44 Conn. 210 | Conn. | 1876
We think the notice in this case is insufficient. Towns are under no common law obligation for the support of paupers. All their liability in this respect is imposed by statute. They are not liable, therefore, for the support of paupers any farther than the statute makes them so. Neither is there any equity in such cases in favor of either town in a controversy, but questions of this character must be determined by the rigid rules of the statute. Those rules govern this case, and by them we are to determine whether the notice given by the plaintiffs to the defendants in this case is sufficient to require the latter to respond to the demand of the former for the expenses incurred by them in the support of the paupers in question. The statute in force at the time the notice was given is as follows, (Bevised Statutes of 1866, page 621:) “The selectmen of every town, whenever a person, not an inhabitant of such town, residing therein, shall become poor, and unable to support himself, shall furnish such pauper such support as may be necessary, as soon as the condition of such pauper shall come to their knowledge.” * * “The selectmen of every town, in which a pauper belonging to another town is chargeable, shall give notice of his condition to the town to which the pauper belongs.” * * “And a letter put into the mail stating the name of the pauper, and that he is chargeable, signed by one of the selectmen of the town where he resides, directed to the selectmen of the town -where he belongs, etc., shall be sufficient evidence,” &c.
Erom the reading of the statute it is obvious that the pauper
The additional words, “ from this date,” do not alter the meaning. The notice would take effect just as early without those words as with them. And it is clear that there is
But we have direct authority on this subject. Section seven of the statute, (Revised Statutes of 1866, page 618,) reads as follows: “Any inhabitant of any town in the state may remove himself, &c., into any town, &c., and shall gain a
Section eight of the same statute reads, “When any inhabitant of any town shall remove into another town,-and while there he, &c., shall become chargeable to the town, &c., the civil authority, &c., may order such pauper to be taken and transported from the town where he resides, and is chargeable, to the town to which he belongs, &c.” Here, again manifestly the word chargeable is used in the same sense as in section seven. In proper order this section ought to follow the section in controversy, for the two sections are concerning the same subject matter. One provides for the liability of a town where one of its settled inhabitants has removed to another town, and is there chargeable. The other provides for the removal of the pauper to the town where he belongs when he is chargeable in another town. If these sections were together in consecutive order in the same statute, then the principle of construction everywhere applied would apply to the case, that when a statute uses a word in a certain sense, it is to be presumed to have been used in the same sense in all other parts of the statute wherever it occurs.
A new trial is advised.
In this opinion the other judges concurred; except Pardee, J., who dissented.