560 P.2d 1127 | Utah | 1977
Donald V. Tolman sued the defendants, K-Mart Enterprises and Jeff T. Dong, its Security Officer, charging that the defendants “falsely arrested . . . and maliciously detained and imprisoned . . .” him in connection with an incident at the K-Mart store in Orem. Defendants answered, relying on the authorization to detain persons suspected of shoplifting provid
On November 16, 1974, plaintiff went in the defendant’s store to buy a can of auto body putty. He noticed that the price on the cans had been increased by sticking another tag thereon. He peeled off the higher price tag, went to the checkout stand and paid the lower price. The Security Officer, defendant Jeff Dong, detained and questioned him; then took him to the Orem City jail. An hour and a half later he was released on bail.
At his trial for this offense in the Orem City Court on February 25, 1975, plaintiff was found not guilty.
, Plaintiff’s principal attack upon the judgment is that the “false arrest” aspect of his action is distinct from false imprisonment. He urges that the one year limitation just referred to therefore does not apply, but that his action therefore falls into the “catch-all” provision of actions “not otherwise provided for by law” in Section' 78-12-25(2) U.C.A.1952.
Solution to the problem thus presented is found in looking to the basic nature of the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s right. So viewed it will be seen as a claim of wrongful imposition of control over his freedom of movement, and thus comes within the framework of the fundamental tort of false imprisonment,
Corroborative of the idea that “false arrest” is but an aspect of false imprisonment within the meaning of our limitation statutes is the fact that Sec. 78—12—29(4) U.C.A. 1953 appears to cover the various invasions of personal liberty.
Plaintiff makes the further contention that if it be assumed, as we have just concluded above, that the one year statute is applicable, it did not begin to run until February 25, 1975, when he was acquitted of the charge, thus only ten months before he commenced this action. With that proposition we do not agree. The general rule is that a statute limiting the time in which an action may be brought begins to run when the cause of action arises.
Consistent with what has been said herein, it is our conclusion that the trial court correctly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Affirmed. Costs to defendant (respondent).
. Mildon v. Bybee, 13 Utah 2d 400, 375 P.2d 458 (1962) and authorities cited therein.
. That the authorities generally affirm that the basic tort is false imprisonment and that false arrest is but a specialized circumstance that may be involved therein, see Prosser on Torts (4th Ed.1971), Section 11, p. 42, 45-46; Alsup v. Skaggs Drug Centers, 203 Okl. 525, 223 P.2d 530 (1950); Price v. Phillips, 90 N.J.Super. 480, 218 A.2d 167 (1966); Collins v. City of San Francisco, 50 Cal.App.3d 671, 123 Cal.Rptr. 525 (1975).
. Sec. 78-12-29(4), U.C.A.1953, * * * “An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment or seduction.”
. 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 108.
. 32 Am.Jur.2d, False Imprisonment, Section 85; 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 175; Belflower v. Blackshere, 281 P.2d 423, 49 A.L.R.2d 917 (Okl.1955).