51 Vt. 144 | Vt. | 1878
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is a petition under the statute to be allowed an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace against the petitioner and in favor of the petitionee. The magistrate denied an appeal. The only question involved is, whether the appeal was properly refused.
The suit is predicated upon one of the coupons which originally was attached to a bond of $500, which, it is claimed, was issued by the town of Concord in- aid of the Essex County Railroad, and purports to be one of the semi-annual interest warrants attached to bond numbered 37, for the sum of $15, without date, and signed, “ Geo. C. Frye, Treas.”
This interest warrant, or coupon, when made and issued was a part of the bond to which it was attached, and its validity as a contract rested entirely upon the authority of the selectmen to execute and issue the bond. If the bond was invalid, the coupons fell with it, as mere accessories and incidents of the bond. The plaintiff could not, therefore, make a prima facie case without proof that the bond was of legal force to bind the town, and that the coupon received virtue and validity by reason of its being attached to, and a mere incident of, the bond. The question in issue, therefore, was, whether bond No. 37 was legally binding upon the town of Concord.
Whether such case be appealable depends altogether upon the statute.' The St. of 1876, No. 64, provides that, “ when neither the ad damnum in the plaintiff’s writ, nor the sum demanded by the declaration, nor the specifications or exhibits of the plaintiff on trial, shall exceed twenty dollars, no appeal shall be allowed.” The case shows that the plaintiff did exhibit a certified copy of the town records of Concord of the “ instrument of assent and subscription contract,” and did prove the tenor of bond No. 37, and that this coupon was annexed thereto and a part of it, and that said bond was duly signed and executed by the selectmen and treasurer of the town of Concord.
The accumulated authorities read by the counsel for the plaintiff, to show that coupons are negotiable so as to enable the holder to sue thereon in his own name, and that the bona fide holder of a detached and unpaid coupon may recover judgment thereon, even if the bond has been paid and cancelled, as in Exchange Bank v. H. P. & F. Railroad Co. 4 R. I. 375, are, doubtless, sound law. But none of them intimate that the holder can recover upon such coupons without proving that they had virtue and validity imparted to them by their attachment to a valid bond ; and do not aid the court in giving interpretation to our statute in regard to appeal.
Judgment affirmed, and cause remanded. -