*1
Margot TORRES, Plaintiff-Appellee, C. Jr., TORRES, Defendant,
Alfred Torres, Successor-In-Interest/
Party-In-Interest-Appellant.
No. 23089.
Supreme Court Hawai'i.
Dec.
As Amended Jan. *3 MOON,
Opinion of the Court C.J. Suecessor-in-interest/party-in-interest-ap- (Louan), pellant Louan B. Torres surviv- Torres, (Alfred), ing spouse of Alfred Jr. appeals Family from the Court of the First Circuit’s: November 1999 order granting plaintiff-appellee the motion of Mar- got (Margot), ex-spouse, C. Torres Alfred’s entry “qualified of an amended domestic order”; relations December denying Louan’s motion for reconsider- *4 grant Margot’s ation of the motion. The family effectively court’s orders amended Margot and Alfred’s 1989 divorce decree [hereinafter, or initial Decree] Decree after survivorship and Alfred’s death awarded ben- pension Margot. efits from Alfred’s On appeal, family Louan contends (1) erred because: neither Louan nor Alfred’s estate were the instant action, (2) brought by Margot; which was language of and Hawai'i the Decree Revised (HRS) (1993) per- Statutes 580-56 did not family jurisdiction mit the court to exercise rights over the to survivor benefits associat- (3) pension; with ed Alfred's the court’s find- ing concerning Margot the date received pension notice from Alfred’s fund she was not entitled retirement benefits based as it the Decree was then written was erroneous; clearly in- the court’s orders rights pension with Louan’s terfered bene- as, Employee fits insofar under the Retire- (ERISA), Security ment Act of 1974 Income 93-406, Pub.L. No. 88 Stat. as amended 1984(REA), by Equity the Retirement Act of 98-397, (codified Pub.L. No. 98 Stat. 1426 at Honolulu, McCarthy, Michael F. on the seq.), rights 1001 et. vested briefs, survivor-in-interest/party-in-inter- for in Louan at either Alfred’s retirement or est-appellant, Louan Torres. death; and the court’s orders further Okimoto, Honolulu, briefs, rights interfered with Louan’s Blake T. on the certain “segregated plaintiff-appellee, Margot amounts” of C. Torres. ERISA, pursuant as amended Honolulu, Ashley K. K. Ikeda and Lori Margot disagrees REA. and also contends (of Aquino Bourg, Weinberg, Roger Van & jurisdiction that this court does not have over Rosenfeld), briefs, on the for amicus curiae appeal appeal Louan’s because the untime- Board of Trustees of the Pension Trust for ly. Finally, amicus curia The Board of Operating Engineers. Op- Trust Fund for Trustees the Pension (the Fund), LEVINSON, MOON, C.J., erating Engineers the trustees ACOBA, NAKAYAMA,JJ.; J., pension, family dissenting, Alfred’s submits that RAMIL, J., joins. with whom court’s orders do not violate federal law.
401 herein, foregoing For requirements, plans the reasons discussed we affirm must comply participation, court’s orders. also various vest- funding general-
ing, requirements. See 1086; ly §§ 520 Boggs, 1051to U.S. I. U.S.C INTRODUCTION 841, 117 S.Ct. 1754. aspects pen- case involves Because this principal object pro- is to ERISA governed by sion federal tect law, preliminary aspects review some employee understanding participants this law facilitate the interests ERISA, beneficiaries, plans background facts. benefit and their amended [hereinafter, collectively, requiring reporting the disclosure and the REA ERISA, participants of financial unless is clear the context beneficiaries thereto, aspects that pre-REA dis- and other information with of ERISA are cussed], conduct, designed by establishing proper to ensure the standards of re- employee sponsibility, obligation pen- administration benefit and for fiduciaries employee plans, by provid- plans. Boggs Boggs, sion benefit U.S. remedies, sanctions, 45, reh’g ing appropriate S.Ct. 138 L.Ed.2d denied, ready 521 U.S. access courts. S.Ct. Federal (1997). initially enacting L.Ed.2d 1043 1001(b); see Boggs, also U.S. *5 ERISA, Congress explained that: imposes 117 at S.Ct. 1754. ERISA size, growth scope, in [T]he and numbers general duty upon plan to act fiduciaries employee plans years benefit recent “solely participants the the and interest substantial; rapid has been and the ... purpose beneficiaries for the exclusive .... well-being security mil- continued and providing participants ... and benefits ” employees dependents lions of and them .... their 29 U.S.C. beneficiaries directly 1104(a)(1)(A)(i). plans; are ... affected these § they public affected with a national are typical A is a form of retirement benefit interest; they ... [and] have become joint annuity” (QJ “qualified & and survivor important affecting stability factor the of SA) that, ERISA, pension plan under each develop- employment and the successful required participants. to offer to its See 29 .... ment of industrial relations 1055(a)(1).2 QJ § A guarantees & SA U.S.C. 1001(a).1 per- payment stipulated § 29 is an of a amount two U.S.C. ERISA intricate comprehensive regulatory sons—typically participant and retired and scheme. See the Boggs, spouse—while 117 All her both alive. 520 U.S. S.Ct. 1754. his or See 1055(d);3 § employee plans vari- see v. Inter- benefit must conform to 29 U.S.C. also Dorn disclosure, Workers, reporting, fiduciary ous re- national Brotherhood Electrical (5th Cir.2000). quirements, 29 If generally §§ see U.S.C. 211 F.3d 941 the first, surviving spouse is participant and 1101 to 1114. In addition to the dies the indicated, preretire- surviving spouse, qualified expressly all Unless references has annuity provided Title 29 of the United States Code are to the 2000 to the ment survivor shall be edition, language which contains identical to surviving spouse participant. of such statutory provisions place at the time of proceedings. have no There been 1055(d) provides, part: § in relevant 3.29 U.S.C. significant changes perti- in the law substantive section, "quali- purposes For of this the term nent to case since that time. this joint annuity” an an- and survivor means fied nuity— 1055(a) 2. 29 U.S.C. states: ap- pension plan (1) Each to which this section participant with a sur- the life of provide plies shall that— annuity life of the which is vivor for the (1) participant in the case of a vested who (and greater percent less than is not date, annuity starting before does not die of) annuity percent the amount of the than payable participant the accrued benefit to such payable during joint lives of the which is qualified provided shall form of a spouse, participant and the annuity, joint and survivor equivalent actuarial which is the participant who the case of a vested annuity single participant. life for the annuity starting dies date and who before governed or her guaranteed, for the of his could affect remainder life, equal fifty percent payments to at least Trustees Directors Guild ERISA. See participant of the amount received while the America-Producer Pension Benefits 1055(d). (9th Tise, Should was alive. U.S.C. 234 F.3d Cir. Plans long enough to working 2000) die after participant [hereinafter, aAs Guild]. Directors retiring, qualify for benefits but before risk, result, participant’s ex-spouse was at surviving spouse guaranteed lifetime also circumstances, being out” in some “frozen to as a this is referred payments; benefit retirement benefits earned annuity preretirement qualified survivor participant employment attributable 1055(a)(2) §§ (QPRSA). See U.S.C. during marriage. place took course 1055(e).4 QJ Both of benefits—the & forms subsequent participant If remarried QPRSA—are collec- referred to SA and died, surviving ly spouse—rather than tively throughout “sur- this memorandum ex-spouse—may have been entitled viving spouse or “survivor bene- benefits” QJa or a & SA either fits.” QPRSA, equities of regardless of 1055(d) ends, accomplish §§ contains
To ERISA situation. anti-alienation, 1055(e). provi “spendthrift” broad (discussed sion, 1056(d)(1), in 29 U.S.C. Responding to confusion on fra), prohibits plans from as “taking changes in point, and into account signing other than the individuals patterns, marriage work status of surviving designated participant or current partnership, an economic and the substan- Moreover, contains a spouse. ERISA also partnership tial contribution provision supersedes preemption broad spouses who work in and outside the both 1144(a) laws, contradictory state home,” Congress ERISA 1984 amended (discussed infra), including, in some re [by passing specifically pro- REA] *6 law. Prior to the spects, domestic relations assignments of vide for state-court-ordered REA, apparently courts enactment depen- plan spouses benefits former pro disagreed preemption as to whether this dents. vision, spendthrift in combination with the Guild, (quoting issuing at 419 provision, barred courts from Directors F.3d state Committee, Judiciary proceedings S.Rep. No. 98- orders domestic relations Senate 1055(e)slates, (III) part: qualified § in relevant retired with an immediate 29 U.S.C. joint annuity and survivor at the earliest retire- purposes For of this section— age, ment (2), (1)Except provided paragraph (IV) day day which died on after the on preretirement "qualified term annui- survivor participant such would have attained the earli- annuity ty” a the life of the means survivor for age, est retirement surviving spouse participant (B) of if— plan, tire period under the the earliest for (A) payments surviving spouse surviving pay- spouse un- a which tíre receive annuity annuity such later than the ment under is not the amounts der such are not less than participant in which the month would have annuity payable a which would survivor age attained the earliest retirement under annuity qualified joint under tire and survivor plan. (or plan equivalent under the the actuarial separated In the case of an who individual thereof) if— before individu- from service the date of such (i) participant after in the case of who dies death, (A)(ii)(I) ap- subparagraph al’s shall not participant on which attained the date p!y- age, participant had earliest retirement such In the case account of individual joint qualified with an retired immediate subparagraph plan participant or described in annuity day partici- before the survivor section, (B) (C) (b)(1) or of of this subsection death, pant’s date "qualified preretirement the term survivor an- (ii) participant the case who dies on of a nuity” annuity means an for the life of the participant or before date on which the surviving spouse equivalent actuarial die would have attained the earliest retirement portion percent less is not than 50 age, participant had— (as participant of the account balance of the (I) death) separated on the date from service participant had the date of which the death, (within right meaning nonforfeitable tide). (II) age, of this retirement section 1053 survived the earliest (1984)). at 1 excep- The REA pension plan created responsible for determin- general provi- ing tion ERISA’s anti-alienation whether the DRO meets above re- by permitting pension sion quirements benefits to be QDRO notify- to create presents disbursed to a former who ing participant payee and the alternate “qualified (QDRO) domestic relations order” decision. U.S.C. plan 1056(d)(3)(G)(i)(II).5 administrator. 29 § U.S.C. participant A or ben- 1056(d)(3); Guild, § see also Directors 284 eficiary may bring a civil action state F.3d at 419-20. court, 1132(e)(1), federal see § U.S.C. challenge pension plan’s determination as QDROs subset of relations “domestic whether a DRO is a or to “recover (“DROs”); orders” DROs are orders benefits to him [or her] due under the terms
relating
provision
support,
“to the
of child
plan,
of his
[or her]
[or
enforce his
her]
alimony,
property rights
or marital
to a
rights
plan,
under the terms of the
or to
spouse,
child,
spouse,
former
other de-
clarify
rights
his
her]
to future
[or
pendent
plan
of a
...
participant
made
plan[.]”
under
the terms
pursuant
to a State domestic relations
1132(a)(1).
mind,
With
this review
we
1056(d)(3)(ii).
law.” 29 U.S.C.
A DRO
turn to
the facts
this ease.
recognizes
is a
if it “creates or
to,
payee’s right
existence of an alternate
II. BACKGROUND
assigns
payee
right
to an alternate
to,
part
all or
pay-
receive
Margot and Alfred
were married
respect
able with
participant
They
divorced in 1989.
no
had
children.
plan[.]”
a[n
ERISA]
29 U.S.C. The divorce occurred after Alfred ceased
1056(d)(3)(B).
working
employers
who contributed to
Fund,
and all of
(footnote
Alfred’s
Guild,
Directors
must contain a = share) retirement) ([Margot’s] ]. requirements. and meet certain substantive 1056(d)(3)(C) 1056(d)(3)(D). §§ purpose and For the allocation of interest, greater will [Margot’s] These be discussed de- is the “Partici- [Alfred] infra payee (e.g., pant” an plan tail. When alternate ex- in the aforementioned and DRO, spouse) payee [Margot] Payee (up obtains the alternate Alternate to the above) present plan; specified must pension percentage the DRO to the 1056(d)(3)(G)(i) (II) pertinent period receipt states within reasonable after order, part: plan of such administrator shall any qualified In the case of domestic relations order determine such is a whether order plan— received notify partici- domestic relations order and (I) promptly administrator shall no- pant payee and each alternate of such determi- tify participant payee and each alternate nation. plan’s receipt proce- order and such determining qualified dures for status of orders, domestic relations and meaning Margot to surviv- within the state was entitled aforementioned Plan whether ing spouse benefits. Equity Act of 1984. the Retirement assigned later, to the The share awarded and in No- Approximately two months Payee requested appropri- from the aforementioned Alternate Alfred vember paid Payee paperwork apply Plan shall be to the Alternate ate for and receive his as, however, if, Fund; pension and when commences from the he [Alfred] paperwork necessary from Plan. completed retirement benefits had not receive payment, option of from Fund before at the the Alter- receive benefits he Said Payee, may paid January to the on 1998. At the time of nate Alternate died his death, directly to Louan. Payee transferred from the Alfred married The eligible Fund that Alfred for bene- agrees a financial aforementioned Plan to institu- fits retroactive to December 1997. The party or other third as directed tion Louan, permitted surviving Fund as Alfred’s Payee writing Plan. said Alternate spouse, and her behalf to elect Alfred’s paid that in a “100% jurisdiction The Court shall retain over Contigent payment Annuitant” form. This the retirement interest described herein QJ option from & that differs SA long for as as both shall live contingent provides annuitant form reduced party’s either death. and after payments participant benefit authority shall also have the Court alive; participant in ex- while the just every equitable to make death, change, participant’s after the the sur- provisions any of the inconsistent viving guaranteed spouse is to receive the herein. of his or her same amount for the remainder specific au- The Court shall also have lifetime. just thority to make orders deems 1, 1998, Margot’s September On counsel equitable of the income tax result copy Louan’s received from counsel consequences which flow from the division September Fund’s 1997 letter Alfred distribution of re- the aforementioned indicating Fund Margot had It is the intent of the tirement interest. not consti- determined that the Decree did party on his Court each shall be taxed QDRO. tute valid record is silent respective or her share retirement litigants communication between the time(s) share said becomes place September have taken between subject to taxes. September Language in 1997 and reciprocal provi- also The Decree contained brief, however, suggests Fund’s amicus awarding sion Alfred a share “retirement paid following to Louan benefits were plan. Margot’s benefits” retirement January 1998. Between Alfred’s death copy A sent to Decree was Alfred’s September counsel for June (i.e., Fund), fund which acknowl- Margot engaged unsuccessfully and Louan *8 2, February edged receipt of it on On attempting to matter discussions resolve the 1989, 1, a March Fund sent to letter of who to was entitled the survivor benefits Margot, indicating that it would time, determine pension. During this from Alfred’s requirements whether Decree met Margot’s Fund counsel concern- also advised a necessary to it as under establish ing QDRO. of valid elements law. federal 23, 1999, Margot filed a motion in On June divorce, family seeking Following Alfred married court to amend the 1989 the 1989 “QDRO” They by entry or for an order had child. Decree Louan October 1991. one 8, 1997, QDRO. compel to to It September the Fund sent Louan “execute” the On letters that, Margot although Margot’s individually to and to should noted here addressed Alfred, indicating request a motion as a to enter a Decree was not was fashioned earlier, “QDRO,” family meaning within as discussed ERISA. DRO; Among problems court can enter identified the Fund clearly DRO is a fact that did not determines whether was the the Decree QDRO. Consequently, 4, Margot’s 1999, August motion is On litigants apparently properly request court, more considered as a met with the and the court “short set Decree, family amend the 1989 and the 3,1999. September trial” Septem- At the 17, order, ultimately court’s November 3, hearing, Margot ber pre- and Louan motion, granting Margot’s properly is more legal argument testimony but sented no was as an considered amendment to the Decree. family taken. The court took the matter Hereinafter, 17, family court’s November advisement, and, 10, September on 1999 order and the December 1999 order 1999, Louan supplemental filed a second denying Louan’s motion for reconsideration opposition Margot’s memorandum mo- “DRO,” will collectively referred to tion. Decree[,]” designa- “amended or similar September 24, 1999, family On court tion. issued minute order6 that read: Margot’s Attached motion anwas affida- IN COURT RULED FAVOR OF MS. attorney, stating vit of her that the Decree [ATTORNEY OKIMOTO FOR MAR- that, had been sent to the Fund in 1989 and GOT]. [ATTORNEY] OKIMOTO TO 1, 1989, on March the Fund had acknowl- PREPARE ORDER. [ATTORNEYS] receipt edged of the Decree. The affidavit WERE CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE “[h]owever, further states no word was OF THE COURT’S DECISION. September from received the Fund until attorney] when [Louan’s faxed to [Mar- 17,1999, family On November court filed got’s attorney] copy of the Fund’s Septem- fact, law, findings conclusions of and individually ber 1997 letter” addressed granting Margot’s request to amend Alfred, Margot stating that the Fund family Among the Decree. court’s find- had determined qual- that the Decree did not ings “[Margot] was the statement did ify QDRO. Through attorney, as a her copy September receive the Fund’s pi’ovided Margot’s was notice of motion. [September 1997 letter until 1998] when a copy [Margot’s] was faxed to counsel
By special appearance, Louan filed a mem- counsel].”7 [Louan’s The court also filed a opposition orandum in Margot’s on motion 9, 1999, specifying DRO that same date that: July contending that Louan had not total, unadjusted portion of Alfred’s monthly proper party been litigation made benefit, which accrued in Plan proceedings and that the should be dismissed during Margot’s marriage, Alfred’s and con- proper until continued were “marital property” stituted the of Alfred opportunity named and until she had an Margot that Margot to half discovery. hearing conduct entitled the mo- benefit; 4,1999. Margot thereby tion was should be August continued as if Margot subsequently exchanged surviving Louan and treated she were Alfred’s addressing primarily memoranda to Alfred’s the sub- retirement issues, legal infra, pertain- purpose pre- stantive benefits “for the discussed the 50% ing surviving spouse provid- grant whether the could retirement benefit ed[,]” Margot’s February motion under state and federal law. 1998 until part accuracy imprint 6. The minute record is not of the record on of this is unclear. The affi- ordinarily appeal not be cited. See Margot davit of counsel for indicates that the generally Appellate Hawai'i Rules of Procedure 1, 1998, September letter was received on (HRAP) 10(a) (1999). litigants Rule do opening Louan states in her that she as- brief dispute form and contents of minute sumes the court’s reference June was a *9 order and is referred to as it is insofar Thus, parties agree clerical error. both that the necessary jurisdictional to resolve issue. 1, September letter was on received 1998 rather discussion infra. 1, We, therefore, Sep- than June 1998. utilize 1, operative The tember 1998 date. cor- family actually finding 7. The court’s states rect date is not material to the outcome of this 7, September 1997 letter was faxed to Mar- because, infra, dispute case as discussed is 1, 1998, got’s by counsel Louan’s counsel on Jane family finding 1, over the basis court’s September rather than 1998. The letter bears a counsel, Margot’s Margot, imprint rather than received fax the name Louan’s counsel 1, 1998, 7, significance September date June but the 1997 letter sometime 1998. 406 Doe, 41, 46, family generally In re 84 Hawai'i 928 of the court’s
she dies. effect (1996). Plan, 883, qualified by P.2d 888 if is DRO to Margot would be entitled survivor benefits IV. DISCUSSION 1, 1998, QPRSA beginning February
as a
dies,
to
and Louan is not entitled
until she
Appellate
A.
Jurisdiction: Timeliness of
Al-
any survivor benefits from the Fund.
Appeal
Louan’s
appeal,
on
though
part
not
of the record
Margot
this court
contends that
opening
that the
Louan
her
brief
states
appeal is
jurisdiction
lacks
Louan’s
because
accepted
as a
the court’s DRO
Fund
untimely
as it was
filed within
inasmuch
not
Louan, she
February
According
to
thirty days
family
September
court’s
appeal of
an administrative
this deter-
filed
24,1999
jurisdiction
Appellate
minute order.
mination,
pending
appeal
and the
at
requirement
appeal,
an
base
to resolve
case.
filed them briefs
time
obligation
determine
and this court has
to
on
a motion for
Louan filed
reconsideration
jurisdiction
v.
that such
exists. See Peterson
24, 1999,
summarily
November
which was
Inc.,
Co.,
322,
Light
Elec.
Hawai'i
Hawai'i
85
17,
family court
December
denied
on
(1997).8
326,
1265,
P.2d
944
1269
appeal
filed a
1999. Louan
notice
24,
Margot
September
submits that
13,
January
family
minute
1999—the date
court’s
triggering
order—is the relevant date
III.
OF REVIEW
STANDARDS
thirty-day
appeal
a notice of
deadline
file
jurisdiction
Questions of
are consid
4(a) (1985).9
Ac
HRAP Rule
mandated
Casey,
Hawai‘i v.
ered de novo. Beneficial
cording Margot, although
pending
mo
Hawai'i, 159,
359,
164,
364,
98
45
recon
P.3d
delays
tion for reconsideration
the time
denied,
159,
P.3d
sideration
98 Hawai'i
45
appeal, see HRAP Rule
file the notice of
Adam,
(2002);
475,
v.
97 Hawai'i
359
State
4(a)(4)(v),
motion for
reconsideration
877,
(2002).
481,
Questions
40 P.3d
883
place. A
timely
must
filed in the
first
statutory interpretation
are reviewed de
decree, order,
motion for reconsideration of a
State,
Hawaiian
96
novo. Office of
Affairs
order” must
filed within
or “decision and
394,
(2001).
388,
901,
31 P.3d
Hawai'i
days
twenty
filing
after
the decree
family
legal
court’s
conclusions order or announcement of the “decision
Doe,
order,”
de
In re
occurs
Hawaii
are reviewed
novo. See
whichever
sooner.
283,
(2001).
(HFCR)
59(g)(1)
P.3d
Family
Hawai'i
Court Rules
Rule
(1982). Margot
family
Findings
fact
claims that the
are reviewed under
court’s
standard,
id.,
September
clearly
fami
1999 minute
constituted
erroneous
ly
“equitable”
Consequently,
court’s
decisions are reviewed
a valid “decision
order.”
Margot
that a motion for
under the abuse
discretion standard. See
maintains
reconsid-
Second,
family
concerning appel-
8. There are two other issues
court's orders are neither
order,
decree,
judgment,
see
jurisdiction
parties.
a final
HRS
late
raised
641-l(a),
§§
First,
571-54 and
a certified inter-
party
is not
divorce
a formal
order,
641—1(b),
primary
locutory
two
HRS
However,
Margot
action between
and Alfred.
Nonetheless,
types
appealable
orders.
motion,
Margot's
permitted
opposing
she was
conclusively
family court's orders
determined the
family
proceedings
if
participate in the
disputed
rights
issue of who was entitled to the
party,
B.
were a
see
she
discussion
subsection
sufficiently
survivor benefits and are
distinct
clearly "aggrieved” by
infra, and
the fami-
she
proceeding
from die remainder of the divorce
ruling
ly court's
insofar as she
contends
finality
ap-
"requisite degree
of an
meet
family
wrongfully
ruling
her
court's
has
caused
Doe,
pealable
In re
order.”
Hawai'i at
lose
benefits to which
would
the survivor
she
(citation
quotation
408 added.) demonstrating anywhere in an at- Margot, as other the record
(Emphasis action, discovery. In- perhaps tempt part or to conduct party to the divorce on her Louan, represen- stead, op- or as a claimed “successor Louan filed additional memoranda interests, primarily to Alfred’s retirement on posing Margot’s tative” motion per- moved for substitution should have legal grounds discussed herein. substantive representative special or administrator Furthermore, sonal Sep- appeared at the represent Alfred’s estate. HRS See 3, hearing, 1999 filed a motion for tember (“No proceeding (Supp.1998) § 560:3-104 family of the court’s Novem- reconsideration against estate of dece- a claim enforce 17, order, fully participated in 1999 ber may successors be dent or the decedent’s family proceedings. all of the relevant court appoint- before the revived or commenced Thus, participated practical in all Louan has representative.”). personal ment of respects “party” protect as a her asserted litigation. It in- throughout this
However,
interests
foregoing defect does
to now claim that she is
consistent for her
family
require
court to vacate the
not
and,
“party,”
allowing
do
dispute
not such a
her to
ruling.
begin,
primary
To
court’s
Margot,
prejudice
so would
who has relied
in this case concerns survivor benefits
directly payable
proceed-
Louan Mar- upon
participation
to either
or
in the
Louan’s
subject
testamentary or
got
Accordingly,
not
ings.
and are
we hold
Louan is
Boggs
generally
v.
transfer. See
estopped
claiming
intestate
from
that she was not a
1754,
833,
138
Boggs, 520
117 S.Ct.
purpose
U.S.
proper party to this
for the
case
(1997). Moreover,
doc
45
under the
L.Ed.2d
defending
claim to survivor benefits
her
judicial estoppel,
Ross,
trine
from the Fund.
Ross v.
maintain
party
permitted
will not
N.J.Super.
705 A.2d
790-92
position
positions or to take a
participated fully
inconsistent
(surviving
who
directly
regard
to a matter which is
family
proceedings disputing
ex-
to,
with,
previ
contrary
or
one
inconsistent
spouse’s
claim to retirement benefits
her],
ously
by him
at least
[or
assumed
by family
judgment notwith-
bound
court’s
had,
chargeable
or was
[or she]
where he
formally
standing
fact that
was not
she
facts,
with,
knowledge
an
full
action).
party to the
prejudiced by
[or her]
will
his
action.
Family
C.
Court Pursu-
Jurisdiction of
91, 124,
Marcos,
89 Hawai'i
Roxas
Language
the Decree and
ant to the
(1998),
de
reconsideration
P.2d
§HRS 580-56
nied,
Hawai'i
409
specifying
Margot
that
person
should receive bene-
the
named to receive survivor bene
“if, as,
fits
and when”
pension plan.
Alfred commences to
fits from
id. at
the
See
them,
Margot’s receipt
case, however,
receive
indicates that
family
In the instant
the
court
the initial
was condi-
Decree
was not
to
asked
determine whether
the
eligibility
tioned on Alfred’s
for benefits.
requirements
initial
stringent
Decree
themet
contrast,
points
Louan
out
the
qualify
QDRO
to
it as a valid
under federal
provided Margot
amended Decree
with a
law;
earlier,
as noted
this task falls to the
preretirement survivor annuity—i.e., a bene-
Rather,
family
Plan.
court was
to
the
asked
fit
her
to
should
die
Alfred
he
law,
authority,
before
exercise its
under state
to
eligible
retired and became
for benefits.
“just
equitable”
amending
issue
order
Thus,
Louan,
according to
the amended De-
degree
specificity
the Decree.
need
Margot something
cree
that
awarded
was not
ed
governed by
for the
is not
latter
federal
and,
in the initial
described
Decree
conse-
Thus,
distinguishable
law.
is
Robson
from
quently,
family
jurisdiction
court
no
the
had
Likewise,
the instant
v.
case.
Dorn
Interna
Margot,
hand,
to do so.
on
points
the other
Workers,
tional Brotherhood
Electrical
permitted
out that
initial
Decree
(5th Cir.2000),
211
F.3d 938
also cited
“just
to
that
court
enter orders
Louan,
grounds.
is distinguishable on similar
equitable”
long
so
orders
are not See id. at 946-47.
with
provision
inconsistent
of the
Quade,
Quade
upon
relies
v.
further
Decree.
submits that
She
the amended De-
222,
(1999).
238 Mich.App.
604
778
N.W.2d
cree, permitting her
surviving
receive
Quade,
In
Michigan
Appeals
Court of
benefits,
“just
spouse
equitable”
is
be-
refusing
affirmed a trial court’s decision
cause
was
during
she
married
Alfred
provide
early
enter DRO to
for
retirement
employment
entire
his
course
led to
the divorce
did not
because
decree
According Margot,
benefits.
expressly
specifically provide for
such
nothing in
there is
the amended Decree that
Although
benefits.
at
See id.
779-80.
is
with
inconsistent
the initial Decree. We
appellate
appeared
its decision
base
agree
Margot.
with
Quade
on
ground,
decree
also
Louan,
part,
for
does
her
not con
supporting
contained additional evidence
inequitable
tend that
Margot
it
for
court’s decision in the form of handwritten
surviving spouse
receive the
benefits. Rath
language suggesting
had
er, Louan
law in which
relies
case
several
and, inferentially, rejected,
considered
courts have construed
so as
DROs
not to
applicability
early
benefits.
retirement
provide
express
survivor benefits
lan
where
Thus, Quade
See id. at
distin-
is also
guage mentioning such
absent.
guishable insofar as additional affirmative ev-
For
example,
v.
Robson
Electrical Con
present
case—supported
idence—not
in this
tractors
Local
Association
IBEW Joint
134
Michigan
court’s determination
Chicago,
Pension Trust
Pension Plan No.
contemplate early
decree did not
retirement
374,
245,
Ill.App.3d
312
245 Ill.Dec.
727
Similarly, the court in
benefits.
Samaroo
denied,
reh’g
Ill.App.3d
N.E.2d
(3d
Samaroo,
Cir.1999),
did provision judgment plaintiff id. at in the de- 903-04. the divorce because the ex-spouse’s describing the entitlement knowledge cree law at charged partici- to receive “distribution” time of the divorce “knew” pension plan provi- was similar to pant’s provide decree benefits. did these *13 sion in the in this case. See id. at 901. Decree Roth, at See 506 N.W.2d 903. In contrast to However, nothing in which there is Roth Roth, the in language the of Decree this case in that suggests permit- that decree the case family permitted primary court the to retain primary jurisdic- the trial court to retain ted jurisdiction “just equitable” or- to enter “just equitable” tion to enter orders ders retirement at issue. over the interest regarding the Michi- retirement issue. The Michigan Accordingly, the court's decision appellate reasoning gan court’s was based directly applicable Roth is not to this case. that, upon conclusory part its statement “as sum, has not of Louan met her burden written, judgment precludes the distribution family establishing that the abused its court plaintiff [ex-spouse] of Decree, amending discretion in and we [plan participant] begins untO defendant language hold that of does the Decree long for so as he does receive prohibit family doing. not court from so Id. at 903. The court them.” concluded plaintiff “regrettably, law affords no § 580-56 HRS from of the at relief’ the terms decree. Id. that also contends the DRO violates § HRS 580-56. She submits that HRS significantly, plaintiffs
Most motion to § requires family 580-56 court to “ex- brought pur- in Roth was amend decree (MCR) jurisdiction pressly its reserve” over Mar- Michigan suant Rules Court 2.612(C) (1985), got’s property it did and Alfred’s Judgment Rule Relief Order, not do appears so in the Decree. Louan also is similar to or which HPCR Rule 60(b).11 Roth, argue that the DRO violates HRS 580- 506 N.W.2d 903. The required property. showing for relief under this rule is because divides Alfred’s clearly higher being require arguments than when a case is These closer review pursuant primary, considered to the court’s HRS 580-56. continuing, jurisdiction in
or the first in- provides § 580-56 HRS relevant stance, Heugel as in generally this case. See part: Heugel, Mich.App. 603 N.W.2d (a) (1999). Every decree of which does Apparently applying divorce 2.612(C)(1)(f), specifically recite the final division standard outlined MCR parties property in Roth of the court determined were no is reserved there decision, “extraordinary hearing, circumstances” that would and orders further vacated; 2.612(C) longer equitable 11. MCR Rule states: or it is wise no judgment prospective should have Judgment. Grounds for Relief From (1)On application. terms, just motion and on the court (0 Any justifying other reason relief from the legal party representative relieve or the operation judgment. of the order, party judgment, final from a or (2) The motion must be made within a reason- following grounds: proceeding on the time, and, grounds able for the slated in sub- inadvertence, Mistake, (a) surprise, or ex- (C)(1)(a), (b), (c), year rules within one neglect. cusable order, judgment, proceeding after the or (b) Newly evidence discovered due entered or taken. A motion under this subrule diligence could not have been discovered finality judgment does not affect the of a or time to for a new trial MCR move suspend operation. 2.611(B). (c) (intrinsic extrinsic), power subrule does not limit the misrepre- This Fraud or sentation, independent entertain an action to or other misconduct of an adverse order, party judgment, party. relieve a from a (d) proceeding; grant relief judgment to a defendant not is void. satisfied, (e) actually personally provided in judgment been notified as sub- has re- leased, (B); discharged; prior judgment judgment rule for fraud on or to set aside which it is based has been reversed or other- the court.
4H finally par- Moreover, property QDRO. shall divide the if Decree even ties to such action. provide did Decree for further division
parties’ property, the strictures HRS doing 580-56 forbid court from (d) Following entry of a'decree year. passage According- so one after divorce, entry or the aof decree or order ly, necessary it is to examine whether the finally dividing property November 1999 further DRO divided re- to a matrimonial if action the same is permitted tirement interest in a manner that divorce, reserved decree Margot ordi- receive benefits would elapse year entry of one after of a decree so, narily flow to If Alfred. then the amend- reserving the final division ed Decree HRS 580-56. violated property party, divorced curtesy shall entitled to dower or *14 (cid:127) nothing We conclude that in the record spouse’s estate, part any the former real that, suggests in permitting Margot to obtain thereof, nor to share the of former preretirement annuity, survivor the amend- spouse’s personal estate. personal ed Decree affected Alfred’s entitle- added.) (Emphasis “personal of estate” to ment retirement benefits. If the initial party personal property either includes had not Decree been amended and Alfred as retirement benefits. Linson v. Lin See collecting had lived to commence retirement son, 272, 278, 751, Haw.App. 1 618 P.2d benefits, pension plan permit- his would have denied, Haw.App. reconsideration him to ted receive benefits the form a (1980). Thus, P.2d 748 the statute mandates QJ earlier, QJ As & SA. noted & would SA that, family when the court issues a divorce permitted to have Alfred a fixed in- receive decree, decree is with to the final lifetime, if come for his his sur- parties’ property division of the unless the him, vived she would have to been entitled specifically jurisdiction court retains the fifty percent at least of that fixed receive purpose property If of additional division. for the life. 29 income remainder her family jurisdiction court fur the retains 1055(d). However, U.S.C. if the ini- even division, property jurisdic ther it loses such amended, tial had as it Decree been was permit tion party either access here, begun and Alfred had to collect his party property the of the other once benefits, retirement he would still have been subsequently property, the court the divides entitled the same benefits the form passage year, after the of one whichev QJ Similarly, if had & SA. even Alfred died Boulton, er occurs first. See Boulton benefits, collecting before retirement his sur- 3-4, (1986). Haw. 730 P.2d ERISA, spouse, by viving would defined case, although In this the Decree have been entitled to collect benefits the permitted jurisdic QPRSA family the court to retain form a in which would not Alfred purpose issuing “just individually. tion for the collect benefits 1055(e). Thus, equitable” pertaining orders to the retire Alfred would have been interest, did not expressly regardless ment the Decree the entitled same provide Margot’s family for further division whether not the court amended the Rather, per property. Accordingly, family Alfred’s or- Decree Decree. court’s orders, family amending change mits the court to issue inter der Decree did not alia, requiring payments Margot permit make benefits and did not Alfred’s equalize portion property to one another to income tax liabili to obtain of Alfred’s or, amending arguably, ties the Decree that would otherwise have accrued to disqualify order to correct errors that would Alfred.12 SA, permitted QJ to the federal law also ment which Louan was to elect on addition & Thus, permit requires plans recipient could behalf of herself and Alfred. that, Decree, amending family during argued Qthe J & elect to waive SA form benefit specified applicable portion personal prop- period, divided see 29 U.S.C. court erty Alfred’s 1055(c)(1), presumably depriving right elect to receive benefits him the QJ lump payment some form such as sum the & receive form waive SA and some other However, Contingent pay- right payment. Annuitant” form of the waiver of the "100% hearsay upon reasoning, we affidavit and irrelevant foregoing
Based Counsel’s is family amending respect Margot’s knowledge that the court’s DRO hold trial support was not with the and cannot court’s Decree inconsistent letter finding Margot initial stric- language of the Decree or the did receive letter no other evi Consequently, 580-56. until 1998. there is tures of HRS Because possessed jurisdic- Margot family appropriate suggesting that did not receive dence family until court’s the letter find tion to amend Decree. unsupported ing According record. Family Findings Regarding D. Court’s finding ly, family we hold court’s Margot Learned That When clearly erroneous. Not a Decree Was urges family court’s family Louan next contends that the should be on the basis of decision reversed finding “[Margot] of fact that did not court’s foregoing points error. Louan out copy September Fund’s receive court, reply in a memorandum [September when a 1998] until 1997 letter delay in Margot argued requesting that her [Margot’s] was faxed to counsel copy justified amended because Decree clearly [Louan’s counsel]” erroneous. not learn Plan’s failure she did of Mar- Louan submits the declaration qualify decree until *15 got’s averring Decree was counsel points Margot Louan further out that Fund and that “no submitted to the in 1989 by in that it informed the Fund 1989 would Sep Fund until word was received the regarding as to its advise her determination 1, 1998, attorney] when [Louan’s tember that, qualified status and the of the decree [Margot’s copy of the counsel] faxed to notice, “[notwithstanding appar Margot this 8, September Fund’s 1997 letter” does inquired ently never about the status the family finding that Mar- support the court’s that Fund’s determination.” Louan contends got from the Fund did receive letter and, rights” presumably, on her Margot “sat Louan is correct. earlier. now cannot seek have the Decree amend disagree. ed. We clearly the erroneous Under (1993) review, provides pertinent in this will not disturb 641-2 standard court HRS “left, finding part judgment, “[n]o of fact unless it after exam order or decree record, reversed, and firm ining the a definite shall be amended or modified for commit court is of that mistake has been error defect unless the the conviction appeal injuriously it has opinion on there was affected ted. The test is whether support rights appellant.” the conclu substantial evidence substantial finding of fact. court’s sion of the trier evidence for the erroneous constitute Substantial error, indicate evidence which is of sufficient reversible Louan must how is credible per probative quality finding value to enable affected the outcome of erroneous Wright Wright, a conclu support caution to the court’s decision. son reasonable (1981). Doe, Haw.App. 30 P.3d P.2d sion.” In re Hawai'i (citation omitted). Here, points to the record has not done so. Louan noth- at 889 She ing suggest Fund in record to the events that acknowledgment an contains transpired in Howev between that it received the Decree 1989. either Fund’s er, counsel, stating receipt Margot’s acknowledging affidavit of of the 1989 letter De- 7,1997 September Fund Fund’s that “no word” was from the cree and the letter received Alfred; Margot competent only as to until 1998 is evidence addressed September Margot’s September the letter. when counsel received letter amending subsequent QJa to create a benefits as & SA must be consented Decree collect family effectively changed participant’s spouse. See 29 to § 1055(c)(2). identity "spouse” person could collect surviv- named in a who purposes participant's spouse the collection of bene- as the for or benefits consent to treated consenting QJ collecting a & SA. Such an fits in some form other than order, survivor benefits however, Alfred’s in other than does not affect interest the collection some form Thus, 1056(d)(3)(F). way. QJ in in or entitlement a & SA. See U.S.C. Vesting Margot’s when counsel became aware of Retirement Benefits in Spouse Participant’s Upon Similarly, of the letter’s Louan Current existence. in Retirement points nothing concerning record communications, actions, or motivations support To that sur her contention September until after viving on benefits vested her participant pro- an active As the relevant retirement, eligibility date of Alfred’s ceedings, Louan could have evi- introduced Third, authority upon Louan relies from the concerning might dence factual matters Fourth, Circuits, and Fifth Federal which is family have influenced the court’s discretion- Fund, contrast, discussed calls infra. ary determination amend Decree.13 Guild, our supra, attention to Directors However, Instead, she did not do so. support of its contention that Louan did not primarily legal—rather chose to focus rights obtain vested to Alfred’s bene factual—grounds opposing Margot’s than Margot fits because secured interest Accordingly, motion. because Louan has not rights prior those to Alfred’s retirement. family shown how the court’s find- erroneous Reviewing arguments applica these ing of fact affected the court’s decision ERISA, portion ble we that the fami hold case, finding we hold that the did erroneous ly court’s DRO not inconsistent with the rights not affect Louan’s substantial and does therefore, provisions of ERISA and not constitute reversible error. First, family explain court did not err. we
why
prohibit
ERISA does not
DRO; second,
why
explain
we
court’s
we
E. Whether the Amended Decree Interferes
upon by
law
believe
case
relied
Rights
until Louan’s Vested
Under
distinguishable.
Louan is either
incorrect
ERISA
'
Guild,
Tise,
In Directors
the ex-
Suzanne
*16
family
court
contends
erred
spouse,
support judg
had obtained a child
by amending
Margot
favor of
the Decree
against
pension plan participant,
ment
the
because,
ERISA,
right
surviving
under
the
to
Myers, in
Charles
state court.14 Directors
spouse
partici-
benefits
with a
associated
Guild, 234
at
F.3d
417. Over the course of
plan
pant’s
partici-
vests in the
retirement
Myers
years,
pay
the
ten
did not
next
the
pant’s spouse
participant
on the date that the
an
judgment.
id.
In
effort to collect
See
the
eligible
was
retires. Because Alfred
for re-
arrearage,
returned to
court in
Tise
state
beginning
tirement benefits
December
effectively barring
an
1991 and secured
order
agrees
and the Fund
that—had
not
he
Myers’s pension plan
disbursing any
from
died—Alfred would have received benefits
plan Myers
proceeds of
to
-without first
the
date,
that
retroactive
that
Louan submits
pension plan
notifying
id.
the
Tise. See When
rights
surviving
spouse benefits vested
in 1994that
did not have a
informed Tise
she
that, therefore,
in her on that date and
pro
valid
Tise initiated state court
family
subsequently
not
court could
enter
ceedings to obtain an
that
could
entitling Margot
DRO
Al-
to these benefits.
QDRO
enjoin
qualified
pen
as a
and to
ternatively, Louan contends
under
proceeds
plan
distributing
from
sion
ERISA,
right
surviving
bene-
until the order was issued. See
fits
when Alfred died and that
vested
her
proceedings
id. at
over
418. Various
ensued
court,
reason,
could
years, during
the same
of the
two
course
next
subsequently
Myers
entry
not
award
these benefits
died before
the order
Margot.
disagree
sought by
at
Prior to
We
with both contentions.
Tise. See id.
418-19.
earlier,
ex-spouse
represented
that
13. As indicated
if Louan's status as a
due to
fact
she
nonpart)'
covery,
impediment
conducting
was an
dis-
couple’s
of the
minor children and thus
interests
pursu-
she could have moved to intervene
payee”
appropriate
was
"alternate
under
an
supra
to HFCR
24.
P.3d
ant
at
Rule
See
at
Guild,
F.3d at 420 n. 3
ERISA. See Directors
concerning an
and discussion
“alternate
infra
payee.”
The distinction is not material
actually
Myers
never been married
Tise had
case.
placed
legal position
in the same
as an
but was
individual,
Indeed,
against
death, Myers
another
of benefits.
Id.
the case
his
named
stronger
Curry,
beneficiary
requirement
of the
than
Yvonne
plan.15
Id.
argument
expressly
under
men-
death benefits
that it is not
mere
April
Myers had
at 418.
1996—after
analysis
language and
An
tioned.
order,
an
effec
court entered
died—the state
provisions of
structure
relevant
enabling Tise
pro
tive mine
tunc to
an
that
the lack of
ERISA demonstrates
arrearage by
support
upon
collect
the child
ob-
express requirement
that
payable under
attaching the death benefits
payout of
tained
the initial
before
however,
Curry,
plan.
id. at 419.
of,
with,
part
and an essential
consistent
she,
Tise,
was entitled
claimed that
of the law.
overall scheme
intent
ERISA,
because,
under
death
ERISA,
pre-REA version
Under the
upon
Curry
became vested
the benefits
provision superseded con-
preemption
broad
Therefore,
at 419.
Myers’s
See id.
death.
tradictory
preemption provi-
law.
state
April
Curry
the state court’s
claimed
sion,
effect,
states in relevant
which is still
pen
Id. The
1996 order
unenforceable.
part that
interpleader
an
action
fed
sion
filed
court,
[including
district
and the district
provisions
subchapter
eral
of this
April
1996 order was enforce
ruled
§§ 1055
...
su-
1056]
shall
able,
appropriate portion
entitling Tise
an
persede any and all
laws insofar
State
id. at 418-19.
benefits. See
death
they
may now hereafter relate
employee
....
benefit
Ap
Affirming, the United States Court
Ninth
that “the
peals for the
Circuit noted
1144(a).
provi-
preemption
This
29 U.S.C.
suggest
do
QDRO provisions
ERISA
initially applied
prohibition
sion
to ERISA’s
ex-spouse]
no
in the
[the
has
interest
assignment of bene-
against the alienation or
merely
QDRO, they
plan until
obtains a
she
206(d)(1),
fits,
at
88 Stat.
ERISA
already-exist
prevent
enforcing”
an
her
(now
1056(d)(1)),
at
codified
ing
until
Id.
interest
obtained.
to do
The anti-alienation
and continues
so.
Gendreau,
(citing
In re
122 F.3d
pension plan
provision states
“[e]ach
(9th Cir.1997),
denied,
cert.
523 U.S.
provided
provide that
shall
(1998))
To the extent State (including mestic relations law a commu- domestic relations order—... the former law). spouse nity participant property of a as shall be treated surviving a spouse participant of such for 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii). § 29 U.S.C. (and purposes of this section title foregoing of the is that ordi- relevance any spouse participant shall nary state relations law domestic creates spouse participant treated However, any DRO. such DRO that awards purposes)[.] ERISA-qualified an 1056(d)(3)(F)(i). Thus, through 29 U.S.C. participant than someone other of QDRO, the vehicle REA amended beneficiary provided by “default” ERISA whereby ERISA to create a mechanism against pension plan un- unenforceable participant’s spouse former is entitled “qualified.” less DRO As discussed purposes treated as the “current” supra, pension plan determines whether SA, receiving QJ & properly qual- domestic relations order qualified preretirement annuity, other form law, ified federal 29 U.S.C. benefit, purposes waiving QJ or for 1056(d)(3)(G), plan’s and the determination & SA. be reviewed court. state federal 1132(a)(1)(B) (e)(1). §§ As ERISA, “qualified Under the term domes- supra, further noted see 29 U.S.C. very tic relations order” or connotes 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)(II), qualification re- specific meaning. According 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(8)(B)(i): quirements that establish a DRO as a 1056(d)(3)(C) §§ are listed term “qualified [T]he domestic relations (D). qualification We turn now to these re- order” means domestic relations order— quirements. (I) recognizes creates the ex- (C) Subparagraph states: to, payee’s right of an istence alternate assigns payee to an alternate A domestic relations order meets to, right portion all or a receive of the if requirements subparagraph respect partic- with to a clearly specifies— such order ipant plan, under a (i) name and last known mail-
(II) (if ing any) require- participant to which address (C) (D) mailing of subparagraphs ments and the name and address of payee covered the or- met[.] each alternate der, (C) requirements subparagraphs (ii) percentage amount or (D) will be discussed the context infra. paid by participant’s benefits to be “any payee” is “alternate *18 plan payee, to such or each alternate child, spouse, spouse, depen- former or other per- manner in which amount such recognized participant dent of a who is a determined, centage is to be having a to right domestic relations order as (iii) all, of, period portion payments or a pay- receive the benefits the number of plan partic- applies, able a such to which with to such order 1056(d)(3)(E). ipant.” Finally, § 29 U.S.C. (iv) ap- plan each to which such order the term “domestic relations order” or DRO plies. (in DRO) “qualified” contrast to a means: 1056(d)(3)(C). require- 29 U.S.C. The decree, any judgment, (including or order in subparagraph the de- ments descidbe approval of property agree- a settlement gree specificity which a contain of DRO must ment) which— [hereinafter, qualify in to it as a order
(I) provision specificity requirements]. relates to the of child Note that there payments, nothing requirements support, alimony specificity or marital property rights spouse, to a former state domestic rela- addresses substantive (C) that, a law; subparagraph in order of serve simi- simply provisions effect is their tions particular, by mandating purpose. of state a preemption ERISA’s lar to overcome law, requisite requisite degree specificity contain a order to state DRO must (C) specificity. subparagraph a degree qualify of written a DRO as plan "willbe administrators able ensures (D) additional re- Subparagraph contains identify obligations. precisely them future quirements a DRO as needed establish Thus, specificity both the and substantive (D) QDRO. Subpai'agraph states: requirements plan administrators to enable order meets A domestic relations principal fiduciary obligations fulfill them only if subparagraph of this requirements beneficiaries, as well participants and as order— such implement primary serve to one of ERISA’s (i) require provide plan not does providing in- goals of retirement secure benefit, any op- any type or form come for the nation’s workforce. tion, under the provided not otherwise plan, Notably any from of the fore absent (ii) plan pro- require not does provisions any going mention (determined on vide increased benefits one of two or more beneficia “vest” value), and basis of actuarial competing claims to those benefits. ries (iii) payment of require does not pri provision such a Nor would reflect which are payee to an alternate mary or be essential concern ERISA paid alternate required to be to another operation. competing resolution previously order payee under another involving alimony, claims such matters qualified to be a domestic determined (including pen support, property child order. relations interests) during marriage sion accrued 1056(d)(3)(D). require U.S.C. entirely province within the of state domestic (D) subparagraph provide ments law; above, relations illustrated ERISA’s preemption of to overcome ERISA’s “qualification” of such domestic relations or law, the state must meet certain state DRO enabling solely with ders is concerned succinctly, requirements. More substantive plan fiduciary by ensuring fulfill its duties require cannot Plan to DRO the state obligations and its that its are clear liabilities (i) provide not contem benefits: a form kept of its are within bounds contract (ii) in plated provisions plan; by the qualifi long law. and federal As as ERISA’s greater contemplated by than amount met, requirements per cation DRO (iii) provisions plan; that are law missible under state domestic relations pursuant already committed someone else binding plan. upon should be state court order. The obvious to an earlier Congress provided benefit When requirements is import of these substantive “surviving spouses,” be available to should plans being raided protect pension 1055(a)(2), see, e.g., expressly require plan orders by state court that would to state law left the determination pay provid out benefits administrators identity surviving spouse. such See 29 for, contemplated by, the contract ed 1056(d)(3)(F)(i)(“To pro the extent Thus, recognizing law. or federal any qualified domestic relations or vided “qualified,” preempts orders as ERISA such participant ... der fanner endanger any state court order that would surviving spouse be treated as a shall Dicker plan. the resources Cf. participant purposes section 1055 of Dickerson, F.Supp. son v. (and any spouse participant this title *19 (“the (E.D.Tenn.1992) in Congress intent of partic a shall not be treated as fiscal enacting protect ERISA ipant purposes)!.]”) (Emphasis for such add pension plans for the integrity of covered ed.); at Boggs, see also 520 U.S. 117 (emphasis participants”) all of their benefit (“As matter, general a 1754 whole S.Ct. omitted). subject of the domestic relations husband wife, child, conjunction parent belongs to subpara- in viewed When (D), specificity the laws of it is laws of the States and not to graph evident Support obligations, in par obligations United States. pension plan.” ates Di- ticular, deeply responsibili rooted moral Guild, 421 (emphasis rectors 234 F.3d at in Congress ties unlikely is to have intend omitted); original U.S.C. (Internal upon.”) toed intrude citations and 1056(d)(3)(G)(i). With to this “rea- omitted.); quotation marks In re Mar (H) period,” cf. subparagraph sonable states in. Oddino, riage 16 Cal.4th 65 Cal. entirety: (1997) (“To Rptr.2d P.2d (i) During period in which the issue spouses dependents former extent of whether a domestic is a relations order in rights participant’s have a retirement ben qualified being domestic relations order is efits, ERISA, rights those derive not from administrator, (by plan determined law.”); but from state domestic relations see jurisdiction, competent a court of or other- generally Corp., Patton v. Denver Post (D.Col.2002) wise), (conclud plan sepa- F.Supp.2d administrator shall (hereinafter ing rately nothing that “there is account for or its the amounts [ERISA] legislative history” precludes state in this subparagraph referred as the exercising courts from authority amounts”) their “segregated which would have grant retrospective relief in a domestic rela payee during been to the alternate case); Hogle Hogle, tions 732 N.E.2d period such had if the order been deter- (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (holding qualified mined to be a domestic relations did prevent ERISA an Indiana state order. attaching court from the defendant’s (ii) If period within the 18-month de- upon assets based a California writ of execu (v) (or scribed in clause the order modifi- tion alimony entered to enforce arrear- thereof) qual- cation determined be a Thus, age). nothing in the structure order, plan ified domestic relations supports ERISA Louan’s claim that survivor pay segregated administrator shall at “vested” her Alfred’s retire thereon) (including any amounts interest ment. can The most that be inferred from person persons to the entitled thereto. that, foregoing structure ERISA, pension plan right ahas to know (iii) If period within the 18-month de- obligation the sum total of its actuarial at a (v)— scribed in clause point partici reasonable in time—such as the (I) it is determined that the order is or, pant’s if perhaps retirement it occurs order, qualified a relations domestic earlier, participant’s af death—and time, point ter such state orders plan’s obligation. cannot increase a There (II) or- the issue as to whether such fore, long it adversely does not affect qualified der is a or- domestic relations manner,
pension plans in
there is
resolved,
der is not
nothing
language
in the
structure
plan
pay
then the
administrator shall
requires QDRO
ERISA that
to be obtained
initially
segregated
(including any
paid
before
amounts
interest
benefits are
out
thereon)
participant’s
person
persons
retirement.
who
would
such amounts
have been entitled
foregoing, language
addition to'the
in 29
if there
no
had been
order.
1056(d) appears
specifically
an-
for,
ticipate,
provide
situations which
(iv) Any
that an
determination
order is
valid
par-
does not issue until
after
qualified
domestic relations order which
ticipant’s
initially paid
benefits are
out. Sub-
is made after the' close of the 18-month
(G)
(H)
paragraphs
identify
responsi-
(v)
ap-
period
shall
described
clause
pension plan
bilities
once
receives
plied prospectively only.
Specifically,
pension plan
DRO.
“[o]nce the
(v) For
this
purposes
subparagraph,
that a domestic
notice
relations order has
period
the 18-month
may
described
issued that
period
period beginning
clause is the 18-month
take
reasonable
to determine wheth-
*20
er
is a
payment
the order
cre-
with the
on which the first
therefore
date
designated beneficiary.”
required
the
Di-
[or her]
would
to be made under
his
be
Guild, 234
at 422.
statute
relations order.
rectors
F.3d
The
domestic
requires
segregated
the
amounts be
1056(d)(3)(H).
§
29 U.S.C.
(such
beneficiary
paid to
“default”
the
(H)
provi-
contains
Subparagraph
several
spouse)
current
if the
status is still
DRO’s
that the
sions that demonstrate
structure
eighteen
doubt after
months.
29 U.S.C.
contemplates
the
specifically
ERISA
1056(d)(3)(H)(iii)(II).
§
cannot
The statute
identity
to benefits
of the individual entitled
provide
payee’s
“loss” of the
alternate
after
initial
may not
certain until
be
up payment
if it did
right
hold
of benefits
First,
very
begins.
payout
benefits
contemplate
payee’s right
alternate
(H)
subject
itself is
subparagraph
matter of
place.
to do so in the first
pension
must
plan
with
concerned
actions
Finally,
expressly provides that
the statute
being
during
period in which
perform
it is
“any
quali-
determination that an order is a
who is
bene-
determined
entitled
receive
relations order which is made
fied domestic
period,
pension
During
fits.
this time
...
period
the close of the 18-month
after
during
plan
required
segregate
prospectively only.” 29
applied
shall be
eighteen
first
that such benefits
months
added).
1056(d)(3)(H)(iv)(emphasis
§
ultimately U.S.C.
would
if a DRO is
be
By
doing,
contemplates
so
QDRO.
ERISA
that such
to be a
29 U.S.C.
determined
(v).
1056(d)(3)(H)(i)
benefit-seg-
might change
identity
order
“This
obviously
beneficiary.
provisions of
regation requirement
Accordingly,
assumes
already
permit a
payable during
specifically
court to
ERISA
state
determining
payment
al-
period
plan is
benefits to an
whether
Guild,
QDRO.”
payee
ex-spouse
F.3d
DRO is a
Directors
such as an
after the
ternate
payout
begun.
422.
initial
of benefits has
at
Second,
view,
contemplated
provisions, in
“Congress expressly
foregoing
our
might
require-
proceedings
specificity
state
with the
further
substantive
QDRO-determi-
during
qualify
the 18-month
ments
a DRO as a
ensue
needed
id.,
goal
provide
period!,]”
nation
because 29 U.S.C.
effectuate the
ERISA
cer-
1056(d)(3)(H)(i)
provides
tainty
plan
expressly
for the
administrators con-
cerning
obligations.
possibility that the
whether a DRO is
Rather than hav-
issue
them
“by a
QDRO might
ing
uncertainty
have
to factor in
over
to be determined
continued
beneficiary
competent jurisdiction” during
pay
court of
this which
over
Moreover,
1056(d)(3)(H)
period.
payable,
one
ordi-
amounts
because
would
narily expect
plan
provides plan
bright
able to decide
administrators with
(the
qualifies
as a
in a
eighteen-month
period)
whether a DRO
line
time
months,
period
eighteen
guide
administering
far
them in
of time
less than
benefits.
purpose
period
provision
decidedly
with
“the evident
of the 18-month
not concerned
who,
claimants,
provide
competing
identifying
among
was to
in which
defect
time
original
cured”
a state
is entitled to the
under state law.
DRO could be
Guild, 234
court. Directors
F.3d at
In support of her contention that ERISA
reason,
provides
For
statute
requires
vesting
at
of benefits with her
ex-spouse
payee is
or alternate
entitled
retirement,
primarily
Alfred’s
Louan relies
segregated
aside
receive the
amounts set
Hopkins AT
upon
v. & T Global Information
eighteen
during
period
initial
month
if he
(4th
Co.,
Cir.1997),
employee organization,
be-
change
marriage requirement
who is
in ERISA’s
any
eligible to
come
a benefit
[brought
receive
on
the
REA] is evidence
type
employee
plan
from an
which
benefit
[s]urviving [s]pouse
in
vest
the
[b]enefits
employees
employer or
covers
of such
spouse
participant
married to the
on the date
organization,
of such
or whose
members
Hopkins,
Again, provides, court’s foregoing, rationale do not find Based we best, support Hopkins at surviving spouse weak conclusion evidence participant’s foregoing also benefits vest in the conclusion. The REA amend current provision per- require ed ERISA’s the time waiver retirement Accordingly, spouse’s writing suasive. we decline to follow consent be and the *23 Hopkins spouse’s signature the rationale of and hold that sur- plan a witnessed spouse viving in representative notary public. benefits did not vest Louan REA 206(e)(2)(A) (now upon codified, eligible Alfred’s De- § retirement date of with minor 1,1997. 1055(e)(2)(A)). cember changes, at 29 The U.S.C. purpose provision evident of this is to: Vesting in Benefits Current (note
protect spouses
general
in
that some
Spouse upon
Participant
Death
spouses
ex-spouses);
current
will become
(2) protect
plans against
pension
upon
Louan also relies
to
Samaroo
subsequent
spouses
a
providing
claims
support
surviving spouse
her contention that
have,
procedure
verify
they
definitive
to
that
vested in her
when Alfred died.
fact,
waived
to
their entitlement
certain Samaroo,
Winston,
participant,
and his
Furthermore,
pension benefits.
the REA
Louise,
ex-spouse,
were
in 1984.
divorced
provides
“[a]ny
spouse
that
aby
consent
[for Samaroo,
Louan submits to 29 U.S.C. estopped claiming Louan is from 1056(d)(3)(H)(iii)(II), § required Fund proper party the is was not a she to this case pay any segregated to purpose defending amounts claim to attributable the her brief, suggests interpretation In its amicus the Fund that the of the law which we have however, 1056(d)(3)(H) conclusion, application § suggests of 29 U.S.C. practice is more reached this (l)(a) theory. pay difficult appears than in The Fund the Fund should Louan either: the guidance Contingent to seek as which dollar benefits attributable to the An- 100% amount, whom, 1, Option period owes the benefits attrib- nuitant from the November 17, 1999, (b) period apparently through plus utable to the time before it November the qualified monthly the DRO. of the Because unusual cir- benefits attributable to the benefits that case, Margot payable specified cumstances of this the Fund is correct as to would have been as 18, difficulty implementing the the law because in the DRO from 1997 until the November DRO, monthly payable qualification plus the dollar amount of benefits date of the Fund's (c) interest; (2)(a) Contingent Option under the Annuitant the benefits attributable to 100% likely Contingent Option chosen Louan is to be different from the the Annuitant from the 100% 1, 31, monthly payable period through January dollar amount of as a November issue, however, (b) Margot. QPRSA plus This is not attributable to the properly monthly repeating payable It before this court. bears benefits that would have been Margot February specified that the federal issue this case is limited to in the DRO from family entering qualification whether the court erred in 1998 until the date of the Fund's DRO, interest; (c) (3)(a) rights plus DRO that interfered with Louan's vested the 100% rights segregated Contingent period Option or Louan’s to certain monies Annuitant from the 1056(d)(3)(H). pursuant § to 29 U.S.C. As indi- November 1997 until the date of the Fund's above, DRO, (b) family qualification plus cated court did interest. not err. (3) (Alfred) Fund; Jr., al- under a known as
survivor’s benefits finding though family Operating Engineers court’s of fact con- Plan Retirement (the Plan) cerning Margot participant, the date that received notice which he was the though majority upholds entry Fund that did not meet even from the the decree order, requirements QDRO clearly of an if erro- determined to be a (4) neous, error; qualified (QDRO) such was not reversible domestic relations order (a) § language 414(p) of the 1989 divorce defined under of the Internal Reve- neither (b) (the Code), decree, nor Hawañ nue Code of 1986 see 26 Revised Statutes 206(d) (2002), 580-56, juris- deprived family seq., court of Em- et decree; family ployee Security Act of diction amend the Retirement Income (ERISA), (2002), amending court’s November 1999 DRO see 29 U.S.C. seq.,1 assign any rights initial did not interfere with et "would decree Alfred’s Employee rights spouse, Appellee under the to Alfred’s Louan’s vested former (ERISA), Security Margot (Margot), Act and not Louan. Retirement Income Torres none; family granting had I Mar- because she While believe the order got’s entry court’s November 1999 DRO does not motion for of an amended (the rights family interfere with Louan’s ben- court of the first circuit court) jurisdiction, I efits before the date the Fund was "within the court’s because, qualifies Accordingly, majority’s un- dissent from the DRO. characterization ERISA, prospective resulting can der the DRO have and its conclusion only, required affirm No- Plan pay effect we court’s Louan bene- and, amending opinion published initial vember 1999 order fits. Because this thus, jurisdic- precedent divorce decree and its December in our establishes tion, hereto, denying Appendix Louan’s motion for see A reconsider- attached beyond ation. rules of law involved extend this case alone. *26 ACOBA, J.,
Dissenting Opinion by RAMIL, J., joins. I. majority Appellant Margot Tor- The awards Louan and Alfred were in 1967 married (Louan) 10, portion January res and divorced on di- The (the decree) husband, Torres, accrued her late Alfred vorce decree2 was submitted to consistency, hereinafter all For cites to Code and the ERISA statute refer to the United States Code. They provisions provide 2. Certain in the 1989 divorce decree are relevant. as follows: (Alfred,Jr.) (Margot) [ ] [ ] a. Defendant's Retirement. Plaintiff Operating Engineers’ awarded a retirement under share of Defendant’s if, as, Retirement Plan and when Defendant commences to receive the [Margot) computed according same. The share which is awarded shall be following to the formula: purpose [Margotl's interest, For the of this allocation of Defendant is '‘Participant’’ fMargotl the Payee (up in the aforementioned the Alternate percentage specified above) under the aforementioned 1984, meaning Equity Plan within the of the Retirement Act of Payee assigned The share awarded and to the Alternate from the paid Payee if, as, aforementioned Plan shall be to the Alternate and when Participant commences to receive retirement benefits from the Plan. Said payment, Payee, may paid option at the of the Alternate be to the Alternate Payee directly or transferred from the aforementioned Plan to a financial party Payee writing directed Alternate institution or other third as to said Plan. name, Security Defendant’s current address and Social No. are: (DRO) 1999, Up Margot the Plan as domestic relations order until June and Louan QDRO for determination. The decree indi- attempted dispute apparently settle to comí; jurisdiction cates the retains over the 23, 1999, over benefits. On Alfred’s June interest” of “retirement Alfred that was Margot subject filed the motion which is the Margot party’s awarded to “after either appeal, seeking an order for a with, authority just death” “to make Louan, compel Alfred’s as Successor- equitable any” order not inconsistent with In-Interest, QDRO. Margot execute provisions of the decree. a Proposed to her motion “First attached acknowledged receipt The Plan of the de- QDRO.” Amended motion was heard on 1, 8, cree on March September 1989. On 3, 1999, September repre- 1997, apparently the Plan wrote a letter to sented counsel. Alfred, Margot indicating QDRO. alia qualify divorce decree did not aas inter The court found for “[b]ut (Alfred’s) The Plan determined that the 1989 decree death, [ ] deceased the Plan because, QDRO among was not a paying pen- would [Alfred] have commenced things, the decree failed account sur- paperwork as all sion benefits soon as had vivor specify long benefits and did not how completed, payments been and those would paid Margot. were be 1, have been made retroactive to December correspondence, same the Plan also advised 1997, the date Defendant became entitled to might required pay be out the begin receiving the benefits.” person might benefits to who otherwise them, entitled if the was not DRO In light findings, concluded qualified eighteen- within (1) jurisdiction the court had to enter period specified month in the ERISA law. QDRO, Margot “amended” was entitled under the treated as if she were applied Plan for Alfred ben- surviving spouse purposes efits to be effective on December 1997. Alfred’s away passed January He before qualified joint annuity and survivor and/or completing papers. his benefit At the time qualified preretirement annuity, survivor death, Alfred was married to Louan. ERISA, set forth in widow, Louan, Alfred’s had no interest Margot The court found that did re- copy September Margot. ceive a Plan’s court indi- awarded September letter until June granting 1998. On cated it would enter orders Mar- *27 1998, Margot’s apparently counsel submitted entry QDRO got’s for and motion a document denominated as the First QDRO approving proposed submitted QDRO February Amended to Plan. On compel to first and to execute the 28, 1999, responded the Plan’s counsel to subsequently and did so. amended 1, Margot’s September correspondence conclusions, findings Pursuant to its and suggested changes with to to be made “First Amended entered the QDRO. suggested First Amended The Order). (the [QDRO] provides It as changes copy made and was sent to were ” attorney for Louan on follows: March .... [ALFRED] name, (Alternate Payee’s) security Plaintiff's current address and social are: .... [MARGOT]
No. applicable Operating Engineers' This Order Trust Plan is to Pension Plan, presently Operat- Retirement administered the Pension Trust Plan Street, Francisco, ing Engineers, 642 Harrison San California 94107. jurisdiction The Court shall retain over the interest de- retirement long parties herein for as and after either scribed as both shall live party's death. equitable authority every just make Court shall also have the and provisions herein. inconsistent added.) (Emphases (the
WHEREAS, [ALFRED, “Par- JR.] (the ticipant”) “Alternate [MARGOT] and (e) The “Plan” shall the Pen- term mean Payee”), De- [Divorce] ... executed the Plan Trust sion maintained Pension 1989; January ... on herein cree filed Engineers. Plan Operating Plan for and Board of Administrator is the of Trustees Plan for En- Operating the Pension Trust
WHEREAS, pro- said Divorce Decree gineers at.... located for of Marital Assets vided the division Participant Alternate between the and the Payee 2. The and this Court Alternate Payee; and [QDRO] intend this to be as de- Order 401(a)(13) 414(p) fined Section and WHEREAS, Di- pursuant said Internal as Revenue Code Decree, [QDRO] provides for vorce this amended, Equity and the Retirement Act disposition of the benefits division Accordingly, as amended. the Al- Participant Operating due Payee granted portion ternate bene- Engineers’ grants Retirement Plan and Plan, thereby entitling the Payee rights to such benefits Alternate fits from portion receive Payee Alternate QDRO; forth the terms set this equal percentage the Par- WHEREAS, pro- said Divorce Decree ticipant’s Plan as determined jurisdic- shall vided that the Court retain hereinbelow, provided paragraph and as over described tion the retirement interest QDRO. this long as the both shall therein as Furthermore, this not re- shall death; party’s live after either quire provide the Plan to bene- increased deceased, WHEREAS, Defendant (determined fits on the basis of actuarial 17,1998; having January died on value) require provide Plan WHEREAS, this intended to be Order is Payee Alternate which are 414(p) as Section defined required paid another alternate Internal Revenue Code as amend- payee previously under another order de- ed, of 1984 Equity Act the Retirement [QDRO]. termined (H.R.4280); portion Participant’s 3. That to- NOW, THEREFORE, HEREBY IT IS tal, unadjusted monthly pension benefit ADJUDGED, DECREED AND OR- accrued the Plan between the date of Payee re- DERED that the Alternate will 30, 1967) marriage (September and the payments Participant’s re- ceive 1989) (January date divorce consti- below, pursuant named tirement property Participant tutes the marital assignment to Alter- court’s of benefits Payee. disposing Alternate below, Payee by nate the order herein asset, Payee property marital Alternate 401(a)(13) compliance with Sections hereby proper- her separate awarded 414(p) of Internal Code of Revenue ty property por- marital one-half of amended, as follows: tion. *28 1.Definitions: Payee 4. Alternate shall be treated as (a) “Participant” shall mean The term Pariicipant’s surviving spouse she were if [ALFRED, JR.], who is now deceased por- property with to the marital address, security whose known social last pension his tion accrued of benefits for of birth follows: number and date were as pre-retirement purpose the 50% surviv- of spouse ing provided under benefit by his JR.] is survived [ALFRED Accordingly, her Plan. she shall receive [LOUAN,] is spouse, who ALFRED TOR- property share as a 50% marital one-half RES’ survivor-in-interest. surviving pre-retirement spouse benefit (b) 1, 1998, Payee” payable February to as “Alternate shall her The term address, [MARGOT], long live. whose current as she shall No other benefit mean secui’ity payable portion of shall remain from that of social number and date birth pension Participant’s as total accrued are follows: during marriage to Participant’s gross pay benefits accrued his of retired amount Payee. Payee. to Alternate Alternate Participant beneficiary If or 5. or his prior conflicting 12. There are no surviving spouse post-retire- is awarded a previous agreements pro- and no orders ment increase benefit calculated based any viding the Plan to under -a accrued, the amount of benefits Alternate spouse different different former Payee pro post- any shall share rata in Employee. of retirement. copy 13. A this certified Order shall assignment 6. This benefits does upon be served Plan Administrator require provide any type to the Plan forthwith. This take Order shall effect any option form of benefit not otherwise immediately. Any amendment modifi- provided Notwithstanding the Plan. under qualify this cation Order to this order any provision contrary, Partici- [QDRO] as a shall be retroactive to the pant may to select receive his accrued divorce, parties January date of the Plan in form whatever 1989. chooses, Participant provided he added.) (Emphases copy The court issued a permitted selects a form “QDRO” of the 1999 to the Plan. Plan. brief, represented in As its amicus on Feb- During the effective term ruary apparently the Plan notified QDRO, Payee solely the Alternate shall be Margot accepted that it had responsible informing notifying quali- November 1999 Amended DRO as Plan Administrator of the Plan toas QDRO fying for status. Plan has indi- changes of her residential address. date, cated of Alfred’s benefits none pursuant 8. This is issued anyone, including have disbursed been Statutes, the Hawai‘i Revised as 581-A7 of Also, answering Louan. as stated in Louan’s provides which the division amended\ brief, appealed Louan has that determination property rights, marital as defined (Board). Plan’s Board of Trustees spouses spous- therein between and former yet The Board has not made its decision. es in divorce. actions for pro- The intent II. Payee vide the Alternate with a retirement payment fairly represents marital her appeal, Louan maintains that the court On share the retirement (1) defined Louan nor erred because: neither paragraph hereinabove. If Order parties this action even Alfred’s estate are Plan submitted to the Administrator affected; (2) though rights their [QDRO] Plan is to be a within the held not jurisdiction to court did not have determine meaning 414(p) Internal Section benefits; rights to Alfred’s amended, Revenue Code posthumous could not the court enter request compe- agree to a court of it would since interfere Louan’s jurisdiction modify tent the Order vested interest the survivor benefits aris- [QDRO], par- it a make reflects the “segregated ing from Alfred’s intent, ties’ said modification Order provisions; and amounts” under ERISA tunc, pro if appropriate. entered nunc competent support no there is evidence Margot not receive a
the contention did continuing copy September shall of the Plan’s notice 11.The Court have *29 QDRO. a jurisdiction every reason- DRO did not to make order that the constitute ably necessary implement party accom- a appear Plan did not to this The however, brief, case, plish payment Pay- taking the direct filed an amicus Alternate by position Margot Plan of that entitled to ee the Plan Administrator of the the the Participant’s gross granted survivor the 1999 Or- percentage her share under our domestic pay, including right to ad- der if order is valid under retirement the the precise Plan Administrator of law. vise the relations Margot awarded to be- “retirement interest” III. right to such benefits accrued dur- cause the jurisdiction of this case and The court had marriage According- ing Margot’s to Alfred. authority to award survivor benefits had ly, no manifest abuse of discretion there was 410-411, majority opinion at Margot. See exercising equitable pow- by the court in its Here, Hawaii Re P.3d at 811-813. under decree, modify the divorce and under ers to (HRS) (1993), § 580-47 vised Statutes circumstances, was not the 1999 Order equitable making court had an basis with inconsistent the decree.3 doing so precluded and was not from award (1993). by § court conclud HRS 580-56 Mai’got as if she “shall be treated ed IV. surviving spouse with Alfred’s] [was by Ninth Circuit in Trustees As noted property portion marital of his accrued
to the
Am.-Producer Pension
the Dirs. Guild of
family
pension
We review the
benefits[.]”
(9th
Tise,
v.
Director’s
V. (c) participant payee, the and alternate amount of The court’s benefits to be awarded to the designated 1999 Order payee Qualified “First or Amended Domestic alternate the manner which such Rela- (d) order, however, calculated, tions Order.” The amount be and does not number or period payments; require plan constitute a unless not it meets certain (a) 1056(d)(3).5 requirements. provide § type See 29 form U.S.C. or of benefits (b) 414(p) plan, Under section and Code section offered under the increased 206(d)(3) (on ERISA, generally value), is an benefits basis of actuarial or (c) recognizes spouse’s, order payee former to an alternate that are child’s, spouse’s, rights or dependent’s required paid pay- be to another alternate benefits, pension plan to an previous QDRO. individual’s and ee under U.S.C. assigns rights. (3); § such 414(p)(l)(A)(i), See 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C. (C) (D). 414(p)(7); 1056(d)(3); 1056(d)(4)(B)(i)(I), see also and appear (i) just equitable mailing and orders shall the name and the known last ad- further (3) finally dividing distributing (if ... any) and participant dress and name real, mixed, parties, personal, estate of the or mailing payee address of each alternate community, joint, separate.... whether or order, covered orders, making these further court shall (ii) percentage partici- amount respective take into consideration: merits pant's paid plan benefits to be tire to each parties, par- the relative abilities or the payee, such alternate or the manner in which ties, party in which will condition each percentage amount or is to deter- divorce, imposed upon left the burdens mined, party either the benefit of children of (iii) payments period number parties, and all other circumstances applies, which such order .... case (iv) plan applies. each to which such order added.) (Emphasis (D)A domestic relations order meets the re- 1056(d)(3), pertinent part, quirements subparagraph of this if such states: order— (i) (B) purposes paragraph—(cid:127) For of this provide any require plan type does not (Í) "qualified the term or- domestic relations benefit, option, or form of not otherwise der” means domestic relations order— provided plan, under (I) recognizes which creates or the existence (ii) require provide in- does to, payee's right assigns of an alternate (determined creased benefits on the basis to, payee right an alternate receive all or a value), actuarial portion respect with (iii) require payments does not plan, participant under payee required which are to an alternate to be (II) requirements to which the paid payee another another order (C) met, (D) subparagraphs previously qualified be a determined to domes- tic relations order. (C) A re- domestic relations order meets the added.) (Emphases subparagraph only quirements of this if such clearly specifies— *31 430 Here, (Supp.2001),8 implicitly to 571-14 1999 Order states that alter- HRS the law, apply interpret is “a court of federal portion of payee a the nate shall receive jurisdiction” competent under the ERISA Plan; it participant’s benefits under the Oddino, Marriage re 16 law. See In Plan the Plan the as Pension identifies Cal.Rptr.2d P.2d 939 Cal.4th 65 by the Plan for maintained Pension Trust (1997) (holding “Congress that extended 1273 Engineers; gives names and Operating the jurisdiction concurrent action state Alfred, participant, as and Mar- addresses beneficiary to participant a obtain clari- form, got, payee; and the as alternate states fy [QDRO] a benefits under the terms of payment, including amount of manner and Airlines, plan”); see also Jones v. American payee shall as that the alternate treated be Inc., (D.Wyo.1999) F.Supp.2d 57 1232 surviving and her award shall be (“It unlikely Congress, acting highly seems pre-retirement in form of the “50% sur- protect rights spouses former
viving spouse provided under the benefit” court, adjudicated in state dependents as Plan, payable February from 1998. would, time, deprived have the same them Hence, appear would the 1999 Order sat- existing ability to obtain enforcement them QDRO isfy requirements. required in court rights of those state Furthermore, it appears the court had separate a lawsuit them instead to initiate QDRO plan a determination of the 1999 court a made federal whenever retirement qualified designated disputed 1999 status of state Order. The Order “First order.”); Board the La- Trustees Qualified Domestic Relations Amended Or- Trust Fund Northern borers Pension der,” designates it itself the third Levingston, F.Supp. 816 Qualified clause as “this Domes- WHEREAS California (N.D.Cal.1993) (“In light specific (“QDRO”),” it tic Relations Order states term, competent general ‘court use of clause “this the sixth WHEREAS Order amendments, jurisdiction’ in the 1984 QDRO is intended to be a as defined likely Congress pre- most inference is 414(p) of the Section Internal Revenue Code that both state and federal courts sumed 1986,” it 2 that states section “[t]he determinations.”). reviewing QDRO be would Payee Alternate and this Court intend 1056(d)(3)(G)(i),then, Under U.S.C. Qualified Order to a Domestic Relations plan administrator and “court com- 401(a)(13) Order defined Section petent jurisdiction!,]” U.S.C. 414(p) of Internal Revenue Code 1056(d)(3)(H)(i),9 are authorized deter- 1986....”6 require- meets the mine whether DRO QDRO. appear law ments does B. court, prohibit granted which has Second, QDRO determination the Or- DRO, court, making family “by performed plan must adminis- der QDRO determination with trator, by competent jurisdiction, a court of Moreover, pre- same order.10 as mentioned § 414(p)(7).7 Ar- otherwise.” viously, Margot represents Plan al- has court, guably authority ready which had determined that the DRO is 580-47, QDRO.11 pursuant an order see issue HRS only contrary clearly arguably QDRO 6. mination. The statute states otherwise. indication Order, 1056(d)(3')(H)(i). See 29 U.S.C. is section 13 of the status may require Order indicates that 571~14(a)(3), provides part, 8. HRS in relevant provides QDRO determination inasmuch as origi- have court "shall exclusive “[a]ny qualify amendment of this Order to jurisdiction proceedings ... all [i]n nal Qualified Domestic Or- this order as Relations chapter 580[.]” [HRS] parties retroactive der shall be date divorce, January (Emphasis 1989.” [sic] 9. 11. See note infra added.) supra 9. note majority 7. The and the seem to believe here, Plan, administrator, practice plan I it is the better to submit believe that entity ad- authorized to make a deler- orders determination to is the *32 apply on VI. Code to an “order received after the date on which benefits would be argues Margot’s right that to obtain Rather, payable”).12 QDRO a even when QDRO expired passed a away. when Alfred would be rendered ineffective—such as when support, For Louan cites Rivers v. Central participant’s fully distributed, a account is (5th Corp., and South West 186 F.3d 683 account, nothing there is and it is the no Cir.1999) (concluding that ERISA longer accruing statutes do not benefits—the irrevocably benefits on the vested date the QDRO right indicate the obtain a has participant’s wife, in the retirement second expired. where the first had failed to wife obtain a QDRO prior retirement); participant’s to the VII. (3rd Samaroo, Samaroo v. 193 F.3d 189 Cir.1999) (holding that divorce decree is not A pension plan, DRO will not cause a QDRO 401(a) where it effect of increasing subject had section the Code and the plan liability by conferring survivor’s benefits provisions, pay partici- anti-alienation plan right ex-wife after to those pant’s benefits participant benefits other than lapsed); had Hopkins Louan, v. AT & T Global beneficiary, or a such as unless that Co., 105 Solutions F.3d 156 QDRO. order is be a determined to See 29 Information (4th Cir.1997) (ruling that surviving 1056(d)(3); § U.S.C. also 26 see U.S.C. spouse partici 401(a)(13).13 words, ERISA benefits “vest in § In other DRO shall pant’s current partici on the date the separately cause the Plan to for account retires”). pant payable Margot amounts according to the Order, such pay but to amounts However, a straightforward reading of the upon QDRO. determination that is a See statutory language does indicate that the § 414(p)(7)(A); U.S.C. U.S.C. right QDRO expire to obtain a will at retire- 1056(d)(3)(H). § the 1999 Because Order did ment, death, payable when benefits become DRO, compelled constitute a Plan was or at particular time. See Di- account separately for amounts that the 1999 Guild, rectors at 421 (indicating 234 F.3d Margot, pay- Order awarded to the alternate QDRO require- “for all the detail of 414(p)(7)(A); § ee. See 26 U.S.C. U.S.C. ments, specifies ERISA nowhere that a 1056(d)(3)(H)®. § QDRO must inbe hand before benefits be- payable”); QDROs: plan come An Division order that is submitted to a Qualified QDRO Through generally suspend Pensions will Domestic Rela- determination segregated [hereinafter tions Orders Handbook distribution of amounts for an ] 2-13) (2001) (Q eighteen-month 20-21 (indicating period pending & A such a deter- 1056(d)(3)(H)(v); procedures § 414(p)(7) set forth section mination.14 See U.S.C. which, duties, (A) may any period ministrator of its general.—During because in which familiarity plan, have more immediate with the the issue whether a domestic relations order nature, handling competing of this claims qualified being is a domestic relations order is administrator, (by plan law. U.S.C. determined 1056(d)(3)(H)(iv). § otherwise), competent jurisdiction, court of plan separately administrator shall account may Secretary regulations 12. The of Labor issue (hereinafter paragraph in this the amounts upon Secretary consultation with of Trea- amounts”) "segregated referred to as the sury. 414(p)(13). See 26 U.S.C. In consulta- which would to the have been alternate Treasury Department, Depart- tion with the payee during period the order had been such if (DOL) published ment of Labor has qualified determined domestic to be a relations Handbook. See id. at 1 n. order. (B) Payment payee if order de- to alternate 401(a)(13), part, provides: 13. Section relevant qualified termined to be domestic relations or- qualified A trust shall not constitute trust period within described in the 18 month der.—If plan under this section unless such (E) (or subparagraph order modification part provides provided trust thereof) qualified be a domestic is determined to plan may assigned under the or alienated. order, pay relations administrator shall 401(a)(13) added.) (emphasis 26 U.S.C. (including any segregated interest amounts thereon) person persons § 414(p)(7) part entitled states relevant as follows: thereto. determination, (“While any segregated Guild, at 421 234 F.3d Director’s determination, paid if it must been out as there plan making this amounts could have that would be due segregate the benefits no from the court.16 26 U.S.C. were 1056(d)(3). payee under the terms alternate There 414(p)(7); that those during first 18 months fore, possible DRO that Louan have been it is payable if the DRO is would be payment under the eligible for of benefits *33 ultimately QDRO.”)- Orders that deemed following pass plan point at one Defendant’s eigh- QDROs after the to be are determined segre ing, apparently Plan inasmuch as the applied to period are the relevant teen-month 29 gated the benefits. See U.S.C. “Any prospectively. determination account 1056(d)(3)(H). § qualified relations that an order is a domestic imposes seemingly law an ob- The ERISA 18- after the close of the order which is made pay ligation on the Plan to the benefits to the applied prospec- ... period shall be month eighteen-month period beneficiary after an 1056(d)(3)(H)(iv); § only.” 29 tively U.S.C. run, However, supra has see note 15. the Guild, 422 234 F.3d at Directors see also says nothing rights vesting about statute (“This benefit-segregation requirement obvi- beneficiary eighteen months. after Cf. may already ously that benefits be assumes Ross, N.J.Super. A.2d Ross v. 308 705 period plan is deter- payable during the (rejecting arguments that 796 QDRO.”) mining order] is [an whether beneficiary’s ex- benefits vest either the regard, argues once the In this dividing benefits on wife current wife following period submission eighteen-month case, grounds). amicus as the expired, to the Plan she of the 1989 decree indicates, rule, Plan—by seemingly brief right in an vested had irrevocable discretion, otherwise—apparently re- person ... who would have paid as “the making payments from ac- frained from if there had to such amounts been entitled anyone, including Louan. count to no order.”15 been Thus, reasons, 414(p)(l)(C)(ii). § she VIII. right. with that It is interfered Order hand, qualified the other once as was sub On 1989 divorce decree true QDRO, QDRO the 1999 Order took “effect immedi- Plan for determination mitted to the and, expired ately.” without The 1999 Order is order period an 18-month had different Compare QDRO §411 (C) provisions. Payment plan participant IRC certain period 414(p) § described within the 18 month IRC and ERISA ERISA 203 with cases.—If in (E)— subparagraph 206(d). Generally, participant when retires (i) it is determined that the order is not plan, and takes distribution from the he is enti- order, qualified relations domestic benefits, only tled to his vested unvested benefits (ii) whether such order is a the issue as to QDRO assign partici- A are forfeited. qualified relations order is not re- domestic benefits, however, (or pant’s beneficiary’s) vested solved, plan pay administrator shall then the payee. to an alternate (including any segregated interest the thereon) amounts person persons to the who would arguable eighteen-month It is as to when the entitled to amounts there had have been if i.e., started, period payment when "first would been no order. required [1989 DRO].” to be made under the (D) Subsequent determination or order to be supra 414(p)(7)(E); 26 U.S.C. see also note 15. only.—Any prospectively applied determination however, question, I to that believe answer qualified relations an order is a domestic relevant. See discussion the 18- which is made the close infra. after (E) period subparagraph described in month prospectively only. applied shall be pay- 17. A order a Plan to make can (E) period.-For of 18-month Determination present in the or future and not in the ments peri- purposes paragraph, 18-month of this (Q 2-11) past. 19 & A Handbook at subparagraph in this is the 18- od described (the only begin eighteen-month period can after period beginning with the date on which month Thus, eighteen- receipt plan). payment required to be made would be first suspension period in effect was reset and month relations order. under the domestic 17, 1999, began on November or the date added). (Emphases QDROHand- Plan received the 1999 Order. See 2-13). (Q (It vesting book at 20-21 & A should be noted concept vesting and the 15.The prevent closely putative payee alternate cannot provisions are related to the decree, 17, 1999, pay- prior the 1989 different accumulated to November (The Order, ment commencement date. majority controversy as holds. The 17,1999, granted on November indicates paid Louan should have been whether payable Margot, alter- prior any point Plan to that date or at time payee, immediately). Upon nate appropriately is not before us. The written taking Order effect as a a determina- appear itself does not to be tion the court made and the Plan is autho- record. Louan admits she has not filed a independently rized apparently to make payment. claim for The record does not make, did “segregated amounts” should indicating contain that Louan instrument have immediately payable Margot. become payment is entitled to immediate of benefits. § 414(p)(7)(B); 26 U.S.C. Plan, previously, party not a stated 1056(d)(3)(H). suit, thus, the Plan cannot be Order apply would amount to take action. Plantations ordered Haiku *34 Cf. (and thereof) any appreciation of benefits Lono, 96, 102, Ass oc. v. 56 Haw. 529 existing in Alfred’s Plan account on Novem- (1974) (“In 1, P.2d 5 order of for the decree 1999, 17, QDRO. ber the date of the If the binding upon per court [] the lower to be Plan had amade distribution before Novem- sons, suit, they must be made to the 17, 1999, ber for example, beneficiary to a (Internal plaintiffs either as or defendants.” Louan, such apply as would not to Order omitted.)). quotation marks The Plan’s such distributed amount. But the Plan did interpleaded. funds were not Aetna Cf. Life not make a distribution Louan. to Accord- (9th 1030, Bayona, v. 223 1033 Ins. Co. F.3d ingly, QDRO payment awarding Mar- to Cir.2000) (holding interpleader is an ac got prospectively takes effect from Novem- relief,” “equitable tion obtain appropriate to ber to segregated 1999 as benefits. may brought by participant, be benefi effect, QDRO giving prospective I believe ciary, fiduciary provisions to enforce of obligated payments the Plan is to make plan); Kapaia ERISA terms of ERISA QDRO required by already that had not Store, Henriques, Ltd. v. 33 Haw. prior paid eighteen-month been out to the (1935) (holding non-parties must resort period suspension of payment dating of from interpleader funds in order claim November 1999. Under the facts of this garnishee may of that such claims hands so case, paid none of those funds have been out adjudicated). fiduciary Plan The has and, thus, subject such all funds are to the respect by with duties issues raised QDRO. Metropolitan v. See Ins. Co. Life v. Chartering See Marine (7th Cir.1994) Louan. Tinoco Wheaton, 42 F.3d Co., Inc., 311 F.3d 2002 WL (explaining purpose segregating (5th Cir.2002) plan (“Congress funds established exten protect is to ERISA administra- disclosure, paying wrong party being tors fiduciary duty from reporting, sive claimant). sued a rival against requirements possibility to insure expectation employee’s benefit IX. through management poor would be defeated (Internal Thus, quota plan administrator.” we should not conclude that Plan omitted)).18 pay segregated appeal is to to Louan out funds tion marks Louan’s (Ü) payment beneficiary having 414(p)(7) taking a [Section action domestic granted every Code], eighteen relations months tire negative QDRO obligation á plan’s participant because once made, determination is to the then plan discharged administrator distribute payee each alternate shall be § 414(p)(7)(C).) amounts. See 26 U.S.C. any payment pursuant the extent of made such [sic ]. Act ERISA, QDRO According provisions to the 1056(d)(3)(I). fiduciary duty 29 U.S.C. govern provisions in Part which the actions of fiduciary plan with [i]f a acts accordance administrator, plan capacity [relating fiduciary Plan in its part the state, this subtitle pertinent part: duties] in— (i) fiduciary discharge treating with [A] shall his duties domestic relations order be- as (or solely being) plan ing qualified respect to a in the interest of the not rela- domestic order, participants and- tions and beneficiaries QDRO not until presently pending be decree did constitute a June Plan’s decision question is 1998. The to that Plan. answer fore Order, validity of the 1999 pertinent to the pay out Ordering the Plan effect to which is the relevant order. already sub- segregated amounts would, ject light APPENDIX A circumstances, prece- questionable establish For, purpose it is the of a dence. published opinions lack of rights participant and a alienate “problem” by legal as has been cited beneficiary, Louan. See community. Report the [Hawai'i] 1056(d)(3)(A); Supervised Von Haden Unpublished Reviewing AJS Committee Haden, 301, 304 Von 699 N.E.2d Estate [hereinafter, Report”] at 4 Opinions “the (“A QDRO plan (Ind.App.1998) allowfs] regarding that discussion Views issue infra. assign part participant largely unpublished relegated have been settlement.”). as the Inasmuch divorce opinions, generally which are unavailable. to be a has been 1999 Order determined Accordingly, following I have included QDRO, If terms must there be enforced. part my discussion concurrence. See controversy to Louan’s Shimamoto, Blind, N.K. Justice is But Plan, claim, dispute is with not the her Mute?, Hawai'i B.J. She Should law, with the with the ERISA (“The ] Blind [hereinafter Justice is *35 QDRO. currently a publication debate catch-22 for is justices: judges judge jus and if a or some
X. opinion pub that tice believes an should be lished, is, dispute and is no over there issues, remaining it should be As to the however, if, justice judge publication; a or from the evident discussion opinion published, that should be believes Louan, provisions supra, that aas successor- majority publish, and the votes not to then in-interest, authority no has to exercise justice’s judge product (including or work is a to whether the 1999 Order why particular published) case should be QDRO in or connection with the execution simply relegated is to a dissent concur any QDRO. 414(p)(7)(A); 26 U.S.C. (Italicized unpublished opinion.” in an rence 1056(d)(3)(H). Rather, statute emphases original.)). in plan or a court authorizes the administrator jurisdiction competent a make I. determination, only may and Plan “exe- payments according or make cute” in It is of stare decisis nature Thus, QDRO. a I would terms of See id. in this court decides when effect matters of part of court’s order com- hold that that impression, prece- first in fact establish we Louan, successor-in-interest, to ex- pelling and, therefore, publish opin- our dent should inappropriate 1999 Order and ecute the depart fail publish, ion. When we we from must be reversed. procedure legiti- established which lends above, macy decision-making process and we to our also Also evident the discussion guidance question neglect responsibility provide our not resolve the of whether need coui'ts, finding attorneys, parties. import that Louan did not and court erred one copy September of such an act to make law for case receive Plan’s others, process informing only, singling it out the divorce from all 1997 notice her (B). 1104(a)(1)(A) (A) purpose In the 29 U.S.C. and con- for the exclusive of: (i) providing participants benefits to text of a administrator also shall their beneficiaries ... discharge of an its duties in the interests alter- care, skill, (B) diligence prudence with the payee, pur- nate who considered for "shall be prevailing die then under prudent circumstances any provision beneficiary poses of [ERISA] acting capacity man in a like 1056(d)(4)(J). pian.’’ under the in the with such matters would use familiar enterprise of an of a like character conduct aims[.] with like arbitrary. suggested adoption that can Ramil be described has rule like that of First Appeals there fundamental Circuit Court of When reasons (1) require publication publishing given would of a case opportunity arewe unanimously by to, when case is decided but fail we also our compel to do so trial “[ajfter if, single dissent, opinion without a rely employ courts and counsel to on and views,” any an exchange single justice precedent jurisdictions established publication; votes for with “a dissent trying in our own when cases state. or with than opinionf,] more ... unless one judges all participating against publi- decide II. Doe, 1, 15, cation.” Doe Hawai'i questions publish we presented Unless (Ramil, J., dissenting, P.3d us, will they go continue unaddressed J.) joined Acoba, (quoting United .States manner, authoritative and error Appeals Court of First R. Cir. other, compound leaving similar cases 36(b)(2)). See, Shimamoto, N.K. Justice and the guess counsel trial courts to at the Blind, supra (Adoption at 12 of a “‘one Therefore, apply. law to fact that justice rule, publication’ ‘majority unlike the majority publish of the court votes not rule, faithfully premises rules’ abides publica- should not be determinative upon opinions SDOs memorandum question. tion It inis the order of case law based, promotes judicial accountability, were development that discourse on issues not cov- judge justice’s facilitates role in the existing published opinion ered should legal system—without sacrificing judicial be disseminated and made available ex- economy.”). adopted Similar rules have been amination, consideration, and citation jurisdictions.1 in other similarly Only those affected interested. light open debate can the dialectic III. process subject place, critique take *36 agreed will Justice Ramil and I have bar, parties, the other of branches agree by any continue to recommendation scholars, government, legal and future any justices publish the other a case process analysis resulting courts. The majority even if will a not adhere theory, critique legal concept, hones and rule. policy. support do so we We because Consequently, opinion any it should not matter wheth- one of col- our majority, forth leagues publication er such discourse is set in a a that decision warrants concurring, dissenting opinion. or in opinion Justice that the views raised See, ("The e.g., following along indicating 6th Cir. crite- R. with a statement the action addressed.”); by panels determining special opinion ria shall be which is Ariz. considered 111(b)(4) designated publi- ("Dispositions Sup.Ct. a be whether decision will R. of matters Reporter: requiring in the ... whether before a written cation Federal the court decision accompanied by concurring dissenting by opinion majority of it is a or shall be written when a acting opinion.... opinion desig- judges determine[s] An or order shall be that it a involves upon any legal unique publication request nated for issue of sub- factual interest or Cir., I, App. panel.”); public importance, disposition member of the 8th stantial or if the ("The by panel accompanied separate U.S.C.A. Court or a will determine of matter concur- ring opinions published, except dissenting expression, which to be and the author may judge opin- separate expression pub- that make such lished, that it [or her] of his desires be publication."); by opinion.” Cir. R. be ions available 9th 36-2 then decision shall written, (Internal ("A omitted.)); numbering disposition desig- be N.D. reasoned shall section 14(c) ("The only Sup.Ct. opinion if ... [i]s nated as OPINION it: accom- Admin. R. separate dissenting only panied concurring published judges be if one of the three separate expression, participating of such ex- one the author decision determines that pression requests disposition publication of the of the standards set out in this rule is satisfied. expression." (Cap- published opinion separate and the must include concur- the Court ("[I]f added.)). original.)); R.App. (Emphasis P. For italization Ala. rences and dissents.” rules, these, Judge Opinion' jurisdictions’ in a a Justice or well as other see 'No case writes Doe, opinion, concurring n. special with or n. 52 P.3d at either dis- Hawai'i at 15 J.) (col- court, (Ramil, J., Acoba, dissenting, joined senting reporter from the action jurisdictions). publish special opinion, lecting shall that similar rules in of decisions other publication of a calling for the an auto- this court This is not disseminated.
should be
mark.
but, instead,
particular case miss the
decision,
matic and blind
judicia-
every
recognition that
member
summary disposition
favor the use of
We
of his
on the
because
ry, chosen to sit
bench
majority
in which
of cases
orders for the vast
expertise,
and valuable
has distinct
or her
currently appropriately utilized.
they are
Simply put,
case.
viewpoints to offer
each
orders have been filed
Numerous such
justice
not be
disagreement with a
should
propose
signed.
do not
we have
We also
justice’s
of that
to limit the reach
reason
dissenting
or concur-
every case in which
Shimamoto,
N.K.
Justice
comments. See
requires pub-
necessarily
ring opinion is filed
(“A
Blind,
glance
through
back
supra, at 7
summary disposition
A
lication.
number
a coun-
that not
is this
time reminds us
separate opin-
filed with a
orders have been
can voice
try
on the belief that we
founded
urge that
be
ion.3
did not
these cases
We
majority,
opinions against the
but
our
published, as we do here.4
occasions embraced
have on numerous
we
however,
cases,
of a future
some
opinions in the wisdom
We believe
those
liti-
published. Guidance to
decision must be
day”)
provided,
would
gants and the trial courts
analysis would
exists. The
where none
IV.
pending
citation in
by litigants for
available
public and the
subsequent cases. The
justice”
By
rule
contrast
the “one
legal community would be informed of the
which had
Ramil and
suggested
Justice
developing law in this area.
court,2 the
the custom of this
once been
a “ma-
“policy” in this court follows
current
does,
By ignoring, as it
the views
other
majority
obtained,
jority
approach, which the
rules”
simple majority
justices
after
majority
course. The
insists is the better
As we
majority invites avoidable error.
concede,
publication guidelines
appears to assert
vail occur under
must all
error
“majority
inquiry
than
rules” would result
is on which side
system;
the relevant
grinding
weigh
to a halt.
I submit that
appellate process
would
the least.
out’
error
jurispruden-
gained
ma-
in a
respect,
all
I submit that the
there is more to be
With
due
milieu,
sense,
present
legal
justice
tial
and in the
jority’s
against any
arguments
one
27, 2001)
J.,
*37
(Nakayama,
dissenting, joined
Aug.
My understanding
majority
rule re-
2.
is that
Ramil, J.).
by
recently adopted
garding publication
Ramil,
by Justice
the custom of
1996. As related
jus-
previously
with a
was to concur
this court
majority’s refusal to address issues of first
4.The
See,
publish.
recommendation to
tice’s
impression
do with numbers.
has little to
Bush,
24808,
e.g.,
No.
2002 WL
State v.
J.,
11,
(Acoba,
(Oct.
2002) (SDO)
dis-
31302086
See,
Irvine,
24193,
e.g.,
Hawai'i
v.
No.
98
State
Makalii,
24833,
senting);
431,
Hawai'i
v.
No.
99
State
12, 2002)
507,
(Hawai'i
(unpub-
P.3d
Jul.
51
374
J.,
2, 2002) (SDO) (Ramil,
(Oct.
Federal Courts the De- Report justices submitted Publish, J.App. Prac. cision & Process Supreme Hawaii Court for our consider- report (discussing a 1989 proposal ation. The recommends findings significant which reflected “that a adopt to HRAP Rule amendment portion rulings 35,5 of non-unanimous problem perceived [in “[t]here because published, legal community Circuit] [and] Eleventh were with the continued and, ideology judges played disposition ... summary par- role use of orders recommendation, alia, situations, suggests opin- 5. The AJS inter In all other a memorandum / unpublished dispositional ion or an amendment to HRAP Rule 35. See The Re- proceeding cited in opinion other action or port suggested adds a amendment if *38 persuasive party or has A order value. re-alphabelizes supple- c new subsection and and opinion unpub- or who cites memorandum ments the current subsection c as follows: dispositional copy shall lished order attach of (c) Application Any party Publication. or for opinion the or order to the document which person may apply good other interested cited, for appendix, it indicate as an shall publication cause shown to the an court for of any subsequent disposition opinion of the or unpublished opinion. appellate after the courts known dili- (d (c) ) opinion A [ ] Citation. memorandum gent unpublished If an search. decision unpublished dispositional or order shall not be argument, citing party cited at oral the shall any nor ac- considered shall cited provide copy to the court the other authority, proceeding controlling tion or ex- as citing unpublished opinion parties. When cept disposi- opinion unpublished order, when the or party opinion's indicate or must the pending of tional order establishes the law the case, unpublished status. judicata estoppel, re or (underscoring, indicating [sic] collateral Report The at addi- tions, brackets, deletions, proceeding involving indicating origi- in a criminal action nal). respondent. the same further indicated that such a mea-
islators functioning “improve would the and effi- sure inability to tieularly, the cite memorandum judicial process.” ciency appellate of the opinions opinions despite fact that these the Rep. No. in 2001 House Conf. Comm. length and con- appear to be substantial Journal, at 1129. prece- and often other case law tent cite However, funding as for for the two ICA Report at 4 dent for the conclusions.” The judicial reported positions, legislature added). consequences (emphasis The of not Judiciary that no “[t]he that also testified publishing have become a concern to the thus appropriation is needed for the 2001-2002 A core function of this bench and the bar. Rep. No. year.” fiscal Comm. Conf. law, interpret forth our court is to to set at bill will “[T]his 2001 House Journal analysis, announce for the education Judiciary process of begin allow the public. abandon guidance We judges It recruiting two for the ICA. new that we take a crabbed function when view that your no new intent Committee publication. provided purpose funds be for this additional year for 2001-2002.” fiscal Stand. Comm. VII. at Rep. No. in House Journal with number un- The dissatisfaction po- of whether two ICA determination these published opinions why is also one reason past sitions could have been funded prompted legislature to authorize State was present budgets point judiciary what judges on two additional the Intermediate requests legislative appropriations should (ICA) Appeals The 1996 Court of level. subject obviously be made is exercise backlog is of a fundamental lack of reflective judiciary administration’s discretion. In legislature resources. autho- “[t]estimony reports also indicate appointed judges rized two additional to be Judiciary on this measure this ses- ICA, appellate case load. view expansion sion indicated that of the interme- 1,§ Act Haw. L. at 646 See 2001 Sess. reorgani- preparatory court is for later diate (HRS) (amending Hawaii Revised Statutes appellate system, which zation of the could 602-51 indicate the number subject bills for Session.” judges on the would be increased ICA Rep. No. in 2001 Conf. Comm. Senate two). considering whether such mea- legisla- Journal at 944. A search of the 2002 necessary, legislature sure viewed reorgani- has tive bills not revealed remedy judges as the additional one plan. zation burgeoning summary disposition use or- ders, apparently par- prompted some public is from What is stated record question [they getting were] ties “to whether certainly misrepre- do not and we intend process[ due ]”: privy are not to inter- sent the record. We
Attempts appellate case ju- deal nal made administrative decisions procedures pro- have into load evolved diciary Obviously, we administration. cesses have been viewed controver- wholeheartedly agree with and all ef- sial, causing litigants question expand some forts made the current number pro- due getting whether the judges ICA. example, large
cess. For number of VIII. by summary disposi- were cases decided opinion, tion orders instead and oral Any implication adoption of a one- argument has ... [I]f become rare. justice far-reaching have a ad- rule would appellate is to maintain an effective State cases, custody child impact in criminal verse *39 justice system disposes in a of cases cases, and busi- parental and termination provides litigants timely manner and with cases, property and in civil ness owners hearing process, fair the number of ICA decidedly A exaggerated be a one. would judges must increased. be one-justice in would not a rash rule result delay. publication requests significant Rep. No. in House Stand. Comm. added). Journal, justice” approach adopted (emphasis leg- at 1495 “one has been The The many jurisdictions. implemented highest in mines our and role as the state court and Taking expertise into account of all mem- reason that we are here. regarding necessity this court
bers clarifying any the law in area makes the best X. judicial of our
use collective wisdom. A. It is evident that number of cases on website, answer, Judiciary’s The is not the
appeal,
resulting hardship
by
and the
faced
is,
fallacy
and the
it
arguing
transpar-
is
litigants, may
part
be in
due to the lack of
specific
ent.
If the searcher knows the
legal precedent
name
practice.
cleai'
in an area of
case,
and
filing
date of
can
pursued
the case
be
appeals
by
Non-meritorious
are
liti-
among
dispositions,
located
gants
murky,
numerous
includ-
when the law is
because the
orders,
ing
Thus,
chronologically
listed
and
unpredictable.
by
pub-
result
month,
grouped by year
by
and
date of deci-
lishing and clarifying the law when such need
evident,
Judiciary,
sion. See State of Hawaii
Hawaii
uncertainty,
we
contribute
Orders,
and, thus,
Appellate
Opinions
Court
backlog.
to our
contribute
(last
http:/Avww.state.hi.us/jud/ctops.htm
up-
2002).
However,
Aug.
dated
researching
IX.
matter, entirely.
is another
The research
possibility
consequences
The
of unintended
limited,
capabilities
extremely
prac-
if not
resulting
establishing precedent
should
tically
Judiciary
non-existent.
home
view,
not, my
in
publication
alter
when war
page
repository
is a
of our
disposi-
recent
that,
ranted. We cannot
fear
hide behind the
tions; it is not a
tool.
research
case,
deciding
may
creating prece
in
we
That is
of our
dent.
the nature
common law
B.
States,
system. See
v. United
Anastasoff
event,
reality
primarily,
(noting that
F.3d
904-05
the common
only published opinions
are considered
precedent
law doctrine of
directed that all
lawyers
judges
researching
in
the law
cases decided contributed
the common
point
specific
with
to a
of law or a
and, thus,
law,
value,
precedential
retained
Only
dispositions that
issue.
those
are acces-
“published”
if
even
those cases were
sible via
established
the seventeen
case law
reporters),
official
us moot on
vacated
engines,
reporter
search
such as found
(8th Cir.2000) (en
grounds,
job C. to see to it that our decisions have the clarity foresight convey the effect Additionally, HRAP because the current intended, refuge expedient not to take prohibits unpublished Rule 35 citation to unpublished of an cover decision. opinions, majority when a of this court votes
Furthermore, case, against publication dissenting as the court last resort state, duty concurring opinions eases can- we are bound decide hard those presented authority by attorneys to us to render our who issues best not be cited as hope judgment urge in all To allow a a similar view or a reexamina- cases. concern majority position, by attorneys consequences govern our tion of for unintended separate judges common and trial consider the is to abandon our law tra- who decisions deciding altogether. opinions helpful in related To silent because issues. dition remain situations, might say Ultimately, are afraid of what in those value we we under- *40 XII. practi- concurring opinions to dissenting and judges and is nil. tioners review, espe- require focused Cases which of
cially
with matters
first
those
deal
published on
impression or which should be
XI.
disposi-
grounds,
susceptible
not
to
backlog do not
and a
Limited resources
may
according
tion
to limited time lines
summary
disposition of eases
warrant
by majority. Not all cases
determined
concept was
published. This
re-
present simple
previously
ques-
should be
decided
by
Eighth
Court
critical
cently expressed
Circuit
tions of law. The
examination
inevitably
inescapably
objected
necessary
strongly
review
Appeals, which
accomplish.
Anastasoff,
requires
time
panacea
non-published eases as a
over-use of
and re-
223 F.3d
904. Such examination
judicial backlog
emphasized
our obli-
for
many
separate
spawn
instances where
view
necessary
gation
spend the time
to do
major
positions may
opinions and
result
job
competent
on each case:
original
modifications and even reversals
judges
among
It
is often said
majority
positions agreed
of this
high that
it is
appeals
is so
volume
upon
contrary approach
court.
Insistence
precedential
simply unrealistic to ascribe
can
have a deleterious effect on the
every
do not have
decision. We
value
eases,
affected,
the outcome of
job,
enough
argu-
to do a decent
time
development
law.
of case
runs,
plain language,
put
when
ment
Moreover,
ultimate resolution of
even the
treating every opinion
prece-
as a
justify
through
apparently simple cases
sum-
some
true,
judicial system is
If this is
dent.
mary disposition may
then
take more time
trouble,
remedy
but the
indeed
serious
initially
initially
estimated.
Issues not
raised
underground body
is not
create
majority may
pointed
or addressed
only.
place and
good
law
for one
time
by a
“ma-
out
dissent
concurrence. The
instead,
enough judge-
remedy,
is to create
justices
jority” may change several times as
volume, or,
that is
ships to handle the
if
posed
grapple with
law and facts
within a
practical,
judge to take
each
case, and with other considerations and com-
competent job
enough time to do a
promises.
The decision whether the case
backlogs
If this means that
will
each case.
may
change
published
should be
or not
also
price
paid.
grow, the
must still be
during
times
the course of consider-
several
Accordingly,
ation.
the end result
(emphasis
Anastasoff,
441
length
tial
Report
judgment
by
and content.”
at 4.
a rush to
is
The
that mandated
Also, denying “publication does not
policies
procedures embracing
somehow
and
internal
'
deposit that
energy
time and
back into the
summary decisions. Too often
adminis-
pool of resources
that it can
on
so
be used
approaches
expedit-
tration of formulaic
Shimamoto,
cases.”
other
N.K.
is
Justice
ing cases becomes the
and
focus
the time
Blind, supra, at 11.
court,
energy of the
which should otherwise
spent
be
on our
fundamental function
de-
importantly,
expenditure
More
ciding cases.
I see no
in a race to
filling
virtue
analysis
court’s resources in
out the
previously thought
“easy
stamp circulating
what was
an
ease”
rubber
draft
decision
resources,
cannot be
labeled waste of
when
quickly by
so that
issued
be
the court.
justice
justice
being
believes that
is not
approaches
public’s
Such
detract
atten-
by
superficial
served
ap-
treatment of an
prominent
delays,
tion from
reason for such
Thus,
peal.
operate
we do not
as a “commit-
is,
supra
the lack
resources. See
tee,”
views,
opposed by
and our
while
VII.
Section
justices,
certainly
is
intended
But other internal administrative obstacles
impugn
integrity.
their
counts
Case
and sta-
delay
cause
inefficiencies
resolution
disposition
tistics should not drive our
objec
cases. Obstacles such as the lack of
process.
deliberative
In a conflict between
opinion
tive criteria as to
an
whether
should
two,
primary duty
our
giving
lies
Tau‘a,
published,
be
see State v.
98 Hawai'i
litigants
they
case and the
involved
time
426,
441 n.
P.3d
1
n.
Anastasoff,
deserve. See
ciary alone will be held accountable with- pressures out reference to collateral Moreover, although a case should be whatever source. and, thus, published exacts deliberation time Health, v. Secretary Graver Ed. & Wel complete, long-term, publication over (E.D.Pa.1975) fare, F.Supp. 636-37 decreasing backlog has the effect of added). (emphases ourselves, courts, attorneys trial saving time, effort, expense of and re- agree I that cases should needless be decided possible. justice promptly publish But is no do ad- there When we sources. *42 us, judicial squarely presented power, all and questions dress the wide-ranging systemic large favoring any effects. public par there are at without one ty litigant or the interests of over one anoth subse- party Each for whom the issue er. quently is faced with an error arises anew “novel,” yet we have because at guess it. Trial courts must addressed applied, delaying
what law should be further clerks, judges, of trials. Law resolution justices and must effect “reinvent State, v. P.3d
wheel.” See John
(Alaska
(Manheim, J.,
Ct.App.1989)
concur-
(“[S]o
ring)
many
unpub-
our
decisions are
parties—whether they prosecutors and cases, parents in criminal
defendants cases, business enti-
children
ties, government, public large— at attorneys guess at what them jurisdiction,
law risk of wrong. By
guessing time the matter is court,
brought again to this much time passed.
events have It is no wonder representatives both the bench citing to
the bar recommend the recourse of only body of law oftentimes available opinions.
them—unpublished
XV. view, struck our balance is of our role as the court of last context long range per
resort in this state
spective litigants must take. in each we judgment
case deserve considered justice. obligation
each Our to the rule assiduously, evenly,
law apply is to
justly; expediency play part in the should no engaged.
task in which we ax-e In that re more, less,
gard, guidance authoritative legal right present balance in our
strikes the satisfying indi By obligation our
milieu. cases, duty fulfill
vidual we our as stewards