Tompkins v. Dallas Cotton Mill, 41 S.E. 938

Tompkins v. Dallas Cotton Mill

41 S.E. 938 | N.C. | 1902

Lead Opinion

Cook, J.,

after stating tbe case. It certainly appearing that the witness’ estimate was based upon the profits growing out of circumstances then existing, we think his Honor erred in not sti’iking out his entire answer, as moved for by the plaintiff’s counsel. And there being no evidence that witness based his estimate or calculation upon any data other than those of profits, his statement, or estimate, should not have been submitted to the jury for consideration. The witness estimated the monthly rental value of the machinery to be $1,500, being the profits derivable from a rising market both as to the raw material purchased and the manufactured goods sold. But if the price of the manufactured goods had gone down with the rise in the raw material remaining, the result would necessarily have been different. So, it is clear to us that his estimate was based upon speculation and uncertain profits, depending upon a variety of contingencies, the failure of any one of which would subvert his whole calculation, and. which are too remote and indeterminate to enter into and become the measure of damages. Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers. 19 Ga., 416. While it appears from his estimate that the market went in favor of defendant, and that it would have made a handsome profit if it had obtained its machinery, and gotten the same in good working oader, and had had a sufficient number of competent employees and laborers and an ample supply of material, and met with no reverses, yet if the market had gone contra, and reverses had befallen it, then, instead of having a profit, it might have incurred a loss, ir, which event the default of plaintiff would have been a benefit rather than an injury. Nevertheless, as the injury can not be estimated by the standard of profits, the law will not allow it to go unredressed. The measure of damage is a fair *352rental value of tbe mill for tbe loss of time caused by plaintiff’s wrong' — tbat is, tbe portion of tbe mill tbis machinery would bave equipped. If tbis can not be otherwise accurately determined by certain and determinate data, which were "contemplated by tbe parties and entering into their contract, then tbe law will allow tbe legal rate of interest upon tbe capital invested, to be tbe measure (Rocky Mount Mills v. Railroad, 119 N. C., 693, 56 Am. St. Rep., 682), not because it is an accurate criterion, but’ for tbe reason tbat it is approximately just. Tbe party injured by reason of a breach of contract should be, so far as money can do it, placed in tbe same sitution with respect to' damages, as if tbe contract bad been performed. Robeson v. Harman, 1 Ex. Ch., 855-6. In tbe case at bar, there is no certainty as to' what would bave been defendant’s situation if plaintiff bad performed its contract; but it is shown tbat it bad capital invested in its plant and other machinery which was kept idle during tbe time plaintiff was delaying tbe fulfillment of its contract, upon the value of which it is entitled to recover tbe legal rate of interest ; and it may bave incurred losses and expenses which were incidental to such delay, such as insurance, idle labor, deterioration in its machinery, .etc., which could be considered if properly put in issue. Tbe charge and rulings of bis Honor, with respect to which other exceptions are taken, are sustained.

For tbe error above pointed out, a new tidal is awarded.

New Trial.

Concurrence Opinion

*353Furches, C. J.,

concurring.

I agree in the conclusion that there should be a new trial. As I remember the facts in the case, the defendant owned a cotton mill, which he was operating, and had been operating for some time. But thinking it would be profitable to do so, he concluded to enlarge his mill, and for that purpose built an addition to his mill-house, in which to place new machinery. He also made a contract with the plaintiff to furnish the new machinery necessary for this addition to his mill. The machinery was to be furnished at a specified price, to be delivered by a specified time, and to be paid for when delivered. The plaintiff furnished the machinery, but did not deliver it at the time specified in the contract, nor for some months afterwards. The defendant failing to pay for the machinery after it had been delivered by the plaintiff, this action was brought for the agreed price of the machinery bought by the defendant and delivered to him by the plaintiff. The defendant answered and admitted the contract and the receipt of the machinery, but alleged that it was not delivered at the time it was to have been delivered, whereby and by reason of which he sustained great loss and damage, which defendant set up by way of counter-claim and recoupment.

On the trial, the defendant undertook to prove speculative damages, and was allowed to introduce evidence to that effect, over tile objection of the plaintiff. This was error. The evidence of Wilson, as reported in the case, should not have been allowed, aiid the opinion of the Court so states.

But I do not understand that the old mill, as I will call it to distinguish it from the neAv mill or addition, was stopped on account of not receiving the new machinery. So I think the opinion of the Court erroneously allows the defendant damages for that. The defendant had no money invested in the machinery sued for, as he was to pay for it when delivered, and has never paid for it yet. He is, therefore, it seems *354to me, not entitled to any damages on that account, unless he is entitled to speculative damages'upon an estimate of what he could have made if the machinery had been delivered on time, as he claims he is.

Not being entitled to speculative damages, nor to damages for money invested in the machinery, as he had none invested, the only damages I can see that he is entitled to is the interest on the money invested in putting up the addition to his mill, preparatory to putting in the new machinery; for the reason that such a structure, without any machinery in it, could not be rented for any price.

The opinion of the Court allows the defendant to recover for "insurance, idle labor, deterioration, in machinery,” which he had not received nor paid for. This Court expressly held in Alpha Mills v. Steam Engine Co., 116 N. C., 797, that the plaintiff in that case could not recover for insurance.

MoNtgomeet, J.; concurs in the concurring opinion.

Lead Opinion

It certainly appearing that the witness's estimate was based upon the profits growing out of circumstances then existing, we think his Honor erred in not striking out his entire answer, as moved for by the plaintiff's counsel. And there being no evidence that witness based his estimate or calculation upon any data other than those of profits, his statement, or estimate, should not have been submitted to the jury for consideration. The witness estimated the monthly rental value of the machinery to be $1,500, being the profits derivable from a rising market both as to the raw material purchased and the manufactured goods sold. But if the price of the manufactured goods had gone down with the rise in the raw material remaining, the result would necessarily have been different. So, it is clear to us that his estimate was based upon speculation and uncertain profits, depending upon a variety of contingencies, the failure of any *242 one of which would subvert his whole calculation, and which are too remote and indeterminate to enter into and become the measure of damages. Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers, 19 Ga. 416. While it appears from his estimate that the market went in favor of defendant, and that it would have made a handsome profit if it had obtained its machinery, and gotten the same in good working order, and had had a sufficient number of competent employees and laborers and an ample supply of material, and met with no reverses, yet if the market had gone contra, and reverses had befallen it, then instead of having a profit, it might have incurred a loss, in which event the default of plaintiff would have been a benefit rather than an injury. Nevertheless, as the injury can not be estimated by the standard of profits, the law will not allow it to go unredressed. The measure of damages is a fair rental value (352) of the mill for the loss of time caused by plaintiff's wrong — that is, the portion of the mill this machinery would have equipped. If this can not be otherwise accurately determined by certain and determinate data, which were contemplated by the parties and entering into their contract, then the law will allow the legal rate of interest upon the capital invested to be the measure (Rocky Mount Mills v. R. R.,119 N.C. 693, 56 Am. St., 682), not because it is an accurate criterion, but for the reason that it is approximately just. The party injured by reason of a breach of contract should be, so far as money can do it, placed in the same situation with respect to damages, as if the contract had been performed. Robeson v. Harman, 1 Ex. Ch., 855-6. In the case at bar there is no certainty as to what would have been defendant's situation if plaintiff had performed its contract; but it is shown that it had capital invested in its plant and other machinery which was kept idle during the time plaintiff was delaying the fulfillment of its contract, upon the value of which it is entitled to recover the legal rate of interest; and it may have incurred losses and expenses which were incidental to such delay, such as insurance, idle labor, deterioration in its machinery, etc., which could be considered if properly put in issue. The charge and rulings of his Honor, with respect to which other exceptions are taken, are sustained.

For the error above pointed out, a new trial is awarded.

New trial.