In this сase, plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Michigan’s Single Business Tax Act, MCL 208.1 et seq.; MSA 7.558(1) et seq. Plaintiffs argue that the act contravenes the Michigan Constitution because (1) it imposes a tax upon the exercise of a fundamental constitutional right, (2) it imposes a double income tax on certain Michigan taxpayers in contravention of the uniformity requirement of Const 1963, art 9, § 3, and (3) it effectively imposes a graduated income tax contrary to Const 1963, art 9, § 7. The trial court held as a matter of law that the statute was constitutional and summarily dismissed plaintiffs’ complaints. We affirm.
On January 11, 1982, plaintiffs in this case filed four separate actions in the Court of Claims seeking single business tax refunds for the years 1977 to 1979. Initially, the only issue raised in each action was whether certain monies paid by financial institutions to new car dealerships in the course of dealer-arranged new car financing constituted interest as used in the Single Business Tax
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Act.
1
This precise issue was pending before this Court and was resolved against the plaintiff in
Town & Country Dodge, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury,
Plaintiffs’ actions were consolidated at the trial court level for purposes of the summary judgment motion, which the Court of Claims denied by opinion and order dated July 12, 1984. The court held that plaintiffs’ constitutional claims had been decided adversely to plaintiffs in
Stockler v Dep’t of Treasury,
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Plaintiffs appealed the orders of summary judgment as of right and all four cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Pursuant to plaintiffs’ motion, this Court granted a stay pending the Supreme Court’s review of
Town & Country Dodge, Inc, supra.
An opinion in that case was issued on December 28, 1984, in favor of defendant.
Town & Country Dodge, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury,
The particular arguments presented in this case have, been raised in this forum before. Contrary to defendant’s brief on appeal, however, they have not all been decided.
3
These three issues were first presented in
Stockler, supra,
and again in
Town & Country Dodge, Inc, supra.
In
Stockler,
we considered whether the Single Business Tax Act interfered with a fundamental constitutional right to engage in business activity and whether the act imposed а graduated income tax on Michigan taxpayers. Sto
ckler,
however, was commenced as an action for declaratory relief prior to the еffective date of the Single Business Tax Act and some of the constitutional arguments raised were viewed as nonjusticiable. In
Town & Country Dodge, Inc, supra,
plaintiffs failed to raise their constitutional arguments before the Michigan Tax Tribunal and this Court thus declined to consider them on appeal.
Plaintiffs first argue that MCL 208.31; MSA 7.558(31) is unconstitutional on its face bеcause it includes language which transforms a fundamental constitutional right (the right to engage in business) into a mere privilege. Plaintiffs further argue that because the right to engage in business is a fundamental constitutional right, the Legislature may not impose a tax upon the exercise of that right and its attempt to do so in the form of the single business tax must be disallowed.
MCL 208.31; MSA 7.558(31) provides in relevant part:
(1) There is hereby levied and imposed a specific tax of 2.35% upon the adjusted tax base of every person with business аctivity in this state which is allocated or apportioned to this state.
(4) The tax so levied and imposed is upon the privilege of doing business and not upon inсome.
Plaintiffs focus on the language "privilege of doing business” in attacking the constitutionality of the Single Business Tax Act on its face. Generally, however, we will uрhold a statute as constitutional wherever it may be reasonably construed in a manner that is consistent with the constitution of this state. Tax laws, in particular, аre accorded a presumption of constitutionality.
Kostyu v Dep’t of Treasury,
Moreover, in
Stockler,
Plaintiff cites Murdock v Pennsylvania,319 US 105 ;63 S Ct 870 ;87 L Ed 1292 (1943), in support of his contention that the right to engage in business is a fundamеntal right which cannot be taxed. Murdock distinguished first amendment activity from commercial activity and held that a tax could not be imposed on the privilege of engaging in the former. The right or privilege of engaging in business is an important aspect of liberty, but it is not a fundamental right. Griswold v Connecticut,381 US 479 ;85 S Ct 1678 ;14 L Ed 2d 510 (1965), Ferguson v Skrupa,372 US 726 ;83 S Ct 1028 ;10 L Ed 2d 93 (1963). Business and occupations may be regulated and tаxed.
We fully agree with this analysis and conclude that plaintiffs’ first constitutional argument is without merit.
Plaintiffs next argue that the single business tax violates the state constitutional prohibition against double taxation. Const 1963, art 9, § 3. We disagree. Plaintiffs’ entire argument is built on the theory that the single business tax is a tax upon income, a theory which hаs consistently been rejected by the appellate courts of this state. Rather, Michigan’s single business tax is a value-added tax imposed on an activity rather than on the income which results from the activity. See
Mobil Oil Corp v Dep’t of Treasury,
Plaintiffs finally argue that the single business tax constitutes a graduated income tax in violation of Const 1963, art 9, § 7. Again, we disagree. As already discussed, the single business tax is not an income tax and is thus not governed by Const 1963, art 9, § 7. See
Davis v Dep’t of Treasury,
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments are without merit and we affirm the trial court’s summary disposition of this cаse.
Affirmed.
Notes
The Single Business Tax Act provides that a term used in the act and not defined has the same meaning as in United States federal income tax law in effect for the tax year. MCL 208.2(2); MSA 7.558(2).
Defendant’s oral motion for summary judgment should have been brought under GCR 1963, 117.2(3), now MCR 2.116(C)(10). In dismissing these actions, the Court of Claims considered the merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges under the authority of Stockler, supra. Since it is apparent from the lower court proceedings that all parties and the court viewed the motion for summary judgment as a motion for a ruling on the merits, we will proceed to analyze this case on that basis.
Defendant’s entire argument on appeаl is that plaintiffs’ constitutional claims have been resolved in Stockler, supra.
The similarity of these constitutional arguments is explained by the fact that plaintiff in Stockler, infra, is an attorney who subsequently represented the taxpayers in Town & Country Dodge, Inc, supra, as well as the taxpayers in the instant case.