In this libel action arising out of a series of articles published in the Savannah Morning News, plaintiff William Torrance appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to various defendants connected with the newspaper (“the newspaper defendants”). In Torrance v. Morris Publishing Group,
The facts are recited at some length in Torrance I, and we will not repeat them here except as necessary for resolution of the issues presented. This action was brought by William Torrance, the city manager of the City of Vidalia, against four corporations connected with the Savannah Morning News, the editor and two reporters for the newspaper, and a City of Vidalia police investigator,
The series had to do with a thwarted GBI investigation of drug use, alleged unlawful recording and dissemination of a GBI agent’s (Tapley’s) cellular telephone calls, her federal case against city officials, the mysterious death of a young black man whose body was found in the swimming pool of the city attorney, and belief by some that the deceased had been outside the window of the city manager’s daughter on the night before he died.
The trial court entered a very comprehensive order dealing with many issues, including venue, Torrance’s status as a public official, actual malice, and a point-by-point analysis of the allegedly defamatory statements. In his sole enumeration of error, Torrance contends the trial court erred in granting the newspaper defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The focus of Torrance’s appeal is on the content of the statements and the question of actual malice; he acknowledges that he is not appealing the determination that he was a public figure at the time of the statements.
As a public figure, Torrance must meet a very high standard of proof to prevail on the issue of defamation, regardless of the existence of any privilege under OCGA § 51-5-7. He must
show by clear and convincing evidence that false and defamatory statements were published with actual malice. “Actual malice” in a constitutional sense is not merely spite or ill will, or even outright hatred; it must constitute actual knowledge that a statement is false or a reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.
Actual or constitutional malice is different from common law malice because knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth may not be presumed nor derived solely from the language of the publication itself. Reckless disregard requires clear and convincing proof that a defendant was aware of the likelihood he was circulating false information. Thus, it is not sufficient to measure reckless disregard by what a reasonably prudent man would have done under similar circumstances nor whether a reasonably prudent man would have conducted further investigation. The evidence must show in a clear and convincing manner that a defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statements.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Atlanta Humane Society v. Mills,
[although the burden is on the plaintiff at trial to prove actual malice, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, it must negate a plaintiffs claim of actual malice by establishing that it lacked knowledge that the defamatory matter was false or did not publish it with reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not.
(Citations, punctuation and footnote omitted.)
Here, the reporters who investigated and wrote the stories testified by affidavit that they thoroughly researched the stories, wrote them carefully, and reread them as they went through the editing process. Both testified that “there is no statement in any of them that I believed or so much as suspected was a false statement about William Torrance.” The editor of the stories likewise testified that there was nothing in any of the articles that he knew or suspected to be false.
More specifically, the reporters detailed the sources for each of the statements complained of by Torrance. These included copies of police reports, crime scene logs, and notes; pleadings and depositions in a related federal action brought by the GBI agent whose telephone calls were intercepted, including the sworn testimony of Torrance;
After this showing was made, it was Torrance’s duty to “come forward with evidence of malice so as to create a jury issue on this claim.” Torrance I,
Where there is uncontradicted testimony by a party as to a certain fact then the opposing party must produce “some other fact” to the contrary. If the “other fact” is shown directly, that is sufficient for the case to go to a jury, but if it is circumstantial then it must be evidence sufficient to support a verdict. The circumstantial evidence must be inconsistent with the direct testimony and must tend to establish the conclusion projected while rendering less probable all inconsistent conclusions. The evidence must not constitute a “mere inconclusive inference” for then it is insufficient to withstand summary adjudication.
(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Rabun v. McCoy,
The alleged failure to investigate fully regarding the daughter’s window was disposed of in our opinion in Torrance I. Torrance also complains that the reporters reported false information and ignored other information, but, as noted above, in each instance the reporters cited official records, deposition testimony and pleadings in the federal litigation, or personal interviews of identified individuals. They testified that they obtained particular information that contradicted Torrance’s version of the facts.
Torrance cannot show actual malice merely by making assertions contrary to those of the identified sources from which the newspaper defendants obtained their information. “[T]he press need not accept denials, however vehement; such denials are so commonplace in the world of polemical charge and countercharge that, in themselves, they hardly alert the conscientious reporter to the likelihood of error. [Cit.]” (Punctuation omitted.) Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton,
Moreover, the newspaper defendants did not conceal this information, but published Torrance’s denials and other contradictory evidence in the articles themselves. This is in contrast to such decisions as Lake Park Post v. Farmer,
Here, while Torrance argues that malice is shown because the series “presented a distorted interpretation” of the facts, errors of fact caused by negligence or by adoption of one of a number of possible interpretations do not show actual malice. Morton v. Stewart,
Finally, Torrance contends that a jury issue was created with respect to actual malice because Torrance testified at his deposition that one of the reporters was “hostile and agitated” while interviewing him and told him that he ought to be in prison. As the trial court noted, three witnesses contradicted Torrance’s account of this interview. But, as the trial court also observed, even if we assume Torrance’s assertion to be true, as we must on summary judgment, “ ‘[a]ctual malice’ in a constitutional sense is not mere spite or ill will; it must be actual knowledge that a statement is false or reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity. [Cit.]” Sparks v. Peaster,
Under these circumstances, Torrance has failed to meet his heavy burden to show actual knowledge or reckless disregard of truth or falsity, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the newspaper defendants.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Our opinion in Torrance I was issued before the trial court ruled in the case before us, and the trial court relied on it in its ruling.
The police investigator is not a party to this appeal. Another police officer named in Torrance I obtained summary judgment on the basis of the one-year statute of limitation for injury to reputation, and we affirmed. Id. at 566 (1).
See Tapley v. Collins,