Lead Opinion
Dоuglas and Brenda Lawrence appeal to this Court from a summary judgment order declaring the existence of a thirty foot wide express easement across their property in favor of Tower Asset Sub Inc. We vacate the summary judgment and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
I.
This is the second of two casеs involving the same basic question — whether property owned by the Lawrences is subject to an express easement for access to other property located near its eastern side. In the first case, Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence,
This case involves the right to use a private road, known as Blossom Mountain Road, located on Blossom Mountain, south of Post Falls. Blossom Mountain Road traverses the Lawrence property, which is located in the southeast quarter of section 21 (the “Lawrence parcel”), crossing into the southwest quarter of section 22, wherе Robert Hall owns certain property (the “Hall parcel”). Tower Asset Sub Inc. currently leases and occupies the Hall parcel.
The Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were once part of a single tract of land under the common ownership of Harold and Marlene Funk. In 1975, the Funks divided their land and sold what is now the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc. while retaining the southwest quarter of section 22. The Funks and Human Synergistics signed a sale agreement, which set forth that the parcel bought by Human Synergistics was:
5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and including an ingress egress easement over portions of Section 21 heretofore granted to the grantors. Said easement shall be over existing roads until such time as all record owners shall agree to the relocation, improvement and/or abandonment of all or any portions of any roads.
Seventeen years later, in 1992, the Funks executed and delivered a warranty deed conveying the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics. The warranty deed stated that the deed was given “in fulfillment of those certain contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the conveyance of the above described property.” In 1996, after a number of other conveyances, the Lawrences acquired ownership of their parcel.
Tower initiated this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief when the Lawrences refused to allow it to traverse Blossom Mountain Road. Tower argued it had the right to use Blossom Mountain Road to access its parcel, and alleged six causes of action to support its position: (1) express easement; (2) implied easement; (3) easement by necessity; (4) easement by prescription; (5) injunctive relief; and (6) breach of contract. After Tower moved for summary judgment, the district court ordered the par
II.
In this opinion, we address three issues: (1) whether Tower has standing; (2) whether Hall is an indispensable party; and (3) whether the district court erred in declaring the existence of an express easement on summary judgment. In their briefing before this Court, the parties have argued a number of other issues but it is unnecessary to address them as a result of our ruling on the latter issue.
When reviewing a summary judgment order, this Court applies the same standard as the district court. Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc.,
A.
The Lawrences contend that Tower lacks standing to bring this suit because it failed to demonstrate an ownership or leasehold interest in the dominant estatе. Standing is a subcategory of justiciability and is “a preliminary question to be determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case.” Troutner v. Kempthorne,
This Court has established that title ownership is a prerequisite to quiet title to an easement appurtenant in favor of a dominant estate. Beach Lateral Water Users Ass’n v. Harrison,
Hall, who is not a party to this suit, is the record owner of the alleged dominant estate.
We hold that Tower, as lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek injunctive relief preventing the Lawrences from interfering with its alleged right to use the easement, but lacks standing to seek to quiet title to the easement.
B.
The Lawrences argue that the district court erred in proceeding with this case be
(1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the pеrsons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
This Court has held that joinder of all parties with an interest in the subject matter of the suit is not required; rather, only those who have an interest in the object of the suit should be joined. Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust,
As we have already determined that Tower does not have standing to bring a quiet title action, we need not address whether Hall was an indispensable party to that portion of this case. With respect to Tower’s request for injunctive relief, Tower’s objective is to enforce its alleged right to use Blossom Mountain Road as an ingress/egrеss easement. This determination can be made without affecting Hall's rights because Tower need not quiet title to the easement in order to enforce any right it may have to use the easement. Therefore, Hall is not an indispensable party to the request for injunctive relief.
c.
The Lawrences contend that the district cоurt erred in declaring the existence of an express easement over the Lawrence parcel. In reaching its conclusion, the district judge held that the 1992 warranty deed from the Funks to Human Synergisties was ambiguous
An easement is the right to use the land of another for a specific purpose that is not inconsistent with the general use of the property by the owner. Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc.
In Capstar, the district court determined that the sale agreement, which had been recorded in the county records prior to the recording of the warranty deed, was effective, in and of itself, to create an express easement by written agreement. We determined that the language in the sale agreement was insufficient on its face to establish an express easement. As an additional ground for granting summary judgment, the district court cited Seccombe v. Weeks, which we found to be inapplicable. In addition, we expressed reservations about the precedential value of its holding.
As it did in Capstar, the district court held Seccombe to be controlling in this case. For the same reasons we stated in Capstar, that holding is in error and must be vacated.
In its bench ruling, the district court also determined the 1992 warranty deed to be ambiguous because it made reference to the sаle agreement. The district court indicated that this and other evidence established the Funks’ intent to “keep ingress and egress open” over the Lawrence parcel. However, the Funks’ intent, whatever it may have been, is not sufficient to substitute for a writing that is effective to grant, reserve, or except an express easement. In Capstar, we held that the language of the sale agreement is insufficient to establish an express easement. There is no language in either the sale agreement or the 1992 warranty deed, whether the documents are considered separately or in combination, that is sufficient to establish an express easement.
Final resolution of this case would have been expedited, had the district court not confined its inquiry to the express easement issue. Based on evidence submitted to the court, certain of the other theories showed greater promise from Tower’s standpoint and it is unfortunate that those theories were not fully developed and decided upon. By confining its consideration to the express easement issue, justice in this case has been delayed. We hold that the district court erred in its conclusion that an express easement existed in favor of the Hall parcel, and we therefore vacate the summary judgment.
III.
The district court’s order fоr summary judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road across the Lawrencе parcel. However, that does not establish an express easement, which must be created by a written instrument.
. Of interest is the fact that in Capstar the same district judge determined the sale agreement and deed to be unambiguous. There is no explanation as to why the deed would be unambiguous in that case, while it is ambiguous in this case.
. The record includes such an аgreement. Shortly before the Lawrences purchased their property, their predecessors in interest entered into a written agreement with the owner of property in the southwest quarter of section 22, granting him a forty foot wide nonexclusive ingress and egress easement over the portion of the Lawrence рroperty traversed by Blossom Mountain Road. The property to be benefited by this easement was near to, but did not include, the Hall property.
.The record includes a deed wherein a predecessor in interest of the Funks granted an easement over the portion of Blossom Mountain Road traversing the Lawrence property to the General Telephone Company of the Northwest. That deed, dated October 16, 1966, benefited property owned by General Telephone in the southwest quarter of section 22, but not the Hall property.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and concurring in the result.
I concur in Parts II.A. and II.B. of the majority opinion, and I concur in the result with respect to Part II.C.
The district court’s finding of an express easement in this case was based upon the 1992 warranty deed from the Funks to Human Synergistics. The contract provided that the sale was:
5. Subject to and including an ingress egress easement over this and adjoining property in said sections 21 and 22 owned by the grantor and including an ingress egress easement over рortions of Section 21 heretofore granted to the grantors.
The contract recited that the Funks had executed a deed conveying the property to Human Synergistics and provided that a copy of the contract and a warranty deed would be placed in escrow. That apparently was not done because the Funks later executed a warranty deed on November 18, 1992. That deed did not reserve or grant any easement. The district court held that the above-quoted sentence in the real estate contract created an easement. The district court did not explain how it could have done so.
Under the doсtrine of merger, any recitals in the real estate contract were merged into the deed. As we stated in Jolley v. Idaho Securities, Inc.,
This deed is given in fulfillment of those certain contracts between the рarties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the conveyance of the above described property, and the covenants and warranty herein contained shall not apply to any title, interest or encumbrance arising by, through or under the purchaser in said contract, and shall not apply to any taxes, аssessments or other charges levied, assessed or becoming due subsequent to the date of said contract.
The recital does not incorporate the contract by reference, but merely excludes from the warranties of title, quiet enjoyment, and against encumbrances any defect arising out of the purchаser’s conduct during the time from the contract of sale to the issuance of the warranty deed. Thus, under the doctrine of merger, any purported reservation or grant of an easement in the real estate contract would be irrelevant. The district court erred in attempting to create an easement based upon the real estate contract.