TONYETTE O. v. FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of Social Security
Case No. 2:24-cv-00333-AJR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
May 21, 2025
HON. A. JOEL RICHLIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
Tonyette O. (“Plaintiff“) brings this action seeking to overturn the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner” or “Defendant“) denying her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB“). (Dkt. 12 at 5.) For the12 reasons stated below, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on March 22, 2019, alleging disability commencing in August 2008. (Dkt. 6-4 at 17; Dkt. 6-6 at 2-5.) Plaintiff‘s date last insured for benefits was December 31, 2013. (Dkt. 6-5 at 2.) The Commissioner denied the claims by initial determination on May 6, 2019, (Dkt. 6-4 at 9), and upon reconsideration on July 20, 2019. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiff filed a written request for a hearing in October of 2019. (Dkt. 6-5 at 19.) On October 5, 2022, Administrative Law Judge Robin Rosenbluth (the “ALJ“) conducted a hearing3 and subsequently published an unfavorable decision on December 21, 2022. (Dkt. 6-3 at 37-76; id. at 23-33.) Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ‘s decision by the Appeals Council on February 13, 2023. (Dkt. 6-5 at 100-02.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff‘s request for review on November 14, 2023. (Dkt. 6-3 at 2-4.) On that date, the ALJ‘s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. See
III. THE FIVE-STEP SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS
To qualify for disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that prevents the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity and that is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least twelve months. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing
To decide if a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step inquiry. See
- Is the claimant presently engaged in substantial gainful activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step two.
- Is the claimant‘s impairment severe? If not, the claimant is found not disabled. If so, proceed to step three.
- Does the claimant‘s impairment meet or equal one of the specific impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the claimant is found disabled. If not, proceed to step four.
- Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.
- Is the claimant able to do any other work? If not, the claimant is found disabled. If so, the claimant is found not disabled.
See Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2001);
The claimant has the burden of proof at steps one through four and the Commissioner has the burden of proof at step five. See Bustamante, 262 F.3d at 953-54. Additionally, the ALJ has an affirmative duty to assist the claimant in developing the record at every step of the inquiry. See id. at 954. If, at step four, the claimant meets their burden of establishing an inability to perform past work, the Commissioner must show that the claimant can perform some other work that exists in “significant numbers” in the national economy, taking into account the claimant‘s residual functional capacity (“RFC“), age, education, and work experience. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098, 1100; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 721;
IV. THE ALJ‘S DECISION
The ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation process and concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act through Plaintiff‘s date last insured. (Dkt. 6-3 at 23-33.) At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from her alleged onset date of August 1, 2008 through her date last insured of December 31, 2013. (Id. at 26.) At step two, the ALJ found that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and obesity. (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that, through the date last insured, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of any of the listings in the regulations. (Id.)
The ALJ assessed Plaintiff‘s RFC through the date last insured and concluded that she could perform “light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except [Plaintiff] can stand and/or walk 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; sit 6 hours in an 8 hour workday; never climb ladder/rope/scaffolds; only frequently perform other postural activity; and can never work around unprotected heights, dangerous machinery, or similar workplace hazards.” (Id. at 28 (bold omitted).) The ALJ found that Plaintiff‘s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work of as an office manager. (Id. at 33 (bold omitted).) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Act from August 1, 2008, the alleged onset date, through December 31, 2013, the date last insured. (Id. at 33.)
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720 (citing Jamerson v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1997)). It is “relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (citing Jamerson, 112 F.3d at 1066; Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1279). To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the court must “consider the record as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner‘s] conclusion.” Aukland, 257 F.3d at 1035 (citing Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993)). If the evidence can
VI. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises four issues for review: (1) whether the ALJ properly evaluated the medical opinion evidence; (2) whether the ALJ‘s decision was supported by substantial evidence in light of new and material evidence submitted to the Appeals Council; (3) whether the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff‘s subjective symptom testimony; and (4) whether the ALJ erred in formulating the RFC. (Dkt. 12 at 13.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner.
A. The Court Finds No Basis For Remand In The ALJ‘s Evaluation Of The Medical Opinion Evidence.
In her first ground for relief, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in the evaluation of the medical opinion evidence. (Dkt. 12 at 14.) Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions of chiropractors Spunt and Manfre using the standards applicable to medical opinion evidence. (Id. at 14-15.) Further, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in evaluating a 2019 letter from Plaintiff‘s rheumatologist Dr. Singh, and erred in evaluating the opinion of medical advisor Dr. Nickerson Geneve. (Id. at 17-18.)
1. Legal Standard.
“When determining whether a claimant is eligible for benefits, an ALJ need not take every medical opinion at face value.” Cross v. O‘Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, “the ALJ must scrutinize the various—often conflicting—medical opinions to determine how much weight to afford each opinion.” Id. For applications filed on or after March 27,
An ALJ cannot reject a medical source‘s opinion without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). Supportability means the extent to which a medical source supports the medical opinion by explaining the “relevant ... objective medical evidence.” Id. at 791-92 (citing
2. The ALJ Was Not Required To Evaluate The Opinions of Chiropractors Spunt And Manfre Under The Standard Applicable To Medical Opinion Evidence.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions of chiropractors Spunt and Manfre using the supportability and consistency standards in
Under the applicable regulations, only licensed physicians and certain other qualified specialists are considered acceptable medical sources. See
In March of this year, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion overruling the line of cases requiring “germane reasons” for rejecting this type of evidence. See Hudnall v. Dudek, 130 F.4th 668, 669 (9th Cir. 2025). That opinion was subsequently vacated and withdrawn. See Hudnall v. Dudek, 133 F.4th 968 (9th Cir. 2025). On May 13, 2025, the Ninth Circuit issued a new opinion explicitly declining to address the issue of whether the germane reasons standard has been overruled by the revised regulations. Hudnall v. Dudek, No. 23-3727, 2025 WL 1379101, at *2 (9th Cir. May 13, 2025) (“In light of those revised regulations, the Government argues, our court‘s precedent requiring that an ALJ give a ‘germane reason[]’ for rejecting lay testimony should be overruled ... We need not decide whether those regulations constitute ‘intervening higher authority’ that is ‘clearly irreconcilable’ with our precedent.“).
Regardless, the Court notes that even assuming the “germane reasons”
3. The ALJ Was Not Required To Evaluate Dr. Singh‘s Letter As A Medical Opinion.
Under a
“Ms. Ortiz has evidence of sacroiliitis noted initially on a CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis in 2015. This finding would be consistent with the diagnosis of ankylosing spondylitis, however the official diagnosis was not made until 2019 at the time she became my patient. The finding on the CT
scan in 2010 suggests that the diagnosis of ankylosing spondylitis goes back to 2010. Ankylosing spondylitis is an inflammatory arthritis of the spine which typically presents his chronic back pain before the age of 45. He [sic] can be associated with one or more articular and periarticular extraspinal features including synovitis, enthesitis, dactylitis. Multiple joints can be involved. Patients can also have uveitis, psoriasis or inflammatory bowel disease (ulcerative colitis or Crohn‘s disease).”
(Dkt. 6-8 at 361.)
The ALJ did not find Dr. Singh‘s “opinion” persuasive because: (1) Dr. Singh did not treat Plaintiff in 2010 or prior to the date last insured; (2) Dr. Singh did not have firsthand knowledge of Plaintiff‘s condition prior to December 31, 2013; and (3) Dr. Singh based this opinion entirely on one imaging scan, without sufficient, objective, or longitudinal treatment evidence. (Dkt. 6-3 at 31.)
Defendant is correct in arguing that this letter does not amount to a medical opinion under
4. The Court Finds No Error Regarding The ALJ‘s Treatment Of Dr. Geneve‘s Opinion.
In cases where the “medical evidence is not definite concerning the onset date and medical inferences need to be made, SSR 83–20 requires the administrative law judge to call upon the services of a medical advisor and to obtain all evidence which is available to make the determination.” Armstrong v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1998); DeClements v. Astrue, 365 F. App‘x 842, 843 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We cannot determine from this record the date DeClements became disabled . . . Under similar circumstances, we have interpreted Social Security Regulation 83–20 to require that the ALJ may not draw medical inferences alone but must call upon the services of a medical advisor to review the medical record and determine the correct onset date.“).
Here, the date of Plaintiff‘s ankylosing spondylitis was uncertain and therefore, the ALJ called medical advisor Dr. Nickerson Geneve as a witness to review Plaintiff‘s objective medical evidence. (See Dkt 6-3 at 43-56.) Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “failed to acknowledge the consistencies between Dr. Singh‘s opinion and the testimony of Dr. Geneve,” “failed to acknowledge that Dr. Geneve testified that he did not have any specific experience with rheumatology,” and failed to acknowledge that Dr. Geneve did not have the opportunity to review Dr. Singh‘s opinion letter. (Dkt. 12 at 17-18.)
The Court concludes that the ALJ sufficiently evaluated Dr. Geneve‘s opinion using the most important factors, supportability and consistency. See Cross, 89 F.4th at 1213. First, the ALJ found Dr. Geneve‘s opinion “supported by the minimal treatment record during the insured period, which established few clinical findings, normal motor strength, intact sensation, negative straight leg raises, and mild degenerative lumbar changes.” (Dkt. 6-3 at 32.) Further, the ALJ found Dr. Geneve‘s opinion consistent “with the absence of follow-up treatment or any consistent medical treatment for many years following the insured period,”
Plaintiff cites no caselaw to support the argument that the ALJ committed legal error by failing “to acknowledge that Dr. Geneve testified that he did not have any specific experience with rheumatology.” (Dkt. 12 at 18.) To the contrary, the Court notes that once an ALJ has addressed the supportability and consistency factors, the ALJ “may discuss other factors, such as the medical source‘s ‘relationship with the claimant’ or ‘specialization,’ but generally has no obligation to do so.” Cross, 89 F.4th at 1214 (citing
B. The New Evidence Submitted To The Appeals Council Does Not Render The ALJ‘s Decision Unsupported By Substantial Evidence.
In her second ground for relief, Plaintiff argues that new and material evidence, considered and rejected by the Appeals Council, renders the ALJ decision unsupported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. 12 at 19-20.) Specifically, Plaintiff
1. Legal Standard.
A party seeking a remand for consideration of additional evidence under
2. Dr. Singh‘s Retrospective Opinion.
After the ALJ‘s unfavorable decision, Plaintiff submitted a “retrospective” medical opinion from Dr. Singh to the Appeals Council. (Dkt. 6-3 at 16-19.) The Appeals Council considered this evidence and made it a part of the Administrative Record. (Id. at 2-5). However, the Appeals Council determined that the retrospective opinion would not change the outcome of the ALJ‘s decision. (Id. at 2-5). In his “retrospective” opinion, Dr. Singh opined that Plaintiff had ankylosing spondylitis, and that Plaintiff had a demonstrated history of back, hip, or neck pain consistent with ankylosing spondylitis as of December 31, 2013. (Id. at 17.) When asked if Plaintiff‘s early signs of ankylosing spondylitis were present prior to December 31, 2013, Dr. Singh checked the box stating “Yes,” but then wrote “unknown to me for sure because I didn‘t meet [Plaintiff] until 2019 . . . patient states yes.” (Id.) When asked if Plaintiff had ankylosing spondylitis bowel
When asked to indicate, based on her best medical opinion, “the beginning of [Plaintiff‘s] ankylosing spondylitis,” Dr. Singh wrote “2015 is when CT scan shows concrete evidence ... so prior to 2015.” (Id.) Further, Dr. Singh wrote “I see changes in 2015 – unclear how long prior it began.” (Id.) When asked whether, in her medical opinion, whether the pain of Plaintiff‘s ankylosing spondylitis would cause Plaintiff to miss work some days per month prior to December 31, 2023, Dr. Singh wrote “unknown to me.” (Id. at 18.) When asked how long, based on Plaintiff‘s history and medical records, did Plaintiff experience periods of intense pain prior to December 31, 2013, Dr. Singh wrote “unknown to me as I began seeing her in 2019.” (Id.) When asked how long, based on Plaintiff‘s history and medical records, would Plaintiff have needed to shift positions from sitting to standing and or walking prior to December 31, 2023, Dr. Singh stated “unknown to me.” (Id. at 19.) When asked to indicate, based on Plaintiff‘s history and review of Plaintiff‘s medical records, what Plaintiff‘s capacity to sit at one time, stand at one time, walk at one time, sit cumulatively in an 8-hour day, stand cumulatively in an 8-hour day, and walk cumulatively in an 8-hour day, Dr. Singh wrote that she “[could not] answer these questions.” (Id.) When asked when she believed Plaintiff‘s ankylosing spondylitis was present, Dr. Singh wrote “back pain reported to PCP Dr. Alam 12/30/2010.”
3. Analysis.
The Ninth Circuit has explained that medical evidence “submitted to the Appeals Council does not affect the ALJ‘s disability determination and does not
Accordingly, the Court concludes that remand is not warranted based on Dr. Sign‘s retrospective opinion because the new evidence post-dates the period under review, the evidence is distinctly non-retroactive in nature, and nothing in the new evidence would reasonably affect the ALJ‘s decision.
C. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff‘s Subjective Symptom Testimony.
In Plaintiff‘s third ground for relief, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ “failed to identify any specific inconsistencies between Plaintiff‘s testimony and the medical evidence.” (Dkt. 12 at 24.) Further, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide analysis to explain the rejection of Plaintiff‘s testimony. (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to identify the specific testimony which the ALJ found not credible or explain what evidence undermined that testimony. (Id.)
1. Legal Standard.
When assessing a claimant‘s credibility regarding subjective pain or intensity of symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. See Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). First, the ALJ must determine if there is medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms alleged. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1014. “In this analysis, the claimant is not required to show that her impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the
If the claimant satisfies this first step, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant‘s testimony about the symptom severity. See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678; see also Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (“[T]he ALJ may reject the claimant‘s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only if he makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so.“); Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[U]nless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on affirmative evidence thereof, he or she may only find an applicant not credible by making specific findings as to credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each.“).
In discrediting the claimant‘s subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ may consider the following:
- ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant‘s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid;
- unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and
- the claimant‘s daily activities.
Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Inconsistencies between a claimant‘s testimony and conduct, or internal contradictions in the claimant‘s testimony, also may be relevant. See Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2014); Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). In addition, the ALJ may consider the observations of treating and examining physicians regarding, among other matters, the functional
Further, the ALJ must make a credibility determination with findings that are “sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit claimant‘s testimony.” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039; see Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A finding that a claimant‘s testimony is not credible must be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant‘s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant‘s testimony regarding pain.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The ALJ must identify “what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant‘s complaints.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 493. Although an ALJ‘s interpretation of a claimant‘s testimony may not be the only reasonable one, if it is supported by substantial evidence, “it is not [the court‘s] role to second-guess it.” Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. Plaintiff‘s Subjective Symptom Testimony.
Plaintiff testified that prior to giving birth in December of 2013, she experienced back pain and struggled to complete daily activities. (Dkt. 6-3 at 59-60.) Plaintiff testified that she was unable to kneel to bathe her child or play with her child on the floor, and could not bend to put her child in a crib. (Id.) Plaintiff also testified that her pain prevented her from shopping, and that therefore she would give her older children money to make purchases while she waited in the car. (Id. at 60.) Plaintiff testified that she was able to drive locally. (Id. at 63.) Plaintiff was able to lift her child, but had trouble bending over. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that she was unable to sit all day due to orthopedic pain. (Id. at 63-63.) Plaintiff treated her pain with Epson salt baths, ice packs, and Ibuprofen. (Id. at 69.)
3. Analysis.
After considering the evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff‘s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the [Plaintiff‘s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in [the ALJ‘s] decision.” (Id. at 29.) Thus, because the ALJ determined that there was medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms Plaintiff alleged, and because the ALJ did not make a finding of malingering, the ALJ was required to provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting Plaintiff‘s subjective symptom testimony. See Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 678.
The ALJ considered Plaintiff‘s testimony regarding disabling pain, but discounted this testimony based on inconsistencies with the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff‘s inadequately explained failure to seek treatment, and Plaintiff‘s history of conservative treatment, when treatment was obtained. (Id. at 29-31.) Specifically, the ALJ cited objective medical evidence that undermined Plaintiff‘s allegations of disabling pain including an October 2009 x-ray revealing straightening of the normal cervical lordosis but otherwise unremarkable soft tissues of the neck, (id. at 29 (citing Dkt. 6-8 at 216)); an August 2010 abdominal and pelvic CT scan showing mild asymmetric soft tissue attenuation in the posterior aspect of the left ischiorectal fossa suggesting infectious or inflammatory process but otherwise unremarkable findings, (Dkt. 6-3 at 29-30 (citing Dkt. 6-8 at 5-6)); and an office note from chiropractor Robert Sprunt stating Plaintiff could return to work in November 2010, (Dkt. 6-3 at 30 (citing Dkt. 6-8 at 2)). The ALJ also cited records from Facey Medical Group in December 2010 which stated that Plaintiff experienced “on and off” back pain; that her neurological exam was within normal limits; that she had no spinal tenderness or paraspinal muscle spasms; that her
In addition to the inconsistencies between Plaintiff‘s subjective complaints of disabling pain and the objective medical evidence, the ALJ cited to Plaintiff‘s unexplained lack of treatment. (Dkt. 6-3 at 30.) In particular, the ALJ noted that “[t]here were no records of follow-up treatment in 2011, 2012, or 2013,” nor did Plaintiff supply records of “any supporting, objective clinical evidence through the date last insured.” (Id.) Further, the ALJ noted that when Plaintiff did seek treatment for her allegedly disabling pain, it was conservative treatment, including chiropractic care and Advil PM. (Id. (citing Dkt. 6-8 at 352 “Patient is not interested in any medications.“).) Finally, the ALJ noted that prior to December 31, 2013, Plaintiff testified that her daily activities included caring for a young child. (Id. at 31.)
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to provide analysis to explain [her] rejection of [Plaintiff‘s] testimony.” (Dkt. 12 at 24.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ “failed to identify the specific testimony which the ALJ found not credible or explain what evidence undermined the testimony.” (Id. at 24-25 (citing Treichler v. Comm‘r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014)).) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error because the ALJ‘s reasoning for rejecting Plaintiff‘s subjective symptom testimony must be “inferred.” (Dkt. 12 at 25.) The Court has reviewed the ALJ‘s reasoning for rejecting Plaintiff‘s subjective symptom complaints and finds no such error.
In evaluating subjective symptom testimony, the ALJ was permitted to consider inconsistencies between Plaintiff‘s testimony and the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff‘s unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek
D. The ALJ Did Not Err In Formulating The RFC.
In Plaintiff‘s fourth and final ground for relief, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in formulating the RFC because the ALJ‘s RFC assessment is inconsistent with the opinion of chiropractor Manfre. (Dkt. 12 at 25.) Further, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to account for Plaintiff‘s chronic pain “documented in Dr. Singh‘s records which Dr. Singh opined existed prior to 2013.” (Id. at 25-26 (citing Dkt. 6-8 at 334, 361).) As explained above, chiropractor Manfre‘s opinion is not a medical opinion and therefore the ALJ did not err in formulating an RFC which is purportedly inconsistent with chiropractor Manfre‘s non-medical opinion. The Court has examined the two pages of the record cited by Plaintiff in support of her argument that the ALJ erred by failing to account for Plaintiff‘s chronic pain as “documented in Dr. Singh‘s records which Dr. Singh opined existed prior to 2013.” (Id.)
One of the records cited by Plaintiff in support of this contention is Dr. Singh‘s “retrospective” opinion which the Court has already found speculative, and hardly shows that Plaintiff suffered from chronic pain prior to 2013. (See Dkt. 6-8 at 361.) The Court has reviewed the one other page cited by Plaintiff in support of this argument, which is a progress note from April 24, 2019. (Dkt. 6-8 at 334.) The
VII. ORDER
Consistent with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that Judgment be entered AFFIRMING the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties.
DATED: May 21, 2025
HON. A. JOEL RICHLIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE