platted apart effect of as is on such 34-12-104 set W.S. use, recording. acknowledgment acknowl- or other or is The thereon charitable, recording plat, equiva- religious edgment dedicated to of such educational simple portion purposes." in fee of such lent to a deed

H83 fee, upon conveyance of an creates a in so far as we lot and the dedication finally upon determine, vacation of the street. have been able to applied.2 intent rule has not been developments parcel Most involve a property, exclusively by develop- owned Mason, Ill. v. Town Lambach er/grantor. Unless the mineral estate has (1944), 53 N.E.2d discusses reserved, previously a common law and stat- distinction between in fee owns the entire estate abso- utory light pre- in the lute. intent rule: sumed process subdividing lots and defin- plat, “If it is a common-law then the ing accomplished the streets either only acquired municipality an easement by statutory dedication or common right The fee is to use the streets. dedication: owners, passed adjoining subsequent grantees convey- pursuant “A dedication is one ** * statute, ance of the lots. It is also true to the terms of the and is almost filing universally created and re- the fee to the and not where easement, cording plat. A merely in mu- of a common-lawdedica- is vested requires tion an intention to dedicate ex- minerals under the nicipality, it owns the form, pressed acceptance in some and an of the streets and lessees of the surface proper public of the dedication right abutting lots have no owners authorities, by general public It user. to take such minerals.” distinguishable from a dedi- We have determined that dedi- cation, grant, in which is the nature of a Wyoming public authority in a cation vests prescription and from which is based on only a fee determinable to with long period Generally a of use. a com- portion surface estate and a limited below upon mon-law dedication rests the doc- ground sufficient to accommodate the vari- estoppel. Statutory trine of public City ous utilities. Evanston v. legal generally vests the title to the Robinson, 702 P.2d 1283 grounds apart public purposes set for in present to issue in the case This leads municipal corporation, the com- while original dedicator and where legal method title in mon-law leaves claim the mineral estate lot owners both McQuillin, original 11 Mu- owner.” developer, Lincoln under the street. The 33.03, nicipal Corporations p. 640 § presumed Company, argues that the Land (3rd Ed.1983). apply rule should not to vest intent ly- estate abutting lot owners the mineral Dedication Common Law Rather, urges it us ing below the streets. A common law dedication does not principle conveyancing, apply to a first developer to the fee. The affect title 1.e., only to grantee obtains title that the to hold in fee to the streets continues title in the specifically described and also to the lots. The dedica nothing more. deed however, easement, tion, creates a surface appurtenant, for discussing any policy specifically considera- an easement Before public to use as a street tions, parties ably presented, we the benefit which the purposes. Thompson, 2 public interests Com analyze the various take time important the Modem Law Real at issue. It is to mentaries on in the land (1980 Replacement). 321 happens Property, to these various in- explain what § lot, dedication, terests, also sells an only upon but When not alleys City Tempe, streets and in the example, 3 vests the fee to the see Moeur v. 2. For 878, "where, 196, (1966), Ariz.App. public, purchaser particular P.2d 881 "a of a lot obtains here, plat filing street, fee in of such vests the alley as or the no interest in the in front particular municipality, purchaser of a also, the acquires Smith, Belgum City the rear of his lot." See the streets.” no interest in 212-213, 774, 205, Kimball, Bradford 163 Neb. 81 N.W.2d 366, (1954), 120, 276 P.2d 177 Kan. (1957). 62 A.L.R.2d 1295 filing plat and dedication where the effect of severance presumes intended and created horizontal common law that he de- dedication. convey specifically not the lot deed, also to the middle scribed but the dedication does not Since applies adjoining street. This rule authority, public pass the minerals though nothing the deed described even dedicator continues to hold the particular lot. Versions of more than Mining v. Bohn Leadville estate. recognized by this court this rule have been Co., (1906), P. 37 Colo. modify and we do not intend to that rule. recognized that Garage, v. Transcontinental See Coumas plainly “It was the intention of the dedi- 41 A.L.R.2d 539 part the title to so much of cator to necessary property only its as was cases, law dedication common establishing purpose effectuate the operates pass intent rule alleys designated and certain streets and adjoining title to the middle of the use, described cases, proper to the entire street. city and to clothe the with the absolute passed the entire fee Title thus includes purpose only, title for that thereto absent a reservation of the mineral estate. any interest not to vest with estate or explained by This result can be the fact exist thereunder.” the ores that appurtenant an easement cannot be possibility The dedicator also holds the estate to which created without servient to the surface estate and should reverter obligation rests and a dominant estate any lots are the street be vacated before right belongs. necessary It is to which the sold, simple fee determinable would person. unity of title to be in the same 34-12-104, revert to the dedicator. W.S. Thompson, supra, 323. § supra. This result occurs abutting if no lots are sold. appurtenant An cannot easement separate from the land to which it is exist occurs, If a sale then a different by conveyed It cannot be annexed. apply if the set of rules vacated. separate the land party entitled to it from belongs to vacate to the abut decision appurtenant. Thompson, it to which ting Upon lot owners. W.S. 34-12-106. supra, vacation, § the fee to the surface estate street then vests in such lot owners. of- an easement de- Since the survival though legisla W.S. 34-12-109. Even of a servient es- pends the existence result, explain tion dictates this it does not tate, through applica- the result obtained possibility whether the of reverter was presumed intent rule assures tion of the lot, along abutting transferred requirement. the fulfillment of that possibility simply whether the of reverter Mason, vanished. Lambach v. Town of Statutory Dedication supra, expla provides 53 N.E.2d at an resulting than in an ease Rather nation: desig public platted in the area ment to possibility of reverter in the “Neither cre nated for owners, abutting lot nor the title to the produces fee. The of dedication ates a act ownership sepa- center of the street The first is an separate three interests. ownership rate from the of the lots. It simple determinable in the estate in fee may conveyed or not be detached and conveyed to the au surface estate separate as an interest or estate leased is less thority. simple A fee determinable passes by and distinct from the lots. It The transferor retains a than absolute. operation any subsequent own- of law to Watt, possibility of reverter. Williams v. (citations omitted) er of the lots.” possi 668 P.2d foregoing comprises in It follows from the the second bility of reverter possibility passed by reverter virtue The third interest is a generated. terest abutting lots, street, describing the lying of the deed estate below the

H85 though specifically by men- dedication. This even was not severance occurs vir- creating in the tue of the tioned deed. dedication statutes “equivalent to a deed in fee to such are left to decide whether the miner- We portion premises platted as is on passed al estate below the street also to the apart such set for streets.” 34- W.S. abutting though lot owners even the deed 12-104, also, supra. See Evanston conveying the lot made no reference to that Robinson, supra. estate.3 severance, After the mineral en- suggested It has been that the joys separate apart an existence from lot owners should be treated the same re- the surface estate. The severance creates gardless development of whether the exists separate two estates both of which are by virtue of common law or dedi- mutually dominant and servient. Each is a urged cation. It has also that the law separate independent freehold estate does piecemeal not look with favor Wyoming other. Ohio Oil Co. v. ownership Accordingly, of land. are we Agency, urged to remove the from the picture and hold that the lot own- ers own the minerals by statutory The fee created dedi Merely streets. to arrive at a desired re- cation becomes the street.5 This is unlike sult is not in and of itself sufficient reason the case of a street easement created particular way. to decide an issue in a On common law dedication. The street created hand, conceptual the other unless is a there by statutory dedication does not need a obstacle, the fact that a result is desirable Moreover, servient estate. a street created enough. be reason These are the subject statutory dedication is not deciding factors we must consider requirement unity of title to both ser- whether to extend the intent rule and dominant estates. The vient by statutory to the mineral estate created adjoining lot is severed from the street as a dedication.4 separate fee estate. Unlike the case of a easement, dedication, there are no common in street created Unlike occurs, concepts require statutory unity such as the of title which no severance a ded application ication involves a severance of the surface ment which necessitate the upon statutory and mineral estates of the street area the intent to a rule Burckhartt, suggested holding 3.Much has been made of Prall v. It has been that our here 19, 280, (1921). 299 Ill. 132 N.E. 18 A.L.R. 992 requires Payne City that we reverse v. Lara application That case did not involve the mie, 1965). (Wyo. P.2d 557 That case held 398 Prall,' dedicator, presumed intent brought an action of rule. the legislation, that because of the dedication the ejectment against Burck- city could not transfer its interest in a street to a possession hartt Carrithers to recover and party third because the lot owner was alleys streets and in a subdivision which he had reasoning to it vacation. The in entitled hand, platted. Unlike the case at the streets and holding inconsistent with the volved here is not alleys simply ap- had been vacated. The court Payne. plied the Illinois vacation statute which vested title to the lot owners vacation. lying re- 5. The mineral estate below the street recognized The court that the dedication re- by grantor mains with the virtue of the sever- grantor possibility served to the the of reverter is, occurring It ance at dedication. the estate so dedicated. It was asked to to therefore, meaningless require grantor the to to the vacation statute which determine whether be- reserve the mineral estate under the street vested the dedicated estate in the by already cause it has been severed virtue of deprived property the dedicator of a owners not be reserved. right process. dedication and need due The court deter- without reverter, possibility being mined a contrast, and surface In where mineral expectancy protec- was not entitled to such bare one, by to the estates are a transfer reference Moreover, tion. the entire estate both surface passes it is surface also the mineral estate unless comprise minerals were deemed to the sub- and is because that estate com- reserved. This so ject pass matter of the dedicated and prises single, unsevered unit. Wyoming, public authority. only dedication, subject becomes the surface estate remain with the dedicator. minerals CARDINE, Justice, dissenting, sepa- Chief The dedication creates dedication. THOMAS, Justice, passes joins. The sale of the lots with whom rate estates. deed. described only that estate opinion analysis majority begins' its as: expression This rule finds dedication the flat state- with 370, Ala. Rodgers “From v. [242 Alford So.2d ment the act of creates dedication 373, 409, following: is 410] simple de- separate a fee three interests: ‘ * * * “ grantee rule a can ac- [A]s for in the surface used terminable by only de- quire his deed the land street, possibility of in the same reverter it, by not acquire and does scribed separate mineral estate property, and way of land outside such appurtenant quarrel the street. I have no below While description. first with the characterization of the two ^{[*] [*] [*] [*] [*] [*]} interests, there is no basis for the state- “ ment that estate under the McKissock, Humphreys v. ‘For the miner- street is somehow severed from 781, 304, 779, 140 U.S. 11 S.Ct. property. adjoining al estate under the said, 473, quoting from L.Ed. it was majority’s based on this Since the result is 382, Rosenthal, 61 v. N.Y. Woodhull premise, erroneous dissent. 390, appurte- never that “land can be land, pass or it as with nant other by majority that a The statement belonging All that rea- to it. can be separate mineral estate ‘ap- sonably is that word claimed by created sets the street carry purtenance’ with it ease- will stage separate bizarre results. enjoyed used ments servitudes presumably mineral estate is bounded on they for whose benefits lands its from sides a vertical extension Even an easement will were created. above, upper edges necessary pass unless not limit the mineral defined ’ ” thing granted.” enjoyment deepest points used the street. Central Milner, 275 Ala. Oil Co. Standard premise thesis majority’s is the 152 So.2d severed from estate is on dedication phrased by remainder dedicator’s principle The same other Riches, conveyed Wash. can thereafter McConiga courts (1985) express description in a con- App. as fol- reference Thus, reasoning veyance. following lows: “ pos- following majority, scenario land; appurtenant ‘That land is never * * * sible: carry a fee an easement or a lesser estate as an incident an accre- (O) in 1. The owner absolute tion, conveyance of the fee sim- but the property. of Blackacre the subdivides not ple piece title to one of land will plat 2. files a which shows streets in O carry as an incident or an accretion a fee 34-12-102, accordance with W.S. and the ” equal degree quality.’ or greater of plat duly approved with is in accordance Mills, (quoting Hagen v. Bolcom [74 According major- to the W.S. 34-12-103. (quoting 133 P. 1000 Wash. 462] es- ity, point separate a mineral at this 276, 124 Jefferson, Minn. White [110 under the streets is severed from tate (1910)])). 262 N.W. 125 N.W. by the held O. fee creating special We would be a in any 3. lots are Before the subdivision adopt if conveyancing of we were to rule sold, plat the is vacated in accordance This we decline to the lot owners’ views. property dedi- 34-12-106. The W.S. adopt original disposition We our of do. O, for the streets reverts to who cated in Town this case as set out of Moorcroft property the same which he now owns Lang, supra. However, prior had to the dedication. it es- permanently is into two summary judgment of now divided We reverse the tates, non- mineral under the the estate the district court.

H87 existent streets the remainder Dedication under the statute therefore re- fee. width, sults a severance of the depth length property required subsequently conveys 4. 0 of “all for the street. The dedicator still Blackacre absolute.” retains remaining estate, the including entire the According majority, sepa- the complete and undivided estate mineral un- rate mineral estate under the location of derlying his property. Since the mineral the formerly platted is con- streets not underlying estate the street is not severed veyed with Blackacre it is not because surrounding by from the land held the conveyance. dedi- specifically described in the statutory filing, cator at the tíme of the result, the separate As a retains 0 the miner- estate, dedication statute not does affect al which is later by described disposition of vacated, property. has which with reference to streets that do not exist. Thus, question the true is whether a sub- sequent abutting property transfer of the I recognize While such a result implies a grantor reservation of by could proper conveyancing, be reached underlying agree the street. do not This type “mineral question may implication” by be answered by required, reservation is or reference to existing supported, by even law of the state does providing the statutes not require adoption public “implied dedication of streets use. reserva- theory by tion” majority. advanced previous Our decisions treat the statutes concerning being dedication of streets as In contrary the absence of statute or streets, concerned with the not with the decision, judicial the common law is the law remaining property. dedicator’s When Wyoming. state of W.S. 8-1-101. are filing streets dedicated majority correctly recognizes The the com- plat, property dedi- interests rule, mon which is that a relinquishes “only cator include the surface described as bounded a street and much so of the subsurface as is neces- to extend to the center of the sary for municipal street construction and street. Coumas v. Transcontinental Ga- Robinson, City services.” Evanston v. 99,118, rage, 748, 754, P.2d (Wyo.1985). Only P.2d (1951); A.L.R.2d 539 see also cases collect- strip required shallow for the street sev- ed at 49 A.L.R.2d rule is ered from the of the dedicator. not, majority suggests, as the based on appurtenant theories of easements and it is While true such dedi- Rather, unity provides of title. pre- cation effects a horizontal severance sumption clarify legal boundary mineral estate from the surface estate dedi- property that has been described a con- purposes cated for the this court veyance by plat. reference to a or a street has never held that said dedication effects presumption succinctly for the basis a vertical severance of the mineral estate in 2 Thompson Property stated on Real underlying the from the street mineral es- (1980 pp. Replacement): 371-72 property. tate § case, rejected Evanston we “It is convey- an established rule that a theory that dedication of ance of land on way, bounded or causes vertical severance the mineral private, whether carries the ti- below street: estate the way, grant- tle to the center of the if the impermissibly “We would strain the ex- or’s far. title extends so The reason in press statutory provisions support upon we' partly were to of this rule rests the apart principle legal hold that those areas set that a the terminus of alleys boundary by streets and include a a monument at the band cen- ground extending monument, point partly to the center of the tral and encompassing all presumption ordinarily earth of the miner- the the grantor roadways.” reserving als the has no a beneath 702 P.2d at intention way fee in boundary the street or when logically land infers a lack of has to be of benefit such intent to its fase ceased [sic] such (footnotes omitted) reserve land. him.” to by there is no evidence of intent Since conveyance grant cannot the the While estate, grantor to the mineral the retain held by itself because the fee is street area presumptions ap- common should the law nothing in municipality, there is the the ply.1 legislature the enacts a When statute grantor to indicate intent to record dealing property, with it does not necessar- mineral estate under the reserve the that all common law rules ily follow at parties The intent of the the streets. abrogated. dealing property with are We conveyance not is made is subse- time the meaning light the in construe of statutes discovery of valu- quently altered the Cheney, the common law. Goldsmith imply I see minerals. no reason to able 813, More specif- 468 P.2d merely provide to a windfall to reservation ically, construing we have said that “in convey- grantor. A principle the basic the of the common are statutes rules exceptions ancing is that reservations and changed implication doubtful not out; in expressly spelled the ab- must be except by clear and nor overturned unam- language, sence of such language.” biguous McKinney v. McKin- entire to transfer 204, 213, 940, ney, grantor. by the owned (1943). While W.S. 34-12-104 describes implied grantor rely on an Nor can pub- interests dedicated to the by operation At use, reservation of law. purport lic it does not affect the originally lots remaining time when the were con- property of the dedicator. The ques- veyed, Wyoming had ruled on the statute reference not which makes to dis- tion; have position in other there were after lots been but states two according general sold is W.S. 34-12- concerning rules the land under 109, provides on states, vacation of a dedicated streets. In some in pro- street accordance with statute “the abutting entire landowners owned the prietors of lots so vacated enclose the street. In subject to easement for ** * adjoining equal streets lots in others, municipality the entire owned proportions.” of these statutes re- Neither fee, including both the surface mineral underlying fers to mineral estate See, e.g., estates. Lambach v. Town of street. Mason, (1944) Ill. 53 N.E.2d 601 1183). majority (quoted opinion at How- nothing There is in the statutes which is ever, grantor presumed no state contrary presumption. to the common law to have retained mineral estate under Application of the common law results express the street absent reservation after the title to mineral estate under See, conveyed. landowners, lots have being been Miller, Inc., I e.g., Redding Accordingly, Buell v. 163 and I would so hold. dissent (1967) result (discussing majority. 430 P.2d 471 from the reached Colo. conjunction dedication in with THOMAS, Justice, dissenting. Co., Mining Leadville v. Bohn (1906)). 86 P. 1038 There is no Colo. agree majority opinion I cannot grantor assertion basis for an could rehearing any more than could rely imply on the law a reservation of agree original majority opinion under streets. dissenting opinion, the land dedicated There- case. his Chief fore, express of an my absence reservation of Justice Cardine has addressed some of by majority propo- vesting 1. The cases cited which treat dedication as title presumption is sition that the common law not to both the and mineral estates surface in the "fee,” municipality, applicable where creates a different situation from that Annotation, 2) (majority presented rights, at n. do not involve a situa- here. See Relative municipality "fee" tion where the of the street has sev- as between land- owners, minerals, oil, gas underlying from the “fee” of ered jurisdictions (1958). alleys, parks, The cited cases are all from estate. 62 A.L.R.2d

H89 concerns, pleased join and I am in his case law is that this court has carefully erected, block, block my structure that dissent. While efforts at articulation readily this resolves conflict. The immedi- any may not be different than what said is, ately preceding course, City case my prior dissenting opinion, I feel con- Robinson, Evanston v. 702 P.2d 1283 strained to add some comments. Robinson, (Wyo.1985). After the resolu- majority position very The similar to setting tion of this case might symmetrical if one took a what occur keystone clearly predictable. Instead piece pictorial jigsaw puzzle last following Wyoming the clear direction of sense, upside inserted it In a down. precedent, however, majority pro- has puzzle complete, picture but the is not. foreign cured a stone from a quarry to product majority position The in this denigrate integrity of the structure. incomplete picture. case is an If followed might say product One logical conclusion, academically to an what majority efforts has been salt the moth- developer, having would ensue is that the way er lode in such a that it has no future granted simple limited fee estate to the value. municipality purposes public way, of a briefly, To summarize Wyoming having also retained a dominant but miner- recognized court has product of com estate, right al have the to obstruct would mon Gay law dedications. Wyo Johnson’s the surface of the street in a reasonable ming Company Automotive Service v. develop manner order to his mineral City Cheyenne, (Wyo. 367 P.2d 787 public policy opposing estate. The reasons 1961), reh. denied 369 P.2d In undoubtedly such result would resolve cases, subsequent effect of a by denying developer situation having dedication has been treated as sub course, right produce his minerals. Of stantially the same effect as that of a com that is not an obstacle to the Robinson; mon Ruby law dedication. develop obstructing owner who can without Drilling Company, Billingsly, Inc. v. public way. As the of the min- owner (Wyo.1983); Payne P.2d 377 erals, lot owner can recover Laramie, 398 P.2d 557 See infringing his without on the sur- Brown, (Wyo.1976); Morad v. 549 P.2d 312 party. any face estate of other Garage, Coumas Transcontinental Inc., A.L.R.2d majority adoption The asserts that the (1951). Analysis of these several cases special the lot view would create a owners’ proposition manifests the the limited conveyancing majority rule which municipality by created in a In actuality, declines to do. the result of has dedication not been treated majority opinion special is to create the any significant way as different from a is, conveyancing rule of as Chief common law dedication. The interest ac notes, implied Cardine an reserva- Justice quired by municipality upon majority tion of a mineral estate. The does practical purposes. is identical for all Rob that, despite concession re- its deciding cases, inson. In these the Su itself, pre- spect to the street the rule of preme Wyoming Court of has followed the recognize ownership in sumed intent would rule, although presumed intent it has not upon vacation. landowners should, if Clearly, prece so identified it. however, majority, apply The refuses to followed, faithfully apply dent is this rule presumed intent to an logically the rule of to the minerals as well as to surface of a mineral assumed vertical severance estate. which, again, as Justice Chief Car- Wyoming, a common law dedication of out, points assumption that is not dine alley an easement for a street or created by Wyoming precedent. supported use. or dedi- Payne. reliance puzzled I am about the in the real estate cator retained all interest authority from majority on various encompass that the easement did not until Wyoming rather than sundry jurisdictions conveyed property. The effect of he My perception Wyoming was to transfer the entire precedent. the of remaining developer of the to his center of the street with interest abutting of the the lot. purchaser. The effect recognized creating has been as parse Perhaps helpful it is to the effect municipality in to simple limited fee the dedication of streets of a subdivision with proper public in use. held trust for all, alleys. First of the tract is subdi- Payne; Gay The other effects Johnson’s. of those vided into lots. The boundaries same as a common law dedication. are the another, they lots touch one but can be developer retains the entire interest The overlay separated by an of a dedicated encompassed is not in the limited fee that street, alley, public or for other simple conveys. until he When the devel- prop- use. The effect of a vacation the however, conveys, purchaser re- oper erty public dedicated to use is to restore purchaser interest the same ceives original lot lines. if the dedication had been a would receive perspective If one could look from a ap- majority dedication. The common law orig- up, one discover the the bottom would pears accept respect this result with to to in place up inal lot lines to the level of actually estate which is con- public use involved in the street. At this veyed city by to the the dedication and point, boundary move horizontal- would abutting parcel attribute that to the would vertically edge ly and then landowner, purchaser from here the however, approach, majority street. The is developer, upon the street. vacation of top to look from the down and to conclude Logic doing exactly thing the same favors that, original can lot while one discern respect portion of the real es- purposes attributing ownership line for street, lying under the that is not tate but use, upon depth vacation at the majority opinion. horizontally the lot line somehow shifted majority approach The result of the vertically up- and then descended municipalities. ownership unsettled in most that, being contrary to con- shot standard street, Upon abutting vacation of a rules, veyancing retained city has landowner will own whatever by implication. line that area The street, used for a but the subterranean regardless perspec- should be constant belong the street still would area beneath tive. So, developer. example, the lot Thus, Wyoming, adopted we have trespass if commit a he drilled owner would retain, presumed rule of intent to the an- from the surface of what had a water well convey. tithesis of intent to into the estate retained been the street precedent has occurred in the face of developer. justifi- There is no sensible result, clearly points to a different with no Furthermore, result. it is cation distinguish attempt by majority why, lay people difficult for to understand precedent. point, From this overrule that instances which there has been those however, every prior one of the cases street, common law dedication placed Foreign has doubt. been abutting every thing upon landowner owns recognize relied title in nonresi- but, of the street in the next block vacation Wyoming. dents of The result is a non had as to which there sequitur, legally, factually, morally. dedication, landowner does decisis, language, like the Latin Stare not. Evanston Landowners seems to have died. precise disparate result will confront court and hold would affirm district fostered, instead of which the court has the minerals beneath the streets aspects public policy settled. The of this Moorcroft are the of the owners that, demand a conclusion if the situation of the lots the streets. minerals, city is not to have part tract they are owned landowner vacation course, that, justification,

street. reservation the de-

in the absence of a conveyed to the

veloper, the were minerals

Case Details

Case Name: Town of Moorcroft v. Lang

Court Name: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date Published: Sep 25, 1989

Citation: 779 P.2d 1180

Docket Number: 87-182, 87-183

Court Abbreviation: Wyo.