{¶ 2} On September 10, 2004, appellee sued appellant in the Carroll County Common Pleas Court alleging that appellant had defaulted in her payments on an installment note. That case (case No. 04CVH23995) was ultimately resolved by an Agreed Judgment Entry filed on December 16, 2004. In the Agreed Judgment Entry, the trial court granted judgment in favor of appellee and against appellant in the amount of $22,010.34 plus interest at seven percent. The entry also provided that appellee would not "initiate any foreclosure, execution, garnishment or attachment" provided appellant paid appellee $300.00 per month. In order to secure the judgment, appellee filed with the Carroll County Clerk of Courts a certificate of judgment that same day.
{¶ 3} Subsequently, on February 25, 2005, appellant filed a complaint for partition in the Carroll County Common Pleas Court (case No. 05CVH24170) seeking the judicial sale of real estate held jointly by herself and Barbara Toot. On May 24, 2005, appellee intervened in the partition action and filed an answer attaching the certificate of judgment. Specifically, in paragraph two of his answer, appellee stated:
{¶ 4} "[Appellee] denies the allegations set forth at paragraph 3 of plaintiff's complaint, and instead asserts that he has an interest in the subject real estate by virtue of that certain Certificate of Judgment filed on December 16, 2004 and recorded at Carroll County Judgment Docket 12 Page 161, a photocopy of which Judgment Lien is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference."
{¶ 5} In both case Nos. 04CVH23995 and 05CVH24170, on July 15, 2005, appellant filed a motion to enforce judgment and "quash" appellee's judgment lien. The trial court denied the motion in both cases on August 11, 2005. The trial court found that appellee's act of creating or filing a judgment lien, following his obtaining a final consent judgment from appellant in case No. 04CVH23995, did not amount to the initiation of a "foreclosure, execution, garnishment, or attachment" on that judgment.
{¶ 6} Appellant appealed. Lower case No. 04CVH23995 was assigned appellate case No. 05-CA-285. Lower case No. 05CVH24170 was assigned appellate case No. 05-CA-826. On September 29, 2005, this Court, on its own motion, dismissed case No. 05-CA-826 as being duplicative of the issues raised in case No. 05-CA-825.
{¶ 7} Also on September 29, 2005, this Court noted that the judgment entry appealed from closes with the statement that the "case is continued for further proceedings in partition." This Court concluded that "it appears that the trial court has not yet entered final appealable orders as defined by R.C.
{¶ 8} Courts of Appeals in Ohio have subject matter jurisdiction only to the extent conferred by Article
{¶ 9} "(B) An order is a final order that may be reviewed, affirmed, modified, or reversed, with or without retrial, when it is one of the following:
{¶ 10} "(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;
{¶ 11} "(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after judgment;
{¶ 12} "(3) An order that vacates or sets aside a judgment or grants a new trial;
{¶ 13} "(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to which both of the following apply:
{¶ 14} "(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional remedy.
{¶ 15} "(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
{¶ 16} "(5) An order that determines that an action may or may not be maintained as a class action;
{¶ 17} "(6) An order determining the constitutionality of any changes to the Revised Code made by Am. Sub. S.B. 281 of the 124th general assembly, including the amendment of sections
{¶ 18} Turning to the statutory definition, on its face, the trial court's August 11, 2005 judgment entry does not implicate R.C.
{¶ 19} Nor does the trial court's August 11, 2005 judgment entry fall within R.C.
{¶ 20} "`Provisional remedy' means a proceeding ancillary to an action, including, but not limited to, a proceeding for a preliminary injunction, attachment, discovery of privileged matter, suppression of evidence, a prima-facie showing pursuant to section
{¶ 21} Here, the underlying action is simply a complaint for partition and appellant's motion was a motion to "quash" a judgment lien. It does not involve a proceeding for a preliminary injunction, attachment, discovery of privileged matter, or the suppression of evidence. It also does not involve a prima-facie showing of physical impairment for certain tort actions involving silica exposure, mixed dust exposure, and asbestos exposure (i.e., R.C.
{¶ 22} Turning to R.C.
{¶ 23} "`Substantial right' means a right that the United States Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, a statute, the common law, or a rule of procedure entitles a person to enforce or protect."
{¶ 24} "An order that affects a substantial right has been perceived to be one which, if not immediately appealable, would foreclose appropriate relief in the future. Bell v. Mt. SinaiMed. Ctr. (1993),
{¶ 25} In this case it does not appear that the trial court's August 11, 2005 decision affects a substantial right of appellant. It is well established in Ohio that "a lien is immediately created upon the lands of the judgment debtor when a certificate of judgment is filed with the clerk of courts." Std.Hardware Supply Co. v. Bolen (1996),
{¶ 26} "Furthermore, the procedures used to enforce a judgment are separate and distinct from the filing of a certificate of judgment. See, generally, Feinstein v. Rogers
(1981),
{¶ 27} Here, the trial court's reasoning for denying appellant's motion to quash is as equally illustrative of why the order itself is not a final appealable order. The trial court found that appellee's act of creating or filing a judgment lien, following his obtaining a final consent judgment from appellant in lower case No. 04CVH23995, did not amount to the initiation of a "foreclosure, execution, garnishment, or attachment" on that judgment. It is not apparent yet that appellee is trying to enforce his judgment, but rather is merely filing a certificate of that judgment to protect that interest.
{¶ 28} In sum, while appellee's act of filing the judgment lien with the trial court may involve a substantial right of appellant, it does not affect a substantial right of appellant.DeAscentis, supra. Therefore, the trial court's decision denying appellant's motion to "quash" the judgment lien held by appellee is not a final, appealable order. Consequently, we are without jurisdiction to review the merits of appellant's assignments of error.
{¶ 29} For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is dismissed due to the lack of a final, appealable order. This cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings according to law and consistent with this Court's opinion.
Vukovich, J., concurs.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.