Lead Opinion
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge LOURIE. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge PROST.
Touchcom, Inc. and Touchcom Technologies, Inc. (collectively “Touchcom”) appeal from the final judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissing Touchcom’s malpractice suit against the law firm of Bereskin & Parr (“B & P”) and attorney H. Samuel Frost. Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, No. 07-CV-114, slip op. at 1 (E.D.Va. Feb. 4, 2008). The district court dismissed Touchcom’s suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the court erred in determining that it did not have personal jurisdiction over B & P and Frost, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Peter Hollidge, one of the principals of Touchcom, Inc., invented aspects of a pump system that was designed to allow a user to control the system via a central processing unit. In 1987, he retained B & P, a Canadian intellectual property law firm, and specifically H. Samuel Frost, a partner in B & P’s Mississauga office, to file and prosecute the necessary patent applications. Hollidge sought patent protection for his invention in Canada, the United States, and various European countries. B & P and Frost entered into an oral agreement with Hollidge regarding the patent prosecution.
Frost prepared a Canadian patent application on Hollidge’s invention that was filed on August 6, 1987.
To obtain patent protection on Touch-com’s invention outside of Canada, Frost opted to file under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”). The PCT provides a unified procedure for filing a single patent application in multiple countries. Under the PCT process, an applicant first files a patent application in one participating country. The International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (‘WIPO”), on request, then transmits copies of the application to domestic national patent offices selected by the patentee. Those filings are referred to as “national phase entries.”
On August 5, 1988, Frost filed a PCT application in the United Kingdom covering Touchcom’s invention. That PCT application, unlike the Canadian application, did not contain the complete computer source code for the invention; a portion of the source code was unintentionally omitted. On December 29, 1989, WIPO transmitted and filed a national phase application in the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), which is located in Alexandria, Virginia. The U.S. application was identical to the British application; it also lacked the omitted portion of the computer source code.
In order to perfect the U.S. application, Frost transmitted various documents to the USPTO, including a transmittal letter, a cover letter that outlined applicable fees, and a declaration of inventorship executed by Hollidge. Additionally, Frost submitted a preliminary amendment (not related to the source code), a petition to make special, and small entity declarations signed by Hollidge and Touchcom. It is not alleged that Frost, or any other member of B & P, physically entered Virginia to prosecute the Touchcom patent. On June 25, 1991, U.S. Patent 5,027,282 (filed Dec. 28, 1988), claiming the interactive pump system, issued to Touchcom.
Several years after obtaining its U.S. patent, Touchcom filed two patent infringement actions in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. In one of those actions, the district court held that Touchcom’s patent was invalid for indefiniteness. Touchcom, Inc. v. Dresser, Inc.,
On August 25, 2006, Touchcom filed a malpractice action against appellees in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. Appellees subsequently removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. On October 3, 2006, Touchcom voluntarily dismissed the D.C. action and, on the following day, re-filed the case in the circuit court of Arlington County, Virginia.
On January 30, 2007, appellees removed the Arlington County action to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Shortly thereafter, appellees moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Touch-com moved to remand the case to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court then stayed the proceedings pending our decision in Air Measurement Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, 504 F.3d
On February 4, 2008, the district court ruled on all pending motions, including appellees’ motion to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction. Touchcom, Inc. v. Bereskin & Parr, No. 07-CV-114, slip op. at 31 (E.D.Va. Feb. 4, 2008). As a preliminary matter, the court, relying on our decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski LLP,
Touchcom timely appealed the district court’s judgment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
DISCUSSION
Touchcom argues that the district court erred when it found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over appellees. Touchcom contends that, contrary to the court’s finding, appellees’ contacts with the Commonwealth of Virginia were sufficient to satisfy the Virginia long-arm statute and establish specific jurisdiction over appellees. In support of that claim, Touchcom alleges that appellees transacted business in Virginia, contracted to supply services or things in Virginia, and caused tortious injury in Virginia by an act or omission outside of Virginia. Furthermore, Touchcom claims that appellees possess the required “minimum contacts” with Virginia such that exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellees would not be inconsistent with notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In response, appellees urge us to affirm the district court’s finding that it lacked specific jurisdiction over appellees. Appellees claim that Virginia’s long-arm statute does not confer jurisdiction over Frost or B & P because the alleged malpractice does not arise out of business transacted in Virginia or from the transmission of documents to the USPTO. Appellees further argue that the Virginia long-arm statute does not establish jurisdiction because the alleged malpractice was not a tortious act committed in Virginia. Even if the Virginia long-arm statute conferred jurisdiction in this case, and appellees claim it does not, appellees argue that finding personal jurisdiction in this case would violate due process.
The question presented in this case is one of first impression, viz., whether the act of filing an application for a U.S. patent at the USPTO is sufficient to subject the filing attorney to personal jurisdiction in a malpractice claim that is based upon that filing and is brought in federal court. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that it is.
A Standard of Review
We review whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over appellees under a de novo standard. 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc.,
Because the district court decided appellees’ pretrial personal jurisdiction motion without conducting a hearing, Touchcom must make only a prima facie showing that the district court had personal jurisdiction over appellees in order to succeed on appeal. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle,
Courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants on either of two bases: general or specific jurisdiction. Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com. de Equip. Medico,
B. Specific Jurisdiction
Analysis of personal jurisdiction in federal court begins with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Synthes,
The district court, in deciding this case, found that Rule 4(k)(l)(A) did not permit the exercise of jurisdiction over appellees. The court did not examine whether Rule 4(k)(2) permitted the exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellees. The court’s reason for ignoring Rule 4(k)(2) was sound: Touchcom did not allege that that rule permitted the exercise of jurisdiction. However, on appeal, Touchcom does argue the relevance of Rule 4(k)(2), and we are entitled to consider it. See Appellant’s Br. at 32 n. 6.
Appellees argue that Touchcom has waived any argument based upon that rule because it is raising the argument for the first time on appeal. However, Touchcom correctly points out that it did not have the opportunity to argue Rule 4(k)(2) to the district court because the court ruled on subject matter jurisdiction, and thus
For the reasons stated below, we agree with the district court’s findings that under a traditional 4(k)(l)(A) analysis, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over appellees. However, we find that under a Rule 4(k)(2) analysis, exercise of jurisdiction over appellees is permitted. We will analyze each rule in turn.
1. Rule 1(h)(1)(A)
An inquiry into personal jurisdiction involves two steps. Genetic Implant Sys., Inc. v. Core-Vent Corp.,
In this case, the two-step personal jurisdiction inquiry coalesces into a single inquiry. The Virginia long-arm statute has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Virginia to generally authorize the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the U.S. Constitution. Danville Plywood Corp. v. Plain & Fancy Kitchens, Inc.,
The Supreme Court articulated the test for determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
The “constitutional touchstone” of a due process inquiry is determining whether the defendant “purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum state.” Burger King,
In this case, appellees’ contacts with Virginia are limited to the filing of a patent application at the USPTO and subsequent communications and filings made in connection with that application. Appellees never traveled to Virginia in connection with this patent and thus have not contributed to or benefited from Virginia’s restaurants, hotels, airports, or other commercial establishments in its prosecution of the patent. Appellees have not directed any of their activities at issue in this case towards residents of Virginia, nor have they engaged in business negotiations with any Virginia residents. Appellees’ contacts are limited to long-distance communications with a federal agency that happens to be located in Virginia primarily because of the state’s proximity to our nation’s capital. While appellees made such contacts purposefully, and thus those contacts are neither random nor fortuitous, see id., the contacts do not indicate a purposeful availment of the “privilege of conducting business within” Virginia. Finally, they have engaged in no conduct in Virginia that concerns the interests of Virginia, such as protecting its citizens, businesses, or property. For purposes of this lawsuit, appellees do not therefore possess the constitutional “minimum contacts” with Virginia, Hanson,
2. RuleJp(k)(2)
Rule 4(k)(2), entitled “Federal Claim Outside State-Court Jurisdiction,” states, in relevant part: “For a claim that arises under federal law, serving a summons ... establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant if: (A) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction; and (B) exercising jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution and laws.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2). Thus, for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant under that rule, the plaintiffs claim must arise under federal law, the defendant must not be subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction, and exercise of jurisdiction must comport with due process. Synthes,
a. Claim Arises Under Federal Law
This case was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Appellees argued that the case raised a federal question. Touchcom, No. 07-CV-114, slip op. at 6 (arguing subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338). Thus, for the district court to have possessed subject matter jurisdiction over Touchcom’s claim, the claims must necessarily have arisen under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (conferring original jurisdiction to federal district courts over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” (emphasis added)); 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (stating that U.S. district courts possess subject matter ju
We agree with the district court that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1338. As a consequence of that decision, Touchcom’s claims necessarily arise under federal law for purposes of Rule 4(k)(2). The Supreme Court has held that § 1338 jurisdiction extends to any case “in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded complaints.” Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,
Just as in Immunocept, this case concerns state malpractice claims that involve analysis of patent claims and proof of invalidity. Touchcom will be required to show that, had appellees not omitted a portion of the source code from its application, the resulting U.S. patent would not have been held invalid. See Stewart v. Hall,
b. Not Subject to Jurisdiction in Any State
The second requirement of Rule 4(k)(2), that the defendant is not subject to the jurisdiction of any state’s courts of general jurisdiction, poses practical difficulties for district courts. See Synthes,
Rule 4(k)(2) closed a loophole that existed prior to the 1993 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In dealing with the second requirement of Rule 4(k)(2), the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and DC Circuits have adopted an approach that places the burden on the defendant. See Oldfield v. Pueblo De Bahia Lora, S.A.,
A defendant who wants to preclude the use of Rule 4(k)(2) has only to name some other state in which the suit could proceed. Naming a more appropriate state would amount to a consent to personal jurisdiction there.... If, however, the defendant contends that he cannot be sued in the forum state and refuses to identify any other state where suit is possible, then the federal court is entitled to use Rule 4(k)(2). This procedure makes it unnecessary to traipse through the 50 states, asking whether each could entertain the suit.
ISI Int’l,
The First Circuit has a different approach. Under that circuit’s approach, a plaintiff must certify that defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state, at which point the burden shifts to the defendant to refute the plaintiffs certification. Swiss Am. Bank,
We conclude that, in federal cases, the purposes of Rule 4(k)(2) are best achieved when the defendant is afforded the opportunity to avoid the application of the rule only when it designates a suitable forum in which the plaintiff could have brought suit. The advisory committee was concerned with defendants escaping jurisdiction in U.S. federal courts while still having minimum contacts with the United States. If we were to adopt the First Circuit’s requirement that a plaintiff must prove that a defendant was not subject to jurisdiction in any of the fifty states, we would be allowing some defendants to escape jurisdiction due to the excessive burden involved in making such a showing. It is difficult to prove a negative. Furthermore, that approach would not allow plaintiffs to plead jurisdiction in the alternative under Rule 4(k)(l)(A) and Rule 4(k)(2). Requiring a plaintiff to certify that a defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state forecloses an argument by the plaintiff that the defendant is subject to jurisdiction in the state in which the court resides. See Base Metal Trading,
We conclude that the approach articulated by the Seventh Circuit is more in tune with the purposes behind the enactment of Rule 4(k)(2). We agree with the Seventh Circuit that the “[cjonstitutional analysis for each of the 50 states” required under the First Circuit’s approach is undesirable and “eminently avoidable by allocating burdens sensibly.” ISI Int’l,
Turning now to the facts of this case, the district court found, and we have confirmed, that appellees are not subject to Virginia’s courts of general jurisdiction. See sec. Bl, supra. Appellees have not named another state in which they would be subject to jurisdiction. All of the appellees’ contacts with the United States that have been alleged by Touchcom occurred at the USPTO in Virginia. There is no record evidence of any of the contacts relating to Touchcom’s claims occurring in any other state. Thus, we find that for purposes of Rule 4(k)(2) Touchcom has made a prima facie showing that appellees are not subject to the jurisdiction of any state’s courts of general jurisdiction.
As noted above, due to the procedural posture of this appeal, Touchcom is required only to make a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction in order to prevail. Elecs. for Imaging,
c. Due Process
Just as in the due process analysis under Rule 4(k)(l)(A), in deciding whether due process permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2), we must consider whether “(1) defendant has purposefully directed its activities at residents of the forum, (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s activities with the forum, and (3) assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.” Synthes,
Applying the first factor of our three-factor test to this case, we conclude that appellees purposefully directed their activities at parties in the United States and thus had “minimum contacts” sufficient to satisfy due process. Appellees entered into a contractual agreement to obtain U.S. patent protection for Touch-com. That agreement contemplated and resulted in appellees seeking and obtaining a U.S. patent. In doing so, appellees were required to be registered patent agents, submit documents to the USPTO, and perfect their client’s patent application before that agency. It stands to reason that one who has sought and obtained a property interest from a U.S. agency has purposefully availed itself of the laws of the United States.
Appellees argue that because the U.S. patent application at issue in this case originated as a PCT application, their contacts with the United States are not sufficient to subject them to personal jurisdiction in federal court. However, the procedural route by which the patent was obtained is irrelevant. Appellees ultimately obtained a U.S. patent for their client by availing themselves of the only agency authorized to issue such patents, which is, not surprisingly, located in the United States. Appellees were required to submit documents to the USPTO to perfect the U.S. patent application and appellees thus have had minimum contacts with the United States. That appellees never physically entered the country in doing so is not determinative of minimum contacts. See Burger King,
As for the second factor of our due process analysis, we conclude that Touchcom’s claims of malpractice undoubtedly arise out of appellees’ activities with an agency of the United States. Appellees argue that Touchcom’s claims are based upon an error committed in the filing of a
We now turn to the third prong in our analysis. After finding that a defendant’s activities form the basis for the litigation and are sufficient to establish minimum contacts, a court must analyze whether exercising jurisdiction over a defendant based on those contacts would be reasonable and fair. See, e.g., Synthes,
The first factor in our analysis of fair play and substantial justice is the burden placed upon the defendant in having to litigate in the forum. “The unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
Next, we analyze the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute. Although this dispute is between Canadian citizens, the United States has an interest in regulating malpractice occurring at the USPTO regardless of the nationalities involved. The United States also has a legitimate interest in providing an adjudicatory forum for
As for the third prong of the fairness inquiry — the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief in the chosen forum — Touch-corn’s interest in obtaining relief in a U.S. court is also minimal. Both U.S. and Canadian courts could equally provide the relief that Touchcom seeks. This factor is therefore neutral.
The fourth and fifth factors, to the extent they apply, do not convince us that exercising jurisdiction over appellees would violate notions of fair play and substantial justice. “Both factors are concerned with the potential clash of substantive social policies between competing fora and the efficiency of a resolution to the controversy.” Synthes,
Regarding the fifth factor, the United States has a cognizable policy interest in regulating the practice of foreign attorneys that appear before the USPTO. Of course, Canada has an interest in regulating contracts entered into between its citizens. Thus, this factor also does not favor either party. Such a conclusion does not suggest that due process would be offended by the exercise of jurisdiction over appellees. In light of appellees’ minimal burden in litigating this case in the United States and the United States’ interest in and efficiency in adjudicating this dispute, we accordingly find that exercise of jurisdiction in this case comports with due process.
In summary, appellees’ contacts with the United States indicate that appellees “purposefully avail[ed]” themselves of the privilege of conducting business in the United States. Those contacts form the basis for the present action. We therefore conclude that appellees’ contacts with the United States are sufficient to meet the “minimum contacts” standard articulated in International Shoe. Furthermore, exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellees in this case would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The present action was filed in Virginia and no other state appears to have a superior claim to jurisdiction. We therefore find that Touchcom has shown a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia pursuant to Rule 4(k)(2).
C. Statute of Limitations
As an alternative to their jurisdictional argument, appellees argue that Touch-corn’s claims should be dismissed under
CONCLUSION
Because the district court possessed personal jurisdiction over appellees, we reverse the court’s dismissal. We remand the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Notes
. A second attorney, Robert Wilkes, assisted Frost in prosecuting the relevant patents in this case. Wilkes is not a defendant in this action.
. On December 7, 1987, Hollidge assigned his
. This malpractice suit, where the patent owner is the plaintiff, is not a case to which 35 U.S.C. § 293 applies, where jurisdiction over a foreign patentee is provided for proceedings affecting the patent.
. The advisory committee notes to the 1993 amendment state:
Under the former rule, a problem was presented when the defendant was a non-resident of the United States having contacts with the United States sufficient to justify the application of United States law and to satisfy federal standards of forum selection, but having insufficient contact with any single state to support jurisdiction under state longarm legislation or meet the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment limitation on state court territorial jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant was shielded from the enforcement of federal law by the fortuity of a favorable limitation on the power of state courts, which was incorporated into the federal practice by the former rule. In this respect, the revision responds to the suggestion of the Supreme Court made in Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd..,484 U.S. 97 , 111,108 S.Ct. 404 ,98 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2) advisory committee notes to 1993 amendment.
. Because Touchcom argued both rule 4(k)(l)(A) and Rule 4(k)(2), and because we have dealt with both of those rules, we need not decide whether a Rule 4(k)(2) analysis can only be conducted after a Rule 4(k)(l)(A) analysis, as required by the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits. Swiss Am. Bank,
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge PROST.
dissenting.
I agree with the majority’s discussion of Rule 4(k)(l)(A) and its treatment of the first two requirements for personal jurisdiction to be proper under Rule 4(k)(2). I also agree that the Appellees have minimum contacts with the United States as a whole and that Touchcom’s cause of action arises out of those contacts. However, in my view, this case presents one of the “rare situations” in which minimum contacts are present but exercising personal jurisdiction would nevertheless violate due process because “the plaintiffs interest and the state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute in the forum are so attenuated that they are clearly outweighed by the burden of subjecting the defendant to litigation within the forum.” Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp.,
As the majority notes, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction if doing so “would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal.,
With respect to the first factor, the majority concludes that the burden on the Appellees in this case is “minimal” because modern transportation and communication technologies make travel between Toronto, Ontario and Alexandria, Virginia less burdensome than it has been in the past. See Majority Op. at 1417-18 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
Additionally, the burden on the Appellees is not merely the travel time. For example, I do not think we would assume that it is less burdensome for a resident of Buffalo, New York to litigate in Toronto rather than New York City even though Toronto is over 250 miles closer. Regardless of the ease of travel, “[t]he unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness of stretching the long arm of personal jurisdiction over national borders.” Asahi
I also disagree with the majority’s assertion that the Appellees’ eligibility to practice before the USPTO gives them a special familiarity with United States law. Under the applicable rules, an applicant for registration before the USPTO need not demonstrate any general understanding of our country’s legal system. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 11.6(c), 11.7(a). Moreover, the majority identifies no basis for its conclusion that the knowledge and skills necessary to prosecute patents before a government agency would tend to provide familiarity with malpractice litigation before a jury in a trial court.
Admittedly, the task of quantifying the burden on a particular defendant in a particular case and formulating a linguistic description of that burden is not amenable to precision. See, e.g., Asahi,
With respect to the second factor in the analysis, I consider the United States’ interest in adjudicating this dispute to be minimal. Most importantly, neither Touchcom nor the Appellees are citizens or residents of the United States. See Asahi
As a general matter, the majority is correct that “the United States has an interest in regulating malpractice occurring at the USPTO regardless of the nationalities involved.” Majority Op. at 21. However, the due process analysis must be conducted on a case-by-case basis. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co.,
Turning to the third factor, I agree with the majority that Touchcom’s interest in obtaining relief in a United States court is minimal because a Canadian forum is available. Accordingly, I do not believe that this factor supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case.
The majority notes that the fourth and fifth factors — the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies and the shared interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies— “are concerned with the potential clash of substantive social policies between competing fora and the efficiency of a resolution to the controversy.” Majority Op. at 1418 (quoting Synthes,
With respect to the fourth factor, the majority concludes that the United States and Canada would be equally efficient fora because the suit would likely implicate at least some of the laws of each nation. I generally agree, subject to the observation that leaving the adjudication of malpractice claims between foreign parties to the fora in which they both reside would spread the demand on judicial resources more evenly across the globe rather than centralizing it in the United States.
Finally, I believe that the interest of the fora in furthering fundamental substantive social policies counsels against our exercise of jurisdiction. It is true that the United States has a policy interest in regulating foreign patent agents who appear before the USPTO. However, as discussed above, the exercise of jurisdiction in this case would only marginally further that interest. The United States’ interest must be balanced against Canada’s interest in this dispute, which I submit is more significant. First, as the majority recognizes, Canada has an interest in regulating contracts entered into between Canadian citizens. Second, the magnitude and availability of damages for professional malpractice will affect the quality and price— and, accordingly, accessibility — of professional services. Balancing the competing policy considerations can be controversial
In sum, it is my view that a weighing of the factors identified by the Supreme Court demonstrates that exercising jurisdiction over the Appellees in this case is unreasonable. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.