309 Mass. 496 | Mass. | 1941
This is a bill in equity in which the plaintiff alleges, in substance, that the defendants, some of whom are officers and members of a labor union and the others truck operators, conspired to interfere with his business and contractual relations with a company for which he and the other truck operators transported goods. The evidence is not reported and the trial judge made a report of material facts, evidently in accordance with G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, § 23. A decree dismissing the bill was entered, and, in the circumstances, must be affirmed if the conclusions of fact of the trial judge are consistent with the specific facts found by him, and these conclusions, in connection with the specific facts found, support the decree. Goldston v. Randolph, 293 Mass. 253, 255, and cases cited. See Birnbaum v. Pamoukis, 301 Mass. 559, 562.
The judge found that in 1935 the plaintiff became a truck operator for the company in question "under a contract,” and that the other truck operators, who are defendants, also had contracts with the company. Prior to 1938, the transportation business of the company was rotated at night, and the goods were offered to operators in the order of their calling for them during the daytime. Prior to May, 1938, the plaintiff was getting a large part of the company’s business and had increased the number of trucks that he was operating. Included in his business was the "regular Cape run, so called, to Provincetown.” His earnings were substantial. The other operators were notified
We are of opinion that the conclusions of fact of the
It appears that the employees of the plaintiff, as well as those of the other truck operators, were members of the union, and that the contract that was entered into as a result of the strike provided that the work should be confined to the operators who were then working for the company, and that they should be those “employing” members of the union. The conclusion of the trial judge was that the object of the contract was justifiable and legal. This conclusion, however, is not controlling in face of the specific
The trial judge also found that the calling of the strike was not in consequence of ill will or malice toward the plaintiff, nor with the specific intention of injuring him, although the defendants who called the strike “realized that as a result of the contract substantial injury would be done to” the plaintiff. Where, as here, the defendants, without justification, intentionally and harmfully interfered with the plaintiff’s business, that is proof of malice within the meaning of that word as it is used in cases where it has been said that a defendant is not liable unless he acts maliciously. McGurk v. Cronenwett, 199 Mass. 457, 461-462. Martineau v. Foley, 231 Mass. 220, 223, and cases cited. Godin v. Niebuhr, 236 Mass. 350, 351. Sullivan v. Barrows, 303 Mass. 197, 203. Mogul Steamship Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow, & Co. 23 Q. B. D. 598, 611-620. The case at bar is distinguishable from Robitaille v. Morse, 283 Mass. 27, 31, 32, and cases cited.
The trial judge found that “the operators were not parties to any conspiracy or joint.action, except as” set out in his findings, the material parts of which have already been referred to. We think it follows that the operators are bound by the acts of the other defendants made in pursuance of the common object. Commonwealth v. Coshnear, 289 Mass. 516, 526, and cases cited. Commonwealth v. Benesch, 290 Mass. 125, 132-133.
The objection that the company has not been made a party does not prevent affirmative relief being given to the plaintiff. No attempt is made to have the contract between the union and the company declared invalid. See Goyette v. C. V. Watson Co. 245 Mass. 577, 596. No rights of the company are invaded if the defendants are enjoined-from interfering with the contract that the plaintiff has with it, and if they are required to respond in such damages as the plaintiff may be able to show that he has sustained
It follows that the decree is reversed, that the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with his contract with the company, that the case is remanded to the Superior Court for the purpose of assessing such damages as the plaintiff may show he has sustained, and that the plaintiff is to have his costs.
Ordered accordingly.