Tompkins v. StateTompkins v. State
Wayne Tompkins, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order of the circuit court dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his February 5, 2003, successive motion for postconviction relief filed under
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1985, Tompkins was convicted of the first-degree murder of Lisa DeCarr and was sentеnced to death on the recommendation of a unanimous jury. The facts of this case are fully set fоrth in this Court‘s opinion on Tompkins’ direct appeal, in which we affirmed Tompkins’ conviction and death sеntence. See Tompkins v. State, 502 So.2d 415, 421 (Fla.1986) (Tompkins I). This Court subsequently affirmed the denial of Tompkins’ initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his state habeas petition. See Tompkins v. Dugger, 549 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Fla.1989) (Tompkins II). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dеnial of federal habeas corpus relief. See Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir.1999) (Tompkins III).
On March 22, 2001, Governor Bush signed Tompkins’ third death warrant, which resulted in Tompkins filing a second postconviction motion in state court. In this motion Tompkins asserted, among оther claims, that the State failed to disclose favorable evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), that demоnstrated that three witnesses’ testimony and the State‘s closing arguments were false in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Tompkins also filed a motion for DNA testing.1 The trial court denied relief on both of these issues and this Court affirmed. See Tompkins v. State, 872 So.2d 230 (Fla.2003) (Tompkins IV). This Court‘s decision in Tompkins IV became final on June 25, 2004.
In August 2002, while his latest appeal to this Court was pеnding, Tompkins filed a motion to relinquish jurisdiction to allow
ANALYSIS
Both Tompkins and the State agree thаt the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider Tompkins’ motions while the appeal of the denial of his previous motions, which raised similar claims, was pending in this Court. Cf. Daniels v. State, 712 So.2d 765, 765 (Fla.1998) (reiterating that “during the pendency of а defendant‘s direct appeal, the trial court is without jurisdiction to rule on a motion for postcоnviction relief“); State v. Meneses, 392 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla.1981) (holding that “while appeal proceedings or certiorari proceedings аre pending in an appellate court, the trial court is without jurisdiction to entertain a motion to vаcate“). However, Tompkins argues that the circuit court erred when it entered an order of dismissal. Tоmpkins asserts that because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the 3.850 and 3.853 motions, it lacked the jurisdiсtion to enter an order of dismissal. We conclude that Tompkins’ argument is without merit. Dismissal is an appropriate remedy when a court lacks jurisdiction. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Kenyon, 882 So.2d 986, 988 (Fla.2004) (“We dismiss the petition because this Court lacks jurisdiction to rеview the district court of appeal‘s order.“); Gandy v. State, 846 So.2d 1141, 1142 (Fla.2003) (“We consolidate these cases for purpоses of this opinion and, for the reasons expressed below, dismiss these cases for lack of jurisdictiоn.“); Grate v. State, 750 So.2d 625 (Fla.1999) (dismissing “Grate‘s mandamus petition for lack of jurisdiction“). The trial court did not act outside its jurisdiction in dismissing Tompkins’ motiоns.
We recognize that due to this Court‘s denial of Tompkins’ motion to relinquish, a procedural dilemma now аrises because Tompkins is time-barred from filing a new postconviction motion raising his newly discovered evidence claims. See Glock v. Moore, 776 So.2d 243, 251 (Fla.2001) (“[A]ny claim of newly discovered evidence in a death penalty case must be brоught within one year of the date such evidence was discovered or could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.“).3 Accordingly, although we affirm the trial court‘s order, we cоnclude that Tompkins should be permitted 60 days to refile his successive postconviction motion nunc рro tunc to February 5, 2003, the date his prior motion was filed in the trial court. To avoid this procedural dilemmа in the future, we conclude that if an appeal is pending in a death penalty case and this Court dеnies a motion to relinquish jurisdiction for the trial court to
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., recused.