After Remand
Plaintiffs were the owners and the lessees of a building which was substantially destroyed by fire on April 4, 1975. Defendant allegedly caused the fire while repairing his automobile on the premises. At the time of the accident, Michigan’s no-fault automobile insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.; MSA 24.13101 et seq., had been in effect for over a year and a half.
In November of 1975, this Court, in an unrelated case, held that the property provisions of the no-fault act were unconstitutional.
Shavers v Attorney General,
On October 19, 1976, more than 18 months after their building was destroyed by fire, plaintiffs filed an action against defendant alleging tort liability and requesting damages in excess of $10,000. Plaintiffs contended that they made no mention of the no-fault act in their complaint nor did they *378 name defendant’s automobile insurer as a defendant because the property protection provisions of the no-fault act had been declared invalid in this Court’s opinion in Shavers, supra.
In June of 1978, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed this Court’s holding in
Shavers, supra,
finding that the property protection insurance scheme of the no-fault act was constitutional and, therefore, tort liability as a basis of recovery for property damage arising from the ownership, maintenance, or use of an automobile was abolished.
Shavers v Attorney General,
In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in
Shavers,
defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, as plaintiffs’ complaint alleged only tort liability. This motion was granted by the trial court on April 22, 1980. On appeal from that order, this Court, in
Totzkay v DuBois,
Under the law of the case doctrine, however, our earlier decision in the instant case prevents us from basing our present holding on this ground. See
CAF Investment Co v Saginaw Twp,
410 Mich
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428, 455;
On remand, the case was initially assigned to Judge Hathaway of the Wayne County Circuit Court. Defendant moved for accelerated judgment on the ground that plaintiffs’ action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in the no-fault act, MCL 500.3145(2); MSA 24.13145(2). The court denied defendant’s motion on the basis of MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8) which provides a three-year statute, of limitation for tort liability where property damage is involved. .
The case was subsequently reassigned to Judge Finch, who heard and granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of defendant’s liability.
Finally, the case was assigned to Judge Giovan for trial on the remaining issue of damages. Defendant renewed his motion for accelerated judgment on the basis of the one-year statute of limitations. After hearing arguments from both counsel, the court granted defendant’s motion. Plaintiffs appeal as of right from that order and raise several issues.
First, given that the intitial pretrial judge denied defendant’s motion for accelerated judgment, did the trial court thereafter have jurisdiction to grant the same motion? Plaintiffs argue no, and in support of their position cite GCR 1963, 529.2, which provides as follows:
"No judgment or order shall be set aside or vacated, and no proceeding under a judgment or order shall be stayed by any circuit judge except the one who made the judgment or order, unless he is absent or unable to act. If the circuit judge who made the judgment or order is absent or unable to act, an order vacating or setting aside the judgment or order or staying proceedings under the judgment or order may be made by any *380 of the other judges of the circuit or any judge assigned to the circuit.”
Defendant, on the other hand, argues that the authority of the pretrial judge ended at the time that the case was assigned for trial, citing Wayne Circuit Court Rule 6.1, and that, as the "successor” judge, the trial court had authority to review the decisions of his predecessor. Rule 6.1(b) provides:
"The judge to whom a civil case is assigned shall handle all preliminary matters until trial of the case begins. Following pretrial, if a matter comes before the judge which he believes should be decided by the trial judge, he shall refer the matter to the chief judge for disposition.”
We agree with plaintiffs that the pretrial judge who initially denied defendant’s motion was not "absent or unable to act” as envisioned by GCR 1963, 529.2, and hold that the trial court had no authority thereafter to hear the same motion. While under WCCR 6.1(b) the authority of a pretrial judge to decide matters preliminary to trial ends when the trial begins, the authority to hear subsequent motions concerning preliminary matters initially decided by that judge prior to trial continues until those matters are finally and fully resolved. In this regard, WCCR 119.8(a) provides that "[a] motion for rehearing will be assigned to the judge who heard the motion * * Clearly, this local court rule would have little meaning if it could be circumvented by merely waiting for reassignment to the trial judge. The record reflects that a motion for rehearing was never filed by defendant.
Nor do we think that the reassignment of a case for trial purposes, in and of itself, somehow works
*381
to make the pretrial judge "absent or unable to act”. The very existence of WCCR 6.1(b) belies such a contention. As a practical matter, no evidence has been presented which suggests that either pretrial judge was absent or otherwise unavailable to fulfill judicial duties in Wayne County. See
Derosia v Austin,
Finally, the construction urged by defendant would be contrary to the policy behind GCR 1963, 529.2. See
Berar Enterprises, Inc v Harmon,
Next we consider the statute of limitations issue presented in defendant’s motion which has been preserved for appeal pursuant to GCR 1963, 116.2. See 1 Honigman & Hawkins, Michigan Court Rules Annotated (2d ed), p 339. As defendant has cross-appealed from "all prior interlocutory orders”, we are obligated to address the merits of that issue.
Before proceeding, we note that the "law of the case” doctrine, which prevents an appellate court from reconsidering an issue previously determined
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by it in an earlier appeal of the same case, see
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co v Liberty Mutual Ins Co,
It is a general rule that "the statute of limitations in effect at the time the plaintiffs’ cause of action arose governs”.
Zatolokin v Grimm,
While acknowledging that a statute of limitations is not always an automatic bar to untimely complaints, we note that none of the exceptions found in MCL 600.5851 through 600.5855; MSA 27A.5851 through 27A.5855 worked to prevent the filing of plaintiffs’ complaint within a one-year period. Nor is this an appropriate situation in which to invoke our equitable powers. See,
e.g., Huhtala v Travelers Ins Co,
We do not consider the remaining issues which were briefed by defendant on appeal as they have been rendered moot by the dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint.
Reversed.