|!At issue in this ease is whether the court of appeal erred in finding the Shreveport City Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying a special exception use for a proposed liquor store. For the reasons that follow, we conclude the Council’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious, and therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeal.
UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Roland Toups, individually and on behalf of Thrifty Liquor Store, filed an application with the Shreveport Metropolitan Planning Commission (“MPC”) seeking to change the zoning on a parcel of property on Bert Kouns Industrial Loop from R-A (residence/agriculture districts) to B-3 (community business districts), so he could build a liquor store at the site.
^Additionally, Mr. Toups filed an application with the Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) to allow a special exception use for the sale of high alcoholic content beverages. The application specifically requested a special exception use for packaged liquor, wine, and beer. The ZBA unanimously approved the application.
Thereafter, the pastor of Calvary Baptist Church, which is located approximately 1500 feet from the proposed liquor store site, appealed the MPC and ZBA decisions to the Shreveport City Council (“Council”).
Mr. Toups filed a petition in the district court for review of the Council’s action reversing the MPC and ZBA decisions.
After a trial and de novo review, the district court affirmed the Council’s decision denying the special exception use.
Mr. Toups appealed the district court’s judgment affirming the Council’s decision to overturn the ZBA decision and deny the special exception use permit. On original hearing, the court of appeal affirmed the district court’s judgment. Subsequently, the court of appeal, in a divided opinion, granted rehearing and held the “Shreveport City Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the special exception use, and the trial court’s subsequent determination affirming that decision was in error.” Toups v. City of Shreveport, 44,933 (La.App. 2 Cir. 2/10/10),
Upon the City’s application, we granted certiorari to determine the correctness of the court of appeal’s judgment. Toups v. City of Shreveport, 10-1559 (La.11/5/10),
DISCUSSION
Because zoning falls under ■ the jurisdiction of the legislature, courts will not interfere with their prerogative unless the action is palpably erroneous and without any substantial relation to the public health, safety, or general welfare. King v. Caddo Parish Commission, 97-1873 (La.10/20/98),
A challenge to a zoning decision in Louisiana is a de novo proceeding on the issue of whether the result of the legislation is arbitrary and capricious, and therefore a taking of property without due process of law. Palermo Land Co., Inc. v. Planning Com’n of Calcasieu Parish,
In the instant case, the court of appeal found the Council acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the special exception use, because its decision was not supported by objective facts. Specifically, the court found Mr. Toups supported his position with “rational and objective facts,” while the opponents merely submitted unsubstantiated opinions regarding increases of traffic and crime which might occur if the special exception use was granted.
We find the court of appeal’s reasoning would impose a requirement on governmental bodies which departs from our established jurisprudence. In contrast |sto the court of appeal’s conclusion, our jurisprudence has long recognized “expressions of opinion made by citizens to a legislative body serve as a manner by which the legislative body learns the will of the people and determines what benefits the public good.” King, 97-1873 at pp. 16,
The approach taken by the court of appeal would necessarily require courts to inquire into the motivations and -wisdom of legislative determinations by concluding only those opinions supported by “rational and objective facts” are worthy of acceptance by the legislator. Such a conclusion has been soundly rejected by our decisions. More than eighty years ago, in State v. Hill,
We are not presently concerned with the motives which prompted the lawmakers to pass the act, nor with the question as to whether the law is a good or bad law, a wise or an unwise law. The principle is so well settled that the Legislature is the sole judge of the wisdom and expediency of a statute, as well as the necessity for its passage, that it scarcely calls for citation of authority.
This fundamental principle has been espoused repeatedly during the review of zoning decisions. “The courts may not assume powers and functions which the law has lodged in other agencies of government relative to the adoption and administration of the zoning laws; in other words, a court may not constitute itself as a zoning commission, or ‘super-zoning* commission, or zoning board.” Meyers v. City of Baton Rouge,
We recognize the evidence in the record establishes that three other stores in this same area have special exception uses to sell alcohol. However, these businesses currently have the ability to sell only beer and wine, whereas Mr. Toups’ store would also sell liquors such as bourbon, vodka, and rum. Furthermore, unlike the other stores, the main commodity sold at Mr. Toups’ proposed store is alcohol. Additionally, Mr. Toups’ proposed store would have a “drive-thru” window, where drinks such as frozen daiquiris sealed only by tape could be purchased by a driver who then reenters traffic. The Council could logically assume that these factors, combined with the presence of novice drivers from Calvary Baptist Academy, could increase the likelihood of traffic accidents in the immediate area. Under these circumstances, we cannot say the Council’s decision to deny the special exception use was an arbitrary and capricious decision.
|7The court of appeal also determined the Council violated La. R.S. 26:493, which provides:
Except as limited by the provisions of this Chapter the various subdivisions of the state may regulate but not prohibit, except by referendum vote as provided by Chapter 3 of this Title or by legally authorized zoning laws of municipalities, the business of wholesaling, retailing, and dealing in 'alcoholic beverages. No parish or municipality shall, in the exercise of its police power, regulate the business of selling such beverages more than is necessary for the protection of the public health, morals, safety, and peace, [emphasis added]
In City of De Ridder v. Mangano,
The municipal council of De Ridder, therefore, has express authority from the Legislature to adopt ordinances regulating barrooms, provided the regulations are consistent with the Constitution and laws of the state, and do not go further than is necessary to protect the public welfare. Obviously, the purpose of this proviso in the statute is to forbid the governing authorities of a parish or municipality to adopt such a stringent regulation of the retail liquor business as would amount to local prohibition, without a vote of the electors of the parish or municipality. The only question here is whether either of the ordinances in contest goes further in the way of regulating barrooms than is necessary for the welfare of the community — specifically, for the safety, peace or morals of the community.
In summary, we find the Council’s decision to deny Mr. Toups’ request for a special exception use was based on appropriate and well-founded concerns for the public safety, and is not arbitrary or capricious. The court of appeal erred in holding otherwise. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeal must be reversed, and the judgment of the district court reinstated.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed. The judgment of the district court is reinstated.
Notes
. The parcel of land is owned by Alex Mijalis, Mary C. Mijalis, and Christopher Demopulos as trustee of Christopher Trust and SSD Trust.
. The property owners filed a petition of intervention, joining with Mr. Toups in seeking reversal of the City Council's actions. Several churches in the area also sought to intervene, but their interventions were later dismissed.
. The district court also reversed the Council’s decision denying the rezoning of the property from R-A to B-3. That portion of the district court's ruling has not been appealed, and is not at issue for purposes of this opinion.
. In addition to the opinions advanced by numerous citizens regarding the increase in crime and traffic, the Council also considered FBI statistics showing approximately 40% of all crimes are committed under the influence of alcohol, and a 2005 National Highway Transportation Safety Administration report showing 39% of traffic fatalities involve alcohol, and 21% of children age 14 and younger, killed in motor vehicle accidents, were involved in alcohol-related crashes.