136 P. 965 | Utah | 1913
Upon tbe application of tbe plaintiff herein tbis court issued an alternative writ of mandate directed to tbe defendant, tbe Honorable Charles W. Morse, as judge of tbe district court of Tooele County, Utah, requiring him to show cause why a permanent writ should not issue compelling him to reinstate and bear a certain appeal which bad been dismissed by him in a case wherein tbe Eite Candy Company was plaintiff and tbe Tooele Meat & Storage Company, tbe plaintiff herein, was defendant. Tbe appeal aforesaid was taken from a judgment entered on tbe 8th day of February, 1912, in tbe justice’s court of Tooele City in favor of said plaintiff and against said defendant. Tbe appeal was taken pursuant to Comp. Laws 1907, section 3744, which, so far as material here, is as follows:
“Any person dissatisfied with a judgment in a justice’s court, whether tbe same was rendered on default or after trial, may appeal therefrom to tbe district court of tbe county at any time within thirty days after tbe rendition of any final judgment. Notice of tbe entry of tbe judgment must be given to the losing party by tbe successful party either personally or by publication, and tbe time of appeal shall date from tbe service of said notice.”
“Evans & Evans, Attys. Salt Lake City, Utah: In pursuance to the request of your Mr. P. 0. Evans at Wendover at a recent meeting we had there, I desire to say the case of Eite Candy Company, a corporation, which I represented as plaintiff against Tooele Meat & Storage Company, a corporation, in which you represented the defendant, before L. E. Framer, city justice of the peace of Tooele City, Tooele County, Utah, that judgment .was entered in said court in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant on the 8th day of February, 1912, for the sum of $110.93, and for $5.20 costs. That an abstract of judgment was issued from said court and filed in the district court on the 13th day of May, 1912. Since that date there has been accruing costs in the sum of six dollars. The judgment, with interest to date, would be $188.35 and costs due would make a total due of $193.55.”
In addition to the foregoing the letter also stated that the plaintiff would discount the amount of the judgment twenty per cent, if paid. On the 21st of September, 1912, the attorneys for the defendant, in a letter to the attorney aforesaid, acknowledged receipt of the foregoing letter and informed him that they would consider the subject-matter of his letter later and would advise him further in the matter. ■■ Without further communication between the parties the attorneys for the defendant, on the 28th day of Ocober, 1912, attempted to appeal from the judgment aforesaid by serving the statutory notice of appeal. The transcript was accordingly sent to the district court, where counsel for the plaintiff in said action moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that it was not taken within the time required by the statute aforesaid. The district court received the letters aforesaid in evidence and granted said motion and dismissed said appeal, whereupon this proceeding to reinstate the same was commenced, as before stated.
The law respecting notice is well stated, in 29 Oyc. 1117, in the following words:
“The general rule in respect to notices is that mere infor-malities do not vitiate them so long'as they do not mislead, and give the necessary information to the proper parties.”
The only two cases cited by plaintiffs attorneys, namely Deimel v. Obert, 20 Ill. App. 557, and Williams v. Brummel, 4 Ark. 129, are not in point. All that is decided in those cases is that, where a statute requires “notice in writing” to be served, the statute is not complied with by merely reading a notice to the party to be served without delivering a copy of the notice to him. In the case at bar counsel could have accepted service of any formal notice, and their acknowledgment of the receipt of the letter was in legal effect an acceptance of the notice if it was otherwise sufficient as such.
For the reasons heretofore stated the writ requiring the district court to reinstate the appeal should therefore be, and it accordingly is, denied, with costs.