EDWARD C. TOLMAN et al., Petitioners, v. ROBERT M. UNDERHILL, as Secretary and Treasurer of the Regents of the University of California et al., Respondents
Sac. No. 6211
In Bank
Oct. 17, 1952
39 Cal. 2d 708
Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Eugene M. Prince and Francis R. Kirkham for Respondents.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, and Gerald G. Kelly, Assistant County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
On April 21, 1950, the regents passed a resolution which provided that, effective with the academic year beginning July 1st, “conditions precedent to employment or renewal of employment of American citizens in the University shall be (1) execution of the constitutional oath of office required of public officials of the State of California and (2) acceptance of appointment by a letter which shall include the following provision:
“‘Having taken the constitutional oath of office required of public officials of the State of California, I hereby formally acknowledge my acceptance of the position and salary named, and also state that I am not a member of the Communist Party or any other organization which advocates the overthrow of the Government by force or violence, and that I have no com-
mitments in conflict with my responsibilities with respect to impartial scholarship and free pursuit of truth. I understand that the foregoing statement is a condition of my employment and a consideration of payment of my salary.’ ”
Petitioners have taken an oath identical to that prescribed in
We need not discuss the numerous questions raised by petitioners with regard to alleged violation of their civil rights and impairment of contract because we are satisfied that their application for relief must be granted on the ground that state legislation has fully occupied the field and that university personnel cannot properly be required to execute any other oath or declaration relating to loyalty than that prescribed for all state employees.
The historical background of the established practice of limiting the number and types of oaths and tests which may be required as a qualification for public employment has been discussed in our opinion in Pockman v. Leonard, ante, p. 676 [249 P.2d 267]. In California our Constitution has always provided that members of the Legislature and all executive and judicial officers, except such inferior officers as may be exempted by law, shall take the oath now set out in
Respondents contend that state legislation like
It is well settled, however, that laws passed by the Legislature under its general police power will prevail over regulations made by the regents with regard to matters which are not exclusively university affairs. (See Wallace v. Regents of University of California, 75 Cal.App. 274, 278 [242 P. 892]; Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal.App. 619, 624-625 [138 P. 937].) There can be no question that the loyalty of teachers at the university is not merely a matter involving the internal affairs of that institution but is a subject of general statewide concern. Constitutional limitations upon the Legislature‘s powers are to be strictly construed, and any doubt as to its paramount authority to require University of California employees to take an oath of loyalty to the state and federal Constitutions will be resolved in favor of its action. (Cf. Collins v. Riley, 24 Cal.2d 912, 915-916 [152 P.2d 169].)
Although the adoption of local rules supplementary to state law is proper under some circumstances, it is well settled that local regulation is invalid if it attempts to impose additional requirements in a field which is fully occupied by statute. (Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal.2d 366, 370-371 [125 P.2d 482, 147 A.L.R. 515]; Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, 29 Cal. 2d 661, 666 [177 P.2d 558, 170 A.L.R. 225].) Determination of the question whether the Legislature has undertaken to occupy exclusively a given field of legislation depends upon an analysis of the statute and a consideration of the facts and circumstances upon which it was intended to operate. (Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 666; Pipoly v. Benson, supra, 20 Cal.2d at pp. 372-375; In re Iverson, 199 Cal. 582, 586-587 [250 P. 681]; Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 642, 643 [192 P. 442, 21 A.L.R. 1172].) Where the Legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular subject matter, its intent with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local regulation is not to be measured alone by the language used but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme. (Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 29 Cal.2d at p. 666; Pipoly v. Benson, supra, 20 Cal.2d at 371-373; Ex parte Daniels, supra, 183 Cal. at p. 642-643.)
We are satisfied that the Legislature intended to occupy this particular field of legislation by enacting
No question is raised as to petitioners’ loyalty or as to their qualifications to teach, and they are entitled to a writ directing respondents to issue to each of petitioners a letter of appointment to his post on the faculty of the university upon his taking the oath now required of all public employees by the Levering Act. (See Fraser v. Regents of University of California, post, p. 717 [249 P.2d 283].)
Let a writ of mandate issue for the limited purpose above indicated.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Pockman v. Leonard, this day filed, ante, p. 688 [249 P.2d 267], I would issue a writ of mandate as prayed for in the petition.