TONAWANDA v. LYON
No. 214
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Argued February 26, 1901.—Decided April 29, 1901.
181 U.S. 389
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
THIS wаs the case of a bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York on September 9, 1899, by James B. Lyon, a citizen of the State of New York, against the town of Tonawanda, a municipal corporation of that State, and John K. Patton, supervisor of said town. The object of the bill was to restrain the defendants from enforcing payment of a certain assessment against traсts or parcels of land belonging to the complainant, situated in the town of Tonawanda, and abutting on Delaware street in said town. The assessment was levied against said tracts of land to meet thе expense of grading and paving said street, in pursuance of the provisions of statutes of the State of New York and of an order of the town board of Tonawanda. The principal matter complained of was that the method of meeting the expense of grading and paving the said street was by assessing the same against the lots abutting on the street according to frontage thereon, and that the statutes and proceedings thereunder, which provided for that method, were contrary to the provisions of the
The case came on for final hearing on bill, answer and a stipulation of facts, and on January 17, 1900, the Circuit Court decreed, among other things, as follows:
“That those parts of the acts of the legislature of the State of New York mentioned and set forth in plaintiff‘s bill of complaint, to wit, of chapter 550 of the laws of the State of New York for the year 1893, and of chapter 816 of the laws of the State of New York for the year 1895, which authorized and required the town board of said town to levy the assessment fоr the entire expense of paving said Delaware street, set forth in the bill of complaint, upon the complainant‘s said parcels of land described in said bill of complaint and the other lands fronting on said Delaware street, and the acts of the said defendant, the town of Tonawanda, by its town board, mentioned in said bill of complaint, in levying said assessments upon said lands according to the rule prescribed in said acts of said legislature, to wit, in the proportion which the number of front feet of each of said lots and parcels of land bounding and fronting on said Delaware street in front of which said improvement of paving said street was made, and which are assessed therefor in and by said assessment, bear and are to the aggregate number of feet of frontage of all the lots of land so bounding on the portion of said street in front of which said improvement was made, was and were, and each and every of said provisions of said acts of the legislature of the State of New York and all acts of said defendant, the town of Tonawanda, in levying said assessment in the manner and form aforesaid, are wholly unconstitutional and void, as being contrary to the provisions of the
And thereupon the town of Tonawanda and John K. Patton as supervisor of said town were forever enjoined and restrained “from in any manner collecting or enforcing payment of such assessments against said complainant or his land or property.” 98 Fed. Rep. 361.
On January 17, 1900, an appeal from said decree to this court was prayed for and allowed.
Mr. John Cunneen for Tonawanda.
MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The complainant in the court below did not put his claim for equitable relief upon any allegation that, in the proceedings to pave Delaware street and to assess the cоst of the improvement upon the abutting property, there had been any departure from the provisions of the statute, or that there had been attempted any discrimination against him or his proрerty. Nor was it denied that it is the settled law of the State of New York that the method prescribed, of meeting the expense by apportioning the entire cost of such an improvement upon the abutting land according to the foot-front rule, is a valid exercise of legislative power. The People v. Mayor &c., 4 N. Y. 419; Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585.
What was claimed was that a state statute, which directs municipalities to assess the whole expense оf paving any highway therein upon the lands abutting upon the highway so improved in proportion to the feet frontage of such lands, without providing for a judicial inquiry into the value of such lands and the benefits actually to accrue to them by the proposed improvement, is unconstitutional and void. And it was held by the court below that, notwithstanding the courts of the State may have held otherwise, it was its duty to follow the decision of this court in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, which was regarded by the court below as establishing the principle contended for, and accordingly the defendants were enjoined from enforcing payment of the assessment. But we think that, in so understanding and applying the decision in Norwood v. Baker, the learned judge extended the doctrine of that case beyond its necessary meaning.
It was not the intention of the court, in that сase, to hold that the general and special taxing systems of the States, however long existing and sustained as valid by their courts, have been subverted by the
The facts disclosed by the present record do not show any abuse of the law, nor that the burdens imposed on the property of the complainant were other than those imposed upon that of other persons in like circumstances; and it is obvious, from expressiоns in the opinion of the trial judge, that he reached his conclusion because constrained by what he understood to be the principle established by the Norwood case.
It is unnecessary to enter into an examination of the authorities on this subject, as that has recently been done in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 324, in error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, and in Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. S. 371, on appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbiа, in the former of which the effect of the Fourteenth, and, in the latter, that of the Fifth Amendment, was considered.
There were other questions passed upon in the trial court and discussed in the briefs, but the conclusion we now reach renders it unnecessary for us to consider them.
The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the bill of complaint.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, (with whom сoncurred MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA,) dissenting.
My views touching the general questions arising in this case have been expressed in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company and in Wight v. Davidson, just determined. I adhere to those views, and therefore dissent from the judgment in this case. As stated by the Circuit Court, thе special assessment in question was “in the proportion which the number of front feet
The court sаys that it was not the intention of this court in Norwood v. Baker, to hold “that the general and special taxing systems of the States, however long existing and sustained as valid by their courts, have been subverted by the
The court also says that the purpose of the