160 Iowa 472 | Iowa | 1913
I. The sole issue in the case was whether or not Collier, the insured, committed suicide; for death from a pistol shot was either expressly admitted or conclusively shown.
The case was submitted to the jury for it to determine whether or not the death was suicidal; the burden being properly placed upon the defendant. Stephenson v. Association, 108 Iowa, 637; Metzradt v. Brotherhood, 112 Iowa, 522; Tackman v. Brotherhood, 132 Iowa, 64; Van Norman v. Brotherhood, 134 Iowa, 575; Mittelstadt v. Modern Woodmen, 143 Iowa, 186; Connell v. Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 139 Iowa, 444. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, evidently concluding that defendant had not met the burden cast upon it.
For a reversal of the judgment, appellant relies upon four or five propositions; the main one being that the verdict is without sufficient support in the testimony, or, rather, that defendant had conclusively shown that the wound which caused the death was self-inflicted.
He was of a jovial disposition, his family relations were pleasant, and he had no financial difficulties — indeed at this time he had money in the bank, although during this last trip he ran short of funds and wanted Higgins to cash a check for him. This Higgins refused to do, saying that he (Higgins) had enough money to get them both home. He had never been out of work, was in good health, and no possible motive is suggested for committing suicide. He had never, so far as known, owned or carried a revolver prior to the day of the accident, and, so far as shown, had no familiarity therewith. He was intending to go home with Higgins on the day he was shot.
There is no testimony that either of the men was intoxicated, and no motive is shown for Higgins shooting him. Higgins was taken in charge by the police, who searched him, finding $1.60 upon his person, but no weapon of any kind and there was no testimony that either the body or clothing of Collier had, in any manner, been disturbed after he was shot. The tree under which the men lay down was unobstructed and there were no buildings or other screens nearby.
There was also some testimony to the effect that Collier said he had a gun a day or two before he started for Des Moines, and perhaps the day he started; but no one saw any gun about his person until after he was fatally wounded, when it was found as before indicated. Over defendant’s objections, plaintiff was permitted to show that Collier was married on May 10, 1911, and that he told his wife and a Mr. Wilson that he intended to change the beneficiary named in his policy from his sister, the plaintiff herein, to his then wife. This wife testified that there had never been any trouble between herself and husband, but the record discloses that she had a child by him, which must have been conceived before the marriage. ■
The verdict of the coroner’s jury was received in evidence, the only objection thereto being: “The defendant objects to the introduction of the record without the introduction of all the proceedings and the evidence taken in connection with the inquest held at that time.”
From this record, it is apparent that Collier might possibly have met his death in one of three ways: (1) Through suicide, (2) by an accidental discharge of the pistol while in his own hand or in the hand of Higgins, and (3) feloniously by the hand of Higgins. If by either of the two latter methods, the defendant is liable; if by the first, the defendant is not liable.
Appellants say that the physical facts — as the course of the bullet, the powder marks and burns upon the head, the powder marks upon the finger, and some other circumstances — clearly show that the wound was inflicted by Collier with suicidal intent. In the first place, it should be said that there is a dispute regarding the powder marks and burns upon the head, and, again, it cannot be assumed either as a matter of law or of fact that one who commits suicide' holds a revolver in any particular way. Especially is this true where, as in this case, no one can tell whether Collier was standing, lying, or reclining upon the ground when the weapon was discharged.
Counsel for appellant contend that from the testimony as to powder marks and burns, it must be inferred the revolver was held from two to sis inches away from the head and- that the course of the bullet was such as that it could not, in all human probability, have resulted from an accident. Eegarding the first proposition, the fact, that the pistol must have been held some distance away from the head in order to produce the results which were discovered is more significant of accident than of suicide; for, if we have not been misled in our reading, the suicide generally places the weapon against the head or body when he fires, instead of holding it some distance away from the person. Moreover, the line followed by the bullet is very unsatisfactory testimony, for it is subject to deflection by very slight obstacles, and the size of the bullet and quality and quantity of the powder must also be taken into account. State v. Morphy, 33 Iowa, 270; State v. Porter, 34 Iowa, 131; People v. Westlake, 62 Cal. 303; Saunders v. State, 37 Tex. 710. Most of the books say that in cases of suicide, the weapon will be found firmly grasped in the' hands of the deceased. Again, the course of
To our minds, the verdict has sufficient support in the testimony based upon the theory of accidental death.
5. Same : instruction. 8. The verdict of the coroner’s jury as to the inquest held upon the body of Ralph V. Collier at the time of his death, has been offered in evidence upon the trial of this cause. This evidence is competent and should be considered by you as bearing upon the question of whether the death of Ralph V. Collier was by accidental or suicidal means. This verdict, standing alone, would be prima facie evidence that his death was caused by suicidal means, but such verdict is not conclusive; and the actual manner in which he did meet his death may be inquired into by you, and determined by a preponderance of the evidence before you, bearing in mind also the presumption of his death being accidental, together with all the other facts and circumstances surrounding the manner of his death by all the evidence introduced upon the trial of this cause.
This was as favorable to defendant as it was entitled to under any view of the record. If it be said that the prima facie showing, made out by the coroner’s verdict, overcame the presumption that the death was accidental, the case still stood upon the testimony pro and con with the burden, at all times, upon the defendant to prove that the wound was suicidal in character. That burden never shifted although, perhaps, the presumption arising from time to time required either side to proceed to meet these presumptions, as they obtained, first on one side and then upon the other.
Y. The trial court also gave the following instruction:
6. Same. 9. As bearing upon the question as to what was the cause, of the death of Ralph V. Collier, that is, as to whether the same' was suicidal or not, it would not be „ , , ■ ,. , proper for you to base your verdict upon mere conjecture or speculation, nor should you tase your verdict upon mere possibility, but it is proper for you to consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding his death; his dispo*482 sition, his financial condition,, his domestic relations, the character and location of the wound upon his body, the location of his body at the time he was found, soon after the receiving of the said injury, and from all these facts and circumstances, and all other facts and circumstances developed by the evidence in the case, and from the necessary and reasonable inferences which you, as reasonable men, draw from the facts and circumstances developed by the evidence in this ease, you should determine whether the'said Ralph V. Collier’s death was or was not caused by suicidal means.
Our conclusion with reference to the complaint made of this instruction has already been forecasted. There was no error therein of which defendant may justly complain, unless, as defendant contends, there was no question to submit to a jury. That proposition we have already disposed of adversely to his contention.
As the burden was upon the defendant and did not shift during the entire trial, and as' a prima facie case may or may not overcome a presumption in favor of the other party, we think there was no error of which defendant may justly complain. Cases holding the verdict of a coroner’s jury admissible in a civil ease to prove the manner of death, are quite numerous. See 1 Greenleaf on Ev. (15th Ed.) section 556; Pyle v. Pyle, 158 Ill. 289 (41 N. E. 999); Grand Lodge v. Wieting, 168 Ill. 408 (48 N. E. 59, 61 Am. St. Rep. 123);
No prejudicial error is shown, and the judgment must be and it is Affirmed.