107 Ga. 472 | Ga. | 1899
The deed made by Dr. Toole to his first wife and children, assuming that it was delivered, conveyed all the title and interest he had in the land, and was a good
“§2778. Deeds, mortgages, and liens of all kinds, which are now required by law to be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of each county within a specified time, shall, as against the interests of third parties acting in good faith and without notice, who may have acquired a transfer or lien binding the same property, take effect only from the time they are filed for record in the clerk’s office.
“ § 3530. Every voluntary deed or conveyance made by any person shall Be void as against subsequent bona fide purchaser for value, without notice of such voluntary conveyance.
“ § 3618. Every deed conveying lands shall be recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of the county where tjhe land lies. The record may be made at any time, but such deed loses its priority over a subsequent recorded deed from the same vendor, taken without notice of the existence of the first.”
It is contended by counsel for plaintiff in error, that these sections are broad enough to protect grantees under voluntary deeds, because two of them declare in substance that all deeds must be recorded. It will be observed, however, that in the latter part of section 3618, where it provides a penalty for failing to record the first deed, it is declared that “such deed loses
There was uncontradicted evidence by one witness that the first deed was actually delivered. This witness was not impeached, and no attempt was. made to impeach him. The grantor was introduced as a witness, and was allowed to testify, over objection, that when he gave this deed to his son he intended it as a delivery. Under the ruling in the case of Hale v. Robertson & Co., 100 Ga. 168, and the cases there cited, it would seem that this evidence was admissible. But whether it was or not, one witness, as before stated, had testified positively that the deed was delivered. Even if the evidence as to what the grantor said to his son was not admissible, we would not reverse the judgment on that point alone, especially as the question discussed in the first division of this opinion is, in view of the uncontradicted evidence above mentioned, controlling in this case. The grantor’s wife was introduced for the purpose of contradicting him as to his intention to deliver the deed, and it was proposed to prove by her certain conversations had between them as they were looking over his papers, when he said that the deed he made to his first wife and -children was not worth the paper it was written on, and that he had never delivered it. This evidence was clearly inadmissible, because it undertook to give a confidential conversation between hus
The deed offered in evidence and rejected by the trial judge was irrelevant. Its rejection was not error.
Judgment affirmed.