The defendant, Town of Chesterfield (Chesterfield), appeals the decision of the Superior Court (Sullivan, J.) reversing a Chesterfield town meeting vote to discontinue a portion of a class V highway under RSA231:45-a, I (1993). We affirm.
On aрpeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard; and (2) the facts do not support the court’s determination.
The trial court found the following facts. North Hinsdalе Road is a class V highway that is not maintained in the winter and runs through Chesterfield into Hinsdale, where it becomes Plain Road Extension, and then Plain Road. These three roads provide a means of traveling north-south betwеen Route 63 in Chesterfield and Route 119 in Hinsdale. Plain Road runs through a thickly settled part of Hinsdale, which has contributed to increased traffic on North Hinsdale Road in recent years.
On March 11,2003, the Chesterfield Town Meeting voted to discontinue, subject to gates and bars, a quarter-mile section of North Hinsdale Road, beginning at the Hinsdale border and continuing northerly for a quarter of a mile into Chesterfield. Closing this part of the road blocked residents living on Plain Road in Hinsdale from using North Hinsdale Road to reach Route 63 in Chesterfield. After the town vote, the Chesterfield Selectmen installed locked gates that blocked North Hinsdale Road аt the Hinsdale border. Chesterfield was careful not to cut off its own residents from using North Hinsdale Road. After the discontinuance, Hinsdale residents living on or near Plain Road could still reach Route 63, but had to travel as much as ten miles farther than before the discontinuance.
The trial court found that keeping North Hinsdale Road open was important not only for public convenience, but also for public safety. Discоntinuing the road eliminated the only reasonable route for Hinsdale residents living on Plain Road to flee from a nuclear accident at the Vermont Yankee Power Plant. Discontinuance of North Hinsdale Road also cut off a route that police used for backing up other police officers, and
I
We first cоnsider Chesterfield’s argument that the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard. Chesterfield asserts that we should apply the standard articulated in Eastborough Corp. v. City of Eastborough,
As the trial court’s decision to apply a particular legal standard is a question of law, we review the decision de novo. HippoPress v. SMG,
Any person or other town aggrieved by the vote of a town to discontinue аny highway, or discontinue any highway as an open highway and made subject to gates and bars, may appeal therefrom to the superior court for the county in which such highway is situate by petition____[L]ike procеedings shall be had on such petition as in the case of appeals in the laying out of class TV, V, and VI highways____
(Emphasis added.)
We apply the following standard of review for statutory interpretation:
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which we review de novo. We are the final arbiters of the legislature’s intent as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole. We first examine the language of the statute, and, whеre possible, ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. When a statute’s language is plain and unambiguous, we need not look beyond it for further indication of legislative intent, and we will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include.
Woodview Dev. Corp. v. Town of Pelham,
RSA 231:48 expressly applies to appeals from town votes to discontinue a class V highway, and therefore applies to the instant appeal. In stating that “like proceedings shall be had on such petition as in the case of appeals in the laying out of class IV, V, and VI highways,” the
We have previously determined that the laying out of a class IV, V, or VI highway receives da novo review on appeal to superior court. Rodgers Dev. Co. v. Town of Tilton,
Although RSA 231:48 provides for like proceedings, the statute does not set forth the substantive legal standard to apply in discontinuance appeals. We are therefore left with little statutory guidance from the legislature as to what legal standard to apply. “If a statute is ambiguous ... we consider legislative history to aid our analysis. Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the legislature’s intent in enacting them, and in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme.” Hughes v. New Hampshire Div. of Aeronautics,
Our review of the legislative history of RSA 231:48 uncovered nothing that assists us in determining the intended legal standard. Nor have we found case law that would settle this issue. Accordingly, we will determine the appropriate legal standard by considering the policy sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. See id; cf. 16 P. Loughlin, New Hampshire Practice, Municipal Law And Taxation § 54.04, at 583 (1993) (concluding that, because New Hampshire statutes do not expressly set forth the conditions necessaiy for a discontinuance, those conditions must be read into the statutes).
We first note that the legislature has manifested an intent to protect the interests of adjoining towns. RSA 231:48 provides that one town may appeal аnother’s vote to discontinue a highway. RSA 231:44 (1993) provides that when one town discontinues a highway that connects to a highway in an adjoining town, the adjoining town must receive notice of the discontinuance. We therefore conclude that the legal standard in this case must consider the interest that an aggrieved town has in continued use of the highway. As for the appellee town, which voted to discontinue
This standard is analogous to part of the legal standard for determining whether an occasion exists for the layout of a road. See Rodgers Dev. Co.,
II
We next consider whether the facts support the trial court’s decision to reverse Chesterfield’s town vote to discontinue North Hinsdale Rоad. To do so, we must determine the standard by which we review the trial court’s decision. We turn again to the “like proceedings” language of RSA 231:48. A plain reading of this language directs us to apply the same prоcedural standards to a discontinuance appeal as a layout appeal. Standards of review are procedural in nature. Alison H. v. Byard,
The trial court assessed Hinsdale’s interest in continuing North Hinsdale Road by finding: (1) the discontinuance cut off the only reasonable escape route for some Hinsdale residents from such potential disasters as an accident at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant or
Affirmed.