Wе granted these discretionary appeals to address the issue of whether under OCGA § 34-9-206, a motor vehicle personal injury protection (“PIP”) carrier which covered certain medical expenses of the claimant, can be a party at interest to a workers’ compensation claim.
The claimant, Roy Kirk, filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits alleging an injury which arose in the course of his employment with his statutory employers Jackie Smith d/b/a Smith Trucking Company, George Smith d/b/a Smith Logging Company and Tolleson Lumber Company, Inc. While the claim was pending, Smith Truсking Company’s PIP carrier, Southern General Insurance Company (“Southern General”), covered medical expenses incurred by claimant. Subsequently, the ALJ entered an order stating that upon request, Southern General was added as a party at interest to the claim. The original partiеs, claimant, his employers and their respective insurers, filed a joint objection to the joinder of Southern General as a party in interest on the grounds that OCGA § 34-9-206 only provided for joinder of a group insurance company or “other health care
1. Appellants first contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the full board did not have authority to approve the settlement while Southern General’s appeal of the ALJ’s decision dismissing Southern General as a party was pending before the full board. As an interested party, Southern General would have had the right to move for a hearing in the claimant’s case. Also, under Rule 15 (a) Southern General would have been included in the caption to the settlement agreement; therefore, Southern General could have made known to the board that it sought reimbursement for medical expenses paid on behalf of the claimant. Althоugh the board in its discretion may have approved the settlement in spite of any objection it may have had to it, we conclude that the board’s approval of the settlement while Southern General’s appeal was pending deprived Southern General of any meaningful oрportunity to exercise its rights as a party at interest. Therefore, we find appellant’s first enumeration of error to be without merit.
2. Appellants next contend that the superior court erred in concluding that Southern General should be included as a party at interest within the meaning of OCGA § 34-9-206 (a). Priоr to the 1990 amendment, which is not applicable in this case, OCGA § 34-9-206 (a) provided: “A group insurance company or other health care provider who covers the costs of medical treatment for a person who subsequently files a claim under this chapter may give notice in writing to
Appellants also argue that the statute only appliеs when the workers’ compensation claim is filed subsequent to the payment of medical benefits by the other health care provider. Under appellants’ construction of the statute, a provider who covers the costs of medical expenses for a person before that person files a workers’ compensation claim, cannot recover even if the provider had no knowledge that the persоn had filed a claim. We believe that such a construction would lead to unreasonable results. “ ‘(I)n construing [a] statute so as to give effect tо the legislative intent a mere segment of the statute should not be lifted out of context and construed without consideration of all the other рarts of the statute.’ [Cit.]” Mansfield v. Pannell,
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Judgments affirmed.