213 Pa. Super. 282 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1968
Opinion by
The issue in this case is whether a summary judgment was properly entered in favor of the defendant Harry Hollander.
Plaintiffs instituted an action in trespass to recover for personal injuries sustained by wife-plaintiff on July 31, 1966, in a fall on the sidewalk in front of the premises at 423 West Norris Street, Philadelphia. The fall allegedly resulted from “large holes, obstructions,
Defendant Hollander answered alleging that he was a landlord out of possession, averring that “the defendant Hollander leased the entire property located at 423 West Norris Street to Pedro Cumba and Cruz Cumba, his wife, who were in full possession and control of the entire property at all times material to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” The City of Philadelphia’s answer also alleged that the sidewalk was owned, possessed, or controlled by the defendant Hollander, who it claimed was primarily and solely liable. The Cura-bas were joined as additional defendants by the City.
After the pleadings were closed and interrogatories were served upon and answered by Hollander, Hollander moved for summary judgment, attaching a copy of an alleged lease between Garrison Realty Company, agent for Harry Hollander, and Pedro Cumba and Cruz Cumba, his wife. The lease recites that the Cura-bas were renting “All That Certain entire two story store and dwelling property numbered and known as 423 West Norris Street” for two years beginning Au
Plaintiffs filed an answer to the motion for summary judgment in which they alleged that “(a) there are genuine issues as to material facts regarding the lease marked Exhibit ‘A’ and occupancy, making a trial essential to resolve them; and (b) notwithstanding defendant’s allegations as to the lease and occupancy, he may still be found liable, as a landlord out of possession, for the damages pleaded by plaintiff.”
Judge Beimel of the lower court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment. We reverse.
It is well established that we can sustain a summary judgment only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Pa. R. C. P. 1035(b); Michigan Bank v. Steensen, 211 Pa. Superior Ct. 405, 236 A. 2d 565 (1967). The record must be examined in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Schacter v. Albert, 212 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 239 A. 2d 841 (1968). The court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the plaintiff’s pleadings, giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Id. Finally, a summary judgment should be granted only when the case is clear and free from doubt. Mallesky v. Stevens, 427 Pa. 352, 235 A. 2d 154 (1967).
In his answer to the complaint defendant Hollander alleged that he had leased the entire property to the Cumbas and was thus an owner out of possession at the time of plaintiff’s alleged injuries and therefore
Furthermore, since the motion for summary judgment with the attached exhibit is not sworn to in any way, but is simply signed by the attorney, we question the power of the court to consider it in passing on the motion. Unsworn documents are neither referred to in Rule 1035 nor would it appear that they could be classified inferentially among the documents in which factual matters may be presented for purposes of summary judgment. See Wittlin v. Giacalone, 154 F. 2d 20 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Sardo v. McGrath, 196 F. 2d 20, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United States v. Tuteur, 215 F. 2d 415, 417 (7th Cir. 1954); Steven v. Roscoe Turner Aero. Corp., 324 F. 2d 157, 161 (7th Cir. 1963); cf. Lawson v. American Mot. Ins. Corp., 217 F. 2d 724, 726 (5th Cir. 1954); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 259 F. Supp. 440, 457-58 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Shinaberger v. United Aircraft Corp., 262 F. Supp. 52, 56 n. 3 (D. Conn. 1966).
On the record before us it cannot be found as a fact that the defects in the pavement appeared after the leasing. Only in the plaintiffs’ complaint is the matter touched upon. Examining their complaint in the .light most favorable to them and giving them the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the complaint can be read to allege that the defects existed “on the 31st day of July, 1966, and for a long time prior thereto.” This leaves a genuine issue of material fact and thé case lacks the clarity and freedom from doubt necessary to warrant summary judgment.
Judgment reversed with a procedendo.
Paragraph 10 of the Complaint alleged: “10. The said accident and the results thereof were caused by and through the joint negligence of defendants and each of them in that each: (a) failed to use due care required under the circumstances; (b) permitted the existence of the said large holes, obstructions, depressions, irregularities or defects; (c) failed to give warning or notice of the existence of the said large holes, obstructions, depressions, irregularities or defects; (d) disregarded the rights and safety of the plaintiff and other pedestrians lawfully intending to be upon the said sidewalk; and (e) failed to provide a safe and proper route of travel for the plaintiff and other pedestrians proceeding on foot in and along the said sidewalk.”
Since the language of Buie 1035(b) (referring to “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any”) was taken verbatim from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), interpretation of the scope of Rule 1035 can be appropriately aided by reference to federal cases. Schacter v. Albert, supra.