Defendant was tried before a jury on a multi-count indictment for sexually molesting his step-child and found guilty on five counts of committing separate acts of child molestation. This appeal followed. Held-.
1. Defendant “contends that OCGA § 24-3-16 is violative of the right to confrontation under the Federal Constitution [and the State Constitution]. The statute is not сonstitutionally deficient in the manners complained of.
Sosebee v. State,
2. Next, defendant contends the “trial court erred in allowing the *481 jury to consider statements [he] made [while in police custody] which were not voluntarily made when considered in the totality of the circumstances.” Specifically, defendant аsserts he was confused during the police interrogation because he “is Cuban [and] speaks with a heavy Hispanic accent, and it is obvious from his written statement аnd his testimony . . . that his grammar is far from perfect.” To this extent, defendant argues that the jury misunderstood his statement to an interrogating officer that a relative had just advised him (during а telephone conversation from police headquarters) “not to admit to anything or make any deals.” Defendant also argues that the following custodial statement was taken out of context and likewise subjected the jury to misunderstanding: “I am not guilty for what [the victim] has said. I don’t know why she said this. [The victim’s] report cards are getting wоrse and worse. We try to talk to her and she just goes into her room. Last night she was in the house with that boy, all kinds of ... I don’t know if she’s got problems all over the place. I don’t think I dаmaged [the victim] where she should put me in jail. She’s been damaged, but not by me.”
“ ‘Unless clearly erroneous, a trial court’s factual determinations relating to the credibility of witnesses and the admissibility of confessions will be upheld on appeal.’ (Cits.)
(Dampier v. State,
3. Contrary to defendant’s third enumeration, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting two photographs depicting the victim at her mother’s wedding to defendant. These photographs were taken fоur years before defendant’s trial (at a time when the victim was nine years of age) and reflect the victim’s immature physical development. The victim testified that defendant began sexually molesting her soon after her mother’s wedding to defendant. Under these circumstances, the photographs were relevant to show the viсtim’s immature physical development at the time defendant allegedly began molesting the victim. See
Guess v. State,
4. In his fourth enumeration, defendant contends the “trial court errеd in allowing testimony by the State’s witnesses which tended to indicate bad character, where [defendant] had not opened the door to such testimony.” Defendant сites three separate “assignments of error [in the argument supporting this enumeration] in violation of OCGA § 5-6-40. When, as here, [an] appellant asserts more than one error within a single enumeration, this court in its discretion may elect to review none, or one or more, of the errors asserted within the single enumeration.
Wilson v. Southern R. Co.,
Even though it does not appear any of the evidentiary rulings challenged in this enumeration provide a basis for new trial, we elect to review defendant’s first assertion that thе trial court erred in allowing a witness to testify that defendant informed her “[t]hat if I did all this to [the victim] that they’re saying I did, ... I don’t remember it [because] I was either drunk or stoned at the time.” “We find no error in admitting this voluntary statement into evidence. Further, we find that if it placed [defendant’s] character in issue it did so only incidentally. Finally, the statement was not inаdmissible as hearsay because it was at least implicitly an admission against interest.”
Satterfield v. State,
5. Defendant contends in his fifth enumeration that “[t]he trial court erred in denying [his] Motions for Mistrial and in overruling [his] objections to the admission of improper testimony by sevеral of the State’s witnesses.” Again, defendant violates OCGA § 5-6-40 by asserting three separate assignments of error in the argument supporting this enumeration. Nonetheless, we have examined all three contentions and find that “even if there was error it was nevertheless
*483
harmless, since the remaining evidence against [defendant] was overwhelming and it is highly probable that [the errors asserted in this enumeration] did not contribute to the judgment,
Johnson v. State,
6. Defendant complains the trial court erred in refusing to strike two prospective jurors for cause, arguing that he was forced to use two peremptory strikes to exclude these jurors. The first prospective juror indicated affirmatively when defense counsel asked, “is it possible . . . you may be bias or more sympathetic toward . . .” the alleged victim since she “is very near the age of your own сhildren. . . .” The second prospective juror informed defense counsel that she “hated” a deceased uncle for sexually molesting her sister.
“ ‘ “ ‘In order to disqualify a juror for cause, it must be established that the juror’s opinion was so fixed and definite that it would not be changed by the evidence or the charge of the court upon the evidence. (Cit.)’ (Cit.)”
Chancey v. State,
7. Defendant contends the trial court’s charge on voluntary intoxication wаs prejudicial because he did not rely on intoxication as a defense. This contention is without merit as there was ample evidence to support a сharge on voluntary intoxication.
Robinson v. State,
8. In his final enumeration, defendant contends the “trial court erred in failing to charge on sexual assault and sexual battery as lessеr included charges [to the olfenses of child molestation].” This
*484
enumeration presents nothing for review as defendant did not submit written requests to charge on either “sexual assault or sexual battery.”
Cavender v. State,
Judgment affirmed.