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Tonawanda v. LyonTonawanda v. Lyon

Supreme Court of the United States
Apr 29, 1901
214
Versions:181 U.S. 389
21 S. Ct. 609
45 L. Ed. 908
1901 U.S. LEXIS 1370

Lead Opinion

lyr-w. Justice Shieas,

after stating the ease, delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.

Tbe complainant in tbe court below did not put bis claim for equitable relief upon any allegation that, in tbe proceеdings to pave Delaware street and to assess tbe cost of tbe improvement upon tbe abutting property, there bаd been any departure from tbe provisions of tbe statute, or that there bad been attempted any discrimination against him or bis property. Nor was it denied that it is tbe settled law of tbe State of New York that the method prescribed, of meeting tbe exрense by apportioning tbe entire cost of such an improvement upon tbe abutting land according to tbe foot-front rulе, is a valid exercise of legislative power. The People v. Mayor &c., 4 N. Y. 419; Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585.

What was claimed was that’ a state statute, which directs municipalities to assess the whole expense of paving any highway therein upon tbe lands abutting upon the, highway so improved in proportion to the feet frontage of such lands, without providing for a judicial inquiry into tbe value of such lands and tbe benefits actually to accrue to them by the proposed improvement, is unconstitutional and void. And it was held by tbe court below that, notwithstanding the courts of tbe State may have held otherwise, it was its duty tp follow’ the decision of this court in the case of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, which was regarded by tbe court below as establishing the principle contended for, and accordingly the defendants were enjoined from enforcing pаyment of tbe assessment. But we think that, in so understanding and applying tbe decision in Norwood v. Baker, tbe learned judge extended tbe doctrine of ‍​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‍that case beyond its necessary meaning.

It was not the intention of tbe court, in that case, to bold that tbe general and special taxing systems of tbe States, however long existing and sustained as valid by their courts, have been subverted by tbe Fourteenth Amendment of tbe Constitution of tbe United States. Tbe purpose of that amendment is to extend to tbe citizens and residents of tbe States tbe same *392protection' against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty and property, as is afforded by the Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by Congress. The case of Norwood v. Baker presented, as the judge in the court in the present case well' said, “ considerations of peculiar and extraordinary hardships,” amounting, in the opinion of a majority of ihe judges of this court, to actual confiscation of private property to public use, and bringing the case fairly within the reach- of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The facts disclosed by the present record do not show any abuse of the law, nor that the burdens imposed on the property оf the complainant were other than those imposed upon that of other persons in like ‍​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‍circumstances; and it is obviоus, from expressions in the opinio# of the trial judge, that he reached his conclusion because constrained by what he understood to be the principle established by the Norwood case.

It is unnecessary to enter into an examination of the authorities on this subjeсt, as that has recently been done in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., in error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, and-in Wight v. Davidson, on appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, in the former of which the effect of the Fourteenth, and, in the latter, that of the Fifth Amendment, was considered. 181 U. S. 324, 371.

'There were other questions passed upon in the trial court and discussed in the briefs, ‍​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‍but the conclusion we now reach renders it unnecessary for us to consider them.

The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed and the cаuse is remanded to that court with directions to dismiss the hill of complaint.






Dissenting Opinion

Mr. Justice- Harlan,

(with whom concurred Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice MoKeNNa,) dissenting.

My views touching the general questions arising in this case have been expressed in French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company and in Wight v. Davidson, just determined. I adhere to those views, and therefоre dissent from the judgment in this case. As stated by the ‍​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‍Circuit Court, the special assessment in question was “ in the proportion which the number of front feet *393of each of said lots and parcels of land bounding and fronting on said Delaware street in front of which said improvement of paving said street was made, and which are assessed therefor in and by said assessment, bear and are to the аggregate number of feet of frontage of all the lots so bounding on the portion of said street in front of which said improvement was made.” The case, therefore, is one in which, beyond question, private property is specially assessed by the frоnt foot, in the interest of the whole public, for the entire cost of paving a highway, without reference to any special benefits accruing to it, and without the owner of the property being permitted to show that such cost amounts to the confisсation of his property to the extent that it substantially exceeds special benefits, or that it exceeds the value оf the property assessed.

The court says that it was not the intention of this court in Norwood v. Baker, to hold “ that the general and special taxing systems of the States, however long existing and sustained as valid by their courts, have been subverted by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.” The contrary was not asserted by the leariied judge of the Circuit Court, nor has any one in this case сontended that the Fourteenth Amendment subverted the taxing systems of the States. But it was contended, and such is my position, that nothing can be done by or under the authority of a State in violation of that Amendment. After that Amendment became part of the Constitution, the оnly provisions in the state taxing laws or systems that ceased to have operation were those that were inconsistent with the Amendment. No one, I assume, will dispute that proposition.

The court also says that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment “ is to extend to the citizens and residents of the States the same protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty and property, as is afforded by the Fifth Amendment against similar legislation by Congress.” I assent ‍​‌‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌‍most cordially to this view, and therefоre, in another case, felt obliged to express my objection to the intimation that possibly that might be done by Congress under the duе process clause of the Fifth Amendment which could not be done by a State under the same clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Case Details

Case Name: Tonawanda v. Lyon
Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States
Date Published: Apr 29, 1901
Citations: 181 U.S. 389; 21 S. Ct. 609; 45 L. Ed. 908; 1901 U.S. LEXIS 1370; 214
Docket Number: 214
Court Abbreviation: U.S.
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