Toledo v. HancockToledo v. Hancock
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John T. Madigan, Special Prosecutor, for appellee.
Martin J. McManus, for appellant.
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HANDWORK, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, Lawrence Hancock, Sr., appeals from a judgment by the Toledo Municipal Court denying his
{¶ 3} The evidence adduced at the trial, by the city of Toledo, was as follows. L.J.‘s maternal grandmother, Tempie McConnell, testified that on several occasions during the second half of April 2009, when she picked up L.J. from appellant‘s house for court-ordered visitations, she noticed bruising on L.J.‘s body. Specifically, between the dates of April 21 and April 30, 2009, McConnell noticed bruises on L.J.‘s backside, thighs, arm, and back, and, most seriously, in his groin area.
{¶ 4} On April 24, 2009, McConnell notified L.J.‘s guardian ad litem of her grandson‘s bruised condition. A week later, she took L.J. to the doctor, because he was bothered by a painful swelling in his thighs. McConnell stated that she observed that L.J. was not able to climb steps very well, and that he was not able to run as fast as before.
{¶ 5} Sara Magoun, M.D., L.J.‘s doctor, testified that upon examination of L.J., she noticed bruising over the areas of his left thigh, his mid lower back and his groin area, and an abrasion on his right arm. According to Dr. Magoun, the pattern of L.J.‘s injuries was consistent with his being hit by a belt. She stated that he had a significant groin injury which left enough bruising to make him uncomfortable for days after the injury was inflicted. She stated that the abrasion on L.J.‘s right arm was likewise significant and contributed to her opinion that L.J.‘s injuries amounted to serious physical harm.
{¶ 7} At the end of the prosecution‘s case, counsel for appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to
{¶ 8} The trial court denied the motion, after which appellant took the stand and testified as follows. Appellant stated that he hit L.J. to punish him for misbehavior, specifically for lying. He further stated that when he hit L.J., he had the buckle in his hand, and that the only part of the belt that hit the child was the strap. He admitted to using the belt on his son approximately ten times.
{¶ 9} On March 9, 2010, the court issued and filed a written “Finding and Opinion,” finding appellant guilty of child endangerment under
{¶ 10} In addition, the court found that “[t]he physical harm caused in this case was unwarranted in that it involved, in the Court‘s opinion, a minor transgression at best. The child, L.J., was four years of age. The whipping with a belt causing the injuries
{¶ 11} Appellant timely filed an appeal, raising the following as his sole assignment of error:
{¶ 12} I. “The trial court committed reversible error in denying appellant‘s motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to Criminal Rule 29.”
{¶ 13} Under
{¶ 14} “An appellate court‘s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶ 16} “No person, being the parent * * * of a child under eighteen * * * shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of such child.”
{¶ 17} The offense of endangering children contains an additional element, not found in the ordinance, and that is the culpable mental state of recklessness. See State v. O‘Brien (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 122, 125.
{¶ 18} Recklessness is defined at
{¶ 19} “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.”
{¶ 20} Any rational trier of fact could have found that appellant recklessly created a substantial risk to the health or safety of L.J., when, in the course of disciplining his child, he struck L.J. in the groin and other areas of his body, leaving him with bruises and abrasions of such severity that the boy was unable to run or climb stairs for days afterward without experiencing pain. Consequently, appellant‘s conviction for child endangering must be affirmed.
{¶ 22} Case law addressing
{¶ 23} Arguing to the contrary, appellant relies on State v. Kamel (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 306. In Kamel, the defendant was found guilty of one count of endangering children, under
{¶ 24} The Ohio Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeals decision, stated:
{¶ 25} “By [the defendant‘s] own testimony, [the defendant, who was a physician] personally examined his son in his final hours. Yet, no steps were taken by [the defendant] to secure medical attention for his son or prevent any further injury to him. Certainly, this was not consistent with his parental duty of care.” Id. at 309-310.
{¶ 26} Thus, the Supreme Court‘s decision, unlike the one at hand, was clearly based upon evidence of an omission, or failure to act, rather than a commission, or affirmative act. In determining that the evidence in that case was sufficient to support a conviction under
{¶ 27} “It is not necessary to show an actual instance or pattern of physical abuse on the part of the accused in order to justify a conviction under
{¶ 28} We find that the court‘s analysis in Kamel was specifically aimed at justifying a conviction resulting from the defendant‘s acts of omission in that particular case. We do not read it to mean that
{¶ 29} For all of the foregoing reasons, appellant‘s assignment of error is found not well-taken, and the judgment of the Toledo Municipal Court is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Peter M. Handwork, J. _______________________________ JUDGE
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. _______________________________ JUDGE
Arlene Singer, J. JUDGE
CONCUR. _______________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/rod/newpdf/?source=6.