David H. TOTH, Appellant, v. Gerald ARASON, Individually, and d/b/a Arason‘s Body Shop, Respondent.
No. A04-769.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Oct. 12, 2006.
722 N.W.2d 437
Steven A. Nelson, International Falls, MN, for Respondent.
OPINION
GILDEA, Justice.
Appellant David Toth sued respondent Gerald Arason individually and d/b/a Arason‘s Body Shop for breach of contract, deceptive trade practices, and violations of
Toth bought a new Chevrolet light-duty pickup truck in February 1997. In August 1997 the vehicle sustained significant damage in an accident. After the accident, Toth contacted his insurance company, Western National Insurance, and then contacted Arason, who towed Toth‘s truck to his body shop and prepared an initial estimate based on what could be seen from a visual inspection of the truck. Arason did not indicate on the visual damage estimate whether the parts he would use to repair the truck would be OEM.
On behalf of Western, Darris Winter, an independent insurance adjuster, went to Arason‘s to inspect Toth‘s truck. Winter estimated the cost of repairs to the truck to be $10,042.52. In the estimate, Winter allocated $356 for a new radiator and $443.25 for a new A/C condenser.
Arason completed the repairs on the truck and submitted a final invoice to Toth, which stated that it was for “parts, labor, painting, materials to repair front of truck.” The total amount Arason charged for the work was $10,042.52, the exact amount that Winter had estimated. The invoice did not disclose that the radiator and condenser used were non-OEM parts. In fact, Arason was unable to obtain an OEM radiator and condenser, and instead ordered and installed a non-OEM radiator and condenser from Northern Factory Sales. Arason obtained the non-OEM radiator used in Toth‘s vehicle for $197.26 and the condenser for $151.66. Arason did not discount the charges for either the radiator or the condenser despite the fact that he obtained the radiator and the condenser for substantially less than the cost allotted on Winter‘s estimate.
In December 1997, Toth began to notice antifreeze leaking from the truck. Toth brought the truck to Arason, and Arason sent him to the GM dealer in International Falls. The dealer tried to identify the problem multiple times, but was unsuccessful. In February 2000, when the warranty on his truck was about to expire, Toth brought the truck back to the dealer. The dealer determined that the radiator was the source of the leak and informed Toth that he would have to have the radiator replaced. The cost to replace the leaking radiator would have been covered under the truck‘s new-vehicle warranty, but because the radiator in the truck was a non-OEM radiator it was not covered under that warranty. Toth could not afford to pay to replace the radiator immediately, and did not do so until April of 2002, when he had the radiator replaced at a cost of $810.44.
Toth sued Arason individually and d/b/a Arason‘s Body Shop for breach of contract, deceptive trade practices, and violations of
The court of appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for redetermination of the damages with respect to the radiator and for further proceedings on the breach of contract claim for peeling paint. Toth v. Arason, No. A04-769, 2005 WL 1216301 (Minn.App. May 17, 2005). The court of appeals held, among other things, that Toth was not entitled to attorney fees because
I
In his petition for review, Toth asked this court to examine the measure of damages applicable to a claim for violation of the Truth in Repairs Act and to decide whether he could recover his attorney fees. We do not reach these issues because, as set forth below, we find that Toth cannot maintain a cause of action under the Truth in Repairs Act.3
The court of appeals held that the remedies provision in the Truth in Repairs Act was not available to Toth. See Toth, 2005 WL 1216301, at *6. This statutory construction question is one we review de novo. Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dep‘t, 691 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn.2005). When construing statutes, if the plain language of the statute is “clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”
There are three provisions of the Truth in Repairs Act at issue in this case,
Toth argues that Arason violated section 325F.60, subdivision 1(e), because Arason did not identify on the invoice that he had used non-OEM parts in the repair.
Upon completion of repairs, a shop shall provide the customer with a copy of a dated invoice for the repairs performed. * * * The invoice shall contain the following information: * * * (e) a notation specifying which parts, if any, are new, used, rebuilt, reconditioned, or replated if that information is known by the shop. If parts, other than window glass, used in the repair are new parts, the invoice must indicate whether or not those parts are original equipment parts * * *.
There is no question that Arason violated section 325F.60, subdivision 1(e), when he failed to provide Toth with a written invoice or estimate noting whether the radia-
Turning to section 325F.63, Toth contends this provision entitles him to bring a private cause of action for Arason‘s violation of section 325F.60. Generally, a statute must provide for a private cause of action in order for an individual to have standing to sue. See State by Humphrey v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Minn.1996). Section 325F.63, subdivision 3, states: “Any violation of sections 325F.56 to 325F.66 shall be deemed a violation of section 325F.69, subdivision 1, and the provisions of section 8.31, shall apply.” While not providing a separate private right of action, section 325F.63 could be construed to give an individual the right to bring a private cause of action for a violation of the Truth in Repairs Act through application of section 8.31.5
Arason argues and the court of appeals held that section 325F.64, subdivision 1, specifically precludes Toth from relying on section 325F.63 to bring his claim. Section 325F.64, subdivision 1, provides: “Sections 325F.57 to 325F.59 and 325F.61 to 325F.66 shall not apply if an insurer or service contract company pays up to 90 percent of the charge for repairs or pays a charge for repairs above a deductible amount specified in an insurance agreement or service contract.” In other words, section 325F.64, subdivision 1, renders inoperative the only remedial provision of the statute, section 325F.63, if an insurance company has paid for the cost of repairs over the deductible amount.
The parties do not dispute that Toth‘s insurer paid for the repairs to his truck, less a $250 deductible for which Toth was responsible. Section 325F.64, subdivision 1, therefore, by its plain and unambiguous terms, precludes any remedy to Toth under section 325F.63.
Notwithstanding the plain language of section 325F.64, subdivision 1, Toth argues that construing the statute to preclude his claim “produces an absurd result and one plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.” In support of his argument, Toth points to the 1981 amendment to section 325F.64, subdivision 1, which removed section 325F.60 from the listed statutory exemptions. Act of May 8, 1981, ch. 134, § 2, 1981 Minn. Laws 404, 405. Toth argues that to construe section 325F.64 in accordance with the plain language would render the 1981 amendment meaningless. We disagree.
Toth is correct to note that we have, in the past, “look[ed] beyond the statutory
The legislature set out a statutory obligation in section 325F.60, subdivision 1(e), that those performing repair work must provide an accurate written description of their work. The legislature also made a judgment that those consumers who utilize insurance to pay for repairs could not litigate claims for violation of that statutory obligation. This is not an absurd result. Cf. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. League of Minn. Cities Ins. Trust, 659 N.W.2d 755, 762 (Minn.2003) (applying plain meaning of term even though it resulted in “a class of accident victims being uncompensated“).6
We hold that by operation of the plain language of section 325F.64, subdivision 1, the remedy section of the Truth in Repairs Act, section 325F.63, does not apply here, and a private cause of action for damages and attorney fees under section 8.31, subdivision 3a, therefore is not available.7
II
We next address Toth‘s alternative argument that Arason separately violated the Consumer Fraud Act, section 325F.69,
The act, use, or employment by any person of any fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or deceptive practice, with the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby, is enjoinable as provided in section 325F.70.
Section 8.31, subdivision 3a, applies to violations of the Consumer Fraud Act.
Toth claims that, “regardless of the truth in repairs statute, Toth was entitled to proceed under § 325F.69, subd. 1,” because Arason did not inform Toth that installation of non-OEM parts would void the manufacturer‘s warranty and instead told Toth that there would be a one-year guarantee whether Arason used an OEM or non-OEM part. Arason argues that Toth first raised this claim at the appellate level. The court of appeals agreed, noting that there was “nothing in the record that indicates that Toth claimed in the district court that even if Arason did not violate
We agree with the court of appeals. We have said that “a reviewing court generally may consider only those issues that the record shows were presented to and considered by the trial court.” Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn.2001); see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn.1988) (“Nor may a party obtain review by raising the same general issue litigated below but under a different theory.“). Although the complaint generally alleges that Arason violated the Consumer Fraud Act, Toth argued his case to the district court as one stemming from Arason‘s violation of section 325F.60 which, if proved, would have been deemed a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. Toth did not argue to the district court that there was behavior separate from the violation of section 325F.60 that would also be a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act. Because this issue was not pressed below, we decline to address it on appeal.8
Affirmed.
PAGE, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Toth alleged a violation of the Truth in Repairs Act (the Act), which, like the Consumer Fraud Act, is a consumer protection act. See
Since its original enactment in 1978, the Act has required repair shops to provide a customer with a dated invoice for repairs.
In 1981, the legislature amended the Act in several ways significant to this case. First, the legislature created a new definition of “repairs” specific to section 325F.60, the invoice requirement. Under the 1981 amendment, “repair” for purposes of the invoice requirement was defined to include, among other things, “work of any value performed under a manufacturer‘s warranty, a service contract, or an insurance policy.” Act of May 8, 1981, ch. 134, § 1, 1981 Minn. Laws 404, 404. Thus, under the 1981 amendment, a customer is entitled to a written invoice regardless of who pays for the repairs and regardless of how much the repairs cost. More to the point, the 1981 amendment specifically created the right of a customer to a written invoice for repairs that are covered by insurance. Second, because the Act as originally passed exempted insured repairs from all of its requirements, the legislature amended section 325F.64, the exemption section, to carve out section 325F.60, the invoice requirement. Act of May 8, 1981, ch. 134, § 2, 1981 Minn. Laws at 405. Whereas section 325F.64 previously exempted all of the Act if an insurer paid for repairs, under the 1981 amendment section 325F.60, the invoice requirement, applies to insured repairs.
But the legislature did not amend section 325F.63, the remedies provision of the Act. That section continues to provide that any violation of the Act “shall be deemed a violation of section 325F.69, subdivision 1, and the provisions of section 8.31, shall apply.”
The requirement that the customer be provided with a written invoice was amended in 1987 to add the requirement at issue here, namely, that the invoice also disclose whether any new parts used in repairs are or are not original equipment parts. Act of May 6, 1987, ch. 64, § 4, 1987 Minn. Laws 106, 116. Significantly, the same legislation that amended section 325F.60, the invoice requirement, made two other changes to Minnesota‘s insurance laws. First, the 1987 legislation also amended
These are important consumer protections not to be lightly discarded. The requirement of a written invoice specifically detailing whether new parts used in repairs are original equipment parts is not only a check on the repair shop, but also a check on automobile insurers’ claims settlement practices. The written invoice from the repair shop is the only evidence the consumer has as to whether the insurance company has in fact paid for original equipment parts, as the statute requires. And, a written invoice in the hands of the vehicle owner that clearly discloses whether original equipment parts were used in the repairs discourages an insurance adjuster from colluding with a repair shop to bill the insurance company for more expensive original equipment parts but use cheaper after-market parts in making the repairs and split the difference.
The court holds that, despite the amendment of section 325F.60, the invoice requirement, to specifically require that customers receive a written invoice even if insurance pays for the repairs, there is no remedy available to those customers if the written invoice is not provided or, as here, the written invoice is inaccurate or incomplete.1 Not only does the court conclude there is no remedy available to customers, but the effect of the court‘s decision thwarts the purpose of the 1987 insurance reform legislation. Because the court‘s decision removes violations of the invoice requirement from the scope of section 8.31, it bars the attorney general from investigating violations of the invoice requirement in the case of repairs covered by insurance. It similarly eliminates the power of the courts to enjoin violations of the invoice requirement and to award civil penalties for such violations. It also deprives vehicle owners of the information they need to resist unfair settlement practices by insurers. And it eliminates the paper trail necessary to detect kickbacks from repair shops to insurance adjusters. With the legislature having specifically created these protections for consumers by means of the written invoice requirement, I cannot accept that the legislature intended its actions to have no “teeth” by not providing a remedy for violations of the invoice requirement.
But that is what the court concludes. To reach this conclusion the court relies on what it considers to be the plain language of section 325F.64, the exemption provision. Section 325F.64, subdivision 1, provides:
Sections 325F.57 to 325F.59 and 325F.61 to 325F.66 shall not apply if an insurer or service contract company pays up to 90 percent of the charge for repairs or pays a charge for repairs above a deductible amount specified in an insurance agreement or service contract.
The court concludes that under the plain language of section 325F.64, the exemption provision, the remedies available under section 325F.63—including the authority of the attorney general to investigate and prosecute violations—are not available if the repairs are paid by insurance. But under the plain language of section 325F.64, section 325F.64 itself—the exemption provision—does not apply to insured repairs: “Sections 325F.57 to 325F.59 and 325F.61 to 325F.66 shall not apply if an insurer or service contract company pays * * *” (Emphasis added.)2
I would therefore conclude that the language of the statute is not unambiguous, and we must construe the statute to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Tuma v. Comm‘r of Econ. Sec., 386 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1986). In doing so, we are to be guided by several principles. First, in ascertaining the legislature‘s intent, we consider the occasion and necessity for the law, the mischief to be remedied by it, the object to be attained by it, the circumstances of its enactment, and the consequences of a particular interpretation. Hersh Props., LLC v. McDonald‘s Corp., 588 N.W.2d 728, 736 (Minn.1999). Second, the statute should be construed to make it effective, rather than to nullify it. Sandy v. Walter Butler Shipbuilders, Inc., 221 Minn. 215, 223, 21 N.W.2d 612, 616 (1946). Third, we should construe the statute to avoid absurd or unjust consequences. Hince v. O‘Keefe, 632 N.W.2d 577, 582 (Minn.2001). Finally, remedial statutes are to be liberally construed. State v. Indus. Tool & Die Works, Inc., 220 Minn. 591, 604, 21 N.W.2d 31, 38 (Minn.1945).
Applying these principles, I would hold that the 1981 amendment removed section 325F.60, the invoice requirement, from section 325F.64, the exemption provision, for all purposes, and therefore section 325F.63, which provides that “any violation” of the Act is a violation of section 325F.69, subdivision 1, applies to any violation of section 325F.60, the invoice requirement. The occasion and necessity for the law and the mischief to be remedied by the Act as amended in 1981 and 1987 appear to have been in part the practice of automobile insurers in conditioning payment of claims on the use of other than original equipment parts, which as this case demonstrates have the potential to void the
Notes
In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney‘s fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court.