аfter making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
This decree must be affirmed. The contention that the waters covering the submerged part of the lands claimed under lease by thе Erie Shooting Club are navigable, and therefore subject to the public right of navigation, is not supported by the evidence in this record. The fact that this so-called “bay” was surveyed and platted as swamp land by the govеrnment affords a strong presumption against the navigability of the water thereon. This survey was under the authority of thе government, which subsequently conveyed the lands so platted to the slate of Michigan as swamp lands, under thе act of September, 1850, known as the “Swamp Land Act.” That the state subsequently conveyed them is a further circumstance tending to establish that no public easement had or could exist therein by reason of the navigаbility of the waters thereon.
Just where the so-called “bay” opens into the lake, at its southeast end, there is water navigable for ordinary commercial purposes. This channel rapidly shallows as the bay is penetrated. From a line drawn
None of the characteristics of commercial navigability are shown here. It is the natural feeding ground of the duck and оther water fowl. In their pursuit by canoe and fiat-bottomed ducking boats the water may be navigated. That is not commerce, .and proves nothing. The same test would convert every pond and swamp capable of floating a boat into a navigable stream or lake. This bay is not a highway, never has been, and can never be. At the common law the term “navigable” had a technical meaning, and was applied to all strеams or bodies of water in which the tide ebbed and flowed. All such waters were public. That definition is not applicable in this country, and all waters are held navigable in law, and subject to a public use, which are by their character capable of use as highways, for purposes useful to trade or agriculture. It is the cаpability of being navigated for useful purposes, which is the test. Gould, Waters, § 54, and cases cited; Barney v. Keokuk,
In the case of The Montello, cited above, the court said:
“The capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a river-, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be capаble in its natural state of- being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the commеrce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public river or*683 highway. Vessels of any kind that can lioat upon the water, whether pro-lielled hy animal power, by the wind, or by the agency of stеam, are. or may become the mode by which a vast commerce can be conducted; and it wоuld be a mischievous rule that would exclude either in determining the navigability of a river. It is not, however, as Chief Justicе Shaw said, ‘every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe can be made to float at high water, which is deеmed navigable; but, in order to give it the character of a. navigable stream, it must be generally and commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture.’ ”
If this is a private property, it must follow that appellants have no right to trespass thereon. Their own property being inaccessible, save by going over that of appellee, entitles them to a way of necessity. That they obtained by the decree below. Decree affirmed,
