208 N.C. 106
N.C.
1935
*108 Sci-ibNCK, J.

The assessments were levied by virtue o£ chapter 56, Public Laws of 1915, and it is conceded that the plaintiff has complied with the provisions of the statute, and that the amounts sued for, namely, $417.28 and $305.54, are due and constitute a lien against the lots of the defendants, unless the causes of action are barred by the ten-year statute of limitations. C. S., 437; High Point v. Clinard, 204 N. C., 149. The determinative facts are these: The first installment of each assessment fell due on 1 October, 1920, and the second installments thereof .fell due on 1 October, 1921, and other installments on each succeeding 1 October up to' and including the year 1929. The first installments, due 1 October, 1920, were paid on 14 October, 1920, and no other installments have been paid. The summons in the respective actions was issued 31 December, 1930.

A portion of section 10 of the act under which the plaintiff proceeded (O. S., 2716), reads as follows: “Such installments shall bear interest at the rate of six per centum per annum from the date of the confirmation of the assessment roll, and in ease of the failure or neglect of any property owner ... to pay any installment when the same shall become due and payable, then and in that event all of the installments remaining unpaid shall at once become due and payable, and such property . . . shall be sold by the municipality under the same rules, regulations, rights of redemption, and savings as are now prescribed by law for the sale of land for unpaid taxes.”

The defendants’ contention is that the failure to pay the first installment when due on 1 October, 1920, caused all of the installments to become at once due and payable after that date, and caused the ten-year statute of limitations to begin to run against all unpaid assessments; and that the making and acceptance of the payment on 14 October, 1920, extended the time of the beginning of the running of the statute of limitations against all installments then remaining unpaid until 15 October, 1920, and that from 15 October, 1920, to 31 December, 1930, being more than ten years, the causes of action were barred when the summonses were issued. The plaintiff, on the contrary, contends that while the failure to pay the first installments when due on 1 October, 1920, gave to it the right to declare all the remaining installments due and payable, that said installments did not automatically become due and payable in the absence of any declaration by the plaintiff of its purpose to invoke the acceleration provisions of the statute, and that the earliest possible date that the statute of limitations could have begun to run was 1 October, 1921, the date the second installments, the first in which there was a default in payment, fell due, and that therefore its causes of action are not barred by the statute of limitations pleaded, since from 1 October, 1921, to 31 December, 1930, is less than ten years. We concur in the contentions of the plaintiff.

*109 In. Meadows Co. v. Bryan, 195 N. C., 398, tbe statute of limitations was interposed to a series of notes secured by a mortgage deed containing a provision by tbe terms of wbicb, upon default in tbe payment of any one of said notes, “tbe entire debt shall be due and payable, and tbe parties of tbe first part in sucb case do hereby authorize and fully empower tbe said party of tbe second part, bis heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns to sell” tbe lands conveyed at tbe courthouse door, and this Court held that where notes are given in series and are secured by a mortgage deed on lands containing a provision that upon tbe failure to pay any one of tbe notes in tbe series upon maturity all tbe notes of tbe series shall become due and payable, that tbe mortgagee bad tbe option to enforce the sale upon tbe happening of tbe event so specified, and when tbe mortgagee bad not exercised bis option tbe statute of limitations applied as from tbe due date of each note in tbe series, as if tbe provision for tbe acceleration of tbe payment bad not been incorporated in tbe mortgage.

Tbe language of tbe statute, “in case of tbe failure or neglect of any property owner ... to pay said installment when tbe same shall become due and payable, then, in that event, all of said installments remaining unpaid shall at once become due and payable,” is to tbe same effect as that of tbe mortgage deed above set forth, and we are of tbe opinion that tbe purpose of tbe statute was to provide an optional remedy to tbe creditor town (tbe plaintiff) by giving it tbe discretionary right to declare tbe whole debt due upon failure in tbe payment of past-due installments, rather than to provide for tbe automatic acceleration of tbe maturity of all unpaid assessments. To bold that tbe failure to pay any installment when due automatically matured tbe remaining installments and started tbe running of tbe statute of limitations against tbe entire debt would work hardship upon tbe debtor property owner, since they would be subject to foreclosure proceedings wbicb tbe creditor town might not institute except to protect itself against tbe statute of limitations; and to bold that tbe making and acceptance of payment of past-due assessments did not postpone tbe running of tbe statute until another assessment became due would destroy any incentive to tbe debtor property owners to reestablish tbe installment plan for tbe payment of assessments dire in tbe future by paying installments past due.

Tbe Appellate Court of Indiana, in tbe case of People's Trust & Savings Bank et al. v. Hennessey et al., 149 N. E., 365, when called upon to consider a plea of tbe statute of limitations interposed under similar facts and involving a statute with practically tbe same provision as is contained in our statute, held that tbe statute of limitations did not begin to run against unpaid deferred installments of municipal assessment liens upon failure in tbe payment of tbe first installments when *110 due, in the absence of any declaration by the assignee of the assessment liens (the plaintiff) of its purpose to avail itself of its optional right to accelerate the maturity of said deferred installments. The Court’s conclusion was reached by drawing an analogy between the failure to pay notes secured by mortgages with acceleration clauses and failure to pay deferred installments of paving assessments levied by virtue of statutes with similar acceleration clauses.

We hold that the provision for the acceleration of the maturity of deferred installments upon default in payment of past-due installments is for the benefit of the creditor town, and is not self-operative, and that the town, upon default, may either institute foreclosure proceedings or may waive the acceleration provision without starting the running of the statute of limitations.

The judgments of the Superior Court are

Affirmed.