47 So. 88 | Ala. | 1908
This court, in. a very full discussion of the doctrine of specific performance of contracts, speaking through Brickell, O. J., in the case of Irwin v. Bailey, 72 Ala. 467, says: “The principles upon which a court of equity exercises its peculiar jurisdiction to enforce the specific performance of contract are well known, and have been of frequent consideration and application in the past decisions of this court. The court, will not intervene, unless the contract is fair, just, reasonable, and equal in all its terms and parts, is is founded upon an adequate consideration, and its specific execution is free from hardship and oppressoin. If, on either of these points, there be a well-founded objection, the court abstains from interference, leaving the party complaining of a violation of the contract to the remedies afforded him in courts of law. In the exercise of the jurisdiction, the court is invested with a discretion — not arbitrary or capricious, but a sound, judicial discretion, molding and tempering its action, or the refusal to act, in view of the circumstances of the particular case, and from them determining whether the conscience of the party charged with a violation of the contract is so affected that moral and equitable duty compel him to a strict performance, rather than to a payment of such damages as a court of law would award against him. A primary duty of the court is to examine the contract, not merely as a court of law would examine it, to ascertain what the parties have in terms expressed, but what in truth Avas the real intention of the parties, and to carry that intention into effect, or leave the parties to their legal remedies. — Hipwell v. Knight, 1 Y. & C. Exch. 411. There is no class of cases, to Avhich the jurisdiction of a court of equity extends, that the maxim ‘he who seeks equity must do equity’ is more rigidly applied. Hence it results that the contract or agreement
Applying the rule to the case at bar, the question arises, could a court of equity have required a specific performance on the part of Flower & Hagerman of the contract as entered into Avith Cochrane, the predecessor of this respondent? We think not. The contract required of them the continuous operation of the mill, so long- as they OAvned it (not exceeding, of course, the period of the contract), the granting of such a right of Avay as Avas required by the uoav company for the extension of its main line, the furnishing of roadbed and right of way and the laying of the ties ready for rails upon spurs to be built to and through lands whereon timber has been cut. “Contracts AAdiich by their terms stipulate for a succession of acts, AAdiose performance cannot he consummated by one transaction, hut aaúII he continuous,
Moreover, while the original contract did not require the operation of the mill by the successors of Flower & Hagerman, yet this complainant was required, under
Reversed and rendered.