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Topping v. North Carolina State Board of Education
106 S.E.2d 502
N.C.
1959
Check Treatment
Bobbitt, J.

Judge Moore’s order of April 23, 1958, entered after notice and hearing, restrained the original defendants “until the final hearing of the cause or until title tо the full site of 15.15 acres shall have been acquired in fee simple by the Board of Education of Hyde County.”

The original defеndants were entitled, by perfecting an appeal’ from Judge Moore’s said interlocutory order, to a review by this Court of his findings of fact and conclusions of law. Roberts v. Cameron, 245 N.C. 373, 376, 95 S.E. 2d 899, and cases cited. Judge Moore’s order, if erroneous, was subject to correction only by this Court. Mills v. Richardson, 240 N.C. 187, 81 S.E. 2d 409, and cases cited; Dail v. Hawkins, 211 N.C. 283, 189 S.E. 774, and cases cited. Upon their failure to appeal therefrom, Judge Moore’s order determined the status of the case until final hearing. (Note: There has been no final hearing.)

This is an appeal by plaintiff from Judge Paul’s order of November 21, 1958. It presents no1 question as to whether Judge Moore’s order was erroneous in any respect.

Judge Paul was without judicial power to modify or reverse either the findings of fact or the conclusions of law theretofore made by Judge Moore. ‍​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍It is well settled that the findings and decisions of one superior court judge are not subject to review by another superior court judge. Hoke v. Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C. 374, 42 S.E. 2d 407; In re Adams, 218 N.C. 379, 11 S.E. 2d 163; Fertilizer Co. v. Hardee, 211 N.C. 56, 188 S.E. 623. Certain well defined exceptions to this basic rule have no application here.

Advertent to this well established rule, Judge Paul based his decision on the ground that, subsequent to April 23, 1958, the Board of *298 Education of Hyde County bad completely or substantially complied with the conditions presented by Judgе Moore as prerequisite to the dissolution of his order prior to final hearing.

The findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth therein disclose clearly, in our opinion, that Judge Moore’s order of April 23, 1958, was based upon his ruling that the original defеndants had no legal right to pay over the $164,484.44 to the Board of Education of Hyde County unless and until it acquired the fee simple title to the full site of 15.15 acres. Acquisition of the fee simple title to the full site of 15.15 acres was the condition (prescribed by Judge Moore for the dissolution of his restraining order prior to final hearing. Nothing therein suffices to show that Judge Moore contemplated or intendеd that his restraining order was to be dissolved (prior to final hearing) upon a showing that the Board of Education of Hyde County had аcquired a mere right to possession of the 12.11 acres pending final determination of the condemnation procеedings.

Hence,- we are concerned with the title status as of November 21, 1958. ‍​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍Whether the Board of Education of Hyde County сould or would thereafter acquire fee simple title to the 12.11 acres by condemnation or otherwise is beside the point.

Decisiоn herein must be based on the legal significance of what occurred after April 23, 1958, and prior to November 21, 1958, in the condemnation proceeding; and, in ;this connection, our first inquiry is to determine the applicable statutory provisions.

All of the provisions of Ch. 115 of the General Statutes of North Carolina as contained in Yol. 3A and the 1953 Supplement thereto were rеwritten by Ch. 1372, Session Laws of 1955, entitled “AN ACT REWRITING, REARRANGING, RENUMBERING AND AMENDING CHAPTER 115 OF THE GENERAL STATUTES, AND REPEALING CERTAIN OBSOLETE SECTIONS THEREOF.” Article 15, Section 1, of said 1955 Act, as amended by Ch. 1335, Session Laws of 1955, was codified as G.S. 115-125 in the 1955 Supplement to (recompiled) Vol. 3A of the General Statutes. Principally, it brought forward the provisions theretofore codified in Vol. 3A as G.S. 115-85 and considered in Brown v. Doby, 242 N.C. 462, 87 S.E. 2d 921, G.S. 115-125, as codified in said 1955 Supplement, was considered in Board of Education v. Allen, 243 N.C. 520, 91 S.E. 2d 180.

Ch. 683, Session Laws of 1957, is entitled, “AN ACT TO REWRITE G.S. 115-125 RELATING TO THE ACQUISITION OF SCHOOL SITES.” Sec. 1 thereof amends “G.S. 115-125” by rewriting it as therein set forth, providing, inter alia, that a county board of educаtion may acquire a school site by condemnation proceedings ‍​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍instituted by it under the provisions of G.S. Ch. 40, Art. 2. Sec. 2 *299 thereof rеpeals all laws and clauses of laws in conflict therewith.

The 1957 Act now appears as G.S. 115-125 in the 1957 Supplement to Vol. 3A of the General Statutes.

While not so denominated in Ch. 1372, Session Laws of 1955, Sec. 1, Art. 15, thereof, is the 125th section of said chapter. It seems clear that, in enacting the 1957 Act, the legislative intent was to rewrite Art. 15, Sec. 1, of Ch. 1372, Session Laws оf 1955, and we so hold. See Board of Education v. Allen, supra.

Consequently, the condemnation proceedings must be considered as instituted under the provisions оf G.S. Ch. 40, Art. 2, pursuant to authority conferred by Ch. 683, Session Laws of 1957.

It is noted that the provisions of G.S. Ch. 40 apply equally to all bodies politic, corporations and persons (enumerated in G.S. 40-2) possessing the power of eminent domain.

The condemnation proceeding instituted by the Hyde County Board of Education against the Manns is now pending in the Superior Court of Hyde County, awaiting trial at term on exceptions directed both ‍​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍to the petitioner’s right to condemn and to the adequacy of the damages awarded by the commissioners. G.S. 40-19. Present comment on the validity of these exceptions is not necessary or appropriate.

The determinative question is this: Did the payment into court by the Hyde County Board of Education of the amount of dаmages assessed by the commissioners and its possession of the 12.11 acres as authorized by the clerk’s order vest the fee simple title to the 12.11 acres in the Hyde County Board of Education? Explicit provisions of G.S. 40-19 impel a negative answer.

While payment into court of the amount of damages assessed by the commissioners entitled the Board of Education of Hyde’ County to possession of the 12.11 acres “notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, and until final judgment rendered on said аppeal,” in the event of a final adverse judgment it would be required to surrender possession thereof to the landownеrs. G.S. 40-19; R. R. v. R. R., 148 N.C. 59, 61 S.E. 683. In such event, the court would make appropriate orders with reference to the refund of its deposit. G.S. 40-19. Tempоrary possession, pendente bite, subject to removal by final adverse judgment, is quite different from a final judicial determination that the condemnor is entitled as a matter of right to permanent possession. The title of the landowner is not divested unless and until the con-dеmnor obtains a final judgment in his favor and pays to the landowner the amount of the damages fixed by such final judgment. G.S. 40-19; Light Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 209 N.C. 560, 184 S;E. 48. True, a condemnor may not, as a matter of right, take a voluntary nonsuit, over the landowner’s objection, after obtaining temporary *300 possession by payment of the amоunt of ‍​‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​‌‌‌​‌‌​‌​‍damages assessed by the commissioners, R. R. v. R. R., supra, but this is because the landowner may, if he elects to do so, assert his claim for damages on account of the condemnor’s possession pendente lite.

Having reached the conclusion that the Board оf Education of Hyde County, as of November 21, 1958, had not acquired the fee simple title to the full site of 15.15 acres, it follows that Judge Paul’s order of November 21, 1958, is erroneous. Hence, Judge Paul’s ©aid order is vacated; and Judge Moore’s order of April 23, 1958, continues in full force and effect.

Order vacated.

Case Details

Case Name: Topping v. North Carolina State Board of Education
Court Name: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Date Published: Jan 14, 1959
Citation: 106 S.E.2d 502
Docket Number: 31
Court Abbreviation: N.C.
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