Case Information
*3 BEFORE: McKEE and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges,
and POLLAK,* District Judge
(Opinion Filed April 28, 2006) Howard C. Ulan
Daniel M. Fellin (Argued)
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Office of Legal Counsel
Department of Public Welfare
3d Floor West - Health & Welfare Building Seventh & Forster Streets
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Attorneys for Appellants
Mark J. Murphy (Argued)
Disabilities Law Project
1315 Walnut Street - Suite 400
Philadelphia, PA 19107
Attorney for Intervenors
OPINION OF THE COURT STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the issue of whether a state’s affirmative duty under the Due Process Clause to care for and protect a mental health patient in state custody depends upon the _______________________
*Hon. Louis H. Pollak, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. *5 individual’s custody being involuntary. Contrary to the District Court’s resolution of this issue, we conclude that the state does not owe the affirmative duties of care and protection first enunciated in Youngberg v. Romeo , 457 U.S. 307 (1982), to those individuals who are free to leave state custody. We will affirm the District Court’s order denying appellants’ claim to qualified immunity, however, because resolution of that claim should await fuller development of the record.
I.
The plaintiffs are the guardians of twenty adult individuals with mental retardation who formerly resided at Western Center, a mental retardation institution operated by Pennsylvania’s Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”). [1] On April 11-12, 2000, DPW closed Western Center and transferred its remaining residents, including the plaintiffs in the present litigation, to privately operated facilities. At the time of the closing, the plaintiffs were “unwilling to be transferred to placement in community facilities of any type,” “medically and developmentally inappropriate for community placement,” “medically and mentally fragile, especially when removed from their familiar institutional surroundings,” “in need of continuous care by on-site multidisciplinary staff,” and “in need of continuity of placement; stability, and therapeutic access to family.” Am. Compl. ¶ 9.
In the course of the transfer, “a physical blockade was set up by state police at Western Center to separate plaintiffs from their parents, guardians, relatives and other loved ones.” at ¶ 40. “Against each plaintiff’s will, each was prevented from making physical contact with any individual on the other side of the blockade; was ordered into and placed within a bus or van at *6 Western Center, and was then transported to various placements several hours away.” Id. at ¶ 41. Plaintiffs allege that state employees utilized “[p]hysical and psychological force” and that the plaintiffs “suffered severe physical and psychological damage in the forced, involuntary transfer from Western Center.” Id. at ¶¶ 18, 42.
The plaintiffs, through their guardians, filed suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other federal and state statutes. In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated their “constitutional life and liberty interest in . . . appropriate placement and appropriate medical and therapeutic treatment from the state of Pennsylvania.” Id. at ¶ 12. They further allege that the individually named defendants, including Feather Houston, the Secretary of DPW, and Nancy Thaler, the Deputy Secretary, “were personally responsible for the decision to transfer each plaintiff.” at ¶ 43.
Based on these allegations, plaintiffs sought injunctive relief under the Due Process Clause. In Count V, the only claim currently before us, the plaintiffs sought monetary damages from the individual defendants Thaler and Houston based on the same due process violation.
The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting, inter alia , that defendants Houston and Thaler were protected by qualified immunity from plaintiffs’ damage claims. The District Court viewed the issue as whether the substantive due process rights to care and protection possessed by “involuntarily committed residents in state facilities” under Youngberg v. Romeo , 457 U.S. 307 (1982), “are clearly established as extending to voluntarily committed persons.” App. at 30-31. The District Court concluded that it was clearly established that such due process protections do extend to those who are voluntarily committed and denied the motion. We will affirm the order of the District *7 Court, albeit for a different reason.
After Houston and Thaler filed this interlocutory appeal,
the plaintiffs failed to enter an appearance or file a brief.
Houston and Thaler are entitled to pursue their appeal, however,
and we are required to proceed without the benefit of an
appellee’s brief.
United States v. Everett
,
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’
constitutional claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
jurisdiction to review the District Court’s denial of qualified
immunity pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.
Rouse v.
Plantier
,
III.
The officials assert qualified immunity with respect to the
plaintiffs’ damage claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
They will be entitled to such immunity if “‘their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Wilson v.
Layne
,
As a threshold matter, we note that we, like the District Court, read the damage claims before us as resting solely on the substantive due process rights of care and protection recognized in Youngberg v. Romeo , 457 U.S. 307 (1982). Youngberg addresses only the extent to which the Due Process Clause imposes upon the state an affirmative duty to care for, treat, and protect persons in its custody. Id. at 324. We hasten to note that the Due Process Clause, of course, also forecloses the state under some circumstances from taking affirmative action that deprives citizens of interests in life or liberty, regardless of their custodial status. As we pointed out in Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc. , 921 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1990), residents of state institutions whose circumstances do not qualify them for protection under Youngberg nevertheless possess other substantive due process rights to be free of certain state interference in their lives. [3] Because the complaint and, *9 indeed, the briefs before us and in the District Court, rely solely on the rights mandated by Youngberg , nothing we say about the significance of the voluntary or involuntary nature of confinement in this context is relevant in the context of other substantive due process rights of voluntarily committed persons.
In , the Supreme Court held that when the
state deprives an individual of liberty through involuntary
commitment proceedings, it undertakes an affirmative obligation
to confine the individual under “conditions of reasonable care
and safety” that are “reasonably nonrestrictive” and to provide
the individual with “such training as may be required by these
interests.” 457 U.S. at 324. The Court noted that “[s]uch
conditions of confinement would comport fully with the purpose
of [the individual’s] commitment.” ;
see also id.
at 320 n.27
(citing
Jackson v. Indiana
,
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
“generally confer[s] no affirmative right to governmental aid.”
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.
,
Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume
some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”
DeShaney
, 489 U.S. at 199-200;
Collins v. City of Harker
Heights
,
[W]hen the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual’s liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs– e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety–it transgresses the substantive limits on state action set by the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State’s knowledge of the individual’s predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf. at 200 (citations omitted). In other words, “[t]he ‘process’
that the Constitution guarantees in connection with any
deprivation of liberty . . . includes a continuing obligation to
satisfy certain minimal custodial standards.”
Collins
, 503 U.S.
at 127-28. The Supreme Court has stressed that “it is the State’s
affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on
his own behalf–through incarceration, institutionalization, or
other similar restraint of personal liberty–which is the
‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due
Process Clause.”
DeShaney
,
Following the general rule, the Supreme Court in
*11
DeShaney
ruled that the state owed no continuing constitutional
obligation of care or protection to a child who had been
previously taken into custody of the state, but returned to the
custody of his father.
Accordingly, our court recognized in
Fialkowski v.
Greenwich Home for Children, Inc.
,
The intervenors rely on language in some of our cases emphasizing that the relationship between the state and an individual must be custodial in order to trigger an affirmative duty of care between the state and the individual. For example, in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch. , 972 F.2d 1364, 1370 (3d Cir. 1992), we stated that “[o]ur court has read DeShaney primarily as setting out a test of physical custody.” But the D.R. court went on to explain that
[t]he state’s duty to prisoners and involuntarily committed patients exists because of the full time severe and continuous state restriction of liberty in both environments. Institutionalized persons are wholly dependant upon the state for food, shelter, clothing and safety. It is not within their power to provide for themselves, nor are they given the opportunity to seek outside help to meet their basic needs. Obviously, they are not free to leave.
Here it is the parents who decide whether that education will take place in the home, in public or private schools or, as here, in a vocational-technical school. at 1371 (emphasis added). Thus, while the D.R. court
emphasized that a comprehensive custodial relationship is *13 necessary to trigger the state’s affirmative obligation of care and protection, it did so with an understanding that the individual must not be free to leave that custody if he so chooses.
In
Nicini v. Morra
,
It appears that the foster child in
Nicini
originally came
into state custody when his father signed a voluntary-placement
agreement.
Id.
at 801. However, the state court reviewing
Nicini’s placement had ordered that “Nicini would ‘come[]
under the care and supervision’ of [New Jersey’s Department of
Youth and Family Services (“DYFS”)], that he would remain
with the [alleged wrongdoers] ‘for so long as [DYFS] thinks
that’s an appropriate placement,’ and that ‘[u]nder no
circumstances is [DYFS] to return the boy to the home of his
parents without the authority of the Court.’” at 804 (quoting
order of New Jersey Superior Court) (citation omitted). Such an
order by the state, but not voluntary placement in custody
standing alone, amounts to a deprivation of liberty triggering a
“corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for . . .
safety and well-being.”
DeShaney
,
Thus, a custodial relationship created merely by an
individual’s voluntary submission to state custody is not a
“deprivation of liberty” sufficient to trigger the protections of
. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically noted
that when a patient provides valid consent to enter a state mental
*14
treatment facility, there is no deprivation of liberty at all.
Zinermon v. Burch
,
We conclude that appellants go too far, however, when they insist that a court commitment to state custody is a necessary characteristic of a deprivation of liberty sufficient to trigger Youngberg ’s protections. As the District Court observed:
[I]t is consistent with the Court’s rationale in to find that the state “may act to restrict an individual’s liberty when it either involuntarily commits the individual or, at some point during the term of one’s voluntary commitment, takes affirmative steps to restrain one’s liberty.”832 F. Supp. at 124 . In addition, . . . a voluntary commitment may, over time, take on the character of an involuntary one. Such a change could occur [for example] as a result of use of physical or chemical restraints. Id.
App. at 22 (quoting United States v. Pennsylvania , 832 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).
Indeed, even commitments formally labeled as “voluntary” may arguably amount to de facto deprivations of liberty from their inception. See Sarah C. Kellogg, Note, The Due Process Right to a Safe and Humane Environment for Patients in State Custody: The Voluntary/Involuntary Distinction , 23 Am. J.L. & Med. 339, 341-43 (1997) (listing “eight overlapping types of commitment, only one of which can truly be considered voluntary in the sense that it results from the patient’s uncompelled free choice”). In addition, when plaintiffs voluntarily consent to enter state institutions, those institutions may set limits on a patient’s ability to leave. See id. at 342 (“In a voluntary commitment , a facility admitting a competent adult may retain the right to institute involuntary commitment proceedings or demand that certain bureaucratic requirements be met before granting the patient’s request for discharge.”); 1 Michael L. Perlin, Mental Disability Law § 2C-7.2 at 482-83 (2nd ed. 1998) (“Many commentators have suggested that voluntary procedures are ‘subject to abuse’ or involve ‘substantial elements of coercion,’ and that the distinction between ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ patients is often an ‘illusory’ or ‘murky’ one, with voluntary residents often having even fewer opportunities for discharge than those involuntarily committed.”) (footnotes omitted). We note that in Pennsylvania a voluntarily committed inmate may be subject to a waiting period of up to 72 hours before he or she can secure release. See 50 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7206(a).
The existing case law supports the District Court’s
approach of looking beyond the label of an individual’s
confinement to ascertain whether the state has deprived an
individual of liberty in such a way as to trigger
Youngberg
’s
protections. The Supreme Court noted in itself that
“the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded patients
vary widely” and “it is essential to focus on the facts and
circumstances of the case before a court.”
District courts have similarly recognized that patients
who have formally been voluntarily committed may nonetheless
find themselves in a
de facto
involuntary status.
See United
States v. Pennsylvania
,
Count V of the complaint alleges that each plaintiff was in state custody and was injured physically and psychologically in the course, and as a result, of a transfer to an inappropriate institution. It further alleges that the plaintiffs were separated from their guardians and loved ones by a police blockade, and were transferred “[a]gainst their will,” and that “[p]hysical and psychological force was utilized by state employees . . . in the course of the transfer.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 41, 42. We conclude that plaintiffs may be able to prove facts consistent with these allegations that would establish a deprivation of liberty and a violation of ’s duty of care and protection.
While we conclude that a constitutional violation may have occurred, the current record does not provide an adequate basis for passing on the defendants’ claim to qualified immunity. Indeed, contrary to the assumption underlying appellants’ entire appeal, we do not even know whether any of the plaintiffs were the subject of a court-ordered commitment at the relevant time. [5] *18 Moreover, assuming that none were, it is far from clear that any of the plaintiffs were in a position to extricate themselves from state custody at the time of the transfer that allegedly inflicted their injuries.
IV.
We hold that the District Court erred in concluding that the state owes an affirmative due process duty of care to residents of a state institution who are free to leave state custody. We will affirm the order of the District Court denying the motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity, however, so that the matter of immunity can be determined on the basis of a more fully developed record. The order of the District Court entered January 27, 2005, will be affirmed. [6]
Notes
[1] We will refer to the individual former residents of Western Center as the “plaintiffs” throughout this opinion.
[2] See infra , n.6.
[3] In
Fialkowski
, we explained that a voluntarily committed
mentally retarded patient who did not qualify for relief under
would, under the holdings of cases like
Stoneking v.
Bradford Area School District
,
[4] We similarly ruled in Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist. , 985 F.2d 707, 713 (3d Cir. 1993), that a school bus driver “stood in no ‘special relationship’ with the students that would create an affirmative duty of care.” We emphasized that “[n]either the state compulsory attendance laws nor any other state rule required [the students’] presence on the . . . school bus.” at 714.
[5] The defendants submitted a Declaration to the District Court indicating that “[o]nly one plaintiff . . . is currently subject to involuntary commitment, and she currently resides at a private facility.” Geis Decl. ¶ 7. The Declaration says nothing about the commitment status of any of the plaintiffs at the time of the transfer.
[6] If the District Court, on remand, determines that plaintiffs,
whose complaint seeks damages and injunctive relief, are
abandoning their damage claim, the District Court will have no
occasion to devote further efforts to resolving the question
whether defendants Thaler and Houston are entitled to qualified
immunity. Our opinion – indeed, our jurisdiction to review the
District Court’s order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss on
qualified-immunity grounds – is based on our understanding that
plaintiffs have not abandoned their damage claim. Nothing in
the record establishes that plaintiffs have abandoned their
damage claim. Further, the docket shows that plaintiffs have
made some, albeit procedurally inadequate, effort to participate
in this appeal. These facts satisfy us that defendants remain at
risk of being subjected to further litigation on a claim for which
they argue they are entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly,
we conclude that the requirements of the collateral order
doctrine are met and we have jurisdiction over the appeal.
See
Mitchell v. Forsyth
,