Total Quality Logistics, L.L.C. v. JohnsonTotal Quality Logistics, L.L.C. v. Johnson
Everly McMahon Copetas LLC, and David A. Eberly, for appellants.
S. POWELL, J.
{1} Appellants, Jeremiah D. Johnson and Biewer Logistics, LLC (“Biewer“), appeal the decision of the Clermont County Court of Common Pleas overruling their
Facts and Procedural History
{2} TQL is a freight broker and third-party logistics company headquartered in Clermont County, Ohio. Johnson is a former employee of TQL who worked for TQL as a logistics account executive for approximately five months between April 23, 2018 through September 26, 2018. As part of his employment with TQL, Johnson executed an employee non-compete, confidentiality, and non-solicitation agreement (“Agreement“). After Johnson‘s employment with TQL ended, Johnson accepted a position and began working for Biewer. Biewer is a direct competitor of TQL located in the state of Michigan.
{3} On September 20, 2019, TQL filed a complaint against Johnson and Biewer. In its complaint, TQL alleged Johnson had violated the Agreement when he began working for Biewer prior to the expiration of the Agreement‘s one-year restrictive covenant. TQL also alleged that Johnson had breached the Agreement by misappropriating TQL‘s confidential information and trade secrets. Based on these allegations, TQL asserted claims of breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty against Johnson, as well as a claim of misappropriation of trade secrets against both Johnson and Biewer. TQL also asserted a claim of intentional interference with a contract against Biewer.
{4} On October 29, 2019, Johnson and Biewer filed a
{5} On July 13, 2021, the trial court issued a supplemental, nunc pro tunc, decision denying Johnson‘s and Biewer‘s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In its supplemental decision, the trial court noted that Johnson and Biewer, “in filing their motion to dismiss, believe they sought a provisional remedy as defined by
In the event an appeal is taken after a trial on the merits, and this Court‘s Decision reversed at that time, Defendants contend they will have unnecessarily subjected themselves to jurisdiction of this Court, expended untold resources in time, travel, attorneys’ fees, costs, etc., only to perhaps have the matter dismissed and refiled in Michigan, where the parties would have to begin the litigation anew.
The trial court then determined that, based on Johnson‘s and Biewer‘s claims, which included their claim that “the determination of jurisdiction is critical,” as well as their claim that “the judicial economies would be better served if an appeal may be immediately taken from the Decision,” there was no just reason for delay pursuant to
{6} On July 15, 2021, Johnson and Biewer filed a notice of appeal from the trial court‘s supplemental, nunc pro tunc, decision denying their motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Johnson‘s and Biewer‘s Appeal
{7} In support of their appeal, Johnson and Biewer challenge the trial court‘s decision denying their
{8} THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY OVERRULED DEFENDANTS /
{9} Johnson and Biewer argue the trial court erred by denying their
The denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction does not satisfy the requirements for a provisional remedy because it was directed toward resolution of the main action itself and does not involve a proceeding ancillary to the main action as required by
R.C. 2505.02(A)(3) . Further, as noted by the Ohio Supreme Court, “[a]bsent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a post-judgment appeal from a decision overruling a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will provide an adequate legal remedy[.]”
Id. at ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Toma v. Corrigan, 92 Ohio St.3d 589, 591 (2001).
{10} The case law on this matter is abundant and, generally, without exception. See Cooney v. Radostitz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110009, 2021-Ohio-2521, ¶ 16 (“[t]he rule that the denial of a motion to dismiss is not a final order applies with ‘equal force’ to motions to dismiss that challenge personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction“); Goree v. Northland Auto Ent., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108881, 2020-Ohio-3457, ¶ 29 (“[a]n
{11} This holds true even in circumstances where, as here, there is a potential for high litigation costs. See, e.g., Bob Sumerel Tire Co. v. Interstate NDT, Inc., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-160899, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 3571, *3 (Aug. 18, 2017) (“the trial court‘s denial of Interstate‘s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is not a final appealable order because it did not prevent a judgment on the merits or deny Interstate a meaningful remedy on appeal despite the potential for high litigation costs“), citing Katherine‘s Collection, Inc. v. Kleski, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26477, 2013-Ohio-1530, ¶ 13 (“[a] delay in obtaining monetary relief is the necessary consequence of most civil litigation
Conclusion
{12} In light of the foregoing, because a trial court‘s decision denying a
{13} Appeal dismissed.
M. POWELL, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.
S. POWELL, J.