*1 D.J., MARING, reasoning determine whether a mind MARY MUEHLEN KAPSNER, JJ., reasonably have determined that the CAROL RONNING could proved concur. factual conclusions reached were from the weight of the evidence The Honorable ALLAN L. Fuels, entire record.” Power Inc. v. El SCHMALENBERGER, D.J., sitting in kin, (N.D.1979). N.W.2d 214, 220 SANDSTROM, J., place disqualified. Thompson argues
greater weight of the evidence showed
September 2003 incident was substantial in causing spine
factor his cervical condi disagrees, arguing findings
tion. WSI
[¶ 11] The administrative Appellee. responsibility weigh has the and resolve No. 20050143. conflicting opinions. Negaard- Supreme Court of North Dakota. Cooley v. North Dakota Comp. Workers ¶ Bureau, 2000 ND April 2006. Here, 898. own expert, Rehearing May Denied 2006. M.D., Cooper, only physi Robert was the cian fully that was made of Thomp aware history
son’s medical all reviewed pri- Cooper
or records. testified that
symptoms by Thompson prior exhibited September 2003 incident indica were
tive of spine cervical abnormalities. Judge
[¶ 12] The Administrative Law assessment,
adopted Cooper’s noting that
each Thompson’s treating physicians
presented inadequate opinions, advice and ignorant
either failing of or to account for
Thompson’s neck, history extensive
back, and problems. shoulder Upon examination of the entire
record, reasoning we conclude a mind reasonably
could conclude that WSI’s find-
ings supported by weight were
record. We therefore affirm the district judgment
court affirming WSI’s order de-
nying further Thompson. benefits to WALLE,’
[¶ GERALD 14] W. VANDE
C.J., SCHMALENBERGER, L. ALLAN *2 (argued),
Reed K. Mackenzie Mackenzie Dornik, MN, Minneapolis, and Joel F. Ar- Arnason, & (appeared), Rosenquist nason Forks, ND, appel- for claimant and Grand lant. Anderson,
Jacqueline Special Sue Assis- ND, General, Attorney Fargo, ap- tant pellee. WALLE, Justice.
VANDE Chief appealed Lanis Toso from dis- judgment affirming trict court (“WSI”). Safety and Insurance Workforce right affirming issued an order WSI’s WSI and to apply statute allow to collect 50% of the settlement in a ac- award Toso received order to the appealed tion. Toso WSI’s court affirmed district court. The district Court, this appeal order. On right apply had no argues to the settlement subrogation statute the third- award because to Toso’s party action were not related disability expenses and benefits paid by We affirm. WSI.
I 3,1999, Lanis Toso September On filed a claim for workers injury to his in connection with an August occurred left heel which employed as a semi driver. WSI while Toso ben- the claim and awarded accepted benefits, disability Toso received efits. for treat- to an dispute submit the Administrative (“ALJ”). injury. Disability to his ben- Judge ment related Law efits were discontinued when Toso re- ALJ’s recommended decision turned to work. prove found Toso subroga- failed *3 Toso commenced June of § tion interest under N.D.C.C. 65-01-09 third-party against Orthopaedic action improperly applied was to his claim. The Jeffrey Stavenger, al- Associates and damages ALJ found the settlement arose leging negligence in the treatment of out of the work and recommended injury. con- Correspondence Toso’s heel WSI’s order be affirmed. then is- record, in tained in the the form of letters a final adopting sued the ALJ’s rec- exchanged attorney between Toso’s and ommended decision. WSI, third-party notice of the shows given In the third-party WSI. II action, alleged negli- contended the Toso appeal, [¶ 7] On we review the gent not increase his tempo- treatment did WSI, court, decision of not the district rary disability expenses or his medical in- although analysis the district court’s is en injury. curred because of the work-related to respect. titled Zander v. Workforce Toso would contended he have suffered the ¶ Ins., Safety and 2003 ND temporary disability same and medical ex- N.W.2d 668. We review WSI’s decision in
pense damages had the not oc- the same manner as the district court un Rather, alleged only curred. Toso the § der N.D.C.C. 28-32^6. Id. The dis damage alleged negligent trict court must affirm an order of an surgery treatment was was less agency administrative it unless finds might successful than it have been of the following present: that, negligence had occurred and as a result, greater permanent Toso incurred a 1. The order not in accordance with disability negligence. because of the the law. permanent disability
did not
Toso
ben-
2. The order is in violation of the con-
efits.
stitutional
appellant.
[¶ 4] Toso’s
action was set-
3.
provisions
chapter
The
of this
have
tled out of court with the defendants
not
complied
proceed-
been
with in the
$82,500.
agreeing to pay Toso
Because
ings
agency.
before the
court,
the case settled out of
the trial court
4.
procedure
The rules or
agen-
made no determination whether the settle-
cy
appellant
have not afforded the
a fair
damages
inju-
ment
arose out of the work
hearing.
ry. The record does not contain a settle-
findings
5. The
of fact
made
agreement setting
ment
out
what
agency
supported by
are not
a prepon-
the settling
paying
defendants were
for.
derance of the evidence.
applied
[¶ 5] WSI
stat-
6. The conclusions of law and order of
ute,
§
to the entire
agency
supported by
are not
settlement award which allowed
toWSI
findings of fact.
collect 50% of the settlement award for
money
reimbursement
for
for
7.
findings
of fact made
Toso’s medical
disability
agency
sufficiently
do not
address the
payments.
requested
After Toso
reconsid-
presented
agency by
evidence
order,
eration of this
agreed
appellant.
and WSI
deciding
of order
of law and order
without
merits of the
8. The conclusions
placed
issue
before us.
sufficiently explain
agency do not
adopting
agency’s
rationale for not
simple
WSI contends this is a
by a
any contrary recommendations
statutory
matter of
requirement. WSI ar-
officer or an administrative law
hearing
gues
application
of N.D.C.C.
65-01-
judge.
09 is not limited
to damages for medi-
expense, disability,
cal
vocational rehabili-
N.D.C.C. 28-32-46.
tation, or permanent impairment
In evaluating WSI’s find
have been recovered in a third-party ac-
fact,
ings
independent
we do not make
Rather,
argues
tion.
65-
findings
judgment
or substitute our
provides
subrogated
01-09
that WSI is
*4
rather,
WSI,
that of
we determine
injured
rights
of the
reasonably
its factu
whether WSI
reached
fifty percent
extent of
of the damages re-
weight
of the
al conclusions
evi
third-party
covered in a
regardless
Hopfauf
dence on the entire record.
v.
of the
damages
nature
recovered.
Bur.,
N.D.
Comp.
Workers
1998 ND
agree
[¶ 12] Even we were to
¶ 8,
319
Bu-
In a
subrogation only.
subsequent
construing
[¶
of
Insofar as the
case
27]
D.
65-01-09,
reau stands
the shoes Marva
§
N.D.C.C.
our Court stated
capacity,
Ness
her individual
when
purpose
“we are not certain that
subrogee,
those
are barred to the
65-01-09, N.D.C.C.,
§
is limited to reim-
Ness, they
Marva D.
are also barred to
bursing
expenditures.
the Bureau for its
subrogor, the Bureau.
It
by amending
§
is clear that
(citations omitted).
right
Id. at
783
N.D.C.C., in 1965 that the
in-
Legislature
§
under N.D.C.C.
65-01-09
statutory provision
tended this
as an in-
changed by
legislature
has been
sever
centive for
pursue
the worker to
and liti-
(1943),
§ 65-0109
al times. See N.D.R.C.
gate legal
against culpable
claims
third
(1949);
§
N.D.R.C.
65-0109
Gimble v. parties.”
v. N.D.
Lawson
Workmen’s
Company,
Montana-Dakota Utilities
77
Bureau,
Compensation
344,
(1950);
N.D.
44
200-01
N.W.2d
(N.D.1987) (citations omitted).
347
Most
First,
prohibited
§
it
65-01-09.
significantly,
purpose
we noted “the
employee claiming compensation
65, N.D.C.C.,
intent of Title
protect
is to
bringing any third-party action. N.D.R.C.
injured
pros-
worker and ensure the
(1943). Then,
§ 65-0109
an em
allowed
perity
of the State
protecting
wage
its
ployee claiming compensation
bring
to also
Id.;
(stat-
§
workers.”
N.D.C.C. 65-01-01
action,
a third-party
granted
but
the Bu
ing in
part
relevant
that “[t]he state of
right
percent
reau the
one-hundred
Dakota,
North
...
pros-
declares
(1949).
recovery.
N.D.R.C.
65-0109
perity of the
depends
large
state
a
currently grants
right
The statute
WSI a
upon
well-being
measure
wage
fifty percent
recovery.
workers, and ... sure and certain relief is
If
65-01-09.
statute is
...)”.
hereby provided
ambiguous
meaning
or of doubtful
adherence to the strict letter of the statute
N.D.
Lawson v.
Workmen’s
result,
would lead to an
absurd
court
Bureau,
Compensation
pre-
our Court was
may resort to extrinsic aids to determine
sented with the correctness of
calcu-
Shiek,
legislature.
the intent of the
2001
lation of costs under N.D.C.C.
65-01-09.
¶
ND
In all the light of added). I legislature, (Emphasis § 65-01-09 made am Toso’s work- When sustained, encourage place injury convinced the intent has been to was first Dr. Sta- injured bring third-party venger legal liability pay any workers to ac had no tions, I damages. injury and construe statute with both The was sustained be- fact that pipe, belonging employer, that intent and the WSI’s 'con cause a to Toso’s against employer’s struction “militates desired crushed Toso’s ankle at his 1-02-39; end” mind. See N.D.C.C. worksite. Comp.
Lawson v. N.D. Workmen’s Bu cannot [¶ 33] Our statute reau, 409 at 347. N.W.2d apply Stavenger’s until Dr. even said Only alleged malpractice occurred. at that opinion I also am of the that to point had an sustained “under been interpret only provision one of N.D.C.C. creating person circumstances some “All inappropriate. 65-01-09 is sections organization legal liability other than the of a statute must be construed to have pay damages respect thereto.” See law meaning because the neither does nor id. short, guided we are requires idle acts. principle the common-sense that a stat- problem position with WSI’s give
ute is to be read to effect to each of is addressed Larson’s Worker’s Com- provisions, fairly possible.” whenever Law: pensation County Stutsman v. State Historical Soc. An point up problem: illustration will (N.D.1985). N.D., suppose that suffers sim- *9 injury, I turn now to the ple for which he or she would statute, at ordinarily compensation found N.D.C.C. receive $2,000. § 65-01-09: aggra- amount of The is
321 plaintiff on-the-job injury that the actual suffered an by physician, so to vated employer for which compensation his back. Id. The Illinois Industrial Com- $5,000. compen- liable is The becomes mission determined plaintiff was enti- cost, speak, aggrava- to sation so $6,067.47 to in temporary tled total disabil- $3,000. suppose, tion is Now under the ity. Id. Plaintiff later learned that an rule, employer, having paid majority surgery October 1983 back arising out of $5,000 compensation, and on-the-job injury had worsened his subrogated employ- to the having been petition condition. Id. Plaintiff filed a with action, $5,000 malpractice ee’s recovers in January the commission 1985 seeking aggravation for the alone from temporary disability additional total pay- physician. reading a literal Under 1, relating ments back to June 1981. Id. statutes, presum- of most subsequently Plaintiff was awarded keep can the entire ably employer $73,899. 1985, April Id. In plaintiff filed a $5,000 repay compensa- itself for its medical malpractice against the doc- outlay, presumably tion there is no tor performed surgery. who the back Id. employ- over to the “excess” be at 182-83. This case was settled with the unfair, obviously since the ee. This is $350,000. doctor 1989 for Id. at 183. $5,000 damages repay should be used to employer’s Plaintiffs insurer intervened $3,000 only outlay attributable to the requesting and filed a motion that plain- $2,000 should malpractice, and the other tiffs settlement “impressed” be with a lien go employee. inequity to the be- $79,966.47, in the amount of the total glaring you comes more when realize amount paid plaintiff. the insurer had Id. original uncomplicated injury Plaintiff argued the insurer’s lien could not actually might indeed have been caused $6,067.47 in include the employer’s negligence, so that him prior surgery to the nor could it claim money actually employee’s is used to $73,899.00 the entire amount of subse- employer reimburse the for its own quently paid him a portion because wrong. period those benefits were for a before Compensation Larson’s Worker’s Law surgery during plaintiff which could not 112.02(5)(a). case, In it appears this Appeals, work. Id. The Illinois Court of only has reimbursed Toso for dam- own, interpreting a statute similar to our ages arising original injury. out of the agreed stating plaintiff, with the its conclu- provided does not claim to have jurisdictions sion was in line with other any compensation aggravation for the al- who have ruled: legedly Stavenger. caused Toso’s employer’s lien should extend [T]he recovery Stavenger only from Dr. can those attributable been for the said have aggravation injury; i.e. aggravation original injury the amount of the lien should be negligence.' employer limited to amount that the jurisdictions have ad- [¶ 35] Other required because of the mal- Larson’s dressed the issue before us. See practice. Compensation Laiv Worker’s (noting holdings Id. at similar in: (b). 184 112.02(5)(a) In Robinson v. Stellar, 496, P.2d Dodds v. 30 Cal.2d 183 Co., Liberty Mutual Ins. the Illinois Court Kerlan, (1947); 27 658 Heaton v. Cal.2d very with a similar situa- Appeals dealt (1946); 443,165 P.2d 857 Industrial 222 166 Ill.App.3d tion. Ill.Dec. (1991). Co., February the Comm’n v. Standard Insurance N.E.2d 182 *10 322 156, (Co.1962); legal liability pay a dam 587, organization 158 370 P.2d
Colo. Palace, 79, ages respect clearly thereto” does not 102 Nev. 715 v. Breen Caesars right with a to recover for provide WSI (1986); York Drypolcher v. New P.2d 1070 original injury for from paid benefits it 895, Co., 446 85 A.D.2d Telephone damages subsequent recovered for (N.Y.App.Div.1981); and cit- 728 N.Y.S.2d Damages occurring after the malpractice. Larson, 2A A. The Law Workmen’s ing malpractice may may not arise from the 72.65(b) (1952)). Compensation injury by negligent of the aggravation injury “plaintiffs original held court physician. original The seriousness of the creating caused under circumstances not injury and the seriousness of the medical liability of a third legal part party.” on the will negligence affect the determination. that “to hold otherwise The court noted subrogation is entitled to a [¶ 37] WSI employee receiving in the would result § 65-01-09 in this right under N.D.C.C. injuries.” compensation pre-malpractice for view, however, I am of the that our omitted). case. 184(citation Id. at requires that statute Court, Supreme The Colorado arising right paid be limited to benefits out concluding physician person third aggravation original inju- of Toso’s subject under its statute and to common- not, statute, ry. does under our re- WSI liability, law held: right any ceive a to reimbursement for phy- determined that the Since we have compensation paid inju- for WSI a third and that the em- party sician is alleged malpractice ries not related to the compensation for for the ployer is liable injuries aggravation because those were by physician’s negli- injuries not sustained under circumstances gence, express it follows creating Stavenger legal liability Dr. provisions employer [the statute] pay damages respect thereto. In subrogat- and insurer entitled be to be entitled to reimbursement in his ed to the recovery, from Toso’s settlement WSI malpractice against negligent must establish what benefits it However, physician. employee’s through May solely were caused bifurcated, claim, being he can recover negligence. must es- only damages from as the doctor such it compelled payments tablish was to make Ac- negligence. flow from the doctor’s negligence of benefits because only cordingly, subrogated the insurer is establish, If Stavenger. it can so WSI is he is extent then entitled to reimbursement to the ex- required pay aggravation for negli- tent of those benefits due to the Moreover, original injury by the doctor. gence Stavenger. of Dr. If there is no subrogated the insurer is not for com- any compensation paid evidence pensation required pay he is as a to Toso was for Toso suf- result of the accident which did not arise negligence, fered because of the medical physician. then is entitled to a credit in the Industrial Comm’n v. Standard Insurance $30,016.26 amount of (Co. Co., 149 P.2d Colo. 158 obligated to the future (citations omitted). 1962) my opinion, negli- which are a result of the medical in N.D.C.C. lim gence Stavenger. of Dr. Breitwieser See State, (N.D.1954) iting right those v. injuries (holding dependent “sustained under circumstances that a must refund out creating third-party recovery anything paid, than of her person some other *11 nothing if has been there is but to the fund and the amount
reimbursement
can be claimed as a credit toward future her).
compensation due I would reverse and remand this evidentiary hearing
case for an on whether to Toso is aggravation origi-
attributable to the and,
nal Stavenger
so, the amount. Mary Maring Muehlen
Geraldine
bucci, Mary Bernabucci MacGrath
and John R. Bernabucci and Geral Bernabucci,
dine as Trustees of the
John R. and Bernabucci Geraldine Trust, Remainder
Charitable Co
rey Nyhus, Appellants Plaintiffs and
v.
Harvey Odin, HUBER Jan Appellees.
Defendants and
No. 20050275.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
April 2006.
