69 Pa. Super. 468 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1918
Opinion by
This is a scire facias upoii a municipal claim for curbing. The claim and the scire facias issued thereon recited that the work was completed on June 17, 1913, but the claim was not filed within six months of the completion of the work, as required by Section 10 of the Act of June 4, 1901, P. L. 364; that an assessment for the curbing was made against the property on August 19,1913, and duly rendered to the owner; that the remedial statute of May 28, 1915, P. L. 610, gave to the borough a remedy to collect the claim, although the same had not been filed within six months, and that this claim was filed in pursuance of the provisions of said remedial statute. The defendant demurred to the scire facias, upon the ground that the claim had not been filed within six months after the completion of thte work, and there was no lawful authority for filing the same on November 27, 1915. The learned judge of the court below was of opinion that, as the claim had ceased to be collectable at the date of the approval of the Act of May 28, 1915, those provisions of the statute which brought this claim within its protection interfered with the vested rights of the property owner and the statute was to that extent unconstitutional. The court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment in favor of the defendant. The borough appeals from that judgment.
This case as presented involves the single question of the constitutionality of the Act of May 28, 1915, P. L. 610, and it is unnecessary to consider the question of the
The legislature had the power, before this work was
The authorities relied upon by the learned judge of the court below do not establish any principle which cannot be reconciled with that long line of cases of which a few examples have been hereinbefore cited. Lewis v. The Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 220 Pa. 317, dealt with the rights of private individuals, which indirectly arose out of a contractual relation, and it was held that, under the law existing at the time of the accident, the plaintiff’s husband, who was killed, was an employee of the defendant company. Waynesburg Borough v. Ray, 59 Pa. Superior Ct. 640, was decided by this court upon the ground that the case did not come within the provisions of the curative act of April 15, 1907, P. L. 83. It is true that it was in that case said that the power of the legislature to disturb vested rights, by enacting a statute to relieve from the neglect óf a borough to file a lien in time, “would be open to serious question.” That question this court did not then decide. The language of the Act of 1915 is different from that of the Act of 1907 and this case comes clearly within its provisions. The question with regard to which a doubt was then expressed, we are now called upon to decide. We are of opinion that the Act of May 28, 1915, P. L. 610, was a valid exercise of legislative power.
The fact that the claim, recites that there was an assessment made against the property in August, 1913, and a second assessment made after the passage of the curative legislation is not fatal to the claim. The statute expressly validates assessments made prior to its enactment, and authorizes an assessment in case none had al
The judgment is reversed, the demurrer is overruled .and the record is remitted with a procedendo.