Leon Toilette was indicted for malice murder, armed robbery, and other crimes, stemming from the shooting death of John Hamilton, a Brinks employee who, at the time, was picking up cash from a SouthTrust bank. The State served written notice of intent to seek the death penalty. On the first day of jury selection, Toilette pled guilty to one count each of malice murder, felony murder, armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and to two counts of aggravated assault. 1 At the conclusion of the sentencing trial, the jury *101 fixed the sentence for malice murder at death after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Toilette committed the murder during the commission of the capital felony of armed robbery and that he committed the murder for the purpоse of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value. See OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (2) and (4). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1. The trial evidence established that Xavier Wommack had been planning a crime in Columbus, Georgia, and he invited Toilette to travel from Los Angeles, California, to join him. When Toilette arrived in Columbus, he and Wommack, along with a third man, Jakeith Robinson, finalized plans for the armed robbеry of an armored truck. On December 21, 1995, the group followed a Brink’s armored truck to the SouthTrust bank. Toilette sat waiting with a newspaper near the bank, Wommack stood guard across the street, and Robinson sat ready as the getaway driver. As victim John Hamilton returned from the bank to the Brink’s truck with a money bag, Toilette approached Hamilton from behind and then fired at close range into his head, back, and legs, killing him. Carl Crane, the driver of the Brink’s truck, and Cornell Christianson, the driver of a nearby Lummus Fargo truck, chased Toilette and fired shots at him as he fled with the money bag; Toilette returned fire at his pursuers. Wommack fired shots from across the street to aid in Toilette’s escape; however, Wommack and Robinson ultimately drove away without Toilette. Robert Oliver, a police technician, responded to the radio call of a detective at the scene. When confronted by Oliver, Toilette attempted to fire at him and at a cadet who accompanied him, but all of the bullets in Toilette’s revolver were already spent. Toilette threw down his revolver and surrendered.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the statutory aggravating circumstances in this case.
Jackson v. Virginia,
*102 Voir Dire Proceedings
2. Toilette contends that the trial court violated the mandate of
Morgan v. Illinois,
3. Toilette argues that the trial court erred by refusing to excuse prospective jurors Glover, Grillo, Bigbee, Weekly, Wadsworth, Tillman, Bauer, Bone, and Wiggins based on their views of the sentencing options in a death penаlty case. Toilette, similarly, complains that the trial court erred by excusing jurors Sankey, Bell, and Vining, over his objection, based on the court’s determination that these jurors evidenced an inability or unwillingness to consider a death sentence.
Upon a proper motion, a juror should be excused based on his or her views on the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, or life imprisonment with the possibility of parole if “the juror’s views would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ”
Greene v. State,
4. Pretermitting the State’s argument that Toilettе has not preserved the issue for appeal, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing prospective juror Laney based on a showing that he was a federal bankruptcy judge, that notice for various parties to appear before him during the week of Toilette’s trial had already been sent out, and that his access to an available courtroom was limited. See OCGA§ 15-12-1 (a);
McClain v. State,
*103
5. The trial court properly excused prospective juror Butler because the juror was the second cousin of Jakeith Robinson, Toilette’s co-indictee.
Cambron v. State,
Sentencing Trial
6. The widow of the victim testified that “the grief [the victim’s mother] carried over the murder of her son indirectly led to her death.” A co-worker of the victim described the murder as “senseless, explicit, and apparently ruled by greed” and as showing “a blatant disregard for human life.” Toilette waived his right to complain on appeal regarding this testimony, because he failed to object during the trial proceedings. See
Earnest v. State,
7. Toilette argues that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to hear portions of his confession wherein he referred to his own gang affiliation. He has waived his right to raise this claim on appeal, however, by failing to raise this issue before the trial court.
Earnest,
Pretermitting whether the State was required to give pretrial notice of its intent to use Toilette’s confession as non-statutory aggravating evidence at his sentencing trial, which confession would have been admissible in the guilt/innocence phase of his overall trial had he not pled guilty on the first day of jury selection, we find that he waived his right to complain about the lack of notice by failing to object.
Whatley v. State,
8. Toilette argues that he is entitled to a new trial based on various allegedly improper closing arguments made by the prosecutor to which no objections were raised at trial. Toilette argues that he preserved his current objections to the prosecutor’s allegedly improper arguments through a pretrial motion. Although we have held that an adverse ruling by a trial court to a motion in limine seeking to limit a specific argument at trial serves to presеrve the issue of the argument’s propriety for appellate review, see
Carruthers v. State,
(a) Toilette argues that the prosecutor improperly stated in his closing argument that a portion of Toilette’s confession suggested his involvement in other robberies. Toilette contends that the issue of this allegedly improper argument is preserved for appeal because it falls within the mandate of OCGA § 17-8-75: “Where counsel in the hearing of the jury make statements of prejudicial matters which are not in evidence, it is the duty of the court to interpose and prevent the same.” Pretermitting whether a waiver occurred, we note that the argument in question did not violate the statute, because it simply urged the jury tо draw a reasonable inference from Toilette’s statement. See
Waldrip v. State,
(b) Toilette acknowledges that a prosecutor may argue the deterrent effect of a death sentence, see
Pace v. State,
(c) During his closing argument, the prosecutor argued that “thе just punishment under a lot of religions would be death for what [Toilette did].” This argument was improper in that it emphasized the mandates of various, although unspecified, religions. See
Carruthers,
9. Toilette complains about the prosecutor’s reference to the possibility that Toilette waved at or blew a kiss at one of the victim’s children as he or she left the witness stand. Toilette also asserts that *105 the prosecutor improperly argued that “ [government supported, taxpayer funded, taxpayer maintained” prison was “too good” for Toilette. However, because the trial court sustained Tоilette’s objections to these arguments, he suffered no harm, even assuming the arguments were improper.
10. The prosecutor argued as follows:
I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, prison is too good for this defendant. Prison for the rest of his life, prison for seven years and re-paroled, prison for whatever.
Toilette objected to this reference to “how many years” might pass before Toilette would be eligible for parole. The likelihood of parole is an improper subject matter for argument by counsel, except for the limited exception allowing counsel to refer to the significance of life without parole and life with eligibility for parole as those meanings are set out in OCGA§ 17-10-31.1 (d).
See McClain,
11. In a pretrial hearing, the prosecution presented the victim impact evidence it intended to present at trial, including a short videotape of the victim alive in various settings. See
Turner v. State,
12. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in replaying Toilette’s audiotaped confession for the jury in open court upon the jury’s request.
Roberts v. State,
Toilette also complains that the jury had the audiotape of his confession in the jury room during their deliberations. See
Fields v. State,
13. Toilette claims that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. To prevail in his claim, Toilette must demonstrate both that his counsel performed deficiently under constitutional standards and that the deficiency in reasonable probability chаnged the outcome of his trial.
Strickland v. Washington,
Toilette outlines the testimony and evidence presented by the State at trial and complains that “hardly any objections” were raised by trial counsel; however, this generalized complaint fails entirely to set out what particular aspects of counsel’s performance were deficient and why. His allegation that the trial court “had to rescuе the defense attorney” by excluding sua sponte certain victim impact testimony the prosecutor had planned to present obviously cannot show that Toilette was prejudiced, as that testimony was never heard by the jury.
Toilette complains that his trial counsel did not prepare adequate mitigation evidence. Toilette’s lead counsel testified that he was appointed to Toilette’s case more than a year before trial, *107 interviewed potential witnesses, arranged for a mental health examination by a pair of psychologists, arranged for an examination by a neuropsychologist, hired a “mitigation specialist,” consulted with lawyers expert in death penalty cases, and obtained and weighed the usefulness of school and prison rеcords. Counsel did not believe that the psychological experts offered anything helpful to Toilette’s case, and, in counsel’s appraisal, Toilette’s school and prison records were also unhelpful.
The investigation by counsel and the mitigation specialist led to a conclusion that Toilette’s mother and one of his sisters could offer helpful testimony. Although Toilette’s mother testified at trial, Toilette argues that counsel performed deficiently by failing to secure the attendance of his sister through an interstate subpoena. See OCGA § 24-10-91 et seq. Pretermitting the question of whether counsel’s failure to compel the attendance of the witness has been shown to be deficient performance, we conclude that Toilette did not suffer sufficient prejudice to warrant relief. The only testimony in the hearing on the motion for new trial regarding the content of the sister’s potential testimony showed that it would have been merely a “reiteration of the mother’s testimony.”
Toilette notes with disapproval that his lead counsel stated in his closing argument, “I have great loathing for my own client.” However, as trial counsel’s testimony in the motion for new trial hearing indicаted, this statement was made as part of a strategy to appear “credible to the jury.” Counsel’s argument continued by emphasizing that the jury was not required to impose a death sentence in order to “keep [Toilette] out of society” and encouraging the jurors not to impose a death sentence so that they would not “always think of [themselves] as someone who put anothеr person to death when [they] didn’t have to.” We find that trial counsel’s strategy in forging his overall argument was not unreasonable under the circumstances of the case.
Having reviewed Toilette’s arguments and the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Toilette’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
14. The evidence in this case shows that Toilette carеfully planned his crimes and killed without mercy for monetary gain. We conclude, considering both the crime and the defendant, that the death sentence imposed for the murder in this case was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalties imposed in similar cases in Georgia. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (3). The cases cited in the Appendix support this finding in that each also involved an intеntional killing in furtherance of an armed robbery or an intentional killing committed for the purpose of receiving money or other things of value. See OCGA§ 17-10-35 (e).
15. We find that Toilette’s death sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other аrbitrary factor. See OCGA § 17-10-35 (c) (1).
Judgment affirmed.
Appendix.
Perkinson v. State,
Notes
Toilette committed the crimes on December 21, 1995; he was indicted by a Muscogee County grand jury on March 19, 1996, and was re-indicted on August 5, 1996. The State filed written notices of its intent to seek the death penalty on March 21,1996, and on September 27,
*101
1996. The trial court properly merged the felony murder charge into the malice murder charge by operation of law. See
Malcolm v. State,